JUDGMENT Amitava Roy, J. 1. These appeals arise from and call in question the common judgment and order dated July 2, 2008 (Dhanani Shoes Ltd. v. State of Assam [2008] 16 VST 228 (Gauhati)) rendered in Review Petition No. 47 of 2008 and W. P. (C) No. 1781 of 2008 preferred by the respondents herein, whereas by the decision impugned the judgment and order dated April 11, 2008 (Dhanani Shoes Ltd. v. State of Assam [2008] 14 VST 422 (Gauhati)) originally pronounced in W. P. (C) No. 1050 of 2008 (for a review whereof R. P. No. 47 of 2008 was registered at the instance of the respondents herein) had been reversed on review, the assailment of the notice dated April 16, 2008 under section 74(5)(b) of the Assam Value Added Tax Act, 2003 (for short, hereinafter referred to as, "the Act") has been sustained. Being aggrieved by this composite verdict, the Revenue is in appeal. We have heard Mr. K. N. Choudhury, learned Additional Advocate-General, Assam assisted by Mr. R. Dubey, learned Standing Counsel, Finance and Taxation Department of the State for the appellant and Dr. A. K. Saraf, learned senior counsel for the respondents. 2. A fascicule of the essential facts would provide the background for the contentious pleas raised. The respondent-company has introduced itself to be one incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956 and registered both under the Central Sales Tax Act as well as the Assam Value Added Tax Act, 2003 dealing primarily in plastic and leather footwear, sports goods, readymade garments and other allied business in North-East India. It is a distributor of classified products including various branded footwear and is engaged in the business of stocking, wholesaling and retailing thereof in this region. 3. According to it, on February 6, 2008 the Inspector of Taxes, Unit-B, Guwahati, visited its godown situated at Dhirenpara, Guwahati, for a routine inspection and on a misconception issued a notice of the even date under section 74(1) of the Act and demanded from it production of all necessary documents in the nature of books of accounts on the very date itself to ascertain the tax payable by it. A seizure list was prepared thereafter whereby the respondent-company's entire stock of goods lying thereat which, according to it, were of plastic make worth approximately Rs.1.93 crores was seized. A seizure list was prepared thereafter whereby the respondent-company's entire stock of goods lying thereat which, according to it, were of plastic make worth approximately Rs.1.93 crores was seized. The related stock register, five books reflecting business transactions, 1 bundle of loose slips relating thereto, 18 challan books, 11 rough books depicting such transactions and 1 purchase file were also seized. 4. Being aggrieved, the respondent-company on March 7, 2008 submitted a representation before the aforementioned authority contending, inter alia, that the grounds on which the seizures had been effected were not tenable in law and that as the seized stock comprised of plastic goods and not leather goods, those were exigible at the rate of four per cent and not 12.5 per cent as assumed by him. As the representation did not meet with any favourable response, the respondent-company approached this court with W. P. (C) No. 1050 of 2008 (Dhanani Shoes Ltd. v. State of Assam [2008] 14 VST 422 (Gauhati)) seeking annulment of the impugned notice, the seizure memo and the zimmanama, all dated February 6, 2008 issued by the Inspector of Taxes, Unit-B, Guwahati. A direction was also sought for to the said authority to release the books of accounts along with other related documents and the entire stock of goods so seized. 5. The respondent-company in endorsement of the impugnment of the seizure, inter alia, maintained that not only in terms of the notice dated February 6, 2008 issued under section 74 of the Act the seizure of the entire stock of goods was impermissible in law, there being no conceivable reason for the departmental authority to entertain any reason to believe that it had evaded any tax or was attempting to do so, the seizure of its books of accounts too was wholly unauthorized. It contended as well that the ground enumerated in the seizure memo qua the stock in trade, namely, that those were not found matching with the invoices produced was clearly incompatible with the observation recorded in the same document that those matched with the ones of the stock register. That the concerned Revenue authority after effecting seizure of the entire stock of its goods had failed to comply with the imperative prescriptions of section 74(5)(b) of the Act was also underlined. That the concerned Revenue authority after effecting seizure of the entire stock of its goods had failed to comply with the imperative prescriptions of section 74(5)(b) of the Act was also underlined. It emphasized as well that its goods-in-trade having been duly accounted for in its books of accounts, not only one of the conditions precedent for the exercise of power under section 74(3)(a) of the Act did not exist, the seizure of its entire stock of goods in the purported invocation of power under section 74(5)(a) thereof was wholly illegal, arbitrary and without jurisdiction. 6. Having regard to the backdrop of facts and the contours of the assailment recited hereinabove, apt it would be to extract hereinbelow the contents of the aforementioned notice to produce or cause production of the necessary documents as well as the two seizure lists : Notice under section 74(1) of the AVAT Act, 2003 To M/s. Dhanani Shoes Ltd., Dhirenpara, Amtola, Guwahati. You are hereby required to produce or cause to be produced all the necessary documents pertaining to your business to the undersigned on February 6, 2008 at 2:30 P.M. in order to ascertain the tax paid/payable by you and for other verification. Books of accounts to be produced (1) Cash book (2) Ledger (3) Purchase bills (4) Stock register (5) Sale accounts (6) Any other relevant documents. Seizure List In exercise of the powers conferred under section 74(3) of the AVAT Act, 2003, I Sri D. Khersa, Inspector of Taxes, Unit-B found at the godown premises of M/s. Dhanani Shoes Ltd., at Amtola Dhirenpara, relating to the business of Sri Adul Kuddus, S/o Lt Sher All, godown incharge of the said business on today the February 6, 2008 at 3.30 p.m. on the ground stated below in presence of witnesses. Grounds of seizure :-The godown incharge misclassified the goods and effected sale at the lower rate. Goods (footwear) taxable at 12.5 per cent are entered into books of accounts as four pc. Hence taxes are likely to be found evaded payable under the AVAT Act, 2003. List of document seized : 1. Exhibit 1 5(five) Nos. note book containing business transactions. 2. Exhibit 2 1(one) bundle of loose slips relating to the business. 3. Exhibit 3 18(eighteen) Nos. of challan books. 4. Exhibit 4 1(one) Rough book containing business transaction. 5. Exhibit 5 1(one) purchase file. List of document seized : 1. Exhibit 1 5(five) Nos. note book containing business transactions. 2. Exhibit 2 1(one) bundle of loose slips relating to the business. 3. Exhibit 3 18(eighteen) Nos. of challan books. 4. Exhibit 4 1(one) Rough book containing business transaction. 