Order 1. Heard counsel Shri S. Gadodia appearing on behalf of the petitioner and Shri Ajit Kumar, Additional Advocate General on behalf of the State Respondent. 2. The controversy in the instant writ petition is regarding Memo No. 2869 dated 24.12.2010 (Annexure2 to the writ petition), whereby the petitioner's claim for grant of interest subsidy under the Jharkhand Industrial Policy 2001, has been rejected for the financial years 200607 and 200708, on the ground of limitation. The petitioner has also challenged the validity of Clause 4.3 (Gha) 1 & 2 of the Jharkhand Industrial Incentive Rules, 2003 (hereinafter referred to as 'Rules'). 3. The specific assertion on behalf of the petitioner is that these Rules amount to curtailment of the spirit and essence of the Policy i.e. Jharkhand Industrial Policy 2001, hence, amounts to exercise of excessive power and defies the intent of Industrial Policy 2001 itself. The respondents, by means of the impugned Memo No. 2869 dated 24.12.2010 issued by Respondent No. 3, rejected the claim of the petitioner for the year 200607 to be barred by 1 year 13 days and for the year 200708 by 13 days. The facts of the case are as follows : The petitioner is a new Industrial Unit established pursuant to the Jharkhand Industrial Policy 2001 and it is engaged in manufacture of M.S. Wire and M.S. Nail. The date of commercial production of the petitioner unit is 07.02.2004. As per the Industrial Policy 2001, particularly Clause 29.5, the petitioner was entitled for interest subsidy for a period of five years. “29.5. Interest Subsidy The objective of providing this subsidy is to bring down interest cost of industry for the period an industry is in its teething stage and most hard pressed. This subsidy is aimed to encourage industry's continuous growth rather than stagnate and also contribute its share of prosperity to the state. The interest subsidy admissible to new industries shall be admissible in the following manner on the interest actually paid to the financial institutions/banks on loans taken by such new industry: Sl. Incentive Category Maximum Financial Limits (Lakhs) No. % Incentive 1. Interest A 25 The subsidy shall be limited Subsidy B 50 to a sum of Rs. The interest subsidy admissible to new industries shall be admissible in the following manner on the interest actually paid to the financial institutions/banks on loans taken by such new industry: Sl. Incentive Category Maximum Financial Limits (Lakhs) No. % Incentive 1. Interest A 25 The subsidy shall be limited Subsidy B 50 to a sum of Rs. 100 lakhs C 60 annum provided the total interest subsidy shall not exceed 2% of the total sales amount made in the State of Jharkhand and/or in course of interstate sales as supported by the certificate/document issued by the commercial tax authority. This subsidy shall be admissible for a period of 5 years for all categories of industries from the date of commercial production. The petitioner was entitled for interest subsidy for the financial years 200405 to 200809 (financial years 200607 and 200708 in the instant case). Applications were filed by the petitioner before the General Manager, District Industries Centre, Giridih and its claim was duly examined, vide Annexure1 of the writ petition, recommendation was made for payment of interest subsidy amounting to Rs. 2,77,217/in favour of the petitioner for the aforesaid two years. The claim of interest subsidy was rejected on the ground that as per the Jharkhand Industrial Incentive Rules, 2003, particularly Clause 4.3(Gha) 1, it was barred by time and the delay for the year 200607 and 200708 was 1 year 13 days and 13 days respectively. The State of Jharkhand framed Jharkhand Industrial Incentive Rules 2003. In the said Rules, particularly Rule 4.3 (Gha) 1 & 2, provision for limitation for making claim application was provided. Rule 4.3 (Gha) 1 & 2 is quoted below : 'Gha' Samay Sima 1. Ichchuk ikaiyon ko sabhi dristikon se purn vanchhit kagjaton ke sath apne dave kisi vittiya sal ki samapti ke chha mah ke bhitar samarpit karna aniwarya hoga. 2.6 (Chha) mah se adhik ki awadhi ko kshant karne ki shakti Uddyog Nideshak me nihit hogi. Isse adhik ke samay sima ko kshant karne ki shakti Sachiv Uddyog me nihit hogi. The aforesaid Rule provides that the units claiming subsidy shall submit their documents and application for grant of subsidy within a period of six months from the date the financial year comes to an end. Isse adhik ke samay sima ko kshant karne ki shakti Sachiv Uddyog me nihit hogi. The aforesaid Rule provides that the units claiming subsidy shall submit their documents and application for grant of subsidy within a period of six months from the date the financial year comes to an end. Further, the Director, Industry was entitled to condone the delay, if claim is submitted within six months of expiry of limitation and the Industrial Secretary had the authority to condone the period of limitation, if claim was submitted beyond the period of aforesaid six months. The respondents in exercise of the said Rules rejected the claim of the petitioner on the ground of limitation. 