Judgment 1. The petitioner is the defendant in a suit for eviction instituted by the opposite party. It is pending on the file of the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) at Barasat, District 24-Parganas (N). 2. It appears from a reading of the plaint that the petitioner was inducted as a tenant in respect of three shop rooms, described separately in schedules (a), (b) and (c) appended to the plaint, at a monthly rental of Rs.500/-, Rs.145/- and Rs.55/- respectively. Eviction has been prayed for on grounds of default in payment of rent and reasonable requirement of the suit properties by the opposite party, being the plaintiff in the suit. 3. The written statement, filed by the petitioner, records her admission that she is a tenant under the opposite party in respect of the suit properties at the monthly rental of Rs.500/-, Rs.145/-, and Rs.55/- respectively payable according to Bengali Calendar month. However, she disputed the validity, legality and sufficiency of the notice to quit dated May 2, 2006 and claimed that no notice was served upon her. She also denied that she was a defaulter in payment of rent or that the opposite party required the suit properties for own use. 4. It was at the stage of witness action that the petitioner filed an application under Order 6 Rule 17, Civil Procedure Code for amending the written statement filed by her. She proposed to introduce certain sentences after paragraph 17 of the written statement, which are to the following effect : "Admittedly the defendant is a tenant under the plaintiff in 3(three) different tenancies. The rate of monthly rent is Rs.500/- in the tenancy: similarly the rate of rent for the second tenancy is Rs.145/- per month and lastly, another tenancy is Rs.55/- per month. All the tenancies are being run according to Bengali calendar month. The defendant has trade licence and other necessary paper for the purpose of running shop/shops. Be it mentioned here that amongst the tenancies one tenancy is being used as manufacturing purpose wherein Steel Almirah and other things are manufactured there. So, for eviction 6Csix) months notice is compulsory. Moreover, the induction have been made in three different times and the shops are in different places. Although all the monthly rents are being paid according to Bengali Calendar month, but the plaintiff so far issued three separate rent receipts. So, for eviction 6Csix) months notice is compulsory. Moreover, the induction have been made in three different times and the shops are in different places. Although all the monthly rents are being paid according to Bengali Calendar month, but the plaintiff so far issued three separate rent receipts. So for eviction of the defendant three separate notice to quit must be issued. So, the Notice to quit for this snit is totally bad and invalid. The plaintiff should have filed three separate Eviction Suits for three tenancies. The defendant did not receive Notice to quit nor defendant gave any reply by engaging any learned Advocate." 5. The petitioner pleaded that the amendment sought for by her is formal in nature and would not change the nature of character of the suit and further that despite exercise of due diligence, the defect in the written statement could not be detected earlier. 6. The learned Judge considered the application for amendment of written statement and by her order dated November 2, 2011 rejected the same on the grounds that (i) the facts that the petitioner seeks to plead in the written statement upon amendment already find place in the written statement that has been filed by her; (ii) the amendment sought for did not relate to any subsequent event; and (iii) in view of the proviso to Rule 17 of Order 6 of the Code, there was no scope to amend the pleadings after Trial has commenced. 7. Mr. Roy Chowdhury, learned advocate appearing for the petitioner contended that the learned Judge grossly erred in the exercise of her discretion while declining the prayer for amendment. According to him, the learned Judge misdirected herself in forming a view that after Trial has commenced, amendment of pleadings cannot be allowed. 8. He further contended that even though the proposed amendment may not relate to any subsequent event, yet, the Court retains the power to allow an amendment that is proposed to be introduced even after commencement of Trial, upon recording a satisfaction that despite exercise of due diligence the party seeking amendment could not have raised the matter prior to such commencement. 9. 