Judgment :- 1. The petitioner has come forward with the present writ petition challenging an Award passed by the second respondent Labour Court, Salem in I.D.No.494 of 2001, dated 12.02.2004. By the impugned Award, the Labour Court declined to grant any relief to the petitioner and dismissed the industrial dispute raised by him. 2. The writ petition was admitted on 16.7.2007. On notice from this court, the first respondent State Transport Corporation has filed a counter affidavit, dated 12.08.2008. 3. It is seen from the records that the petitioner was appointed as a daily paid driver in the transport corporation on 10.4.1987. His services were regularized on 01.09.1988. At that time, he was working in the Salem Branch. He was assigned the route from Salem to Vellore on 16.01.1989. When the bus was proceeding from Vellore to Salem, it was claimed that the petitioner drove the vehicle in a rash and negligent manner. The bus dashed against a tamarind tree on the right side of the road. In that accident, 23 passengers were injured. The Corporation had incurred loss of Rs.75,000/-A disciplinary action was taken against the petitioner by giving a charge memo on 19.10.1989. The petitioner had submitted his explanation on 26.10.1989. As the first respondent did not find his explanation satisfactory, an enquiry was ordered. The Enquiry Officer by his report dated 16.1.1990 found the petitioner guilty of charges. Thereafter, agreeing with the enquiry report, a second show cause notice was issued on 23.01.1990. He sent a reply to the second show cause notice. However, the first respondent Corporation had dismissed the petitioner from service by an order dated 18.4.1990. 4. It was stated that the petitioner was also injured in the said accident. He also claimed compensation before the Workmens compensation Commissioner (Deputy Commissioner of Labour, Salem) in WC.No.198 of 1990. The Workmen Compensation Commissioner, on notice to the Corporation, had assessed the injury as a permanent total disability and awarded compensation of Rs.1,06,785/-. Aggrieved by the order passed by the Commissioner, the first respondent Corporation had preferred an appeal before this court under Section 30 of the Workmen Compensation Act. The said appeal in CMA No.219 of 1992 was dismissed on 23.8.1999. Even while dismissing the CMA, an observation was made by this court that the Corporation should find the possibility of providing suitable job to the petitioner. The said appeal in CMA No.219 of 1992 was dismissed on 23.8.1999. Even while dismissing the CMA, an observation was made by this court that the Corporation should find the possibility of providing suitable job to the petitioner. Pursuant to the observation made, the petitioner was directed to appear before the Medical Officer. The medical officer found that the petitioners right forearm which was operated upon was restricted to the movement, flexion of elbow right and movement of the fingers of the right hand were also restricted. Based on the medical report, the Selection Committee held that he was not fit for any physical nature of work and he cannot be given any employment in the Corporation. The said fact was also informed to the petitioner on 15.4.2000. 5. In the meanwhile, the petitioner had raised a dispute before the Government Labour Officer, Salem. As the said conciliation officer after notice to the first respondent Corporation, found that there was no possibility of settlement, gave his failure report. On the strength of the failure report, the petitioner had filed a claim statement before the Labour Court on 24.5.2001. The said dispute was taken on file by the second respondent Labour court as I.D.No.494 of 2001 and a notice was issued to the first respondent Corporation. The first respondent corporation had filed a counter statement, dated Nil (July, 2002). 6. Before the Labour Court, on behalf of the workman, five documents were filed and marked as Exs.W.1 to W.5. On the side of the first respondent Corporation, 10 documents were filed and marked as Exs.M.1 to M.10. Before the labour court, the workman also filed a judgment of the criminal court in C.C.No.163 of 2003, dated 18.7.1994 acquitting him of charges of rash and negligent driving. The management document Ex.M.4 was the order passed by the Commissioner in W.C. Case. The labour court, based on these materials, came to the conclusion that the workman did not challenge his termination dated 18.4.1990. If only he had driven the vehicle carefully, there was possibility of averting the accident. During the course of the accident, he had suffered 100% disability. The medical officer had given his opinion that the petitioner was unfit to any work. Though the termination was in the year 1990, he did not raise any dispute immediately thereafter, but he had raised the dispute only in the year 2000. During the course of the accident, he had suffered 100% disability. The medical officer had given his opinion that the petitioner was unfit to any work. Though the termination was in the year 1990, he did not raise any dispute immediately thereafter, but he had raised the dispute only in the year 2000. The Doctors certificate that he was unfit for any work cannot be rejected. Though in a settlement under Section 12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, the workman, who has medical disability, is entitled to get an alternate employment and a reference was made to a judgment of this court in A.Periasamy Vs. Anna Transport Corporation Limited, Salem reported in 2001 LLR 128, the said judgment only talks about that if it is possible, an alternate employment can be given. Hence the Doctors certificate marked as Ex.M.8 cannot be found fault with. The petitioner was not entitled to get any relief. 