4. Submission of the learned counsel challenging the aforesaid order is firstly, that the period of limitation as prescribed under the Rules cannot curtail the substantive right already accrued in favour of the petitioner under the Jharkhand Industrial Policy. Emphasis is on Clause 29.5 prescribing the conditions for claim of interest subsidy. Conditions for claiming interest subsidy under Clause 29.5 of the Jharkhand Industrial Policy 2001, is quoted herein under : (i) The Industry should be a new Industry. (ii) As per category of Industry, the maximum incentive payable would be 25%, 50% and 60% respectively of the total interest paid by the Industry to its Banker. (iii) The subsidy shall be limited to a maximum sum of Rs. 100.00 lakh. (iv) The total subsidy shall not exceed 2% of the total sales amount made in the State of Jharkhand and/or in course of interState sales. (v) Certificate/document issued by the competent Commercial Taxes authority should be submitted for the purpose of determination of the aforesaid sales amount of 2%. (vi) The subsidy shall be admissible for a period of 5 years from the date of commercial production of the Industry. 5. Learned counsel Shri S. Gadodia has vehemently argued that a bare perusal of the aforesaid Clause, it would be evident that no period of limitation was prescribed for claiming the amount of interest subsidy under the Policy itself. Clause 36.2 of the Jharkhand Industrial Policy 2001 was placed before me to emphasize that though the power was conferred upon the respective departments and institutions of the State Government only as a followup action, but not to curb the intention of the policy. Clause 36.2 of the Jharkhand Industrial Policy 2001 was placed before me to emphasize that though the power was conferred upon the respective departments and institutions of the State Government only as a followup action, but not to curb the intention of the policy. Clause 36.2 of the Jharkhand Industrial Policy 2001 reads as under: “All concerned departments and institutions shall issue followup notifications to give effect to the provisions of this policy within 30 days of declaration of this policy”. 6. In view of the aforesaid provisions, learned counsel has argued that the policy did not entitle various departments to frame such Rules so as to render the policy ineffective. Further submission that 'Industrial Policy' framed by the Government is a beneficial legislation to aid the industries but not to render the industry “still born”. Thus, the provision framed by the State Government fixing a period of limitation restricts the industrial development. The very purpose of the policy stands frustrated and, therefore, submission is that the period of limitation prescribed by Rule 4.3(Gha) 1 & 2 of the Rules is beyond the scope of Industrial Policy 2001, rendering the policy redundant. 7. The alternative argument on behalf of the petitioner is that since the Rule provides period of limitation to be computed from the end of each financial year i.e. latest by 30th September. The emphasis is that the calculation of period of six months from the date on which any financial year comes to an end, therefore, claim of interest subsidy need not necessarily be made after the end of a particular financial year and, therefore, cumulative applications in respect of one and more financial years can be made together within six months of the end of last financial year. Thus, the learned counsel submits that treating the period of limitation for a particular year such as the application for 200607 barred by 1 year 13 days, is untenable and illegal. According to the learned counsel, the delay, if any, is only by 13 days since a cumulative claim was submitted at the end of the financial year 200708. 8. Counsel on behalf of the Respondent State has countered the arguments on behalf of the petitioner. Submission is that Industrial Policy and Rules stand on the same footing. According to the learned counsel, the delay, if any, is only by 13 days since a cumulative claim was submitted at the end of the financial year 200708. 8. Counsel on behalf of the Respondent State has countered the arguments on behalf of the petitioner. Submission is that Industrial Policy and Rules stand on the same footing. The policy authorized the respondents to frame Rules with a view to ensure that liberty for claim of interest subsidy should not be flouted such as in the instant case and, therefore, the procedure provided by the Rules is absolutely valid and amounts to a policy decision which cannot be quashed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Besides, the State counsel has also argued that no reason has been given explaining the delay and the respondents have rightly rejected the petitioner's claim because the only reason given was due to some 'unavoidable circumstances', the delay had occurred. Specific pleadings are essential to make out a case for condonation of delay. 