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2012 DIGILAW 444 (BOM)

Yogesh Panditrao Khaire v. State of Maharashtra

2012-02-28

A.M.KHANWILKAR, R.G.KETKAR

body2012
Judgment :- A.M. Khanwilkar, J. Heard the counsel for the parties. 2. Rule. The learned Public Prosecutor waives service for the respondents. Rule is made returnable forthwith by consent. 3. As short question is involved, petition is taken up for final disposal forthwith by consent. 4. The petitioners, by this Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, have challenged the notices dated 25th July, 2011 and 7th September, 2011 issued by respondent Nos.3 and 5, and have prayed for quashing and setting aside the same. They have also prayed for direction against respondent Nos.3 to 5 to refrain from disturbing the petitioners from running their hotel till 3.00 A.M., in view of Government Notification dated 5th March, 2011 bearing No.BSE-03/2010/P.K.69/Kamgar-10 issued by the Government of Maharashtra, Department of Industries, Energy and Labour, Mantralaya, Mumbai. 5. During the pendency of this petition, the petitioners have prayed for further relief by amending the writ petition. The petitioners have sought declaration that Rule 9 of Notification dated 18th July, 1991 issued by the Commissioner of Police, Nashik, is null and void and to quash the same. 6. The petitioners assert that they are running hotel known as "Hotel Saheba", near Mumbai Naka, Bus Stand, Motkarwadi, Nashik. The petitioners have obtained licence bearing No.124/4 (Gangapur Road) 2005 on 22nd March, 2005 from Shop Inspector, Nashik, under the provisions of the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act of 1948", for short) for running the said hotel. In addition, the petitioners registered their establishment, being an "eating house" with the Assistant Police Commissioner (Administration), for which, a certificate has been issued bearing No.CPN/HER/72/96 dated 9th December, 1996, under the provisions of the Bombay Police Act, 1951 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act of 1951"). In due course, the petitioners got the said licence as well as certificate renewed from the concerned Authorities from time to time as per the licence conditions issued under the provisions of the Act of 1948. In due course, the petitioners got the said licence as well as certificate renewed from the concerned Authorities from time to time as per the licence conditions issued under the provisions of the Act of 1948. According to the petitioners, they could keep their establishment open up to 3.00 A.M., whereas, as per the certificate issued by the Assistant Police Commissioner (Administration), they could keep the eating house registered for the purpose of the Act of 1951 open only between 5.00 A.M. and 11.00 P.M. According to the petitioners, their hotel is only an eating house, and not a place of public amusement or a place of public entertainment. The petitioners are supplying only food or drink for consumption in the said hotel to their customers on payment. 7. The petitioners, however, received show-cause notice from respondent No.3, Assistant Commissioner of Police (Administration), dated 25th July, 2011 to show cause why the registration granted to the petitioners to run the eating house should not be cancelled, as the petitioners have violated the terms and conditions specified in the Certificate of Registration, which permitted the petitioners to keep the eating house open only between 5.00 A.M. to 11.00 P.M., whereas the petitioners' eating house was found open up to 2.00 A.M., as noted in the report submitted to respondent No.5 to respondent No.3 dated 19th April, 2011. The notice stated that the petitioners had committed breach of Sections 131-A and 131-AA of the Act of 1951. 8. The notice stated that the petitioners had committed breach of Sections 131-A and 131-AA of the Act of 1951. 8. It is the case of the petitioners that Hotel Saheba has been duly exempted by the Government of Maharashtra through its Department of Industries, Energy and Labour vide Government Notification dated 5th March, 2011 from the time specified in Section 19 of the Act of 1948, and, instead, allowing the eating house (hotel) to be kept open till 3.00 A.M. The petitioners also made representation to the Government of Maharashtra, through its Department of Industries, Energy and Labour, Mantralaya, Mumbai, and requested for issuing directions to respondent No.3 in the context of Government Notification dated 5th March, 2011 granting exemption to the petitioners under Section 19 of the Act of 1948 so as to allow the petitioners to keep their eating house open till 3.00 A.M. According to the petitioners, the Department of Industries, Energy and Labour informed the concerned police station about the Government Notification dated 5th March, 2011, which permitted the petitioners to keep their eating house (hotel) open till 3.00 A.M. 9. Instead of taking note of the said communication from the Department of Industries, Energy and Labour, respondent No.5 issued another show-cause notice on 7th September, 2011 to the petitioners. This notice is addressed to petitioner No.3. It is stated that the petitioners have committed offence under Section 33(w), read with Section 131 of the Act of 1951 by keeping the eating house (hotel) open till 2.30 A.M. on 7th September, 2011. The petitioners have, therefore, rushed to this Court by way of present writ petition initially challenging the two show-cause notices and for issuance of direction against respondent Nos.3 to 5 that they should not disturb the petitioners from running their hotel till 3.00 A.M. in view of Government Notification dated 5th March, 2011. 