Judgment :- V.V.S.Rao, J. The petition is for Habeas Corpus directing respondents 1 and 2, namely, State of Andhra Pradesh through the Station House Officer, P.S., Jubilee Hills, Hyderabad, and the Director General of Police, Andhra Pradesh to trace the daughter of the petitioner Baby Sruthi, produce her before this Court and set her at liberty from wrongful custody from third respondent by giving custody to the petitioner. The ensuing short facts are necessary to consider the issues raised by the parties. The petitioner, now citizen of the United States of America (USA) with Person of Indian Origin (PIO) status, married third respondent, a citizen of the USA with PIO status -on 05.05.2002 at Hindu Temple in Huston, the State of Texas. Sruthi was born on 18.11.2005 in California. After spending two years in the USA, the couple moved to India. For the birth of Baby Sruthi, the petitioner travelled to Huston and that is how Sruthi is a citizen of the USA. The four year old marriage faced unrelenting turbulence. In December, 2009 the couple drew up a parenting plan which the petitioner alleges as vitiated by threats and fraud. The Family Court Commissioner (FCC), the Superior Court of Washington, King County passed orders on 03.04.2010 denying the motion of the third respondent to remove Sruthi from the USA. There was further order that Sruthi shall reside with the mother in Texas. It is also ordered further that if father returns from India, he shall have one week each month to keep the child with him. Three weeks thereafter petitioner and third respondent obtained divorce by mutual consent in USA on 23.04.2010. On the same day, the King County Court considered the motion by third respondent for determination of the jurisdiction and enforcement of the parenting plan. While vacating FCC’s order, the Superior Court validated the parenting plan. On the same day, yet another order of child support was passed by the Superior Court mandating the petitioner to pay $ 725.70 per month and defray transportation expenses for Sruthi’s travel, for visitation purposes. The petitioner appealed against the Order dated 23.04.2010. On 24.01.2011, the Court of Appeals of the State of Washington reversed and remanded holding that the King County Superior Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to validate the parenting plan because Baby Sruthi’s home State is India. The petitioner appealed against the Order dated 23.04.2010. On 24.01.2011, the Court of Appeals of the State of Washington reversed and remanded holding that the King County Superior Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to validate the parenting plan because Baby Sruthi’s home State is India. Consequent thereto on 15.04.2011, the Superior Court vacated the final parenting plan for lack of jurisdiction. After making their attempts in the Courts in the USA, the parties came to India. The third respondent filed O.P.No.295 of 2010 on 12.03.2010 before the Family Court, Hyderabad, under Sections 7 and 11 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 (the Guardians Act, for brevity) for permanent custody of his daughter. Some time thereafter, the third respondent went to Bali, Indonesia. In September, he moved a Memo (SR) No.5150 of 2011 seeking permission to withdraw the OP. He contended that during the pendency of the OP., the child custody proceedings initiated by him in the USA Court ended in his favour and therefore, relief prayed before the Family Court became infructuous. The petitioner opposed the said move to withdraw the OP. Overruling the petitioner, the Family Court permitted the third respondent to withdraw the OP. The petitioner then filed O.P.No.1148 of 2011 under Sections 7 and 25 of the Guardians Act read with Section 7 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 for permanent custody of Sruthi as also permission to take her to the USA. The petitioner also moved an application being I.A.No.726 of 2011 to prevent third respondent from taking Sruthi outside the jurisdiction of Hyderabad. The Family Court granted an ex parte order on 12.09.2011. The petitioner made enquiries at Oakridge International School (OIS) and found that her daughter stopped School. After making efforts to trace Sruthi and attributing the connivance of respondents 4 to 8 with the third respondent in preventing the child coming to her, the petitioner moved this Habeas Corpus proceedings. There are copious pleadings and equally large documents. All the allegations made by the warring parties can be ignored, understanding the parental urge to keep the custody ostensibly in the interest of the child. A reference as such to all the pleadings may not be necessary for considering the three questions as below, namely, the jurisdictional issue, the issues of paternal priority guardianship and relevancy of Foreign Court Orders. A reference