1. Plaintiff, respondent herein, filed a civil suit in the Court of Sub Judge (Small Causes), Srinagar for grant of decree of mandatory injunction, which was decreed vide judgment dated 31.05.2004. The trial court while returning finding on issue no.2 has held that plaintiff-respondent has proved by leading evidence that he was working as a Daily Wager as on 31.03.1994 and thus has completed seven years of service as a Daily Wager. It is apt to reproduce relevant portion of the judgment herein. "The averments of the defendants that actually the list prepared by them i.e. annexure p4 was that of casual labourers appears to be doubtful. On the other hand, the plea of the plaintiff that he has completed seven years of service as a daily wager as on 31.03.1994 has been substantiated by the evidence on record and their seems nothing on record to over-shadow the same and so the court has no reason to disbelieve his contention. Therefore, issue No.1 stands proved and is hence decided in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants." 2. Feeling aggrieved the appellants-defendants questioned the same by the medium of civil first appeal. The first appellate court dismissed the same while holding that plaintiff-respondent has proved that he is working as a Daily Wager and has completed seven years of service, thus is entitled to regularization of services in terms of SRO 64 of 1994. It is apt to reproduce the relevant portion of the judgment herein. "In fact the matter has been dealt with elaborately while taking up issue no.2 viz-a-viz the claim of the plaintiff and objection raised by defendants regarding his status as such this court has no hesitation to hold that in fact the plaintiff being a daily rated employee has every right to get his services regularized in terms of SRO 64 of 1994. Hence no irregularity or impropriety has been found in the trial court finding viz-a-viz thie issue as well." 3. Feeling aggrieved the appellants have filed the civil second appeal. The only question raised by the appellants-defendants is that the plaintiff-respondent was working as a casual labourer and not a daily wager. 4. At this stage learned counsel for appellants stated at the Bar that the trial court as well as the 1st appellate court have not appreciated the evidence in its right perspective. 5. The only question raised by the appellants-defendants is that the plaintiff-respondent was working as a casual labourer and not a daily wager. 4. At this stage learned counsel for appellants stated at the Bar that the trial court as well as the 1st appellate court have not appreciated the evidence in its right perspective. 5. I have gone through the judgment and am of the considered view that both the courts below have rightly appreciated the evidence while holding that the plaintiff-respondent was working as a Daily Wager and has completed seven years of service as on 31.03.1994. Further, this is a question of fact and cannot be said to be a substantial question of law in view of the judgment passed by this Court in Abdul Ahad Dar v. Rasool Dar, 2007 (11) SLJ 779:2007 (2) JKJ HC-282, paragraph 10 whereof reads as under: "10. Second appeal can be filed only when substantial question(s) of law is/are involved. Right of second appeal is neither natural nor inherent but it is a statutory right and is to be regulated in accordance with the law and in accordance with the mandate of section 100 of Civil Procedure Code. The finding of fact cannot be interfered with in second appeal. The second appeal is to be heard only on substantial question of law. The purpose and rationale behind the provisions of Section 100 of Civil Procedure Code is that there must be some finality and certainty." 6. The Apex Court in Gurdev Kaur v. Kaki, AIR 2006 SCW 2404 has also laid down how to entertain second appeal, paragraphs 68, 69 & 70 whereof read as under: "68. The analysis of cases decided by the Privy Council and this Court prior to 1976 clearly indicated the scope of interference under Section 100 C.P.C by this Court. Even prior to amendment, the consistent position has been that the Courts should not interfere with the concurrent findings of facts. 69. Now, after 1976 Amendment, the scope of Section 100 has been drastically curtailed and narrowed down. The High Courts would have jurisdiction of interfering under Section 100 C.P.C only in a case where substantial questions of law are involved and those questions have been clearly formulated in the memorandum of appeal. 69. Now, after 1976 Amendment, the scope of Section 100 has been drastically curtailed and narrowed down. The High Courts would have jurisdiction of interfering under Section 100 C.P.C only in a case where substantial questions of law are involved and those questions have been clearly formulated in the memorandum of appeal. At the time of admission of the second appeal, it is the bounden duty and obligation of the High Court to formulate substantial questions of law and then only the High Court is permitted to proceed with the case to decide those questions of law. The language used in the amended section specifically incorporates the words as "substantial question of law" which is indicative of the legislative intention. It must be clearly understood that the legislative intention was very clear that legislature never wanted second appeal to become "third trial on fact" or "one more dice in the gamble". The effect of the amendment mainly, according to the amended section, was:- (i) The High Court would be justified in admitting the second appeal only when a substantial question of law is involved. (ii) The substantial question of law to precisely state such question; (iii) A duty has been cast on the High Court to formulate substantial question of law before hearing the appeal; (iv) Another part of the Section is that the appeal shall be heard only on that question. 70. The fact that, in a series of cases this Court was compelled to interfere was because the true legislative intendment and scope of Section 100 C.P.C have neither been appreciated nor applied. A class of judges while administering law honestly believe that, if they are satisfied that, in any second appeal brought before them evidence has been grossly mis-appreciated either by the lower appellate court or by both the courts below, it is their duty to interfere, because they seem to feel that a decree following upon a gross mis-appreciation of evidence involves injustice and it is the duty of the High Court to redress such injustice. We would like to reiterate that the justice has to be administered in accordance with law." 7. Viewed thus, this appeal fails and is, accordingly, dismissed along with all CMPs.