10. As aforesaid, during the pendency of this petition, the petitioners have amended the petition, and have asked for further relief of quashing and setting aside Rule 9 of the Notification dated 18th July, 1991 issued by the Commissioner of Police, Nashik, being illegal and ultra vires. 11. This petition has been resisted by filing reply of Inspector of Police attached to Sarkarwada Police Station, Nashik City. 11. This petition has been resisted by filing reply of Inspector of Police attached to Sarkarwada Police Station, Nashik City. In substance, it is stated that the petitioners have breached Condition No.2 of the Certificate of Registration issued by the Assistant Police Commissioner (Administration) to register the eating house (Hotel) Saheba Restaurant for the purposes of the provisions of the Act of 1951 and the Rules framed thereunder. As per the said Certificate of Registration, the eating house was allowed to be kept open between 5.00 A.M. till 11.00 P.M. only; but it was noticed that the petitioners were keeping the said eating house open beyond the said specified time and as late as till 2.30 A.M. That necessitated the issuance of impugned show-cause notices to the petitioners for violating the terms and conditions specified in the Certificate of Registration. It is also stated that the State Government has now adopted uniform policy to allow the establishments to serve food and liquor up to 11.30 P.M. and to shut down the same at 12.30 A.M. The affidavit also records that the Department of Industries, Energy and Labour are in the process of re-considering all cases where permission has been granted by it to keep the establishments open beyond 12.30 A.M.; and, further, no relaxation will be granted, except with prior consultation with other concerned Departments, such as Police Authorities. It is also pointed out in the reply-affidavit that the petitioners are relying on the permission/licence granted by the Industries, Energy and Labour Department dated 27th July, 2011, which is issued in the name of Saheba Hotel Pvt. Ltd., whereas the Certificate of Registration is granted by the Assistant Commissioner of Police (Administration) in the name of Saheba Restaurant. Accordingly, it is submitted that the writ petition be dismissed, being devoid of merits. 12. After considering the arguments and the material on record, the first question which needs to be answered is: Whether the permission/licence granted by the Industries, Energy and Labour Department dated 27th July, 2011 is of any avail to the petitioners, who are claiming relief in respect of Saheba Restaurant at Nashik? 12. After considering the arguments and the material on record, the first question which needs to be answered is: Whether the permission/licence granted by the Industries, Energy and Labour Department dated 27th July, 2011 is of any avail to the petitioners, who are claiming relief in respect of Saheba Restaurant at Nashik? The petitioners have relied on the licence, Exhibit 'B', issued by the Shop Inspector, Nashik, under the Act of 1948 in the name of Saheba Hotel Pvt. Ltd. Indeed, the names of the petitioners are mentioned as Directors of the said Private Limited Company having office at Mumbai Naka, Mumbai-Agra Road, near Highway Bus Stop, Nashik, whereas the Certificate of Registration granted by the Assistant Police Commissioner (Administration), Exhibit 'A', is in respect of establishment Saheba Restaurant at Mumbai Naka, near Bus Stop, Motkarwadi, Nashik. Even this certificate has been issued in favour of the petitioners. This anomaly has not been explained by the petitioners in the rejoinder-affidavit. It is a different matter that the address mentioned in the authorisation/permission issued by the two Authorities under different enactments are similar. However, the former licence issued under the Act of 1948 is in the name of Saheba Hotel Pvt. Ltd., whereas the latter certificate of registration issued under the Act of 1951 is in the name of Saheba Restaurant only. Unless this anomaly was explained by the petitioners on affidavit, we fail to understand as to how the petitioners can take the matter further. 13. Assuming that the discrepancy is in respect of description of the name of the establishment in the two licences/certificates of registration issued by different Authorities under different enactments, the question is: Whether the conditions specified in the licence issued by the Authority, i.e., Shop Inspector, Nashik, under the provisions of the Act of 1948, would prevail over the conditions specified in the Certificate of Registration issued by the Assistant Commissioner of Police (Administration) under the Act of 1951? It is indisputable that both these enactments operate in different fields. 