Per Virender Singh, J.— 1. Respondent - Des Raj (hereinafter to be referred to as writ petitioner) after serving the Revenue Department of Jammu and Kashmir Government, Jammu (Proforma respondent no.2) for long 37 years retired on superannuation on 30th September, 2010. He through the medium of SWP No. 1428/2009 sought indulgence of the writ Court for issuing writ of mandamus commanding Jammu and Kashmir State Board of School Education - Appellant herein (For short Board), to correct his date of birth from 19.09.1952 to 19.09.1953 with a further prayer directing the Revenue department to grant him all the benefits due to him in wake of such correction. 2. It needs to be mentioned here that at the time of filing of the writ petition, the writ petitioner was still in service, therefore, another relief sought for, was not to retire him on the basis of wrong date of birth in the Service Book. However, during the pendency of his writ petition, he retired on superannuation. 3. The writ petition stands disposed of by the learned Single Judge vide order dated 24.11.2011 with a direction to the Appellant Board to hold an enquiry into the matter and transmit the results of the enquiry to proforma respondent nos. 2 and 3 (respondents 1 and 2 in the main writ petition) and, in case, the Board of enquiry finds merit in the case of the writ petitioner and corrects his date of birth, the Revenue Department shall act on such corrected date of birth and extend all benefits under rules available to the writ petitioner. However, an opportunity has also been afforded to the writ petitioner to project his case and supplement his stand with the documents, if any, in his possession. 4. Aggrieved of the said order - Board is before us through the instant Letters Patent Appeal. 5. Since there was delay of 23 days in filing the appeal, the writ petitioner was put to notice, who has put his appearance through his counsel Mr. CM. Koul, Advocate. Vide order dated 6th of March, 2012, the aforesaid delay stands condoned. 6. With the consent of learned counsel for both the sides, the instant appeal has been taken on board for its final disposal at admission stage itself. 7. Mr. D.S. Thakur, learned senior advocate, assisted by Mrs. CM. Koul, Advocate. Vide order dated 6th of March, 2012, the aforesaid delay stands condoned. 6. With the consent of learned counsel for both the sides, the instant appeal has been taken on board for its final disposal at admission stage itself. 7. Mr. D.S. Thakur, learned senior advocate, assisted by Mrs. Aruna Thakur, advocate, submits that from the averments made in the writ petition itself, it is clear that it is a case of recording of wrong date of birth with the school authorities, who have converted his date of birth from Samvat Era to the Christian Era. Therefore, the Board atleast committed no error, inasmuch as, the registered particulars of the petitioner as forwarded by the school authorities were strictly incorporated in the school record. He submits that a mandamus regarding conduct of enquiry by Board could have been issued only, if some allegations of mistake on part of the Board had been alleged whereas from the plain reading of the petition, it is clear tha t no specific mistake is attributed to the Board at all. The allegations, in fact, are made against the school authorities, who had allegedly committed a mistake while converting the date from Bikrami Era to Christian Era. In case, the Board now starts holding an enquiry with regard to the correctness of the date of birth as directed, it will have to check the entire record of the school right from the beginning. Therefore, such like mandamus would not only amount to opening of Pandora's Box, it would be opening the flood gates for other government employees to come forward with such like pleas, even at the verge of their retirement. Therefore, the writ petition ought to have been dismissed being not maintainable on this count alone. 8. Mr. Thakur further submits that the writ petitioner passed his matriculation in Session 1971, whereas the petition came to be filed by him as late as in the year 2009 when he was on the verge of retirement. Therefore, the writ petition ought to have been dismissed being not maintainable on this count alone. 8. Mr. Thakur further submits that the writ petitioner passed his matriculation in Session 1971, whereas the petition came to be filed by him as late as in the year 2009 when he was on the verge of retirement. It appears that it was a clever effort made by the writ petitioner to get his tenure extended in the service through the medium of the writ petition knowing well that his case for consideration was hopelessly time barred which plea was specifically taken by the Board in its objections on the strength of Article 67 of the Limitation Act which provides a limitation of three years from the date of knowledge of the mistake. If any, action was to be taken for correction of the record, the writ petitioner should have taken that step within the said period. 