Judgment 1. The petitioner has come up with the above writ petition challenging a penalty of stoppage of increment for two years without cumulative effect. 2. Heard Mr. R. Mohana Sundararajan, learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. V. Subbiah, learned Special Government Pleader and Mr. R. Jayaseelan, learned Standing Counsel for the respondent-Board. 3. The petitioner was placed under suspension on 21.12.1976 and a charge memo dated 09.02.1977 was issued containing three imputations of misconduct. There was a corrigendum to the charge memo on 04.08.1977. Subsequently, one more imputation was included by a further memo dated 17.8.1977. 4. The charges framed against the petitioner, as seen from the enquiry report, are as follows: “Charge No.1:- that they while being enthrusted with the construction of 60 SLC quarters at Trivellore had failed to maintain proper accounts, of the materials said to have been supplied and issued for construction during 1974-75 resulting in a shortage of materials to the tune of Rs.30,090/- and loss to the Housing Board. Charge No.2:- that they had been very negligent and dereliction of duty entrusted to him.” 5. During the pendency of the enquiry, the suspension was revoked and the petitioner was reinstated on 09.11.1979. Eventually, a penalty of stoppage of increment for two years with cumulative effect was passed on 27.12.1988 and the petitioner filed an appeal on 1.5.1989. 6. During the pendency of the appeal for a period of seven long years, the petitioner reached superannuation and he was permitted to retire on 31.8.1995. 7. After his retirement, the Appellate Authority dismissed the appeal by an order dated 06.02.1996. Challenging the said order, the petitioner filed a writ petition in W.P.No.12518 of 1997. The said writ petition was allowed by this Court by an order dated 25.02.2004 and the matter was remanded back to the Government for a fresh consideration. 8. In pursuance of the said order, the Government considered the appeal afresh and passed G.O.ID.No.560, Housing and Urban Development, dated 01.09.2004, modifying the penalty into one of stoppage of increment for two years without cumulative effect. It is against the said order of penalty that the petitioner has come up before this court. 9. The petitioner has two grievances. The first is about the penalty of stoppage of increment for two years without cumulative effect. It is against the said order of penalty that the petitioner has come up before this court. 9. The petitioner has two grievances. The first is about the penalty of stoppage of increment for two years without cumulative effect. The second grievance is about the regularization of the period of suspension from 21.12.1976 up to 09.11.1979, as a period of leave. 10. Insofar as the first grievance is concerned, I find no justification to interfere with the order of penalty. The final order of penalty, which is challenged in the writ petition, is only a minor penalty, namely, stoppage of increment for two years without cumulative effect. For imposing a minor penalty, no detailed procedure need to be gone into. The imposition of minor penalty, can be even by way of issue of charge memo, solicitation of a reply and the passing of an order after perusing the material on record. In this case, the petitioner had the benefit of undergoing even an enquiry. I find no procedural irregularities in the conduct of the enquiry. The findings of the enquiry officer are also not perverse. There is some evidence for the respondents to hold that the petitioner was guilty of negligence. Therefore, the penalty of stoppage of increment for two years without cumulative effect, cannot also be said to be disproportionate to the finding of negligence. Hence, the first grievance of the petitioner cannot be redressed. 11. Insofar as the second grievance is concerned, the issue is very simple. The period of suspension of the petitioner was from 21.12.1976 to 09.11.1979. This period was not treated as on duty, in view of the fact that the disciplinary proceedings ultimately resulted in a major penalty of stoppage of increment for two years with cumulative effect. But, the major penalty has now been converted into minor penalty by the Government, by the order impugned in the writ petition. In paragraph 5 of the impugned order, the Government had observed that the penalty was on the higher side. Therefore, the Government have chosen to modify the penalty from a major penalty to a minor penalty. 12. Once it is found that the petitioner was liable only for the imposition of a minor penalty, the treatment of the period of three years of suspension as leave, to which the petitioner was eligible, is shockingly disproportionate. Therefore, the Government have chosen to modify the penalty from a major penalty to a minor penalty. 12. Once it is found that the petitioner was liable only for the imposition of a minor penalty, the treatment of the period of three years of suspension as leave, to which the petitioner was eligible, is shockingly disproportionate. In fact, no minor penalty proceedings should follow an order of suspension. Suspension is a power vested upon the employer, to keep a person out of office during the pendency of an enquiry into grave charges. The ultimate penalty, being only a minor penalty, shows that the suspension for a period of three years of the petitioner was unjustified and hence, treating the said period as leave, cannot be sustained. 13. In view of the above, the writ petition is disposed of, upholding the ultimate penalty passed in the impugned order, but directing the respondents to treat the period of suspension from 21.12.1976 to 09.11.1979 as a duty period, entitling the petitioner to the monetary benefits. The respondents shall pass orders accordingly, within a period of twelve weeks from the date or receipt of a copy of this order. There shall be no order as to costs.