14. As regards the Act of 1948, it is an Act to consolidate and amend the law relating to the regulation of conditions of work and employment in shops, commercial establishments, residential hotels, restaurants, eating houses, theatres, other places of public amusement or entertainment and other establishments. It is indisputable that both these enactments operate in different fields. 14. As regards the Act of 1948, it is an Act to consolidate and amend the law relating to the regulation of conditions of work and employment in shops, commercial establishments, residential hotels, restaurants, eating houses, theatres, other places of public amusement or entertainment and other establishments. The extent and operation of the Act of 1948 is to regulate the conditions of work and employment in the specified establishments. In other words, this Act, inter alia, deals with the establishment as defined in Section 2(8) of the Act. The expression "closed" has been defined in Section 2(3) of this Act to mean not open for the service of any customer, or for any business, of the establishment, or for work, by or with the help of any employee, of or connected with the establishment. This definition reinforces that the time specified for keeping the establishment open is to regulate the conditions of work and employment of the employees of the said establishment. For, the establishment can remain open beyond the specified working hours for other purposes, so long as it is not by or with the help of any employee, of or connected with the establishment for doing any business or for giving service to any customer. The expression "commercial establishment" has been defined in Section 2(4) of the Act of 1948, which excludes the factory, shop, residential hotel, restaurant, eating house, theatre or other place of public amusement or entertainment. The expression "eating house" has not been defined separately, but it is covered in the inclusive term of the "establishment" under Section 2(8) of the Act of 1948. The registration of establishment covered under the Act of 1948 is essentially for the purpose of regulating the conditions of work and employment in the establishment which, in no way, addresses the issue of the public order and law and order as such. The timing specified in the Act of 1948 for opening and closing of the establishments is essentially to effectuate the conditions of work and employment of the employees in the establishments covered under the Act of 1948. 15. The timing specified in the Act of 1948 for opening and closing of the establishments is essentially to effectuate the conditions of work and employment of the employees in the establishments covered under the Act of 1948. 15. On the other hand, the Act of 1951 is to consolidate and amend the law for the regulation of the Police Force in the State and intended to amalgamate the different district police forces into one common police force and to introduce the uniform methods regarding the working control of the said Force throughout the State. It is also intended to consolidate and amend the law relating to the regulation of the said Force and the exercise of power and performance of functions by the State Government and by the members of the said Force for the maintenance of the public order. Thus, it is a comprehensive enactment not only intended to amalgamate different Police Forces into one common Police Force throughout the State but also to provide for the powers and performance of functions by the State Government and by the members of the police force for the maintenance of the public order. Section 33, which falls in Chapter IV of the Act of 1951, dealing with police regulations, provides for power to make rules or regulation of traffic and for preservation of order in public place and other matters. Subsection (1) thereof provides that the Commissioner, the District Magistrate and the Superintendent of Police in respect of specified matters in concerned clauses in respect of areas under their respective charges or any part thereof, may make, alter or rescind rules or orders not inconsistent with the Act of 1951. Clause (xa) thereof deals with the matter relating to registration of eating house, including granting a certificate of registration in each case, which shall be deemed to be a written permission required and obtained under the Act of 1951 for keeping the eating house, and annual renewal of such registration within a prescribed period. This is a deeming provision. The Certificate of Registration granted by the Police Authorities to the establishment is in the nature of written permission, as is required to be obtained for the purposes of that Act. This is a deeming provision. The Certificate of Registration granted by the Police Authorities to the establishment is in the nature of written permission, as is required to be obtained for the purposes of that Act. Clause (y) of the said section stipulates prescribing the procedure in accordance with which any licence or permission