ORDER 1. These writ petitions are being disposed of by a common order, i.e., W.P. (MD). Nos. 11882, 11855 and 11856 of 2012, as common question of law and facts are involved in all the writ petitions. 2. The petitioners were imposed minor/major punishment of stoppage of increment for a specified period, which stands expired. 3. The cases of the petitioners are that their further promotion was deferred by the department on the ground that they fell within the check period of five years, as stipulated vide Government Order in G.O. (Ms) No. 368, Personnel and Administrative Reforms (S) Department, dated 18.10.1993. 4. The only ground of challenge to decision of the respondents in all these writ petitions is that the impugned orders of the first respondent in denying the right of consideration for promotion, based on G.O. (Ms) No. 368, Personnel and Administrative Reforms (S) Department, dated 18.10.1993, cannot be sustained in law, in view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Full Bench of this Court in Deputy Inspector General of Police, Thanjavur Range v. V. Rani 2011 (3) CTC 129 , holding therein as under: “17. Insofar as the legal effect of G.O. Ms. No. 368, Personnel and Administrative Reforms Department, dated 18.10.1993 is concerned, as stated earlier, there is no provision in respect of promotion in cases where there is currency of punishment. Therefore, the question as to whether in the absence of a statutory Rule framed under the Proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India, the gap can be filled up by way of Government Order in the form of instructions need not be gone into on the facts of the present case. In any event, a reading of the Government Order itself shows that while dealing about the effect of punishment, individual cases are to be looked into and there cannot be a general yardstick. Even though the said Government Order is stated to have been issued by the order of the Governor, it remains that the same has been issued on the order of the Chief Secretary to Government and it does not frame any rule under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India. We are of the view that the Government Order utmost can be correlated to an administrative instruction given by the Government under Article 162 of the Constitution of India. We are of the view that the Government Order utmost can be correlated to an administrative instruction given by the Government under Article 162 of the Constitution of India. The law is well settled that such administrative instruction cannot in any manner substitute the Statutory Rules. Therefore, we do not accept the contention of the learned Additional advocate General that either G.O. Ms. No. 368, Personnel and Administrative Reforms Department, dated 18.10.1993 or the subsequent Government Letter dated 7.10.2005 given as consolidated instructions for promotion with annexures has to be treated as steps taken by the Government to fill up the gap, which is well within the jurisdiction of the Government. 18. In any event, if such Government Order, G.O. Ms. No. 368, Personnel and Administrative Reforms Department, dated 18.10.1993 creates any inconsistent criteria against the Statutory Rules, the same cannot be accepted. The said aspect has been well established by the Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Shamsher Jang Shukla and Others, AIR 1972 SC 1546 , wherein while dealing with the issue of promotion of a Government servant, it was held that, apart form the Rules framed under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India, any addition by Administrative Instructions imposing more requirements cannot be valid in the eye of law. By dealing with similar contention as made by the Additional advocate General here that in the absence of any prohibition, the gap in the Rules can be filled up by the Administrative Instructions, the Supreme Court held as follows: “7. It may be noted that herein we are dealing only with those who were promoted from the cadre of clerks in the Secretariat. The first question arising for decision is whether the Government was competent to add by means of Administrative Instructions to the qualifications prescribed under the Rules framed under Article 309 . The High Court and the Courts below have come to the conclusion that the Government was incompetent to do so. This Court has ruled in Sant Ram Shama v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1967 SC 1910 , that while the Government cannot amend or supersede the Statutory Rules by Administrative Instructions, if the rules are silent on any particular point, the Government can fill up the gaps and supplement the Rules and issue instructions not inconsistent with the Rules already framed. Hence we have to see whether the instructions with which we are concerned, so far as relate to the clerks in the Secretariat amend or they alter the conditions of service prescribed by the Rules framed under Article 309 . undoubtedly the instructions issued by the Government add to those qualifications. By adding to the qualifications already prescribed by the Rules, the Government has really altered the existing conditions of service. The instructions issued by the Government undoubtedly affects the promotion of concerned officials and therefore they relate to their conditions of service. The Government is not competent to alter the Rules framed under Article 309 by means of Administrative Instructions. We are unable to agree with the contention of the State that by issuing the instructions in question, the Government had merely filled up a gap in the Rules. The rules can be implemented without any difficulty. We see no gap in the Rules.” 5. In view of the authoritative pronouncement by the Hon’ble Full Bench, the impugned orders cannot be sustained in law. 6. Consequently, all the writ petitions are allowed and the impugned orders are set aside and the respondents are directed to consider the case of the petitioners for promotion in accordance with law, without reference to check period. 7. Consequently, the connected Miscellaneous Petitions are closed. No costs. Petitions allowed.