as such to all the pleadings may not be necessary for considering the three questions as below, namely, the jurisdictional issue, the issues of paternal priority guardianship and relevancy of Foreign Court Orders. (i) Jurisdictional Issue The subject matter jurisdiction is governed by, indisputably, the Family Court Act, 1984 (the FA Act, for brevity). Section 7 among others confers very wide jurisdiction on the Family Court constituted under Section 3 thereof. All the matrimonial causes for declaration, non-monetary injunctions, monetary decrees and guardianship disputes of the person or custody of minors fall within the subject matter jurisdiction of Family Court. Section 8 excludes the jurisdiction of the District Court or subordinate civil Court and all the pending matters shall be transferred to the Family Court. Therefore, Family Court in Hyderabad and the High Court being appellate forum under Section 19 of the FA Act are vested with the subject matter jurisdiction. Indeed, under Section 19(4), this Court on its own motion can call for and examine the record of any proceedings before the Family Court for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality, propriety of the order passed by the Family Court. The Guardians Act confers the jurisdiction to decide the disputes in respect of guardianship of the person of the minor on the District Court having jurisdiction in the place where the minor ordinarily resides. If the dispute is regarding the property of the minor, the District Court where the property is situated or such a Court where the minor ordinarily resides shall have concurrent jurisdiction. In view of Section 7(1) and 8 of the FA Act, the jurisdiction hitherto exercised by the District Court shall now inhers in the Family Court. In every case, where the dispute is regarding the jurisdiction of the Court, the question of fact relevant is as to where the minor for whose custody or guardianship, there is a dispute ordinarily resides. The third respondent initially approached the Family Court, Hyderabad, for permanent custody of Sruthi. He withdrew it pleading that he got favourable child custody order from the Courts in USA. The petitioner initiated proceedings in O.P.No.1148 of 2011 under the Guardians Act read with FA Act, which are at the preliminary stage. Thus, the parties admit and accept the territorial jurisdiction of Hyderabad Family Court. He withdrew it pleading that he got favourable child custody order from the Courts in USA. The petitioner initiated proceedings in O.P.No.1148 of 2011 under the Guardians Act read with FA Act, which are at the preliminary stage. Thus, the parties admit and accept the territorial jurisdiction of Hyderabad Family Court. Any contra contention by the third respondent in this regard is belied by the admissions made by him in paragraphs 16, 17 and 18 of O.P.No.295 of 2010. Indisputably the American Courts declined subject matter jurisdiction and as observed by the Court of Appeals of the State of Washington, Sruthi had no significant connection to Washington because she had never been to Washington when the proceedings began before the Superior Court for King County. In the petition for writ of Habeas Corpus before the District Court of Harris County, Texas, third respondent admitted the pending custody matter in India and in supporting affidavit on oath he stated that, “Home State of our child Sruthi Koneru is India, for the agreement of myself and Alekhya Yalamanchili and per the decision of the Court of Appeals of the State of Washington in case No.65663-5-1; Division One …”. The Habeas Corpus Court endorsed the agreed order in the proceedings observing that, “the parties further submit that the issue of intentional or useful failure to comply with the Court orders of India is not addressed by this Court … any claims or defences are reserved for determination by the appropriate Indian Court”. Indeed, third respondent moved the motion for writ of Habeas Corpus relying on the visitation order passed by the Hon’ble Sri Justice G.Chandraiah of this Court in C.R.P.Nos.1881 and 1882 of 2011 arising out of I.A.Nos.2348 and 2349 of 2011 in F.C.O.P.No.295 of 2010 before the Family Court ordering the petitioner to return her daughter to third respondent in India on or before 10.06.2011. All this would clinch jurisdictional issue in favour of the petitioner and the plea to deny the jurisdiction has no merit. When a minor child is a citizen of a foreign country (for whose custody proceedings are initiated in India), is removed from the jurisdiction of the Family Court – allelgedly for unobjectionable reasons – whether our jurisdiction under Article 226 is ousted? We are afraid not. When a minor child is a citizen of a foreign country (for whose custody proceedings are initiated in India), is removed from the jurisdiction of the Family Court – allelgedly for unobjectionable reasons – whether our jurisdiction under Article 226 is ousted? We are afraid not. The High Court of a State constituted as mandated by Article 214, shall have, “the same jurisdiction as immediately exercised before the commencement of the Constitution and the law administered in the existing Court is saved” (Article 225). It is Court of Record (Article 215) with jurisdiction over the territories of the State and all the tribunals and the courts shall be subordinate to High Court (Article 227). The extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue writs is exercised “in relation to the territories within which the cause of action wholly or in part arises for the exercise of such power”. Even if the seat of the Government or authority or the residence of a person is not within the territory of the State, “if the cause of action wholly or partly arises”, this Court is bound to grab the jurisdiction to issue writs including Habeas Corpus. Generally to invite jurisdiction to adjudicate, the suitor must show territorial nexus, pecuniary nexus or protective nexus. The jurisdiction is conferred by the applicable statute depending on these three aspects. To determine jurisdiction of a court, limitations or borders within which the court is empowered to hold jurisdiction cannot be ignored. A legal forum gets jurisdiction to decide or adjudicate a claim only when such authority is enabled to do so; when cause of action arises within its operational area. But, it is not necessary that the entire cause of action should arise exclusively within its jurisdiction. It is quite possible that cause of action or part of cause of action might arise within the jurisdiction of an authority or Court and subject to statutory guidance in that regard, even if part of cause of action arises, judicial authority can take cognizance. When question of territorial jurisdiction of a Court is raised, various issues need to be addressed. Some of them are: What is the nature of the proceedings? What is legal injury suffered by petitioner and what is the obligation of opposite party to compensate such legal injury. When question of territorial jurisdiction of a Court is raised, various issues need to be addressed. Some of them are: What is the nature of the proceedings? What is legal injury suffered by petitioner and what is the obligation of opposite party to compensate such legal injury. Is there any agreement between parties on charging court, and when contesting parties reside at different places whether cause of action or part of action has arisen within territorial limits of the High Court where petition for judicial review is moved? The elements of cause of action are two; first breach of duty owing by one person to another and second damage resulting to other from the breach. Right to sue depends on cause of action, which an aggrieved person is able to show that he suffered legal injury. The cause of action for a writ petition may not be one instance or one important event from the commencement of fiduciary, jural or contractual relationship between the parties, till there is violation or breach of obligations essential to such relation. For a writ petition, it means the sum of total facts and circumstances the petitioner would have to prove if traversed. To know that an aggrieved person has cause of action wholly or in part within the jurisdiction of the Court, one has to read pleadings in their entirety. Pleadings are those, which are material facts, which are compulsorily alleged and proved by suitor. In Kusum Ingots & Alloys Limited v Union of India (2004) 6 SCC 254 ,cause of action has been explained as follows. Cause of action implies a right to sue. The material facts which are imperative for the suitor to allege and prove constitutes the cause of action. Cause of action is not defined in any statute. It has, however, been judicially interpreted inter alia to mean that every fact which would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the Court. Negatively put, it would mean that everything which, if not proved, gives the defendant an immediate right to judgment, would be part of cause of action. Its importance is beyond any doubt. For every action, there has to be a cause of action, if not, the plaint or the writ petition, as the case may be, shall be rejected summarily. Negatively put, it would mean that everything which, if not proved, gives the defendant an immediate right to judgment, would be part of cause of action. Its importance is beyond any doubt. For every action, there has to be a cause of action, if not, the plaint or the writ petition, as the case may be, shall be rejected summarily. In Oil and Natural Gas Commission v Utpal Kumar Basu (1994) 4 SCC 711 , it is laid down thus. It is well settled that the expression 'cause of action' means that bundle of facts