9. Learned senior counsel further submits that may be a petition under Article 226 does not prescribe any specific period of limitation, yet the Courts have adopted the period prescribed under the law of limitation as maximum period within which the petition can be filed or if at all, there is delay in this regard, a case is to be made out projecting sufficient cause for condonation of the said delay. The case on hand, instead of reflecting any sufficient cause for condonation of delay, rather reflects a clever move on part of the petitioner. On this score alone, the writ petition merits rejection. Not only that, even disputed questions of fact were involved in the petition, which controversy could be resolved only by the civil Court on the basis of the quantity of evidence and, therefore, also it should not have been entertained at all. 10. In order to strengthen his submissions, Mr. Thakur has relied upon a judgment of this Court in case titled "Abdul Rashid Sogami v. State of Jammu and Kashmir and anr." decided on 28th September, 2000, (Single Bench) photostat copy thereof placed on record during the course of arguments. 11. Per contra, Mr. Koul submits that virtually the writ petitioner has not been granted any relief by the learned writ Court. 11. Per contra, Mr. Koul submits that virtually the writ petitioner has not been granted any relief by the learned writ Court. It is only a direction issued to the Board to hold an enquiry into the matter and transmit the results of enquiry to the Revenue Department from which the Board should not shirk. He then submits that it is not a case in which the petitioner is seeking some correction with regard to date of birth. It is only a case of wrong calculation as the date of birth of the writ petitioner has been recorded as 17th Magh, 2009 B.K. and by converting the same into Christian Era it is recorded as 19th day of September, 1952, whereas it should have been indicated as 19.09.1953. Because of miscalculation, if the writ petitioner is deprived of one year of the service and all its consequential benefits, it would cause grave prejudice to him. In short, it is setting the service record right. According to Mr. Koul, even equity tilts towards the writ petitioner in this case. 12. In support of his submissions, Mr. Koul has also relied upon a judgment of this Court in case titled "Hans Raj Sharma v. State of Jammu and Kashmir" (Single Bench) reported as 1994 SLJ 380. 13. After hearing learned counsel for both the sides and going through the writ record, we are of the view that the instant appeal deserves to be dismissed. 14. Admittedly the learned writ Court has not entered into any discussion with regard to delay part at all. From the averments made in the petition itself, one can make out that there is a huge delay in knocking at the door of the writ Court, inasmuch as, the writ petitioner passed matriculation in session 1971 and immediately thereafter, he was provided matriculation certificate, whereas the writ petition came to be filed in year 2009. This period comes to almost one year less than 40 years. Assuming for the sake of arguments, we extend some latitude towards the writ petitioner upto the stage of his appointment as Patwari in October, 1973, as he himself had placed the said certificate in the service book at the time of his appointment, still for long 36 years, he could not notice that his date of birth is wrongly recorded as 19.9.1952. After all he has retired as Naib Tehsildar in Revenue Department: This plea, in any case, this Court is not going to accept which is an embodiment of reasoning and reasoning alone. Therefore, in our considered view, his writ petition should have been dismissed on account of delay and laches only. 15. It is beaten law of land that a person, who is watching at the fence for years to come, cannot seek equitable relief. Our view is fortified by the judgment of Apex Court in case titled "State of Maharashtra v. Digambar" reported as 1995 (4) SCC page 683. It is profitable to reproduce the relevant portion of the said judgment hereunder; "........Thus, in our view, persons seeking relief against the State under Article 226 of the Constitution, be they citizens or otherwise, cannot get discretionary relief obtainable thereunder unless they fully satisfy the H igh Court that the facts and circumstances of the case clearly justified the laches or undue delay on their part in approaching the Court for grant of such discretionary relief. Therefore, where a High Court grants relief to a citizen or any other person under Article 226 of the Constitution against any person including the State without considering his blameworthy conduct, such as laches or undue delay, acquiescence or waiver, the relief so granted becomes unsustainable even if the relief was granted in respect of alleged deprivation of his legal right by the State." "Powers of the High Court to be exercised under Article 226 of the Constitution, if is discretionary, its exercise must be judicious and reasonable, admits of no controversy. It is for that reason, a person's entitlement for relief from a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, be it against the State or anybody else, even if is founded on the allegation of infringement of his legal right, has to necessarily depend upon unblame-worthy conduct of the person seeking relief, and the Court refuses to grant the discretionary relief to such person in exercise of such power, when he approaches it with unclean hands or blame-worthy conduct." 