5. Exhibit 5 1(one) purchase file. Seizure list In exercise of the powers conferred under section 74(5)(a) of the AVAT Act, 2003, I Sri D. Khersa, Inspector of Taxes, Unit-B, do hereby seize the following goods found at the godown of M/s. Dhanani Shoes Ltd. at Amtola, Dhirenpara, Guwahati, from the possession of Sri Adul Kuddus, S/o. Lt. Sher Ali, godown incharge of the Dhanani Shoes Ltd., on today the February 6, 2008 at 4 p.m. on the ground stated below in presence of witnesses. Grounds of seizure :--Stock of goods was found not matching with the invoice produced. Goods taxable at the higher rate are found shown as taxable at the lower rate of taxes and thereby causing evasion of taxes payable under the AVAT Act, 2003. List of goods seized :--Stock of goods found in the stock register which is shown as four per cent taxable. 7. The learned single judge as alluded hereinabove, by judgment and order dated April 11, 2008 (Dhanani Shoes Ltd. v. State of Assam [2008] 14 VST 422 (Gauhati)) dismissed the writ petition after hearing the learned counsel for the parties at the motion stage. As the text of this decision would disclose, the following arguments were advanced on behalf of the respondent-company to consolidate and bolster its impeachment of the action of seizure : (i) There was no material available with the concerned Revenue authority to seize its books of accounts and other documents in absence of the necessary pre-conditions prescribed as the sine qua non for invocation of section 74(3)(a) of the Act. (ii) As the materials on record did not indicate that the goods seized had not been accounted for, the power of seizure under section 74(5)(a)(ii) could not have been applied. (iii) If it, according to the concerned Revenue authority, had sold goods without paying the requisite tax, it was at best a case of escaped assessment warranting steps under section 40 of the Act and not the seizure thereof in purported exercise of power under section 74. 8. (iii) If it, according to the concerned Revenue authority, had sold goods without paying the requisite tax, it was at best a case of escaped assessment warranting steps under section 40 of the Act and not the seizure thereof in purported exercise of power under section 74. 8. In refutation, it was insisted on behalf of the Revenue that : (i) the writ petition was not maintainable for non-exhaustion of the alternative and efficacious remedy available in law as well as for suppression of material facts. (ii) as the respondent-company had deliberately misclassified the leather goods as plastic goods to avoid payment of tax at the prescribed rate of 12 per cent, the seizure of the books of accounts, register, etc., under section 74(3) was valid. (iii) as enumerated in the seizure list qua the stock of goods, the same did not tally with the corresponding invoices and, thus, those could not have been said to be accounted for warranting seizure thereof under section 74(5) of the Act. 9. The learned single judge on a conjoint reading of section 40 and section 74 of the Act as a whole returned the following findings on an appraisal of the recorded facts and the available documents : (a) The writ petition was not liable to be rejected on the preliminary objection as raised. (b) Section 74(3)(a) is an enabling provision for the prescribed authority to collect materials for the purpose of determining if any income of the dealer has escaped assessment in any manner whatsoever. The exercise of the power of seizure of the books of accounts, registers, etc., thus, cannot be said to be impermissible for the purpose of ascertaining the income which has escaped assessment. (c) On a careful reading of the grounds of seizure of the books of accounts, registers, etc., the respondent-company, according to the Revenue authority, had kept in its godown the goods in question by misclassifying them and consequently had paid/been paying tax at a lower rate and, thus, evaded payment of tax as due from it. (d) The seizure of goods is permissible only when the statutory authority has reason to believe that those found lying at the place of business belonged to the dealer but have not been accounted for by it in its accounts, registers and other documents maintained in the ordinary course of business. (d) The seizure of goods is permissible only when the statutory authority has reason to believe that those found lying at the place of business belonged to the dealer but have not been accounted for by it in its accounts, registers and other documents maintained in the ordinary course of business. The jurisdiction to effect seizure of the goods is acquired only when those have not been accounted for. (c) A bare perusal of the grounds of seizure of the goods makes it transparent that those were allegedly found to be not matching with the invoices produced. (f) The grounds of seizure disclosed that the entry in the books of accounts allegedly had been made in such a manner that the leather goods taxable at the rate of 12.5 per cent have been shown as plastic goods and taxed at the rate of four per cent. (g) These allegations may or may not be true but have to be assumed "at this stage" to be true and, if so, the inescapable inference would be that by misclassifying the goods those taxable at the rate of 12.5 per cent have been made liable to be taxed at the rate of four per cent resulting in evasion of tax or at least in an attempt to evade tax. Section 74(3) in such a case did empower the respondent-authority to seize the books of accounts, registers, etc. (h) The respondent-company had evaded or was attempting to evade payment of tax as due from it and was keeping or has kept the accounts in such a manner as was likely to cause evasion of tax. If these accusation are true, the revenue authority had good reasons to believe that the respondent-company had evaded or had been attempting to evade payment of tax due from it and was keeping or had kept its accounts in such a manner as was likely to cause evasion of tax. In such circumstances, the exercise of power under section 74(3) and the seizure of the books of accounts, registers, etc., cannot be said to be without jurisdiction or any authority of law. (i) The allegations may or may not be true but this court in the present case has to proceed on the basis that those were true and examine and test if the grounds assigned for the seizure of the stock are sustainable in law. (i) The allegations may or may not be true but this court in the present case has to proceed on the basis that those were true and examine and test if the grounds assigned for the seizure of the stock are sustainable in law. (j) When the goods lying in the godown of the company were allegedly found not tallying with the invoices produced by its representative it cannot be said that the goods had been accounted for by it in its books of accounts, registers, etc., and in such circumstances those cannot be said to have been accounted for in terms of section 74(5)(a)(ii). (k) The conditions precedent for the exercise of power under section 74(5)(a)(ii) did exist and it cannot be said that the seizure of the goods was without jurisdiction or without any authority of law. (l) The ground of seizure was valid as the goods concerned consisted of two parts--(i) stock