which the petitioner must prove, if traversed, to entitle him to a judgment in his favour by the Court. In Chand Kaur v Pratap Singh, (1889) ILR 16 Calcutta 98 at 102, Lord Watson said: ". . . . . . . .the cause of action has no relation whatever to the defence which may be set up by the defendant, nor does it depend upon the character of the relief prayed for by the plaintiff. It refers entirely to the grounds set forth in the plaint as the cause of action or in other words to the media upon which the plaintiff asks the Court to arrive at a conclusion in his favour." Therefore, in determining the objection of lack of territorial jurisdiction the court must take all the facts pleaded in support of the cause of action into consideration albeit without embarking upon an enquiry as to the correctness or otherwise of the said facts. In other words the question whether a High Court has territorial jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition must be answered on the basis of the averments made in the petition, the truth or otherwise whereof being immaterial. To put it differently, the question of territorial jurisdiction must be decided on the facts pleaded in the petition. (emphasis supplied) In Union of India v Adani Exports Ltd. (2000) 1 SCC 567, it was held that, “it is clear from the above judgment that each and every fact pleaded by the respondents in their application does not ipso facto lead to the conclusion that those facts give rise to a cause of action within the Court’s territorial jurisdiction unless those facts pleaded are such which have a nexus or relevance with the lis that is involved in the case. Facts which have no bearing with the lis or the dispute involved in the case, do not give rise to a cause of action so as to confer territorial jurisdiction on the Court concerned.” Indisputably, the battle scene between the petitioner and the third respondent shifted to India in 2010. They reside separately. The third respondent instituted original petition for permanent custody. Within a year thereafter, he shifted to Bali and then withdrew his petition for permanent custody. Relocation at Bali was done without information to the petitioner and she came to know about this through the management of the school where the baby was attending. After filing O.P.No.1148 of 2011, the petitioner then moved this habeas corpus petition. In this mostly admitted background, this Court cannot throw out the petition saying the detenu is outside its jurisdiction. We have a lurking suspicion that the third respondent seems to be bent upon depriving the petitioner of her right of parenting her only child. The third respondent very cleverly, of course, ill-advisedly moved to Bali; From the record it is reasonable to infer that he comes from a rich family. Indeed, in his petition for permanent custody, he gave an exemplary career resume highlighting the fact of founding of M/s.Latitudes Health Private Limited; the largest Day Spa business in India that uplifted him to the position of a prominent businessman in that market segment. The career pursuit is a guarantee basic right. Nobody finds fault with the third respondent moving to Bali for better green pastures. While doing so, he also taken Sruthi when her custody dispute is between the petitioner and her former husband is in the Court. In this background, we are not able to countenance the submission of the senior counsel for the third respondent that the absence of detenu in Andhra Pradesh ousts the jurisdiction of this Court. (ii) Custodial legality issue Habeas corpus is a command to a person having unlawful custody of another person. The command requires the holder to produce the body of the detenu and largely. The writ is procedural rather than substantive (Kanu Sanyal v District Magistrate (1973) 2 SCC 674 : AIR 1973 SC 2684 ). (ii) Custodial legality issue Habeas corpus is a command to a person having unlawful custody of another person. The command requires the holder to produce the body of the detenu and largely. The writ is procedural rather than substantive (Kanu Sanyal v District Magistrate (1973) 2 SCC 674 : AIR 1973 SC 2684 ). The habeas corpus Court in a case of child custody dispute can always direct a person having custody to place the minor child in the custody of another (Gohar Begum v Suggi AIR 1960 SC 93 ). But while exercising such discretion essentially it should be resolved as to whether the custody of the children is unlawful or illegal. Not only that even if the welfare of the child requires the change of present custody, still the habeas corpus can direct such relocation of the infant (Syed Saleemuddin v Dr Rukhsana (2001) 5 SCC 247 ). When can the custody of a child with either of the spouses, in law, is considered unlawful? Before the Full Bench of Kerala High Court in Marggarate Maria Pulparampil Nee Feldman v Dr