16. In case titled "Ghulam Rasool Lone v. State of Jammu and Kashmir", reported as 2009 AIR SCW 5260:2010 (5) JKJ SC-87, in para 14 of the said judgment, it is said: "14. In case titled "Ghulam Rasool Lone v. State of Jammu and Kashmir", reported as 2009 AIR SCW 5260:2010 (5) JKJ SC-87, in para 14 of the said judgment, it is said: "14. The discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution may, however, be denied on the ground of delay and laches. It is now well settled that who claims equity must enforce his claim within a reasonable time." 17. In "Virender Choudhary v. Bharat Petroleum Corporation" reported as (2009) 1 SCC 297 and "S.S. Balu v. State of Kerala", reported as (2009) SCC 479, it has been held by their Lordships that delay defeats equity and those are the relevant factors in exercising equitable jurisdiction. 18. We appreciate the present case yet from another angle within the parameters of Article 67 of Jammu and Kashmir Limitation Act, 1995, wherein, in the first schedule, 'the period of limitation' is prescribed for the 'description of suit' and the 'time from which period begins to run'. 19. The relief claimed by the writ petitioner is on the ground of some mistake and the period of limitation prescribed for filing suit for declaration to this effect is three years and the time which begins to run is when the mistake becomes known to the plaintiff. No doubt that for filing a petition under Article 226, no specific period of limitation is prescribed, but delay is not an unbridled horse having no reins and it is left to whims of the petitioner to choose the time. 20. What we notice in the writ petition is that the petitioner has not whispered a word as to when he came to know of the mistake with regard to his date of birth. We do find that there is a representation (Annexure-C to the writ Court record) filed by the petitioner to the Chief secretary, Jammu and Kashmir Government, Civil Secretariat, Srinagar on 30th June, 2009, wherein while seeking correction of date of birth, he states that few days ago, he came to know of the said fact. But this plea we are not going to accept at all. But this plea we are not going to accept at all. At the cost of repetition, we would once again observe that it was an intelligent move by the writ petitioner to place on record the representation dated 30th June, 2009 before filing the main writ petition in August, 2009, as such, it would not be a ground much less sufficient ground to condone the huge delay of 36 years, even if taken from the date of his appointment as Patwari in Revenue department. 21. Even by virtue of notification No. F(Acad-C) Corr/B/2009 dated 16.02.2009 issued by Jammu and KashmirState Board of School Education Academic Division, maximum three years period is prescribed with regard to the correction of registered particulars, such as name; parentage; Sub-Caste; Guardianship or date of birth. This notification was issued in continuation to the earlier notification of February, 1994 and it appears that the period of one year is extended upto three years from the date of issuance of Diploma/Qualification Certificate. The said notification reads thus; "THE JAMMU AND KASHMIR STATE BOARD OF SCHOOL EDUCATION ACADEMIC DIVISION REHARI COLONY, JAMMU NOTIFICATION In continuation of Notification No:F(Acad-CU)16/CIP/FUA/B/94 dated February 10, 1994 regarding correction in the registered particulars viz; Name, Parentage, Sub-Caste, Guardianship or Date of Birth, the Chairman has been pleased to order that the correction cases of genuine and extra ordinary nature be also entertained for consideration of necessary correction under rules beyond limitation period of one year upto three years from the date of issuance of Diploma/Qualification Certificate. The candidates shall have to submit their applications in this regard on the prescribed form along-with fee to the Joint Secretary (Certificates) J&K State Board of School Education, Srinagar/Jammu as the case may be. Applications submitted and received thereafter (after 03 years) shall not be entertained/considered under any circumstances. No:F(Acad-C)Corr./B/09. Dated:-16-2-2009 Sd/- (Dr. Sheikh Bashir Ahmad) SECRETARY" We appreciate this issue within the ambit of Chapter-Ill of the Jammu and Kashmir Civil Service Regulations Volume-I relating to Rule 35-AA(c) vis-a-vis alteration of date of birth. It reads: (c) Alteration of Date of