sought to be obtained or required under the said Act should be applied for and fixing the fees to be charged for any such licence or permission. The expression "eating house" has been defined in Section 2(5A) of the Act of 1951. It means any place to which the public are admitted, and where any kind of food or drink is supplied for consumption in the premises by any person owing or having an interest in or managing such place, and include a refreshment room, boarding-house, coffee-house or a shop where any kind of food or drink is supplied to the public for consumption in or near such shop; but does not include "place of public entertainment". In the present case, we are not concerned with the place of public entertainment, as, admittedly, the establishment run by the petitioners is an eating house. The definition of "place of public amusement" and "place of public entertainment" is found in Section 2(9) and 2(10) of the Act of 1951, respectively. 16. It is noticed that the Commissioner of Police, Nashik, in exercise of powers under the Act of 1951 and the enabling provisions thereunder, including Section 33(1)(xa) and (y) has framed Rules. It is not in dispute that the Commissioner of Police, Nashik, was competent to frame such Rules in terms of Section 33(1) of the Act of 1951. The said Rules are called "the Eating Houses within the jurisdiction of Nashik Police Commissioner Registration Rules, 1990". These Rules are framed, inter alia, for the purpose of maintenance of the public order. Rule 9 thereof stipulates that the permit holder shall keep open eating house between morning 5.00 (A.M.) onwards till night 11.00 (P.M). The said Rules are called "the Eating Houses within the jurisdiction of Nashik Police Commissioner Registration Rules, 1990". These Rules are framed, inter alia, for the purpose of maintenance of the public order. Rule 9 thereof stipulates that the permit holder shall keep open eating house between morning 5.00 (A.M.) onwards till night 11.00 (P.M). Since the field covered by the Act of 1951 is in respect of maintenance of the public order and not limited to regulating work and employment of the employees in an establishment, as in the case of the Act of 1948, the provisions of the Act of 1951 and the permission granted by the Police Authority under the said Act and the terms and conditions, on which permission is granted, ought to prevail. 17. To get over this position, the counsel for the petitioners had stoutly relied on the decision of the learned Single Judge of this Court in Sardar Refreshments v. State of Maharashtra & Anr., reported in 2005 (3) Mh.L.J. 792 . In that case, the restaurant was in existence for over two decades in Mumbai. An eating house licence was obtained in respect of the said restaurant under the provisions of the Act of 1948. By State Government Notification, the said establishment was exempted from the provisions of Section 19 of the Act of 1948 subject to condition that it should not be opened on any day earlier than 12.00 Noon or closed after 2.00 A.M. In view of the State Government Notification entry 268 of the Second Schedule to the Act of 1948 was added to include the said establishment. In the backdrop of these facts, the Court considered the matter, and held that there is a specific exemption from the application of Section 19 of the Act of 1948; and the condition is that the establishment should not be opened earlier than 12.00 Noon or closed after 2.00 A.M. It went on to observe that that exemption is made part of the Second Schedule to the Act of 1948, and is, therefore, part of the statute. The Court further opined that, pursuant to the power to bring about any change in the Second Schedule to the Act of 1948, the State has the power to do so by issuance of Notification under the Act published in the Official Gazette. The Court further opined that, pursuant to the power to bring about any change in the Second Schedule to the Act of 1948, the State has the power to do so by issuance of Notification under the Act published in the Official Gazette. Until that is done, it would be impermissible by means of administrative circular to issue direction which would control the opening and closing hours as they exist in pursuance of the exemption granted in the Second Schedule with reference to the premises of an establishment listed therein. On this finding, the Court proceeded to quash the endorsement in respect of hours of work of the establishment or in the eating house licence of the petitioner noted by the Police Authorities under the Act of 1951. 18. With due respect, in our opinion, the validity of the condition prescribed regarding working hours in the Certificate of Registration issued under the Act of 1951 cannot be decided on the basis of the working hours of the establishment specified for the purposes of another State enactment, which, admittedly, does not deal with the question of maintenance of the public order, but is limited to regulating the conditions of work and employment of the employees of the establishment. 