9. Regarding the other ground on which amendment was declined, he contended that the petitioner intended to elaborate her defence case by providing more details in respect of facts already on record and this is a permissible course of action in view of the decision' of the Supreme Court reported in (2006) 6 SCC 498 (Baldev Singh and Ors. vs. Monohar Singh and Anr.), wherein it was also held that the Courts ought to be more liberal while considering an application for amendment of written statement than of plaint and question of prejudice is less likely to operate with the same rigour in the former than in the latter case. 10. According to him, since the amendment proposed is necessary for proper and effective determination of the controversy between the parties, the Court ought to set aside the order impugned and allow the application under Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code. 11. Per contra, Mr. Dutta, learned advocate appearing for the opposite party contended that even though the learned Judge of the Trial Court may not have construed the proviso in Rule 17 of Order 6 in the proper perspective, the petitioner did not disclose any reason that could be considered sufficient by the Trial Court for allowing the proposed amendment after commencement of Trial. He contended, while placing reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court reported in (2009) 2 SCC 409 (Vidyabai and ors. vs. Padmalata and Anr.), that the proviso inserted in Order 6 Rule 17 in terms of an amendment effected in 2002, is a mandatory provision and howsoever meritorious a prayer for amendment might be, no Court is entitled to allow the same without being satisfied that despite exercise of due diligence, the matter could not have been raised earlier to commencement of Trial. Reference was also made by him to the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court reported in 2010 (2) ICC 576 (Khushiram vs. Murli Monohar Thatherun Panchayati Mandir and Dharamsda Society) for the same effect. 12. That apart, Mr. Dutta also referred to the decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2007 (2) ICC 1 (Ajendraprasadji N. Pandey and anr. 12. That apart, Mr. Dutta also referred to the decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2007 (2) ICC 1 (Ajendraprasadji N. Pandey and anr. vs. Swami Keshavprakashdasji N. and Ors.) where it was held that grant of amendment at a stage where evidence of three witnesses was over and documentary evidence was tendered for the purpose of recasting issues would cause serious prejudice to the plaintiff and it is in the interest of justice that the amendment sought for should be denied. 13. Mr. Dutta also referred to the decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2010 (9) SCC 385 (Jai Singh and Ors. vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and anr.) for enlightening the Court on the nature and scope of power exercised by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. According to him, the order of the learned Judge impugned in this application ought not to be interfered with on the limited grounds of judicial review based whereon the High Court would be justified in interfering with an order in exercise of power conferred by Article 227 of the Constitution. 14. He thus prayed for dismissal of the revisional application. 15. I have heard the parties and considered the decisions cited at the Bar. 16. Even the decision in Jai Singh (supra), delineating the limits within which the correctional jurisdiction of the High Court can be exercised, does not stand in the way of interfering with the order under challenge since I am of the view that the impugned order, insofar as it holds that amendment of pleadings after commencement of Trial is not permissible, is palpably perverse. The tenor of the impugned order also suggests that since the proposed amendment did not relate to any subsequent event, the learned Judge considered the petitioner not entitled to the relief of amendment of her pleadings. The learned Judge obviously posed a wrong question and apswered it wrongly. 17. Regarding the ground that the material facts that the petitioner seeks to bring on record by amending her written statement are available in the original written statement, it appears that the learned Judge is not entirely in error in so observing. There is an admission in the written statement that the petitioner has been paying Rs.500/-, Rs.145/- and Rs.55/- for the property under tenancy. There is an admission in the written statement that the petitioner has been paying Rs.500/-, Rs.145/- and Rs.55/- for the property under tenancy. However, by way of elaboration, she proposed to introduce a plea that the separate rentals were for separate tenancies and that since no separate notice to quit and vacate for each of the three tenancies had been issued, the opposite party had contravened the provisions of the 1997 Act. The petitioner also intended to urge that one of the shop rooms was being used for manufacturing purpose, and for proposed eviction, a notice of six months was necessary. Although this plea is not to be found in the written statement, already filed, its worth need not be examined at this stage. 18. Baldev Singh (supra) lays down that a more liberal view ought to be adopted while considering an application for amendment of written statement and unless serious injustice or irreparable loss is caused to the party at the receiving end the Court ought to exercise discretion in/favour of amendment. 