Birth. No:F(Acad-C)Corr./B/09. Dated:-16-2-2009 Sd/- (Dr. Sheikh Bashir Ahmad) SECRETARY" We appreciate this issue within the ambit of Chapter-Ill of the Jammu and Kashmir Civil Service Regulations Volume-I relating to Rule 35-AA(c) vis-a-vis alteration of date of birth. It reads: (c) Alteration of Date of Birth. "The date of birth so declared by the Government servant and accepted and once recorded by the appropriate authority (as specified in clause (b) above) in the service book or any other record of service of the Government servant, as the case may be, shall, not be subject to any alteration, except in the case of a clerical error without the orders of the Government. No alteration of date of birth of a Government servant shall be made by the Government (Administrative Department) unless a request in this regard is made by the concerned Government servant within a period of five years of his/her entry into Government service and it is clearly established that a genuine/bona fide mistake has occurred. Provided that in case of Government servant in service on the date of issue of this Notification, a request for alteration of his/her date of birth may be considered by the Government, for reasons to be recorded in writing, if an application to this effect is made within a period of six months from the date of issue of this Notification. Provided that..........................." Rule 35-AA has been inserted in J&K Civil Service Regulations vide notification No. SRO-310 of 1995 dated 29.11.1995 and it still holds the field. 22. Although the plain reading of Clause(c) puts a restriction for a government servant of five years for making a request with regard to alteration of date of birth from the date of his/her entry into government service, yet the first proviso as referred to hereinabove, gives another period of six months to a government servant in service to request for an alteration of his/her date of birth from the date of issuance of the aforesaid notification. 23. We put it in more clear terms. Suppose a government servant had entered into government service within five years prior to issuance of SRO 310 of 1995 which is effective from 29.11.1995, he/she could very well move the request for alteration of date of birth within that period. 23. We put it in more clear terms. Suppose a government servant had entered into government service within five years prior to issuance of SRO 310 of 1995 which is effective from 29.11.1995, he/she could very well move the request for alteration of date of birth within that period. But there could be a case of a government servant who joined government service much before five years of issuance of SRO 310 of 1995 dated 29.11.1995, still the proviso clause enables him to move an application for alteration of date of birth within a period of six months from the issuance of the notification and not thereafter. 24. Taking the case of the writ petitioner on the touch stone of the aforesaid rule position also, his petition deserves to be dismissed. 25. As a sequel to all what is discussed hereinabove, in our considered view, the writ petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches and the learned Single Judge without going into this vital aspect, has disposed it of simply with a direction to the appellant to hold an enquiry. 26. We deem it appropriate to enter into another aspect also vis-a-vis the direction issued in the impugned order, as in our view, it has its far reaching consequences. 27. Prima facie it appears from the impugned order as if an innocuous prayer has been acceded to by the learned writ Court and, therefore, it should not be disturbed. But when appreciated strictly within the parameters of the rules governing the field and the time consumed by the applicant seeking correction in the service records with regard to date of birth, the said direction, in our view, is not sustainable. 28. In "Abdul Rashid Sogami's" case (Supra), virtually the same issued had cropped up. The petitioner there:n was the Range Officer of the Forest Department and due to superannuate on 30th September, 2000. He sought correction of his recorded date of birth from 17.08.1942 to 17.09.1947 on the ground that his date of birth is 17 Magh, 2009 BK. The petitioner had entered the service of the respondent State about three decades ago and on joining the service, his service book was prepared indicating his date of birth as 17.08.1942 on the basis of the certificate submitted by him. The petitioner had entered the service of the respondent State about three decades ago and on joining the service, his service book was prepared indicating his date of birth as 17.08.1942 on the basis of the certificate submitted by him. He remained silent through out & put forth grievance of the change of recorded date of birth in 1999 and his application was mooted through different departments. The petitioner filed the writ petition in this Court seeking direction to the respondent State that he should not be superannuated and instead his service record be corrected according to his date of birth being 17th Magh, 2009 BK. At that time, the State issued SRO 310 of 1995, the provisions of which envisaged that any dispute with regard to date of birth of an employee could be raised by him within six months from the date of its publication and not thereafter. The petitioner therein had not raised the dispute within the said stipulated period and for the first time wake up in November, 1999. 