19. Notably, Section 4 of the Act of 1948 opens with non-obstante clause. It postulates that, notwithstanding anything contained in this Act (Act of 1948), the provisions of that Act mentioned in the third column of Schedule II shall not apply to the establishments, employees and other persons mentioned against them in the second column of the said Schedule. Thus, the sweep of non-obstante clause is limited to the provisions of the Act of 1948 and in respect of establishments, employees and other persons mentioned against them in the second column of Schedule thereunder. The exemption granted in exercise of power under this provision can have no bearing on the conditions specified in the order passed by the Competent Authority under the Act of 1951 or the Rules framed under that Act. It will be too simplistic approach to accept the argument that both the Authorities under the Act of 1948 or the Act of 1951 are essentially discharging the powers of the State and, therefore, the condition specified by the Authority under the Act of 1951 must be in consonance with the timing specified in the Act of 1948. It will be too simplistic approach to accept the argument that both the Authorities under the Act of 1948 or the Act of 1951 are essentially discharging the powers of the State and, therefore, the condition specified by the Authority under the Act of 1951 must be in consonance with the timing specified in the Act of 1948. As aforesaid, the Act of 1948 operates in the limited field of regulation of condition of work and employment of the employees in the concerned establishments governed by the provisions of the Act of 1948, whereas the Act of 1951 operates in a different field and is in respect of the police powers to be exercised thereunder by the Police Authority for facilitating and ensuring maintenance of the public order. The conditions specified by the Competent Authority in the Certificate of Registration issued under the Act of 1951, which, again, is a subsequent State enactment and dealing with different subject-matter, ought to prevail. This crucial aspect has been completely glossed over in the said decision. Moreover, in the present case, the Certificate of Registration issued by the Assistant Commissioner of Police (Administration) for running of eating house is in conformity with the Rules framed under the Act of 1951. Thus, it is not based on an administrative circular as such. 20. To get over this position, the petitioners have amended the writ petition, and have challenged the validity of Rule 9 of the Rules of 1990. According to the petitioners, the Rules of 1990 are ascribable to power under Section 33(1)(xa) of the Act of 1951, which is limited to registration of eating houses. The expression "registration" is used in contra-distinction to the word "licence" used elsewhere in the Act. According to the petitioners, this presupposes that the police cannot usurp the powers of specifying the timings of the eating house and, at any rate, contrary to the timings specified for the said establishment under the Act of 1948 and the licence issued thereunder. Section 33 of the Act of 1951 is purely for the purpose of regulation of traffic and preservation of the public order. This provision can never be extended for providing for working hours of the establishment governed by the provisions of the Act of 1948. Therefore, Rule 9 of the Rules of 1990 is ultra vires and ought to be struck down. 21. This provision can never be extended for providing for working hours of the establishment governed by the provisions of the Act of 1948. Therefore, Rule 9 of the Rules of 1990 is ultra vires and ought to be struck down. 21. To buttress the above argument, the petitioners have invited our attention to the provisions contained in Section 33(1)(e), (i), (j) and (v) of the Act of 1951, which refer to the hours of the day for the purpose of the respective clauses. This, it is argued, is conspicuously lacking in Section 33(1)(xa). Thus, the Rules to be framed in exercise of powers under Section 33(1)(xa) must be limited to registration of eating houses, and not to specify or regulate the timing of the establishments governed by the provisions of the Act of 1948. According to the petitioners, the Rules of 1990, which came into force consequent to Notification dated 18th July, 1991, have become redundant with the changing times. It is common knowledge that, after liberalisation policy adopted by India and the Information Technology environment, the call centres/BPOs operate 24x7. Even the industrial hubs operate in three shifts round-the-clock. Even the places of public amusement, such as cinema houses and theatres, operate till late night without any problem. The ATM Centres operate 24x7. Considering these developments, the norms specified in the Rules of 1990 regarding working hours are harsh to the general public and have outlived their purpose. On these arguments, it is urged that Rule 9 of the Rules of 1990 be struck down. 22. We shall deal with the last argument first. We have no hesitation in accepting the argument of the learned Public Prosecutor that the rights guaranteed under Article 19(1) (g) of the Constitution of India are not absolute. It is open to restrict those rights, but such restriction must be reasonable one and in the interests of the general public. As aforesaid, the Rules of 1990 have been framed in exercise of powers under the Act of 1951 with a view to facilitate maintenance of the public order. 