The petitioner, herein has been convicted under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, (hereinafter, referred to as ‘NI Act’, in short) vide Judgment dated 27.01.2010, passed by the learned SDJM, Dibrugarh, in CR Case No. 517 of 2007, which has been affirmed by the learned Sessions Judge in Criminal Appeal No. 3 (1) of 2010. After convicting the petitioner, the learned Magistrate imposed a fine of Rs. 2,00,000/- (Rupees Two Lacs Only) with default stipulation of Simple Imprisonment for 4 (four) months. Though the amount of fine was maintained by the appellate Court the fine has been converted by the appellate Court as compensation. Being aggrieved with the conviction and sentence, the petitioner has preferred this revision application. 2. Heard Sri K D Chetri, learned counsel for the petitioner as well as Sri A Roshid, learned counsel for the respondent No. 2/ complainant. The State of Assam was represented by Sri K Munir, learned Additional Public Prosecutor. I have also gone through the impugned Judgments and the record. 3. Factual matrix is that the accused had taken a loan of Rs. 1,50,000/-, by executing a written agreement on 19.11.2006. The loan amount was to be redeemed within a period of 6 (six) months. Subsequently, the accused issued a cheque of Rs. 1,20,000/- on 17.05.2007 with a promise to pay the balance amount of Rs. 30,000/- within next one month. The cheque was deposited in the UCO Bank on 13.07.2007. However, the cheque was dishonoured and returned to the payee with an intimation that the cheque could not be honoured due to insufficient fund. Bank’s intimation was received by the complainant/respondent No. 2 on 03.08.2007. It was followed by issuance of statutory notice under Section 138 (b) of the NI Act on 16.08.2007. The notice was received by the accused on 23.08.2007. After receipt of the notice the accused requested the complainant over phone to give some more time to make the payment. 4. Accordingly, the cheque was represented in the Bank for the second time on 17.09.2007. The cheque was again dishonoured on 30.10.2007. Thereafter, second notice was issued to the accused on 05.11.2007 and after receipt of the notice and for non-payment of the cheque amount, the complaint was filed. 5. In view of the concurrent findings of the trial Court as well as the appellate Court, I am not discussing the evidence in detail. The cheque was again dishonoured on 30.10.2007. Thereafter, second notice was issued to the accused on 05.11.2007 and after receipt of the notice and for non-payment of the cheque amount, the complaint was filed. 5. In view of the concurrent findings of the trial Court as well as the appellate Court, I am not discussing the evidence in detail. In this revision application, the following question arises for determination by this Court: Whether cause of action under Section 138 of the NI Act is extended on presentation of the cheque in the bank for the second time, despite service of notice upon the drawer of the cheque? 6. Referring to the Judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of Sadanandan Bhadran –Vs- Madhavan Sunil Kumar; (1998) 6 SCC 514 , Shri Chetri, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the complaint was time barred since the same was not presented within 15 (fifteen) days of receipt of notice by the accused. On the other hand, Sri A Roshid, learned counsel for the respondent No. 2 submitted that since the accused had himself requested the complainant to wait for some time for payment of money, the complainant was legally entitled to present the cheque in the Bank for the second time and as such, the cause of action was rightly accrued after the second notice. It may be mentioned herein that there is no dispute that the complaint was filed within the period of limitation from the service of the second notice. 7. In the case of Sadanandan Bhadran (supra), the statutory notice was sent to the accused on 15.01.1991. On receipt of the notice, the accused approached the complainant and requested for some time to pay the amount. In view of the said assurance, the complainant did not initiate the proceeding immediately and he waited for some time for the accused to keep his promise. Thereafter, the cheque was again presented in the Bank on 04.05.1991 and after dishonour of the cheque another notice was issued on 09.05.1991 and on the basis of the second notice, the case under Section 138 of the NI Act, was filed. The learned trial Magistrate dismissed the case on the ground that there could not be more than one cause of action in respect of a single cheque. The order of acquittal was upheld by the High Court. The learned trial Magistrate dismissed the case on the ground that there could not be more than one cause of action in respect of a single cheque. The order of acquittal was upheld by the High Court. Hence, the matter was carried to the Apex Court. 8. The Hon’ble Supreme Court also affirmed the legal view taken by the learned Magistrate and the High Court and their Lordships have laid down the law that cause of action cannot be extended once the notice is received by the drawer of the cheque and payment is not made. The relevant paragraph of the Judgment is reproduced below: “7. Besides the language of Sections 138 and 142 which clearly postulates only one cause of action, there are other formidable impediments which negate the concept of successive causes of action. One of them is that for dishonour of one cheque, there can be only one offence and such offence is committed by the drawer immediately on his failure to make the payment within fifteen days of the receipt of the notice served in accordance with clause (b) of the proviso to Section 138. That necessarily means that for similar failure after service of fresh notice on subsequent dishonour, the drawer cannot be liable for any offence nor can the first offence be treated as non est so as to give the payee a right to file a complaint treating the second offence as the first one. At that stage, it will not be a question of waiver of the right of the payee to prosecute the drawer but of absolution of the drawer of an offence, which stands already committed by him and which cannot be committed by him again.” 9. The case before me is squarely covered by the aforesaid legal position. In this case also, the complaint was not filed within the statutory limit after service of notice upon the accused. As noted earlier, the first notice was received by the accused on 23.08.2007 and as such, the complaint must have been filed before 07.09.2007. Instead of filing the complaint, the respondent No. 2 presented the cheque in the Bank for the second time on 17.09.2007, i.e, after the expiry of the last date for filing the complaint in the Court. 10. The Judgments cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner/ payee are distinguishable on facts. Instead of filing the complaint, the respondent No. 2 presented the cheque in the Bank for the second time on 17.09.2007, i.e, after the expiry of the last date for filing the complaint in the Court. 10. The Judgments cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner/ payee are distinguishable on facts. In the Judgment of the Apex Court rendered in the case of M/s Dalmia Cement (Bharat) Ltd.-Vs- M/s Galaxy Traders and Agencies Ltd; AIR 2001 SC 676 , there was a dispute regarding proper service of notice. On receipt of the postal document, the accused informed the complainant that the envelope was empty and without any contents and a request was made to the complainant to mail the contents. In this way, there was no clear service of notice. Similarly, in the Judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Suman Sethi –Vs- Ajay K Churiwal; AIR 200 SC 828, the issue before the Apex Court was what would be the implication if the complainant claims payment of some amount, which is not identical to the amount of cheque. In other words, this Judgment is based on entirely different aspect and the issue of second notice was not involved therein. 11. In view of my aforesaid discussions, I hold that the case before me is squarely covered by the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Sadanandan Bhadran (supra). 12. Hence, I hold that the complaint was beyond the statutory period. Consequently, both the Judgments of the trial Court and the appellate Court are hereby set aside. 13. In the result, the revision petition stands allowed. 14. Return the LCRs, along with a copy of this Judgment. _____________