7. It is seen that the accident had taken place on 16.1.1989. The petitioner was dismissed from service on 18.4.1990. At the relevant time, there was no legislation, i.e., the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995. The Supreme Court dealt with the case of rehabilitating a disabled person vide its judgment in Kunal Singh v. Union of India reported in (2003) 4 SCC 524 and gave the background of the Act. In paragraph 8, the Supreme Court had observed as follows:- “(8.) The need for a comprehensive legislation for safeguarding the rights of persons with disabilities and enabling them to enjoy equal opportunities and to help them to fully participate in national life was felt for a long time. To realize the objective that people with disabilities should have equal opportunities and keeping their hopes and aspirations in view a meeting called the "Meet to Launch the Asian and Pacific Decades of Disabled Persons" was held in Beijing in the first week of December 1992 by the Asian and Pacific countries to ensure "full participation and equality of people with disabilities in the Asian and Pacific regions". This meeting was held by the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and Pacific. A proclamation was adopted in the said meeting. India was a signatory to the said proclamation and agreed to give effect to the same. Pursuant thereto this Act was enacted, which came into force on 1-1-1996. This meeting was held by the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and Pacific. A proclamation was adopted in the said meeting. India was a signatory to the said proclamation and agreed to give effect to the same. Pursuant thereto this Act was enacted, which came into force on 1-1-1996. The Act provides some sort of succour to the disabled persons." 8. Further, in the very same Corporation, there is binding settlement under Section 12 (3) agreeing to provide for an alternate employment. During the pendency of the dispute before the labour court, the provisions of the Disabilities Act, 1995 came into existence. Under section 47 of the said Act, it is specifically provides that no employee on account of acquiring disability while in service can be dispensed with from service and that he is entitled for an employment with the same pay scale and service benefits. If there is no such post available, the Act provides to create supernumerary post until he attains the age of superannuation. 9. It must be noted that the Disabilities Act was enacted with a view to implement the international obligation by virtue of the meeting of the Asian and Pacific Decade of Disabled Persons 1993-2002. The objects and reasons as set out in the Act reads as follows: “Statement of Objects and Reasons.-The meeting to launch the Asian and Pacific Decade of the Disabled Persons 1993-2002 convened by the Economic and Social commission for Asian and Pacific Region, held at Beijing on 1st to 5th December, 1992, adopted the Proclamation on the Full Participation and Equality of People with Disabilities in the Asian and the Pacific Region. India is a signatory to the said Proclamation and it is necessary to enact a suitable legislation to provide for the following:- (i) to spell out the responsibility of the State towards the prevention of disabilities, protection of rights, provision of medical care, education, training, employment and rehabilitation of persons with disabilities; (ii) to create barrier free environment for persons with disabilities; (iii) to remove any discrimination against persons with disabilities in the sharing of development benefits, vis-a-vis, non-disabled persons; (iv) to counteract any situation of the abuse and the exploitation of persons with disabilities; (v) to lay down a strategies for comprehensive development of programmes and services and equalisation of opportunities for persons with disabilities; and (vi) to make special provision for the integration of persons with disabilities into the social mainstream.” 10. If the legislation is made pursuant to the international obligation which preceded even the date of the enactment and the respondent corporation has got settlement under Section 12(3) to provide employment for a person who has become physically disabled, the Labour Court was wrong in denying him employment. On the other hand, the legislation principle found in the enactment as reflected under Section 47, should have been taken as the guideline for the grant of relief. Even if he has disability and there was no alternate employment permissible, the second proviso to Section 47 provides as follows: “Provided further that if it is not possible to adjust the employee against any post, he may be kept on a supernumerary post until a suitable post is available or he attains the age of superannuation, whichever is earlier.” 11. In the present case, the disability has not been certified by any competent medical board. The first respondent Corporation had relied upon only its own medical officers opinion. Even assuming that the petitioner had suffered total disability and no suitable employment is available, since he had suffered injury arising out of and in the course of his employment, he is entitled for wages drawn by him in the post of driver normally from the date of dismissal till the date of his actual retirement. The labour court did not go into such aspects of matter. It was persuaded mainly on the ground of delay in raising the dispute and the petitioner had sought for alternate employment after 10 years. 12. The labour court did not go into such aspects of matter. It was persuaded mainly on the ground of delay in raising the dispute and the petitioner had sought for alternate employment after 10 years. 12. Merely because the dispute was raised after 10 years is not a ground to deny the relief as held by the Supreme Court vide its judgment in Government of Gujarat (Fisheries Terminal Department) Vs. Bhikubhai Meghajibhai Chavda reported in (2010) 1 SCC 47 . 13. At the same time, in the absence of any employment, the labour court could have granted suitable monetary relief. Therefore, based upon the principle provided in the second proviso to Section 47, this court hereby directs the first respondent Corporation to pay wages to the petitioner from the date of filing of the claim statement, i.e., 24.05.2001 till the date of his reaching the age of superannuation on par with the workers who are similarly placed. This exercise shall be carried out within a period of 12 (twelve) weeks from the date of receipt of the copy of this order. Accordingly, the writ petition will stand disposed of. No costs.