29. The case set up by the petitioner was resisted by the State that he was not entitled to seek correction of the date of birth, which was recorded in the service book about three decades ago. This Court while relying upon four Supreme Court judgments handed down in cases "Chief Medical Officer v. Khadeer Kadri" reported as AIR 1995 SC 850 , "Union of India v. Saroj Bala" AIR 1996 SC 1000 , "Burn Standard Co. Ltd. v. Dinabandhu Majundar" AIR 1995 SC 1500 and "Union of India v. C. Rama Sawami" AIR 1997 SC 2057, ultimately dismissed the writ petition observing that the petitioner had approached the Court few days earlier to the date of his retirement. 30. In "Khadeer Kadri's" case (Supra), their Lordships observed thai; "No doubt, sub-rule (5) of the Rule 2 of the Andra Pradesh Public Employees (Recording and Alteration of Date of Birth) Rules, 1984, provides power for correction of the bonafide mistake in recording the date of birth. It can not be said that it is clerical mistake. The date of birth having been given and recorded in the service register as early as in 1951, it was a bonafide mistake. It can not be said that it is clerical mistake. The date of birth having been given and recorded in the service register as early as in 1951, it was a bonafide mistake. The respondent claimed that he discovered the mistake in 1991 that his date of birth instead is July 16, 1934, but it was recorded as November 14, 1933. This is only a ruse to get over the bar of limitation to have the date of birth entered in the service record corrected. The rules prescribe the procedure for laying the application within three years from the date of entering into service. In 1976 executive instructions were issued for correction of date of birth which were replaced by statutory rules issued in 1984. The latter also prescribes the procedure. He did not avail of the opportunity when twice, it was available to him to have it corrected. It would clearly show that subsequent belated attempt is not a bonafide one but to have the corrections made to his advantage after the bar of limitation created by the rules." 31. In "Saroj Bala's" case (Supra), the petitioner therein was not granted the relief of correction of date of birth after remaining in service for eighteen years. It was held in the said case by their Lordships that the petitioner therein was a qualified person and could not take the shelter that he was not aware of the date of birth recorded in his service book. 32. In "Dinabandhu Majundar's" case (Supra), it was held that: "The fact that an employee of Govt. or its instrumentality who will be in service for over decades, with no objection whatsoever raised as to his date of birth accepted by the employer as correct, when all of a sudden comes forward towards the fag end of his service career with a writ application before the High Court seeking correction of his date of birth in his service record, the very conduct of non-raising of an objection in the matter by the employee in our view should be a sufficient reason for the High Court not to entertain such applications on grounds of acquiescence undue delay and laches. More-over discretionary jurisdiction of the High Court can never be said to have been reasonably and judicially exercised if it entertains such writ application, for no employee, who had grievance as to his date of birth in his 'Service and Leave Record' could have genuinely waited till the fag end of his service career to get it corrected by availing of the extraordinary jurisdiction of a High Court. Therefore, we have no hesitation, in holding, that ordinarily High Courts should not, in exercise of its discretionary writ jurisdiction, entertain a writ application/petition filed by an employee of the Government or its instrumentality towards the fag end-of his service seeking correction of his date of birth entered in his 'Service and Leave Record' or Service Register with the avowed object of continuing in service beyond the normal period of his retirement." 