9. I have given a careful considerations to the submissions made by the respective counsel, gone through the record and also the citations relied upon by the petitioner and the respondents. The controversy revolves around the question basically, whether the respondents could deprive the petitioner from grant of interest subsidy solely on the ground of limitation which is a condition laid down subsequently by the Rules framed in exercise of powers under Clause 36.2 of the Jharkhand Industrial Policy 2001. Clause 29.5 of the aforesaid Policy lays down conditions for claiming interest subsidy which are already enumerated above. In short, the policy contemplates that the industry should be a new industry and the interest subsidy can only be granted on the basis of certificate/document issued by the competent commercial tax authority and it shall not exceed 2% of the total sale amount in the State of Jharkhand. In course of interstate sale, the maximum incentive payable was 25%, 50% and 60% respectively of the total interest paid by the industry to its bank and the subsidy was limited to a maximum sum of Rs. 100 lakhs. In course of interstate sale, the maximum incentive payable was 25%, 50% and 60% respectively of the total interest paid by the industry to its bank and the subsidy was limited to a maximum sum of Rs. 100 lakhs. This was only admissible for a period of 5 years, meaning thereby the intention of the policy was to grant the interest subsidy for a period of 5 years only and that too, if the industry fulfills the conditions enumerated under Clause 29.5 of the Industrial Policy 2001. The necessary conclusion is that the subsidy was payable only to a viable industry as an encouragement and not which showed no signs of progress. The petitioner, in the instant case, has been deprived on the basis of limitation which is an additional condition imposed by the State Government in its Rules framed under Clause 36.2. 10. I proceed to examine whether such an embargo could have been imposed by the State Government? The Apex Court in the case of State of Bihar & Ors. Vs. Suprabhat Steel Ltd. & Ors., decided with other writ petitions, (1999) 1 SCC 31 , held that certain conditions imposed by the State Government restricting implementation of the Bihar Industrial Incentive Policy, 1993, was ultra vires. The court was of the view that even if the State Government is entitled to issue such notification laying down conditions on the industrial units to avail the incentives and benefits, even then the State Government cannot deny any benefit by imposing conditions which is otherwise available to the industrial units under the Incentive Policy. In the instant case, the incentive policy of 2001 does not speak about any period of limitations for claiming subsidy, the conditions for grant of interest subsidy as enumerated under Clause 29.5, is only available to such industries vis-a-vis total interest paid by industries to its bankers and to a maximum limit of 100 lakhs and would not exceed 2% of the total sale amount made in the State. The imposition of an embargo that a claim made beyond a period of six months from the date a financial year comes to an end is a condition which has left the petitioner stranded. The final rejection of the claim of the petitioner by the State Government treating it to be beyond the period of limitation amounts to curtailing the intention of the industrial policy. The final rejection of the claim of the petitioner by the State Government treating it to be beyond the period of limitation amounts to curtailing the intention of the industrial policy. The rejection is only on the ground that the reason explaining the delay is 'unavoidable circumstances', this did not appear to be sufficient explanation to the Secretary, Industries. The order of Secretary, Industries, is not enclosed in the letter/order dated 24.12.2010 (Annexure2 to the writ petition). It is only an intimation, the reasons disallowing condonation period of limitation is explained in course of reply in the present writ petition. In the case of M/s Bharat Barrel & Drum Mfg. Co. Ltd. & Anr. Vs. The Employees State Insurance Corporation, (1971) 2 SCC 860 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court, while dealing with the law of limitation, was of the view that the limitation pertains to remedy because the Rule is that claims in respect of rights cannot be entertained if not commenced within the prescribed limitations by the Statute in respect of that right. Apart from legislative action prescribing the time there is no period of limitation recognized under the general law and, therefore, any time fixed by the Statute is necessarily to be arbitrary. In the instant case, Clause 36.2 only empowers the respective departments and institutions to issue notification as followup action “to give effect to the provisions of the policy”, but not to take away the very spirit and the purpose for which the policy was framed. The interest subsidy is by way of an incentive to the upcoming industries such as the petitioner and it is for this reason this incentive was provided only for a limited period of 5 years. The State Government was directed to frame such notifications only as a followup actions and not to curtail the incentive which otherwise was necessarily available to the petitioner. 11. In my view, therefore, the provision of limitation provided by the State Government is beyond the intentions of the policy and, therefore, liable to be set at naught. Apparently, the intention of the policy was to grant some benefits to the upcoming industries, therefore, such intentions could not be bridled by Rule 4.3(Gha) 1 & 2. In the instant case, apparently, the Rule prescribing limitation extinguishes the right and affects the substantive right accrued to the petitioner by framing of the policy. 12. Apparently, the intention of the policy was to grant some benefits to the upcoming industries, therefore, such intentions could not be bridled by Rule 4.3(Gha) 1 & 2. In the instant case, apparently, the Rule prescribing limitation extinguishes the right and affects the substantive right accrued to the petitioner by framing of the policy. 