of goods not found matching with the invoices produced, (ii) goods taxable at the higher rate were shown as taxable at a lower rate thereby causing evasion of tax payable under the Assam Value Added Tax Act, 2003. (m) The Revenue authorities were required to complete the process of verification or enquiry under section 74(5)(b) within a week and to permit the respondent-company to obtain release of the seized goods in terms of the provisions contained in section 74(5) and other provisions of the Act. 10. Admittedly, though the respondent-company's oppugnment of the seizure of its books of accounts and the goods in particular was for all practical purposes negated in the writ proceeding, no appeal therefrom was preferred by it. 11. Respondent No. 4, Inspector of Taxes, Unit-B, Guwahati, on April 16, 2008 thereafter issued a notice under section 74(5)(b) of the Act proposing imposition of penalty of Rs.1,99,41,570 on the amount of Rs.66,47,190 alleged to be the tax evaded by the respondent-company and it was asked to offer its reply within the date as stipulated therein. The notice disclosed that in course of the inspection of the godown-cum-business premises of the respondent-company on February 6, 2008 some consignments of taxable goods were seized due to its failure to furnish evidence in support of proper accounting thereof. The notice disclosed that in course of the inspection of the godown-cum-business premises of the respondent-company on February 6, 2008 some consignments of taxable goods were seized due to its failure to furnish evidence in support of proper accounting thereof. It recited further that subsequent verification of the documents produced by it in support of the seized goods revealed that those had not been properly accounted for in its regular books of accounts and that misclassifying the same which was otherwise taxed at the rate of 12.5 per cent those were disclosed to be exigible at the rate of four per cent for the year 2007-08, thereby evading payment of tax due from it therefor. The notice mentioned that the respondent-company, therefore, wilfully evaded payment of an amount of Rs.66,47,190, which was an intentional contravention of the relevant provisions of the Act warranting a penal action. That in issuing the notice the judgment and order dated April 11, 2008 (Dhanani Shoes Ltd. v. State of Assam [2008] 14 VST 422 (Gauhati)) rendered in W. P. (C) No. 1050 of 2008 had been taken note of was also disclosed therein. 12. Stirred by the aforenoted reverses in succession, the respondent-company filed an application seeking review of the judgment and order dated April 11, 2008 (Dhanani Shoes Ltd. v. State of Assam (2008) 14 VST 422 (Gauhati)) (registered as R. P. No. 47 of 2008) supplementing it by an impugnment of the notice dated April 16, 2008 by initiating a writ proceeding registered as W. P. (C) No. 1781 of 2008 (Dhanani Shoes Ltd. v. State of Assam [2008] 16 VST 228 (Gauhati)). Noticeably, in this endeavour it sought to invoke the writ jurisdiction of this court also for an appropriate direction to declare that the words "not accounted for" appearing in subsection (5)(a) of section 74 of the Act be read in terms of sub-section (5)(b) and (5)(c) thereof to signify a default of the dealer in making entries in respect of the goods in its/his books of accounts, registers and other documents, as the case may be, in course of his/its business. 13. 13. As the grounds catalogued in the review application would disclose, the same if paraphrased, projected the following contentions : (i) The learned single judge had failed to taking into account the difference between section 74(3) and 74(5) of the Act in the proper perspective resulting in an error apparent on the face of the record. (ii) The learned single judge left out of consideration the distinctly different pre-conditions for seizure of the books of accounts and goods under section 74(3)(a) and 74(5)(a) of the Act resulting in misconception of law. (iii) The learned single judge did not consider section 74(5)(a) in the context of sub-section (5)(b) and (5)(c) resulting in an error apparent on the face of the record. (iv) The words "not accounted for by the dealer" applied in subsection (5)(a) of section 74 ought to imply that no entry had been made in respect of the goods in the books of accounts, registers and other documents as contemplated in sub-section (5)(b). (v) The learned single judge had erred ex facie in concluding that wrong classification of goods would denote absence of any account thereof whereas "not accounted for" would mean that no entry in respect of the goods had been made in the books of accounts, registers and other documents. (vi) As misclassification of the goods in the seizure lists as well as in the notice dated April 16, 2008 evinced entry thereof in the books of accounts, registers and other documents, the learned single judge erred in concluding that wrong classification of goods did connote that those were not accounted for. (vii) As apparently the goods concerned had been entered into the books of accounts, registers and other documents, the learned single judge ought to have issued a direction to return the same and the omission to do so is an error apparent on the face of the record. 14. Vis-a-vis the notice dated April 16, 2008, the same was denounced to be bereft of jurisdiction inasmuch as section 74(5)(a)(ii) was not attracted to the facts of the case. Moreover, as the impugned notice demonstrated that the Revenue authority had abandoned the ground that the goods seized did not tally with the invoices produced, the demand of penalty on the plea of misclassification thereof for alleged evasion of tax was patently flawed and misconceived. 15. Moreover, as the impugned notice demonstrated that the Revenue authority had abandoned the ground that the goods seized did not tally with the invoices produced, the demand of penalty on the plea of misclassification thereof for alleged evasion of tax was patently flawed and misconceived. 15. It would, thus, be hyaline clear that the respondent-company sought the review of the judgment and order dated April 11, 2008 (Dhanani Shoes Ltd. v. State of Assam [2008] 14 VST 422 (Gauhati)) essentially on the plea of erroneous interpretation of section 74(3) and 74(5) of the Act in the background of the contextual facts and the related documents. 16. The Revenue in its affidavit contended that none of the grounds urged constituted one for review of a judicial decision as contemplated in law and that the learned single judge having pronounced the conclusions on a thorough examination of all material facts and the relevant records in the context of the existing provisions of the statute involved, the review application was unsustainable in and was liable to be rejected in limine. Vis-a-vis the challenge to the notice dated April 16, 2008, the Revenue contended that it was only a dilatory move and prematured as well inasmuch as a demand notice would follow only after due consideration of the reply filed by the assessee in response thereto. That the release of the goods in accordance with the stipulations contained in section 74(5)(d) of the Act would ensue only in compliance thereof was also underlined. 