33. In "Rama Sawami's" Case (Supra) their Lordships while dealing with the same issue held as under; "In matters relating to appointment to service various factors are taken into consideration before making a selection or an appointment. One of the relevant circumstances is the age of the person who is sought to be appointed. It may not be possible to conclusively prove that an advantage had been gained by representing a date of birth which is different than that which is later sought to be incorporated. But it will not be unreasonable to presume that when a candidate, at the first instance, communicates a particular date of birth there is obviously his intention that his age calculated on the basis of that date of birth should be taken into consideration by the appointing authority for adjudging his suitability for a responsible office. In fact, where maturity is a relevant factor to assess suitability, an older person is ordinarily considered to be more mature and, therefore, more suitable. In such a case, it cannot be said that advantage is not obtained by a person because of an earlier date of birth, if he subsequently claims to be younger in age, after taking that advantage. In such a situation, it would be against public policy to permit such a change to enable longer benefit to the person concerned. In such a case, it cannot be said that advantage is not obtained by a person because of an earlier date of birth, if he subsequently claims to be younger in age, after taking that advantage. In such a situation, it would be against public policy to permit such a change to enable longer benefit to the person concerned. This being so, we find it difficult to accept the broad proposition that the principle of Estoppel would not apply in such where the age of a person who is sought to be appointed may be a relevant consideration to assess his suitability." 34. The judgment cited above by Mr. Koul in "Hans Raj Sharma's" case (Supra), in our view, is distinguishable on facts. In the said case, in the service book of the petitioner, his date of birth was recorded as 16.12.1935, which according to him, was not correct. He asserted that his actual date of birth was 16.12.1936, taking the plea that the mistake in recording the date of birth had taken place when it was firstly converted from Christian Era to Bikrami Era and then from Bikrami Era to Christian Era. It was further pleaded by him that firstly he was admitted in Government Primary School, Aghore, whereby his date of birth was recorded in Christian Era as 16.12.1936 and after that he studied in Government High School where his date of birth was recorded as same. When he was admitted in Government Middle School, his date of birth was recorded in Bikrami Era. From that school he went to Higher Secondary School from where he did his Matriculation where also his date of birth was converted from Bikrami to Christian Era and wrongly recorded as 16.12.1935. It was further alleged by him that he made a representation in Decem-ber,1993 to the concerned quarter for correction of date of birth, which was not considered. 35. In the aforesaid case, the learned State counsel had virtually conceded before the learned Single Judge that an enquiry was called for as the petitioner had made a representation whereas in the case on hand, while refuting the averments made in the writ petition in this regard, the stand of the State is that all the averments made in this regard are vague. Reply filed by the Revenue Department reveals that even if, any representation was filed, the same was not maintainable as the writ petitioner had not indicated law/rule under which the representation was allegedly made. 36. Considering particular circumstances of "Hans Raj Sharma's" case (Supra), the learned Single Judge while relying upon the judgment in case titled "State of Orissa v. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei and ors." reported as AIR 1967 Supreme Court 1269 (inadvertently mentioned as page 1969) directed the State to hold an enquiry into the actual date of birth of petitioner therein. 37. We have gone through the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in "Binapani Dei's" case (Supra) reliance thereof made in "Hans Raj Sharma's" case (Supra). In the said case, Binapani 'Dei had joined the service of the State Government in 1938. In 1961, the Government held an enquiry into her date of birth. She was then asked to show cause as to why a certain date should not be taken as her date of birth. The report of the enquiry Officer was not disclosed and she was not given an opportunity to meet the evidence used against her. The Government re-fixed her date of birth and ordered that she be compulsorily retired. Aggrieved of the aforesaid order of the State, she filed a writ petition in the High court which was allowed. 38. The State of Orissa filed an appeal in the Hon'ble Supreme Court contending that the High Court in dealing with a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution ought not to have proceeded to determine disputed questions of fact and that the order re-fixing the date of birth of the respondent therein (Binapani Dei) was an administrative order and the High Court had no power to sit in appeal over the decision of the State Authorities. 39. While dealing with the issue, their Lordships held that under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court is not precluded from entering upon a decision on questions of fact raised by the petitioner. 