12. Counsel Shri Gododia has cited a number of judgments, State of Mysore & Ors. Vs. Mallick Hashim & Co., (1974) 3 SCC 251 , G.B Kumar & Sons Vs. The State of Bihar & Ors., 70 STC 240 and Global Energy Limited & Anr. Vs. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission, (2009) 15 SCC 570 . Paras25, 26 and 27 of the case Global Energy Limited (supra) are quoted below : 25. It is now a well settled principle of law that the rulemaking power “for carrying out the purpose of the Act” is a general delegation. Such a general delegation may not be held to be laying down any guidelines. Thus, by reason of such a provision alone, the regulation making power cannot be exercised so as to bring into existence substantive rights or obligations or disabilities which are not contemplated in terms of the provisions of the said Act. 26. We may, in this connection refer to a decision of this Court in Kunj Behari Lal Butail Vs. State of H.P., (2000) 3 SCC 40 wherein a three Judge Bench of this Court held as under : “We are also of the opinion that a delegated power to legislate by making rules 'for carrying out the purposes of the Act' is a general delegation without laying down any guidelines; it cannot be so exercised as to bring into existence substantive rights or obligations or disabilities not contemplated by the provisions of the Act itself.” 27. The power of the regulation making authority, thus, must be interpreted keeping in view the provisions of the Act. The Act is silent as regards conditions for grant of licence. It does not lay down any pre qualifications therefor. Provisions for imposition of general conditions of licence or conditions laying down the pre qualifications therefor and/or the conditions/qualifications for grant or revocation of licence, in absence of such a clear provision may be held to be laying down guidelines by necessary implication providing for conditions/qualifications for grant of licence also. 13. Provisions for imposition of general conditions of licence or conditions laying down the pre qualifications therefor and/or the conditions/qualifications for grant or revocation of licence, in absence of such a clear provision may be held to be laying down guidelines by necessary implication providing for conditions/qualifications for grant of licence also. 13. In view of the principles laid down by the Apex Court and the reasons enumerated hereinabove, I am of the considered view that the period of limitation prescribed by the State Government amounts to a legislation which renders the industrial policy framed by the Government redundant. It is, therefore, evident that imposition of a period of limitation and subsequent denial of condonation of period of limitation by the Director, Industries, maims the industrial policy. On an examination of the purpose and intendment of the policy and the scheme which effectuates the development of industries has necessarily to be checked in exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In the event the incentives granted by the Government are curbed on flimsy reasons, the result will be that the industries will be rendered sick and disabled. 14. However, I am not convinced with the alternative arguments of Mr. Gadodia. If the submission of the learned counsel to the effect that the Rule permits a claimant to apply for interest subsidy for two consecutive years after end of the subsequent financial year and application for two years could be made together at the end of the last financial year, then there was no purpose for imposing period of six months limitation. Thus, this submission of the learned counsel does not stand to reason. The alternative argument stands negated. 15. All the same, since I am of the view that imposing a period of limitation and the final rejection of the claim of interest subsidy has resulted in nullifying the Industrial Policy itself. I have already concluded that the Rule framed by the State Government imposing a limitation and consequent rejection of the claim of petitioner is an excessive exercise of power specially, in view of the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. 16. I have already concluded that the Rule framed by the State Government imposing a limitation and consequent rejection of the claim of petitioner is an excessive exercise of power specially, in view of the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. 16. Thus, In my view and what has been stated above, the Rule imposing a limitation of six months by the State Government on the face of it, appears to be an excessive legislation and specially in the present case, denial of condonation of the period of limitation by means of Memo No. 2869 dated 24.12.2010 issued by Respondent No. 3 is therefore quashed. Clause 4.3(Gha) 1 & 2 of the Jharkhand Industrial Incentive Rules, 2003 is also set at naught, as it is beyond the scope, intention and purview of the Jharkhand Industrial Policy, 2001 and amounts to curtailment of substantive rights accrued in favour of the petitioner. Respondent No. 3 is directed to examine the case of the petitioner for grant of interest subsidy within a period of six weeks from the date a certified copy of this judgment is produced before him for grant of interest subsidy, irrespective of the period of limitation. 17. The writ petition is accordingly allowed.