17. The learned single judge by the judgment and order assailed herein allowed the review petition and sustained as well the impugnment of the notice dated April 16, 2008. That the release of the goods in accordance with the stipulations contained in section 74(5)(d) of the Act would ensue only in compliance thereof was also underlined. 17. The learned single judge by the judgment and order assailed herein allowed the review petition and sustained as well the impugnment of the notice dated April 16, 2008. On an exhaustive survey of the judicial pronouncements on the law defining the review jurisdiction of a court, the learned single judge concluded that the power of review though statutorily conferred and subject to the limitations prescribed therefor, it is no longer a rule of universal application that the same has to be essentially confined to the two grounds, namely, (i) discovery of new and important matter or evidence which after the exercise of due diligence was not within the applicant's knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree or order was passed ; and (ii) mistake or error apparent on the face of the record; or any such sufficient ground which is analogous to these two. In the perspective of the doctrine of actus curiae neminem gravabit, it was held that when a court corrects and rectifies an error what it restores is the rule of law and does not defeat it. Elucidating that "sufficient reason" under Order 47, rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short, hereinafter referred to as, "the Code") is compendious enough to include misconception of fact, the learned single judge concluded that a misinterpretation of a provision of law or misconception of law resulting in an error would be one apparent on the face of the record and would be a sufficient reason calling for the exercise of the power of review to obviate miscarriage of justice. 18. 18. In this promise, the learned single judge re-appreciated the submissions made on behalf of the parties as recorded in the original decision and in the process took note of the following excerpts from the pleadings in the review proceedings : (a) It was the specific case of the respondent-company in its writ petition that the goods had not been seized on the ground that those had not been accounted for inasmuch as the entries with regard thereto even according to the seizure list did exist in the stock register though those were allegedly made by misclassifying the goods to reflect that those were taxable at a lower rate. (b) The case of the respondent-company was that contrary to the requirements of section 74(5)(a)(ii) the seizure of the goods in question had been made not because of the non-existence of any entry in the books of accounts, registers, etc., but due to the fact that the stock register reflected misclassification of the goods. (c) The Revenue sought to sustain the seizure of the goods on the ground that the stock of goods did not tally with the invoices produced signifying that there was no entry in existence therefor and, thus, could not be said to have been accounted for justifying invocation of the power under section 74(5)(a)(ii). (d) Notwithstanding the fact that the grounds of seizure reflected that it was also due to the alleged misclassification of goods, this was not urged by the Revenue in the writ proceeding. Rather, the same was abandoned. 19. The decision on review was founded on the following deductions : (i) The sole basis for the court to uphold the seizure of the goods was that those did not tally with the invoices produced signifying the legal inference that no entry therefor had existed in the books of accounts, registers, etc., and those were not accounted for within the meaning of section 74(5)(a)(ii). The seizure of the goods was not sustained because of the alleged misclassification thereof as it was not a ground pressed by the Revenue. (ii) The impugned notice dated April 16, 2008 does not even suggest that the seizure was on the ground that the goods did not tally with the invoices produced. The seizure of the goods was not sustained because of the alleged misclassification thereof as it was not a ground pressed by the Revenue. (ii) The impugned notice dated April 16, 2008 does not even suggest that the seizure was on the ground that the goods did not tally with the invoices produced. (iii) The court had not upheld the seizure of the goods in question on the ground of alleged misclassification thereof by the respondent-company so as to make those taxable at a lower rate. (iv) The Revenue's plea in the review proceeding that the seizure of the goods was made not merely because those did not tally with the invoices produced but also for misclassification and that the same (misclassification) predicated that the mere entry thereof in the stock register would not imply that those had been duly accounted for is untenable on a combined reading of clauses (a), (b) and (c) of sub-section (5) of section 74. (v) Clause (a) of section 74(5) denotes complete absence of entry in the books of accounts and the registers maintained by the dealer in his/its ordinary course of business and not "proper, due or valid entry in the books of accounts". It is only when the goods are not traceable to any of the entries, if so made, that seizure of such goods is possible and, thus, complete absence of any entry in respect of the goods sought to be seized has to be the foundation for the seizure thereof. (vi) A conjoint reading of clauses (a), (b) and (c) of section 74(5) clearly conveys that penalty is imposable only when no entry has been made in respect of the seized goods in the books of accounts, registers, etc., and on the dealer's failure to offer proper justification for not making such entries. (vii) It is the non-existence of entry in the books of accounts, registers, etc., that can be the ground for the seizure of the goods and it is such absence of entry which is covered by the expression "not accounted for". (viii) "Non-existence of entry" cannot be equated to the expression "non-existence of proper or due or valid entry" or "absence of proper or due or valid entry, as the case may be". (viii) "Non-existence of entry" cannot be equated to the expression "non-existence of proper or due or valid entry" or "absence of proper or due or valid entry, as the case may be". (ix) Having regard to the import of the expression "not accounted for" appearing in section 74(5)(a)(ii), the conditions precedent for effecting seizure of the goods in the case in hand were absent, rendering the seizure sans jurisdiction and ought not to have been upheld. (x) The decision under review, therefore, suffers from manifest error of law resulting in serious miscarriage of justice which needs to be corrected. (xi) The impugned notice, as a consequence, is wholly vitiated by lack of jurisdiction and is, thus, unsustainable. 