Chacko Pulparampil AIR 1970 Ker 1 : 1969 KLT 174 : 1969 KLJ 363 , a question was raised whether the High Court loses jurisdiction when the children are removed from its territory. Referring to Simpson on ‘the Law of Infants’ (Fourth Edition, page III), the Bench observed that, “ordinarily a Court of Ward cannot be removed out of its jurisdiction and even when the child is removed from its custody, the High Court is not precluded from passing appropriate orders in the interest of the child”. In Eugenia Archetti Abdullah v State of Kerala ILR 2004 (3) Ker 203 : 2004 (3) KLT 1025 , a Division Bench relying on Marggarate Maria Pulparampil considered this aspect and held that, “even when a child is sent out of the jurisdiction of the High Court, the same does not bar passing appropriate orders in the interest of children”. Elucidating further, the Division Bench opined thus. A writ of Habeas Corpus will be issued only when there is illegal detention of wrongful custody. Therefore, we have now to consider whether the custody of the minor children with the father is illegal or wrongful custody and whether it amounts to illegal detention. Admittedly even by the father, himself and his two children are American citizens. A writ of Habeas Corpus will be issued only when there is illegal detention of wrongful custody. Therefore, we have now to consider whether the custody of the minor children with the father is illegal or wrongful custody and whether it amounts to illegal detention. Admittedly even by the father, himself and his two children are American citizens. An adult American citizen can go anywhere in the world subject to travel restrictions and can have abode in any place on the globe subject to the law regarding residential permit there. But, so far as the minor children are concerned, they shall be in the custody of their parents and if there is any dispute between the parents, their custody shall be dependent upon the welfare of the children, as is normally considered by a Family Court.The children of less than 3 years cannot decide where they shall live in a better manner conducive to their health. In such circumstances, the only conclusion possible is that children born in the globe will have their residence conducive to their well being in the place where they were born and brought up as the citizen. Immediately after birth, these two children had been taken from Behrain to Texas. This fact is admitted and thereafter until December, 2003, the children had been in Texas except on temporary visit to some other places with their parents. In such circumstances, when, admittedly by the father, the children are U.S. citizens and are subject to the law of United States, necessarily, it shall be taken as their permanent abode for the time being. So their well being cannot be ensured in any other country. Necessarily, if the children of tender age of less than 3 years are kept out of their motherland to the exclusion of their mother, even if it is by their father, it can only be treated as an ‘illegal detention’ not being conducive for the wellbeing of the children. Necessarily, when there is illegal detention, this Court has to step in and remove the detenu from such illegal detention. (emphasis supplied) In Ruchi Majoo v Sanjiv Majoo (2011) 6 SCC 479 : AIR 2011 SC 1952 , the Supreme Court considered the dispute for custody of 11 year old American child. The father was successful before the Superior Court of California for the County of Ventura. (emphasis supplied) In Ruchi Majoo v Sanjiv Majoo (2011) 6 SCC 479 : AIR 2011 SC 1952 , the Supreme Court considered the dispute for custody of 11 year old American child. The father was successful before the Superior Court of California for the County of Ventura. When mother came to India with the child, a red corner notice was issued for child abduction. She approached the Delhi District Court under Sections 7, 8, 10 and 11 of the Guardians Act. She obtained interim custody. Father moved Delhi High Court under Article 227 who set aside trial court. Mother’s custody case was also dismissed holding that the Delhi court at Delhi had no jurisdiction and that custody issue has to be decided only by American Courts. Three questions were considered by the Supreme Court. These are – (i) whether the High Court was justified in dismissing the petition for custody of the minor on the ground that the Court at Delhi had no jurisdiction to entertain the same; (ii) whether the High Court was right in declining exercise of jurisdiction on the principle of comity of courts, and (iii) whether the order granting interim custody to the mother of the minor calls for any modification in terms of grant of visitation rights to the father pending disposal of the petition by the trial Court. On issues 1 and 2, the Supreme Court held in favour of mother and faulted the Delhi High Court