23. The question is: Whether the Rules of 1990 providing for keeping the eating house open only till 11.00 P.M. can be said to be unreasonable and, therefore, ultra vires? In the first place, no argument is advanced before us to challenge the competence of the Authority concerned to frame such Rules. 23. The question is: Whether the Rules of 1990 providing for keeping the eating house open only till 11.00 P.M. can be said to be unreasonable and, therefore, ultra vires? In the first place, no argument is advanced before us to challenge the competence of the Authority concerned to frame such Rules. Further, the time restrictions specified in Rule 9 to keep the eating houses open until 11.00 P.M. cannot be said to be, per se, unreasonable, as it is intended to facilitate maintenance of the public order. Closing the eating houses at 11.00 P.M., even though the other work places may be open beyond that time, at best, is a case of causing inconvenience to the working public, but, by no standards, it can be considered as unreasonable, keeping in mind the interests of the general public, much less as having no nexus with the object sought to be achieved by the Act of 1951 and the Rules of 1990. A priori, the challenge to Rule 9 of the Rules of 1990 on the ground pressed into service by the petitioners cannot be countenanced. 24. The next argument of the petitioners, is that, some of the clauses in sub-section (1) of Section 33 refer to certain hours of the day, which expression is conspicuously absent in Section 33(1)(xa) of the Act of 1951. That, in our opinion, does not mean that clause (xa), by necessary implication, excludes the police power to specify working hours of the eating house while issuing Certificate of Registration under the Act of 1951, which is intended for maintenance of the public order. On the other hand, the language of clause (xa) does not warrant such interpretation. We may usefully refer to clause (xa). The same reads thus:- "33. Power to make rules for regulation of traffic and for preservation of order in public place, etc.- (1) The Commissioner with respect to any of the matters specified in this sub-section, the District Magistrate with respect to any of the said matters (except those falling under clauses (a), (b), (d), (db), (e), (g), (r), (t) and (u) thereof), and the Superintendent of Police with respect to the matters falling under the clauses aforementioned read with clause (y) of this sub-section, in areas under their respective charges or any part thereof, may make, alter or rescind rules or orders not inconsistent with this Act for -.. (xa) registration of eating houses, including granting a certificate of registration in each case which shall be deemed to be a written permission required and obtained under this Act for keeping the eating house, and annual renewal of such registration within a prescribed period;" 25. On a bare reading of this provision, it not only bestows power on the designated Authority to make rules or orders not inconsistent with the Act of 1951 regarding registration of eating houses, but also takes within its fold terms and conditions on which such registration is granted for operating the eating houses to facilitate maintenance of the public order. The fact that clause (xa) refers to expression "registration of eating houses" and not to granting licence for running eating houses does not necessarily denude the Competent Authority under the Act of 1951 to grant registration of eating houses on such conditions as may be deemed necessary to keep it open only during the specified hours for maintenance of the public order. As noticed earlier, clause (xa) of Section 33(1) of the Act of 1951 is a deeming provision -which stipulates that the Certificate of Registration is deemed to be a written permission "required" and "obtained" under the Act of 1951. Taking any other view would render that provision otiose and mean that no written permission of the Police Authority is required at all. It cannot be gainsaid that keeping any eating house open is to keep a public place open to which the public are admitted for service of any kind of food or drink for consumption in the premises. That activity can certainly be regulated by the Police Authorities for maintenance of the public order. 26. Nothing has been brought to our notice that the working hours specified in Rule 9 of the Rules of 1990 are, in any way, inconsistent with any of the provisions of the Act of 1951. The Certificate of Registration to be issued by the Police Authorities in exercise of powers under the Act of 1951 and the Rules framed thereunder, and more particularly prescribing the working hours to keep the concerned establishment open, is, essentially, for maintenance of the public order. The Certificate of Registration to be issued by the Police Authorities in exercise of powers under the Act of 1951 and the Rules framed thereunder, and more particularly prescribing the working hours to keep the concerned establishment open, is, essentially, for maintenance of the public order. Further, the validity of Rule 9 of the Rules framed under the Act of 1951 cannot be questioned on the basis of the provisions in another State enactment, which, admittedly, does not cover the field of maintenance of the public order. In our opinion, therefore, there is no merit in the challenge to Rule 9 of the Rules of 1990. 