20. The judgment and order under review as well as the impugned notice were accordingly interfered with. 21. Mr. Choudhury has assiduously argued that as none of the grounds enumerated in the review application is apparently recognized in law for review of a judicial decision, the impugned judgment and order is ex facie unsustainable and is liable to be interfered with. The learned Additional Advocate-General maintained that the assertions in the review application against the original decision though may be envisaged for impugnment thereof in an appeal, those by no means, having regard to the legally circumscribed limits of review jurisdiction, are entertainable for the review thereof. Mr. Choudhury relying on the relevant portions of the original decision emphasized that the same had been rendered on an indepth scrutiny of all factual and legal aspects and the determination having been made on the merit of such evaluation, the review thereof on an overall reappraisal of the same facets of the debate was impermissible. While clarifying that the challenge in the instant appeal vis-a-vis the judgment on review is chiefly focused on impermissible exercise of review jurisdiction, the learned Additional Advocate-General has underlined that expansion of the amplitude of the expression "sufficient reason" notwithstanding, a real distinction between the appellate and review jurisdictions do exist. 22. Contending that the observation made by the apex court in Board of Control for Cricket in India v. Netaji Cricket Club [2005] 4 SCC 741 that subsequent event may also be taken into consideration by the court for the purpose of rectifying its mistake so made in the contextual facts is not of general application, Mr. 22. Contending that the observation made by the apex court in Board of Control for Cricket in India v. Netaji Cricket Club [2005] 4 SCC 741 that subsequent event may also be taken into consideration by the court for the purpose of rectifying its mistake so made in the contextual facts is not of general application, Mr. Choudhury maintained that in case the frontiers of these two jurisdictions are not strictly maintained, in the guise of review the same forum would exercise appellate jurisdiction against its decision an eventuality antithetic to the fundamental canons of adversarial dispute resolution. According to Mr. Choudhury, permissibility to notice a subsequent development as observed by the apex court in Board of Control for Cricket in India [2005] 4 SCC 741 cannot be construed to open a new vista to invoke the review jurisdiction of a court in the teeth of the time-tested grounds ordained by Order 47, rule 1 of the Code authoritatively defining the limits thereof. As the original decision when viewed from any aspect did not suffer from an error apparent on the face of the record, the impugned judgment on review following an exhaustive re-appreciation of the same legal and factual determinants for a different view being repugnant to the basic precepts of review jurisdiction, is indefensible in law and is liable to be set aside. 23. According to Mr. Choudhury, as the annulment of the notice dated April 16, 2008 as an immediate consequence of the invalidation of the seizure of goods following a review of the original jurisdiction is legally untenable as well, the impugned judgment and order to that extent also calls for interference. The learned Additional Advocate-General submitted that as a corollary, the respondent-company must be left to comply with the relevant prescriptions of law and exhaust its remedies available under the Act. As in the attendant facts and circumstances the learned single judge had exceeded the review jurisdiction as ordained in law, the impugned judgment and order on both the counts is liable to be set aside, he urged. The following decisions were relied upon : (i) Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma [1979] 4 SCC 389. (ii) Lily Thomas v. Union of India [2000] 6 SCC 224. (iii) State of West Bengal v. Kamal Sengupta [2008] 8 SCC 612. 24. Dr. The following decisions were relied upon : (i) Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma [1979] 4 SCC 389. (ii) Lily Thomas v. Union of India [2000] 6 SCC 224. (iii) State of West Bengal v. Kamal Sengupta [2008] 8 SCC 612. 24. Dr. Saraf per contra has argued with detailed reference to section 74 of the Act that as on the face of the contemporaneous documents, namely, the books of accounts, registers, etc., of the respondent-company and the seizure memos, the goods had been accounted for, the learned single judge was justified in reviewing the original decision in the interest of justice. Contending that section 74(3)(a) and 74(5) operate in two independent and distinctly different fields with varying preconditions defining the scope and extent of the exercise of power by the authorities concerned thereunder, the learned senior counsel has insisted that the words "not accounted for" used in section 74(5)(a) when read cumulatively with section 74(5)(b) would assuredly mean absence of any entry in respect of the goods in the books of accounts, registers and other documents of the dealer. As in the original decision, this decisive legal aspect had escaped the attention of the learned single judge facilitating the demand for penalty on the basis of an invalid seizure, the judgment in review occasioned essential correction of errors apparent on the face of the record and, thus, is unassailable in law. Dr. Saraf urged that not only the allegation of misclassification of goods testifies entries of those seized in the respondent-company's books of accounts, registers, etc., invocation of the power under section 74(5)(a) was clearly de hors jurisdiction. He urged that even assuming that there was a misclassification or mismatch of the goods suggesting wrong counting thereof, no seizure was permissible under section 74(5)(a) and, thus, the impugned judgment and order passed to obviate gross miscarriage of justice can by no means be said to be in breach of the review jurisdiction recognized in law. The learned senior counsel insisted that the original decision suffered from wrong assumption of facts calling for a review thereof in the interest of justice. According to him, review jurisdiction is not as constricted as sought to be projected by the Revenue, the underlying object thereof being to correct/rectify apparent errors to prevent miscarriage of justice. 25. The learned senior counsel insisted that the original decision suffered from wrong assumption of facts calling for a review thereof in the interest of justice. According to him, review jurisdiction is not as constricted as sought to be projected by the Revenue, the underlying object thereof being to correct/rectify apparent errors to prevent miscarriage of justice. 25. To reinforce his arguments, the learned senior counsel referred to section 46(2)(b) of the Assam General Sales Tax Act, 1993 and relied on the decision of this court in Kamal Kr. Sarma v. State of Assam [2005] 3 GLR 425 dilating on the purport of the words "not properly accounted for" in this legal provision. He further urged that the show-cause notice being one for misclassification of goods only and not for any omission to make any entry thereof in the books of accounts, registers and other documents of the respondent-company, it was ab initio void and, thus, was rightly interfered with by the impugned judgment and order. To buttress his arguments, Dr. Saraf placed reliance on the following decisions : (i) State of Maharashtra v. Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak [1982] 2 SCC 463. (ii) Lily Thomas v. Union of India [2000] 6 SCC 224. (iii) Rajender Singh v. Lt. Governor, Andaman & Nicobar Islands [2005] 13 SCC 289. (iv) Food Corporation of India v. SEIL Ltd. [2008] 3 SCC 440. (v) Jagmohan Singh v. State of Punjab [2008] 7 SCC 38. (vi) Inderchand Jain (Dead) Through LRs v. Motilal (Dead) Through LRs. [2009] 14 SCC 663. 26. The essential pleadings and the arguments advanced on the basis thereof have received our cautious and studied scrutiny. As has been emphasized on behalf of the appellant time and again in course of the arguments, the only thrust of the instant assailment is the impermissibility of entertainment of the grounds of review suitably attired to secure a rehearing of the issues once decided as if in appeal before a higher forum. A breach of the legally recognized parameters of judicial review has been emphatically projected seeking interference with the impugned judgment and order. The present adjudicative pursuit logically would, thus, be limited within this periphery. 27. A breach of the legally recognized parameters of judicial review has been emphatically projected seeking interference with the impugned judgment and order. The present adjudicative pursuit logically would, thus, be limited within this periphery. 27. The factual background with the progression of events culminating in the decision appealed against as well as the grounds for review and the deductions made thereon having been adverted to hereinabove in sufficient details, it would be expedient at this juncture to traverse the law of curial review culled from the authorities cited at the Bar. 28. While the decision in State of Maharashtra v. Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak [1982] 2 SCC 463 propounds the inexpediency and impermissibility of questioning matters of judicial record being against public policy as well as judicial decorum making it incumbent upon the party entertaining a reservation qua the correctness of the recording of a proceeding in a court, to draw the attention of the very judge or judges--the author(s) thereof, for corrective intervention, the jurally acknowledged grounds of review of a judicial determination find reiteration with striking similitude in the decisions of the apex court in Lily Thomas [2000] 6 SCC 224, Board of Control for Cricket in India v. Netaji Cricket Club [2005] 4 SCC 741, Rajender Singh [2005] 13 SCC 289, Food Corporation of India v. SEIL Ltd. [2008] 3 SCC 440, Jagmohan Singh [2008] 7 SCC 38, State of West Bengal v. Kamal Sengupta [2008] 8 SCC 612 and in Inderchand Jain (Dead) Through LRs [2009] 14 SCC 663. 29. In Inderchand Jain [2009] 14 SCC 663, the honourable apex court on a survey of the law on the review jurisdiction of a court synopsized the following pristine principles : (i) Review proceedings are not by way of appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47, rule 1 CPC. (ii) Power of review may be exercised when some mistake or error apparent on the face of record is found. But error on the face of record must be such an error which must strike one or more looking at the record and would not require any long-drawn process of reasoning on the points where there may conceivably be two opinions. (iii) Power of review may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. But error on the face of record must be such an error which must strike one or more looking at the record and would not require any long-drawn process of reasoning on the points where there may conceivably be two opinions. (iii) Power of review may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. (iv) Power of review can also be exercised for any sufficient reason which is wide enough to include a misconception of fact or law by a court or even an advocate. (v) An application for review may be necessitated by way of invoking the doctrine actus curiae neminem gravabit. 30. Their Lordships while endorsing the above parameters of review recalled the observations of the honourable apex court made in Board of Control for Cricket in India [2005] 4 SCC 741 in paragraphs 89 and 90 thereof as hereunder : 89. Order 47, rule 1 of the Code provides for filing an application for review. Such an application for review would be maintainable not only upon discovery of a new and important piece of evidence or when there exists an error apparent on the face of the record but also if the same is necessitated on account of some mistake or for any other sufficient reason. 90. Thus, a mistake on the part of the court which would include a mistake in the nature of the undertaking may also call for a review of the order. An application for review would also be maintainable if there exists sufficient reason therefor. What would constitute sufficient reason would depend on the facts and circumstances of the case. The words 'sufficient reason' in Order 47, rule 1 of the Code are wide enough to include a misconception of fact or law by a court or even an advocate. An application for review may be necessitated by way of invoking the doctrine actus curiae neminem gravabit. 31. Incidentally, in Board of Control for Cricket in India [2005] 4 SCC 741, their Lordships while dwelling on the grounds for review as ordained by order 47, rule 1 of the Code, remarked that the observations made by the apex court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius AIR 1954 SC 526 that "any other sufficient reason" ought to be at least analogous to those specified in the rule was not of universal application. Mar Poulose Athanasius AIR 1954 SC 526 that "any other sufficient reason" ought to be at least analogous to those specified in the rule was not of universal application. In other words, the apex court in Board of Control for Cricket in India [2005] 4 SCC 741 propounded that the words "any other sufficient reason" appearing in Order 47, rule 1 of the Code ought to be accorded some flexibility to accommodate reasons not strictly analogous to the two other grounds, namely, (i) discovery of new and important matter or evidence which after the exercise of due diligence was not within the applicant's knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed ; and (ii) mistake or error apparent on the face of the record. That a subsequent event may also be taken into consideration by the court for the purpose of rectifying its own mistake was observed in paragraph 93 of this decision. The apex court in Jagmohan Singh [2008] 7 SCC 38 reiterated that a court is not precluded from taking into consideration any subsequent event, of course on rare occasions, in imparting justice in a given situation. 