19. One may in this connection also note the decision of the Supreme Court reported in (2009) 10 SCC 1984 (Revajeetu Builders and Developers vs. Narayanaswamy and Sons and Ors.) wherein, after considering a host of decisions, the factors that the Court ought to bear in mind while considering an application for amendment of pleadings has been laid down by the Supreme Court. Paragraphs 63 and 64 of the decision being relevant are quoted below : "63. On critically analysing both the English and Indian cases, some basic principles emerge which ought to be taken into consideration while allowing or rejecting the application for amendment: (1) whether the amendment sought is imperative for proper and effective adjudication of the case; (2) whether the application for amendment is bona fide or mala fide; (3) the amendment should not cause such prejudice to the' other side which cannot be compensated adequately in terms of money; (4) refusing amendment would in fact lead to injustice or lead to multiple litigation; (5) whether the proposed amendment constitutionally or fundamentally changes the nature and character of the case; and (6) as a general rule, the Court should decline amendments if a fresh suit on the amended claims would be barred by limitation on the date of application. These are some of the important factors which may be kept in mind while dealing with application filed under Order 6 Rule 17. These are only illustrative and not exhaustive. 64. The decision on an application made under Order 6 Rule 17 is a very serious judicial exercise and the said exercise should never be undertaken in a casual manner. We can conclude our discussion by observing that while deciding applications for amendments the courts must not refuse bona fide, legitimate, honest and necessary amendments and should never permit mala fide, worthless and/or dishonest amendments." Referring to imposition of costs, it was held therein as follows: "61. The Courts have consistently laid down that for unnecessary, delay and inconvenience, the opposite party must be compensated with costs. The imposition of costs is an important judicial exercise particularly-hen the Courts deal with the cases of amendment. The costs cannot and should not be imposed arbitrarily. In our view, the following parameters must be taken into consideration while imposing the costs. These factors are illustrative in nature and not exhaustive: (i) At what stage the amendment was sought. (ii) While imposing the costs, it should be taken into consideration whether the amendment has been sought at a pre-Trial or post-Trial stage. (iii) The financial benefit derived by one party at the cost of other party should be properly calculated in terms of money, and the costs be awarded accordingly. (iv) The imposition of costs should not be symbolic but realistic. (v) The delay and inconvenience caused to the opposite side must be clearly evaluated in terms of additional and extra Court hearings compelling the opposite party to bear the extra costs. (vi) In case of appeal to higher Courts, the victim of the amendment is compelled to bear considerable additional costs. All these aspects must be carefully taken into consideration while awarding the costs." 20. As observed by the Supreme Court, deciding an application for amendment of pleadings requires exercise of judicial discretion on sound principles and the Court cannot be casual in its approach while allowing disallowing a prayer. Even when it considers it proper to exercise discretion, costs ought to be awarded for the inconvenience and harassment that the other side might be subjected to in the circumstances. 21. Even when it considers it proper to exercise discretion, costs ought to be awarded for the inconvenience and harassment that the other side might be subjected to in the circumstances. 21. I am of the considered view that the learned Judge of the Trial Court proceeded to reject the prayer of the petitioner with a negative mindset. The proviso was interpreted as a fetter to exercise of discretion to allow amendment after commencement of Trial. It is obvious that she was so influenced thereby that it led to her being misdirected and thus causing miscarriage of justice by not considering the application for amendment with an open mind. 22. The basic test that is to be applied for deciding whether an amendment should, be allowed or not is, whether the amendment is necessary for the determination of the real question in controversy between the parties. Once Trial of a suit has commenced, the party seeking amendment must also explain why prior to such commencement prayer for amendment could not be made. 23. The question as to whether the petitioner, at the stage the proceeding has reached, is at all entitled to amendment of her pleadings on payment of compensatory costs, ought to be reconsidered by the learned Judge keeping in mind the above points as well as the decisions referred to hereinabove except Jai Singh (supra), which deals with a separate aspect. 24. The order impugned stands set aside. The revisional application stands allowed, without order for costs. 25. The application under order 6 Rule 17 consequently revives and shall be decided by the learned Judge, subject to her convenience, as early as possible. However, the learned Judge shall take care to ensure that a final decision is given within a month from date of receipt of a copy of this order. Urgent Photostat certified copy of this order if applied for, shall be furnished to the applicant at an early date.