Research › Search › Judgment

Punjab High Court · body

2012 DIGILAW 434 (PNJ)

Ravinder Kumar Contractor v. Executive Engineer, Punjab Water Supply & Sewerage Division No. 1, Ludhiana

2012-03-07

L.N.MITTAL

body2012
JUDGMENT Mr. L.N. Mittal, J.: (Oral) - C.M. No. 6387-C-II of 2012 Allowed as prayed for. C.M. No. 6388-C-II of 2012 : For reasons mentioned in the application, which is accompanied by affidavit, delay of 03 days in filing the appeal is condoned. Main Case : 2. Contractor Ravinder Kumar has filed this revision petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India assailing orders of both the courts below. 3. Respondent no.1 – Executive Engineer awarded contract to the petitioner-Contractor. Disputes arose between the parties. The disputes were referred to Arbitrator – respondent no.2 as per arbitration clause in the agreement. Respondent no.1 – Executive Engineer made claim of Rs.6,86,978.66 before the Arbitrator. The Arbitrator, vide Award dated 15.02.1989, awarded Rs.6,80,087.66 in favour of Executive Engineer, payable by the Contractor. 4. Executive Engineer filed application under Sections 14 and 17 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 (in short – the Act) for making the Award as ‘Rule of the Court’. The Contractor did not appear despite service and accordingly, the Award was made ‘Rule of the Court’ vide ex-parte order dated 06.05.1991 and decree was passed accordingly. However, on application moved on 18.05.1991 by the Contractor, the ex-parte order and decree were set aside vide order dated 26.11.1991. 5. The Contractor filed objection petition-cum-reply on 21.12.1992 assailing the Award. It was pleaded that the Arbitrator misconducted himself and the proceedings. The Arbitrator did not afford proper opportunity of hearing to the objector nor the objector was allowed to cross-examine the witnesses of the Executive Engineer. 6. Learned Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division), Ludhiana, vide impugned order dated 12.02.2008 (Annexure P-2), dismissed the objections filed by the Contractor and allowed the application filed by Executive Engineer under Sections 14 and 17 of the Act and made the Award ‘Rule of the Court’ and passed decree accordingly. First appeal preferred by the Contractor has been dismissed by learned Additional District Judge, Ludhiana, vide judgment and decree dated 23.11.2011 (Annexure P-4). Feeling aggrieved, Contractor has filed this revision petition. 7. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the case file. 8. At the outset, it has to be noticed that the objection petition filed by the Contractor was hopelessly barred by limitation. Feeling aggrieved, Contractor has filed this revision petition. 7. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the case file. 8. At the outset, it has to be noticed that the objection petition filed by the Contractor was hopelessly barred by limitation. Initially, vide ex-parte order dated 06.05.1991, the Award was made ‘Rule of the Court’, but on application of Contractor, the said ex-parte order was set aside vide order dated 26.11.1991. However, the Contractor filed objections on 21.12.1992 i.e. more than a year thereafter. According to Article 119 (b) of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, limitation period for filing the objection petition for setting aside of Award was 30 days from the date of service of notice of the filing of the Award. The said limitation period commenced on 26.11.1991, when ex-parte order was set aside. In fact, Contractor got notice of filing of Award on or before 18.05.1991, when he filed application for setting aside ex-parte order dated 06.05.1991. However, the Contractor possibly could not file objections against the Award till ex-parte order dated 06.05.1991 was set aside. The said ex-parte order was set aside on 26.11.1991 and consequently, the Contractor could file objections within 30 days thereof, but he filed objections more than a year thereafter and thus, the objections were hopelessly barred by limitation. No application for condonation of delay in filing the objections was moved along with the objection petition. However, after 15 years, the Contractor moved application on 17.09.2007 under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of the aforesaid delay of almost one year. However, even in the said application, no ground whatsoever was pleaded for condonation of the said long delay. Thus, objections preferred by the objector Contractor were hopelessly barred by limitation and, therefore, liable to dismissal on this ground. 9. Even on merits, the objector failed to prove that proper opportunity was not granted to him by the Arbitrator for cross-examining the witnesses and for hearing. Grouse of the Contractor is that spot measurement of the work done by the Contractor was not got done by the Arbitrator. However, perusal of the orders of the courts below reveals that on the request of the Contractor, the Arbitrator appointed Mr. J. S. Kahlon, SDE as Special Officer to investigate the said fact by spot inspection. The objector, however, did not co-operate with Mr. However, perusal of the orders of the courts below reveals that on the request of the Contractor, the Arbitrator appointed Mr. J. S. Kahlon, SDE as Special Officer to investigate the said fact by spot inspection. The objector, however, did not co-operate with Mr. Kahlon, who had to write letter dated 13.05.1987 to the Arbitrator. The Arbitrator still granted another opportunity to the Contractor for spot verification, but still the Contractor did not take any interest. He did not get the measurement done at the spot. Mr. Kahlon wrote another letter dated 20.08.1987 to the Arbitrator. Ultimately, the Contractor even stopped attending the hearing before the Arbitrator. Thus, it cannot be said that proper opportunity of hearing was not given by the Arbitrator to the Contractor. On the other hand, even after the objector stopped attending the hearing before the Arbitrator, the Arbitrator had been sending notice of each and every date of hearing to the Contractor. These facts have been mentioned by the trial court after perusal of the record of Arbitrator. It is thus manifest that Contractor himself misconducted before the Arbitrator and not vice versa. There is no material on record to depict that the Arbitrator misconducted himself or the arbitration proceedings. 10. Counsel for the appellant next contended that the impugned Award is not speaking one. However, under the Act, there was no requirement that the Award had to be speaking one. Even non-speaking Award under the Act of 1940 is valid. There is not even plea by the Contractor that in terms of arbitration clause, the Award had to be reasoned or speaking one. Consequently, even non-speaking Award is not liable to be set aside merely because it is non-speaking Award. 11. Counsel for the petitioner next contended that courts below have awarded interest on the awarded amount from the date of Award, but the interest could be granted only from the date of decree of the trial court. Reliance in support of this contention has been placed on judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s Jagdish Rai and Brothers vs. Union of India reported as 1999 (2) R. C. R. (Civil) 400. The contention has no merit. According to this judgment, claim for interest cannot be made if it is not made in the trial court. The contention has no merit. According to this judgment, claim for interest cannot be made if it is not made in the trial court. However, in the instant case, the claim for interest was made in the trial court and has been allowed by the trial court. Consequently, judgment in the case of M/s Jagdish Rai (supra) does not support the contention of the petitioner. Rather, it goes against the said contention and interest can be granted from the date of Award, if claim is made before the trial court. 12. For the reasons aforesaid, I find no merit in the instant revision petition. Both the courts below have examined the matter in correct perspective. There is no illegality, perversity or jurisdictional error in the impugned orders of the courts below warranting interference by this Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction either under Article 227 of the Constitution of India or under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The revision petition is accordingly dismissed in limine. ---------0.B.S.0------------