27. The petitioners had invited our attention to the meaning of expression "register" and "licence" as spelt out from the Concise Oxford Dictionary, Ninth Edition, and the Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition. However, that will be of no avail to the petitioners, considering our opinion that the power bestowed by the Act of 1951 in the Police Authorities to issue registration of eating house will include granting such registration on terms and conditions as may be warranted for running the eating house for maintenance of the public order. 28. The petitioners also placed reliance on another decision of the Single Judge of this Court in the case of Farid Abdul Latif Noorani v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., reported in 2007 (5) Bom.C.R. 114 . In that case, the challenge was to the order passed by the Competent Authority for cancelling Registration Certificates issued under the Act of 1951. The said Registration Certificates were cancelled on the ground that the certificate-holder was running the eating house beyond prescribed period. The argument, which is canvassed before us has been noted while recording the grounds agitated by the petitioners therein. However, on analysis of the reasons recorded in the reported decision, we find that the Court proceeded to answer the controversy on the finding that the Competent Authority had committed manifest error in issuing show-cause notice under Section 33(w) of the Act of 1951 in respect of the establishment, which was only an eating house, and not house for the public amusement or entertainment. The Court then considered the facts of the said case, and held that the decision of the Competent Authority of cancellation of Certificate of Registration is disproportionate, for which reason also, the same deserved to be set aside. The Court then considered the facts of the said case, and held that the decision of the Competent Authority of cancellation of Certificate of Registration is disproportionate, for which reason also, the same deserved to be set aside. Thus, this is not an authority on the point under consideration in the present matter. 29. As is noted in the reply-affidavit filed by the State in the present petition, the matter has been considered at the appropriate level, and it has been decided that the Department of Industries, Energy and Labour, before granting exemption in exercise of power under the Act of 1948, in future, shall do so in consultation with the Police Authorities. Further, the said Department has decided to review all the cases, in which exemption has been granted by it, to bring in conformity with the perception of the Police Authorities, who have the authority and are obliged to ensure maintenance of the public order in the concerned area. That may have to be done on a case-to-case basis. Be that as it may, for the view taken in this decision, the working hours specified in the Rules framed under the Act of 1951 or in the Registration Certificate issued to the establishment by the Competent Authority under the Act of 1951 ought to prevail and will have to be abided by the concerned establishment. 30. As is noticed earlier, this writ petition has been filed primarily to challenge the show-cause notices issued by the Competent Authority under the Act of 1951. Ordinarily, this Court ought to be loath in interfering at the show-cause notice stage. However, since the petitioners have raised wider issues, including about the authority of the police to impose working hours as condition for grant of Certificate of Registration for the purpose of the Act of 1951, we deemed it appropriate to examine the controversy in detail on merits. 31. That takes us to the accompanying Civil Application. During the pendency of this petition, ad-interim relief in terms of prayer clause (b) of the petition was granted to the petitioners. However, on 28th November, 2011, grievance was made before us that the petitioners were not in a position to avail of the ad-interim relief because the local police officer has seized the eating house licence of the petitioners. That fact was refuted by the Pubic Prosecutor. However, on 28th November, 2011, grievance was made before us that the petitioners were not in a position to avail of the ad-interim relief because the local police officer has seized the eating house licence of the petitioners. That fact was refuted by the Pubic Prosecutor. For that reason, we gave liberty to the petitioners to take out formal application and pray for appropriate reliefs as may be advised. In that context, this application has been filed. 