32. The apex court in State of West Bengal v. Kamal Sengupta [2008] 8 SCC 612 also following an extensive survey of the law, propounded that where a review is sought on the ground of discovery of new matter or evidence, the same must be relevant and must be of such character that if it would had been produced in time it might have altered the decision. Their Lordships observed that mere discovery of new or important matter or evidence was not a sufficient ground for review ex debito justitiae and the party seeking review also has to show that such additional matter or evidence was not within its knowledge and that the same could not be produced earlier even after the exercise of due diligence. Their Lordships held the view that "mistake or error apparent" by its very connotation signify an error which is evident per se from the records of the case and does not require a detailed examination, scrutiny and illustration either of the facts or the legal position. Their Lordships held the view that "mistake or error apparent" by its very connotation signify an error which is evident per se from the records of the case and does not require a detailed examination, scrutiny and illustration either of the facts or the legal position. It was underlined that if an error is not self-evident and detection thereof requires long debate and process of reasoning, it cannot be construed to be one apparent on the face of the record for the purpose of Order 47, rule 1 of the Code. Their Lordships ruled that an order or decision or judgment cannot be corrected merely because it is erroneous in law or on the ground that a different view could have been taken by the court on a point of fact or law. It recalled as well its observation, amongst others, in Parison Devi v. Sumitri Devi [1997] 8 SCC 715 that in the exercise of jurisdiction under Order 47, rule 1 CPC it was not permissible for an erroneous decision to be "re-heard and corrected" and that there is a clear distinction between erroneous decision and an error apparent on the face of the record. That a re-hearing of the dispute on aspects of a case not highlighted earlier or perhaps could have been argued more forcefully or reinforced by binding precedents not cited to facilitate a favourable verdict is not contemplated in a proceeding for review as observed in Haridas Das v. Usha Rani Banik [2006] 4 SCC 78 was also underlined. It referred with approval as well the observations made in Ajit Kumar Rath v. State of Orissa [1999] 9 SCC 596, that a review cannot be claimed or asked for merely for a fresh hearing or arguments or correction of an erroneous view taken earlier and can be invoked only for correction of a patent error of law or facts which stares in the face without any elaborate argument being needed for establishing the same. While cataloguing the principles gleaned from the whole gamut of its decisions on the law of judicial review, their Lordships eventually concluded that the expression "any other sufficient reason" appearing in Order 47, rule 1 of the Code has to be interpreted in the light of other specified grounds and that an error which is not self evident and which can be discovered by a long process of reasoning cannot be treated to be one apparent on the face of the record justifying exercise of the power of review. 33. In Lily Thomas v. Union of India [2000] 6 SCC 224, their Lordships underscored that the power of judicial review is not inherent in a court but essentially conferred by law. While emphasizing that justice is a virtue which transcends all barriers and that rules or procedures or technicalities of law cannot stand in the way of administration thereof, their Lordships reiterated that review by no means is an appeal in disguise. It was held that if the error sought to be corrected was under a mistake stemming from erroneous assumption which was non-existent and if not rectified would have the potential of resulting in miscarriage of justice, the exercise of review jurisdiction was permissible. Their Lordships, however, cautioned against such intervention to substitute the earlier view only. While reiterating that the power of judicial review has to be exercised within the limits thereof as statutorily conferred, their Lordships propounded that mere possibility of two views could not be a ground for review. 34. In Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma [1979] 4 SCC 389, the apex court while dilating on the power of review of a High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitution of India held that the plenary jurisdiction of this constitutional forum to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors notwithstanding, there are definitive limits to the exercise of its power of review. It was reiterated that such a power should be exercised on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the person seeking the review or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made. It was reiterated that such a power should be exercised on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the person seeking the review or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made. While reaffirming that such a power may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record was found, their Lordships emphatically mandated against the invocation thereof to correct a decision that was erroneous on merits. That a writ court exercises its power of review under article 226 of the Constitution of India both as a court of law and one of equity was observed by the apex court in Food Corporation of India v. SEIL Ltd. [2008] 3 SCC 440. 35. The enunciations though are suggestive of marginal transigence in approach in the recent times qua the review jurisdiction permitting consideration of any subsequent event as a conceivable facet of the expression "sufficient reason", the fundamental difference between an appeal and a review has not been obliterated thereby and though very subtle, subsists with overwhelming realism. Indubitably, review jurisdiction is one conferred by law and necessarily has to be circumscribed by the prerequisites for the exercise thereof ordained by it. The salutary objectives thereof though embodied in the pristine maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit, the invocation of review jurisdiction unmistakably has to be within the contours enjoined by law lest its subsumption in the appellate jurisdiction eventuates. The ambit of this jurisdiction dominantly is presided over by the two grounds enumerated in Order 47, rule 1 of the Code, i.e., (i) discovery of new and important matter or evidence which after the exercise of due diligence was not within the applicant's knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decision was made, and (ii) mistake or error apparent on the face of the record. The expression "sufficient reason" as a matter of universal rule even if not insisted upon to be analogous to these two legally codified precepts of review, a perceptible nexus ought to exist and unbridled divagation therefrom is the prepotent precedential mandate. The expression "sufficient reason" as a matter of universal rule even if not insisted upon to be analogous to these two legally codified precepts of review, a perceptible nexus ought to exist and unbridled divagation therefrom is the prepotent precedential mandate. A mistake or error apparent necessarily has to be one which is patent on the face of the record and does not warrant a detailed and exhaustive examination/scrutiny of the facts and the law involved to fathom and ferret out the same. A decision erroneous in law or on the ground that a different view of the same court was plausible is not envisaged within the legally recognized tenets of review jurisdiction and no re-hearing for correcting such a decision is permissible. The carefully secured distinction between these two cardinal jurisdictions is, amongst others, the time-tested endeavour to safeguard against the possibility of the same forum