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2012 DIGILAW 437 (MP)

Ramcharan v. State of M. P.

2012-04-24

G.D.SAXENA

body2012
ORDER G.D. Saxena, J. 1. This revision petition has been submitted under section 397/401 of Cr.P.C. by accused/petitioners challenging an order dated 19th January 2012 in Special Sessions Case No. 79/2011 passed by the Special Judge (SC & ST), Guna (M.P.) framing thereby charges against the petitioners for commission of offence punishable under sections 323, 294, 506(Part II) of I.P.C. read with section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act 1989. 2. Facts, in short, just for the adjudication of the case are that on 21st August 2011 at around 10.30 p.m., when the complainant Kanhaiyal was standing outside his room, let out to him by the accused-petitioner Ramcharan, at that juncture all the accused, namely, Prakash Dhakad, Ramesh Dhakad accompanied with their father Ramcharan (landlord) came to him and uttered abusive language denoting to his caste. It is alleged that thereafter accused Prakash gave a blow with a lathi which hit on the left side of the complainant, causing injury. When the complainant’s wife came to his rescue, she was also assaulted with a lathi blow which hit on her right hand. Accused Ramcharan threatened the complainant to his life, if the room is not vacated by him. On the report of the complainant, an FIR was lodged and after investigation, the charge-sheet has been filed against the petitioners-accused for the alleged offences. On committal in trial, the charges have been framed as mentioned above. Before the learned trial court, the petitioners-accused moved an application under section 228 of Cr.P.C. for discharging them of the offence under the Act, which came to be rejected, hence this revision. 3. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners/accused is that the impugned order passed by trial Judge is illegal and without jurisdiction. It is contended that the learned trial Judge at the time of framing the charges against the petitioners/accused did not think it proper to consider the ingredients of the offence for which the charge was framed. It is submitted that from perusal of the charge-sheet papers it is clear that in a sudden provocation that too without any intention to insult or humiliate, the accused had uttered the words which had absolutely no meaning. Therefore, according to the learned counsel, no offence as alleged under the Act, prima facie is made out against the petitioners. It is submitted that from perusal of the charge-sheet papers it is clear that in a sudden provocation that too without any intention to insult or humiliate, the accused had uttered the words which had absolutely no meaning. Therefore, according to the learned counsel, no offence as alleged under the Act, prima facie is made out against the petitioners. The impugned order of charge is per se illegal and without jurisdiction, hence, same is liable to be set aside. On the basis of above, it is prayed that by allowing the revision petition, the order impugned may be set aside and the accused may be discharged of the offence. In support of the arguments, learned counsel placed reliance on the decisions in the cases of Surendra Kaurav & others Vs. State of M.P. 2008(1) MPHT 317 , Ram Chandra & others Vs. State of M.P. 2009 (1) MPWN 77 and Shankar Singh Vs. State of M.P. 2005 (II) MPWN 21 . 4. The learned Public Prosecutor for the respondent/State, on the other hand, supported the impugned order and prayed for dismissal of the revision. 5. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and also perused the impugned order and the documents filed on the record. 6. The question for consideration in this case is whether the learned trial Judge was justified in framing the charges for the alleged offence against the petitioners-accused in the light of the material placed before him and whether the said material was sufficient to make out a prima facie case for proceeding against the accused ? 7. Before adverting to the rival submissions of the learned counsel for the parties, it would be useful to reproduce the relevant section of the Act 1989. Same runs as is under:- “Section 3 (1)(x) :- (1) Whoever, not being a member of a Schedule Caste or a Schedule Tribe intentionally insults or intimidates with intention to humiliate a member of a scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe at any place within public view, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months and may extend to five years and with fine.” 8. In the case of Gorige Pentaiah v. State of A. P. and Ors [AIR 2008 SC (Supp) 634] the Apex court held:- “In the instant case, the allegation of respondent No.3 in the entire complaint is that on 27.5.2004, the appellant abused them with the name of their caste. According to the basic ingredients of section 3(1)(x) of the Act, the complainant ought to have alleged that the accused-appellant was not a member of the Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe and he (respondent No. 3) was intentionally insulted or intimidated by the accused with intent to humiliate in a place within public view. In the entire complaint, nowhere it is mentioned that the accused-appellant was not a member of the Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe and he intentionally insulted or intimidated with intent to humiliate respondent No. 3 in a place within public view. When the basic ingredients of the offence are missing in the complaint, then permitting such a complaint to continue and to compel the appellant to face the rigmarole of the criminal trial would be totally unjustified leading to abuse of process of law.” 9. Again, in the case of Swaran Singh Vs. State through Standing Counsel (2008 AIR SCW 5758), following has been observed :- “In our opinion, calling a member of the Scheduled Caste ‘Chamar’ with intent to insult or humiliate him in a place within public view is certainly an offence under section 3(1)(x) of the Act. Whether there was intent to insult or humiliate by using the word ‘Chamar’ will of course depend on the context in which it was used. A perusal of the FIR clearly shows that, prima facie, an offence is made out against the appellants 2 and 3. As already stated above, at this stage we have not to see whether the allegations in the FIR are correct or not. We have only to see whether treating the FIR allegations as correct an offence is made out or not. In our opinion, treating the allegations in the FIR to be correct an offence under section 3(1)(x) of the Act is prima facie made out against appellants 2 and 3 because it prima facie seems that the intent of the appellants was to insult or humiliate the first informant, and this was done within the public view. In our opinion, treating the allegations in the FIR to be correct an offence under section 3(1)(x) of the Act is prima facie made out against appellants 2 and 3 because it prima facie seems that the intent of the appellants was to insult or humiliate the first informant, and this was done within the public view. It has been alleged in the FIR that Vinod Nagar, the first informant, was insulted by appellants 2 and 3 (by calling him a ‘Chamar’) when he stood near the car which was parked at the gate of the premises. In our opinion, this was certainly a place within public view, since the gate of a house is certainly a place within public view. It could have been a different matter had the alleged offence been committed inside a building, and also was not in the public view. However, if the offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. Also, even if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then also it would be an offence since it is in the public view. We must, therefore, not confuse the expression ‘place within public view’ with the expression ‘public place’. A place can be a private place but yet within the public view. On the other hand, a public place would ordinarily mean a place which is owned or leased by the Government or the municipality (or other local body) or gaon sabha or an instrumentality of the State, and not by private persons or private bodies.” 10. Recently, in the case of Asmathunnisa Vs. State of A.P. ( AIR 2011 SC 1905 ), it has been held as under:- “10. The aforesaid paragraphs clearly mean that the words used are “in any place but within public view”, which means that the public must view the person being insulted for which he must be present and no offence on the allegations under the said section gets attracted if the person is not present.” 11. The aforesaid paragraphs clearly mean that the words used are “in any place but within public view”, which means that the public must view the person being insulted for which he must be present and no offence on the allegations under the said section gets attracted if the person is not present.” 11. In all those cases referred to herein above, it is held that merely because word “Chamar” has been used that would not mean that it was used in order to intentionally insult or humiliate the complainant, who is belonging to Scheduled Caste in a place within public view. 12. It is not disputed that the accused/petitioners are the members of upper caste and the complainant and his family members are belonging to “Ahirwar”, which falls within the definition of Scheduled Caste, as declared in Schedule X under the Indian Constitution. On perusal of the FIR, case-diary-statements of the witnesses and the spot map prepared during investigation, it is gathered that when the complainant was standing in front of his room, which was situated in the periphery of other houses and not on the public road, accused Ramcharan alongwith his sons Prakash and Ramesh came and by using absurd words insulting to his caste asked to vacate their room. His son Ramesh also uttered the absurd words and then caused him injuries. Thus, the material available and considered above, does not disclose in any manner that the insulting words were spoken by the accused/petitioners at the place within public view. Absolutely, therefore, there is no iota of evidence before the learned trial Judge for framing charge against the accused for commission of offence punishable under section 3 (1) (x) of the Act. 13. In the result, the revision petition stands allowed only to the extent of framing of charge under section 3 (1)(x) of the Act. The petitioners/accused are discharged of the offence under section 3(1)(x) of the Act. It is made clear that the trial against petitioners/accused shall continue for other charges except the charge under section 3 (1)(x) of the Act.