32. In the application, it is asserted by the petitioners that their licence bearing No.CPN/EHR/72/1996 was seized by the D.C.P., Shri Sahebrao Patil, on 13th October, 2011 from their hotel premises. That seizure was done without effecting any panchnama. It was a highhanded and unwarranted action of the officer, which ought not to be countenanced. On this assertion, it is prayed that the respondents be directed to return the said licence to the petitioners. 33. In response to this application, Sahebrao Himmatrao Patil, Deputy Commissioner of Police, Zone-I, has filed his personal affidavit, although he is not party-respondent in the said application. He has denied all the allegations made by the petitioners, and has called upon them to be put to strict proof thereof. According to him, the petitioners have made baseless allegations with a view to put the police machinery on the back-foot and not take action against the erring persons, such as the petitioners. As a matter of fact, he has stated, on affidavit, that, on 13th October, 2011, he had never visited the petitioners' establishment as alleged or otherwise. He has denied the allegation of having seized the licence or, for that matter, having kept the same in his custody. He has stated that, on 13th October, 2011, he was conducting departmental enquiry and doing other office work in his office. He did patrolling on College Road, Canara Corner and Gangapur Road. He did not visit the petitioners' hotel on that date. These facts are reinforced from his diary of schedule/programme which is maintained in his office. Accordingly, he submits that action should be taken against the petitioners by issuing perjury notice, having made statements on affidavit, which are false to their knowledge. 34. Notably, no rejoinder-affidavit has been filed by the petitioners to refute the stand taken by the said police officer. Accordingly, he submits that action should be taken against the petitioners by issuing perjury notice, having made statements on affidavit, which are false to their knowledge. 34. Notably, no rejoinder-affidavit has been filed by the petitioners to refute the stand taken by the said police officer. Further, the matter was fully heard on 13th January, 2012 in the morning session, as it was listed 1st on Board in terms of the previous order. The matter was exhaustively argued by Mr. H.E. Palwe. During his arguments, he did not invite our attention to the criminal application and the reliefs claimed therein and more particularly the affidavit filed by the officer. He addressed us only on the basis of pleadings and documents in the writ petition. 35. However, when the Court was about to rise at about 5.30 P.M. on that day, some other advocate mentioned the Criminal Application for withdrawal. Initially, we were inclined to grant the said request, without realising that the Criminal Application was in the same matter which has been heard and reserved for judgment. However, as that request was vehemently objected by the learned Public Prosecutor, who insisted that this is a fit case where the petitioners should be proceeded for making false and irresponsible allegations against a senior police officer, we did not allow withdrawal of the Criminal Application and decided to dispose it of along with the Writ Petition. The petitioners, realising that the allegations made in the Criminal Application are false, and cannot be substantiated, more particularly in view of the uncontrovertible stand of the concerned police officer on affidavit, are, now, not interested in pursuing this Criminal Application. However, we will not permit them to withdraw the application, but will reject the same, being ill-advised and misadventure of the petitioners. 36. At the same time, we record our deep anguish for the manner in which an unsuccessful attempt was made by the petitioners through their Advocate to withdraw the application without inviting our attention thereto during the hearing of the writ petition. However, instead of issuing suo motu perjury notice, as suggested in the reply-affidavit, as also by the Public Prosecutor, we leave all remedies to the State of Maharashtra, as well as Shri Sahebrao Himmatrao Patil, Deputy Commissioner of Police, Zone I, Nashik City, open. However, instead of issuing suo motu perjury notice, as suggested in the reply-affidavit, as also by the Public Prosecutor, we leave all remedies to the State of Maharashtra, as well as Shri Sahebrao Himmatrao Patil, Deputy Commissioner of Police, Zone I, Nashik City, open. They are free to pursue their remedies against the petitioners in relation to the false, reckless and unsubstantiated allegations made against the senior police officer in the said Criminal Application. All questions in that behalf will have to be decided in the proposed proceedings, if resorted to, in view of the liberty granted as above, on their own merits. 37. As a result, we proceed to pass the following order:- (1) Criminal Writ Petition is dismissed, being devoid of merits, with liberty to the Competent Authority to proceed against the petitioners on the basis of the impugned show-cause notices in accordance with law. Rule is discharged. (2) Criminal Application is dismissed with the observations made in paragraph 36 above.