exercising appellate jurisdiction over its own determination a concept anathemic to the notion of fairplay and justice--the quintessence of the rule of law. No microscopic and forensic analysis of the facts and law once scrutinized and acted upon is comprehensible in the exercise of review jurisdiction. The plenary power of a writ court notwithstanding, to reach injustice, it has to traverse within the legally defined limits of review and any breach thereof would be at the pain of invalidation of the resultant exercise. The progressive initiatives of relaxing the rigid periphery of review jurisdiction adumbrated by Order 47, rule 1 of the Code are at best frontal spruce-ups and do not militate against the edifice of review jurisdiction founded on the bedrock of the grounds enjoined by Order 47, rule 1 of the Code. 36. Reverting to the facts, the learned single judge initially upheld the seizure of the books of accounts, registers, etc., as well as the goods on a scrutiny of he grounds of seizure thereof. It noticed that the respondent-company, according to the Revenue, had stored in its godown goods by misclassifying them to render those exigible at a lower rate of tax. That the grounds of seizure of the goods revealed that those were allegedly not matching with the invoices produced was also taken note of. It noticed that the respondent-company, according to the Revenue, had stored in its godown goods by misclassifying them to render those exigible at a lower rate of tax. That the grounds of seizure of the goods revealed that those were allegedly not matching with the invoices produced was also taken note of. Inferring that the allegations as made in the seizure lists are correct, it was held, inter alia, that as the seized goods were found not tallying with the invoices produced, those could not be said to have been accounted for in the books of accounts, registers and other documents of the respondent-company as contemplated under section 74(5)(a)(ii) of the Act. It, thus, concluded that the conditions precedent for the exercise of power under this provision of the Act did exist and, thus, the seizure of the goods could not be repudiated to be without jurisdiction or authority of law. 37. The grounds of review as adverted to hereinabove in essence sought a reinterpretation of section 74(3) and 74(5) of the Act to highlight the distinction between the pre-conditions for the application thereof. It was sought to be contended that as admittedly the relevant entry vis-a-vis the seized goods had been made in the books of accounts, registers, etc., of the respondent-company, those by no means could have been said to be "not accounted for" by the dealer as contemplated in section 74(5) and, thus, an error apparent on the face of the record had ensued. The learned single judge in the impugned decision on a review of the original determination underlined that as the Revenue had sought to justify the seizure of the goods only on the ground that the same did not tally with those in the corresponding invoices, it could not be concluded that there was no entry therefor in the books of accounts, registers and other documents of the respondent-company. In that eventuality, according to the learned single judge, in view of the existing entry in the books of accounts, registers, etc., the goods could not be said to have been "not accounted for" within the meaning of section 74(5)(a)(ii) of the Act and, thus, the seizure thereof in the purported exercise of the power thereunder was without jurisdiction. In that eventuality, according to the learned single judge, in view of the existing entry in the books of accounts, registers, etc., the goods could not be said to have been "not accounted for" within the meaning of section 74(5)(a)(ii) of the Act and, thus, the seizure thereof in the purported exercise of the power thereunder was without jurisdiction. It was held that the seizure of the goods had not been upheld as section 74(5) denotes complete absence of entry in the books of accounts, registers and other documents maintained by the dealer in his/its ordinary course of business and not "proper, due or valid entry" in the books of accounts. That in the show-cause notice dated April 16, 2008 the purported action under section 74(5) for imposing penalty was sought to be resorted to on the ground of misclassification of goods only was emphasized as well. 38. With utmost respect to the analysis undertaken by the learned single judge of the facts and the law involved, we are unable to lend our concurrence to the approach adopted. As the original decision would reveal, the findings recorded therein in favour of the seizure of the books of accounts, registers, etc., as well as the goods of the respondent-company are evidently based on a exhaustive examination of the facts as well as a dialectical inquest of the essential facets of the legal provisions associated therewith. The view taken by the learned single judge in the decision reviewed was a plausible one and, in our modest comprehension, a reconsideration thereof by undertaking a reappraisal of the salient features of the same legal provision was, in the teeth of the judicially enunciated dictas aforestated, impermissible in the exercise of review jurisdiction. Noticeably, no new or subsequent development of the kind as contemplated in the Board of Control for Cricket in India [2005] 4 SCC 741 and Jagmohan [2008] 7 SCC 38 had emerged in the factual firmament warranting this venture. Neither any error apparent on the face of the record nor any discovery of new or important matter of evidence not within the knowledge of the respondent-company inspite of its due diligence had surfaced to undertake the exercise. The text of the notice dated April 16, 2008, in our estimate, cannot be accommodated in any of the grounds for review recognized in law. 39. The text of the notice dated April 16, 2008, in our estimate, cannot be accommodated in any of the grounds for review recognized in law. 39. On a totality of the deductions as above, we are of the unhesitant opinion that the decision rendered by way of review of the original judgment and order dated April 11, 2008 (Dhanani Shoes Ltd. v. State of Assam [2008] 14 VST 422 (Gauhati)) cannot be sustained in law and on facts. The impugned notice dated April 16, 2008 though mentions that the decision dated April 11, 2008 (Dhanani Shoes Ltd. v. State of Assam [2008] 14 VST 422 (Gauhati)) had been taken note of in issuing the same, we are of the view that the respondent-company ought to avail of its remedies under the law vis-a-vis the same. Having reversed the judgment and order dated July 2, 2008 (Dhanani Shoes Ltd. v. State of Assam [2008] 16 VST 228 (Gauhati)) whereby this notice too had been annulled on the limited considerations recited hereinabove, we consider it expedient not to offer any comment on the merit of the challenge to the notice dated April 16, 2008 and leave the parties to exhaust their remedies otherwise available in law. In the result, the impugned judgment and order dated July 2, 2008 (Dhanani Shoes Ltd. v. State of Assam [2008] 16 VST 228 (Gauhati)) is set aside. W. P. (C) No. 1781 of 2008 is also closed in the above terms. The appeals are allowed. No costs. In favour of Department.