for declining jurisdiction. The relevant observations are as follows (paras 57 to 61). … … whether a court otherwise competent to entertain the proceedings concerning the custody of the minor, ought to hold a summary or a detailed enquiry into the matter and whether it ought to decline jurisdiction on the principle of comity of nations or the test of the closest contact evolved by this Court in Surinder Kaur Sandhu v Harbax Singh Sandhu ( (1984) 3 SCC 698 : AIR 1984 SC 1224 ) have arisen either out of writ proceedings filed by the aggrieved party in the High Court or this Court or out of proceedings under the Guardians and Wards Act. The decisions rendered by this Court in Elizabeth Dinshaw v Arvand M. Dinshaw ( (1987) 1 SCC 42 : AIR 1987 SC 3 ); Sarita Sharma case ( AIR 2000 SC 1019 ), V.Ravichandra (Dr) (2) v Union of India ( (2010) 1 SCC 174 )and Shilpa Aggarwal v Aviral Mittal( (2010) 1 SCC 591 )arose out of proceedings in the nature of habeas corpus. Proceedings in the nature of habeas corpus are summary in nature, where the legality of the detention of the alleged detenu is examined on the basis of affidavits placed by the parties. Even so, nothing prevents the High Court from embarking upon a detailed enquiry in cases where the welfare of a minor is in question, which is the paramount consideration for the Court while exercising its parens patriae jurisdiction. A High Court may, therefore, invoke its extraordinary jurisdiction to determine the validity of the detention, in cases that fall within its jurisdiction and may also issue orders as to custody of the minor depending upon how the Court views the rival claims, if any, to such custody. The Court may also direct repatriation of the minor child to the country from where he/she may have been removed by a parent or other person; as was directed by this Court in Ravi Chandran and Shilpa Aggarwal cases or refuse to do so as was the position in Sarita Sharma v Sushil Sharma ( (2000) 3 SCC 14 : AIR 2000 SC 1019 ). What is important is that so long as the alleged detenu is within the jurisdiction of the High Court no question of its competence to pass appropriate orders arises. The writ court's jurisdiction to make appropriate orders regarding custody arises no sooner it is found that the alleged detenu is within its territorial jurisdiction. (emphasis supplied) The law is thus well settled that the dispute before the civil court under Guardians Act is concerned with the final child custody rights of the parents whereas habeas corpus proceeding deals with protection of the person who is held in unlawful custody. A child is not a property or a commodity. When the parents complain unlawful removal from its jurisdiction the court is bound to issue habeas corpus exercising parens patriae jurisdiction. Both the proceedings are summary but the proceedings under Guardians Act are substantive whereas habeas corpus proceedings are procedural. A child is not a property or a commodity. When the parents complain unlawful removal from its jurisdiction the court is bound to issue habeas corpus exercising parens patriae jurisdiction. Both the proceedings are summary but the proceedings under Guardians Act are substantive whereas habeas corpus proceedings are procedural. Even if the child is not within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, if the parties had already approached a competent civil court which is within the supervisory or superintendence jurisdictional area of the High Court, it is entitled to assume jurisdiction. The factum of relocation of a child is no ground to oust habeas corpus jurisdiction of the High Court. We, therefore, hold on the issue against the third respondent and in favour of the petitioner. Parental priority issue Section 6 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 (the Hindu Minority Act), supplemental legislation to Guardians Act – confers the status of natural guardian on father for boy or an unmarried girl. The mother takes a secondary place. Emphasising this, the senior counsel would urge that when the third respondent relocated Sruthi at Bali, his custody is not unlawful and habeas corpus be denied. He, however, does not dispute that though the baby is with the third respondent, the petitioner has visitation rights and that for the last about one year, she is deprived of daughter’s custody limited to periodical visitation period. There is no doubt that the third respondent avoided the determination of the parenting issues. This puts the petitioner in a disadvantageous position. Can this be accented by this Court as justified under Section 6 of the Hindu Minority Act? The myth of father’s preferential right to minor custody is destroyed in Geetha Hariharan v Reserve Bank of India (1999) 2 SCC 228 . Applying the principle of purposive interpretation, the apex Court ensured gender equal parenting rights while interpreting Section 6(a) of the Hindu Minority Act. The ratio therein is that father by reason of dominant personality cannot be ascribed to have a preferential right over the mother in the matter of guardianship since both fall within the same category and the word “after” in Section 6 shall have to be interpreted in terms of the constitutional safeguards and guarantees. The ratio therein is that father by reason of dominant personality cannot be ascribed to have a preferential right over the mother in the matter of guardianship since both fall within the same category and the word “after” in Section 6 shall have to be interpreted in terms of the constitutional safeguards and guarantees. Therefore, we have to reject the submission and hold that the claim by the third respondent to have preferential right to remove Sruthi from the jurisdiction of Courts in Andhra Pradesh and relocate to Bali cannot be upheld. Relevancy issue In his pleadings, third respondent took a stand that the American Courts favoured him by granting custody rights. Even in the Memo filed before the Family Court, he asserted that the US Courts permitted him to have child custody. This was an incorrect statement. Of course, the Court of Appeals for the State of Washington nullified the FCC’s parenting plan holding that the Court at Washington lacks subject matter jurisdiction. The Court at Tennessee also denied habeas corpus for the same reason. The orders of the American Court, thus, are relevant and go against the third respondent himself, who seems under an idea that he got a court validated licence to have custody of Sruthi, which emboldened him to relocate to Bali. Having taken recourse to the orders of American Courts, at this stage he cannot be heard to say contra. The issue is accordingly decided against the third respondent. Paramount interest issue In child custody matters, Indian Courts exercise parens patriae jurisdiction. The principle of comity of nations or jurisdictions, ordinarily, does not bar exercise of such jurisdiction. They have two options – either to direct the production of detained child before the competent Indian court or foreign court or determine the paramount or best interest of the child as parens patriae (V.Ravichandran (Dr) (2) v Union of India (2010) 1 SCC 174 , Shilpa Aggarwal v Aviral Mittal (2010) 1 SCC 591 andRuchi Majoo). The warring parents cannot object to the exercise of parens patriae jurisdiction by the High Court or the civil Court, as the case may be. The competent Court, say Family Court is already seized of the matter in the original petition moved by the petitioner. Who should have custody of Sruthi is a matter of enquiry by the said Court. The warring parents cannot object to the exercise of parens patriae jurisdiction by the High Court or the civil Court, as the case may be. The competent Court, say Family Court is already seized of the matter in the original petition moved by the petitioner. Who should have custody of Sruthi is a matter of enquiry by the said Court. Pending those proceedings, the petitioner in our considered opinion cannot be deprived of her visitation rights or periodical custody of the minor growing girl especially when the third respondent admits that even as per the orders of the American Courts, the petitioner has for visitation rights and it was she who was supporting their daughter under the Child Support Order passed by the Superior King County Court, Washington. The unilateral relocation of Sruthi by third respondent while child custody proceedings are pending before the Family Court, suddenly destroyed the level playing field. This is adverse to the interesting mother and the custody of her daughter with the third respondent is certainly unlawful. He is bound to produce the child before the Family Court which has already passed an order of injunction in I.A.No.726 of 2011, which has to be respected and enforced. Conclusion In the result, the writ petition is allowed. A writ of Habeas Corpus shall issue to third respondent to produce Sruthi, a minor child aged about 7 years, daughter of the petitioner and the third respondent before the Family Court within four weeks from the date of receipt of copy of this Order, to be communicated to the third respondent by his counsel forthwith by e-mail. On failure to comply with the writ, the court directs the Director General and Inspector General of Police, Government of Andhra Pradesh and the Officers designated by him to take all steps for production of third respondent and Sruthi before the Family Court. The writ petition with the above directions is allowed with costs set at Rs.1,00,000/-(Rupees one lakh only) to be paid by the third respondent directly to the petitioner by way of demand draft or through electronic money transfer. The W.P.M.P.Nos.9261 and 9262 of 2012 shall stand disposed of.