39. While dealing with the issue, their Lordships held that under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court is not precluded from entering upon a decision on questions of fact raised by the petitioner. Where an enquiry into the complicated questions of fact arises in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India before the right of an aggrieved party to obtain relief claimed may be determined, the High Court may in appropria te cases decline to enter upon the enquiry and may refer the party claiming the relief to a suit. But the question is one of the discretion and not of the jurisdiction of the Court. On the individual facts of that case, their Lordships held that in the said case, the dispute was about the regularity of the enquiry and the High Court was apparently of the view that the question whether the State acted arbitrarily did not raise any question of investigation into the complicated issues of fact and, therefore, their Lordships did not find it to be a case of calling for any interference with the exercise of discretion of the High Court. The other issue which has cropped up in the "Binapani Dei's" case (Supra) that the common ground between the parties was that no enquiry in accordance with the provisions of the Article 311 made by the State Government. The plea of the State was that Article 311 had no application to the case of the respondent therein because she was not dismissed or removed from service. It was contended by the State that the true date of birth of respondent was April 16, 1907, as such, she was properly declared superannuated in consonance with the finding arrived at in an enquiry held for that purpose by the State. It was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that an action between contesting parties, and strict compliance with the forms of judicial procedure were not called upon and that the authority concerned was under a duty to give the person against whom an enquiry is held an opportunity to set up his version or defence. It was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that an action between contesting parties, and strict compliance with the forms of judicial procedure were not called upon and that the authority concerned was under a duty to give the person against whom an enquiry is held an opportunity to set up his version or defence. It was, thus, held that the rule that a party to whose prejudice an order is intended to be passed is entitled to a hearing applies to judicial tribunals and bodies of persons invested with authority to adjudicate upon matters involving civil consequences and that the duty to act judicially arises from the very nature of the function intended to be performed and that if the tails of the justice be ignored and an order to the prejudice is made, the order is a nullity. In this background of facts, the Hon'ble Supreme Court while noticing that the enquiry and decision taken in the case of the respondent therein was contrary to the basic concept of justice and cannot have any value. Ultimately the order of the High Court was upheld by dismissing the appeal of the State. 40. At the cost of repetition, we may state here that the facts of the case on hand are entirely distinguishable from the facts of the case of "Hans Raj Sharma's" case (Supra), as such Mr. Koul, may not be in a position to derive any advantage from the said judgment. Rather "Abdul Rashid Sogami's" case relied upon by Mr. Thakur, learned senior advocate where therein the learned Single Judge while relying the ratio of "Khadeer Kadri's" case (Supra), "Saroj Bala's" case (Supra), "Dinabandhu Majundar's" case (Supra), and "C. Rama Sawami's" case (Supra), dismissed the writ petition of the petitioner therein, in our view, is more similar to the facts of the present case for arriving at the just conclusion, which we have otherwise tested on the ground of delay and laches attributable to the writ petitioner coupled with the rules governing the field with regard to time period asking for alteration of Date of Birth as contained in the Jammu and Kashmir Civil Service Regulations (Volume-I). 41. Even testing the case of the writ petitioner on the touch stone of equity, he is on a very slippery footing. 41. Even testing the case of the writ petitioner on the touch stone of equity, he is on a very slippery footing. Equity tilts towards a vigilant person and not towards the person who slept over the matter for years together and when reached the stage of retirement, knocked at the door of the Court. 42. Viewed thus, the net outcome is that the appeal on hand is allowed and the impugned order dated 24.11.2012 passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby directing respondent no. 3 (Chairman J&K Board of School Education) to hold an enquiry into the matter and transmit the results of the enquiry to respondent nos. 2 and 3 is set aside. 43. Resultantly, the main writ petition bearing SWP No. 1428/2009 stands dismissed in toto. 44. CMA No. 18/2012 also stands disposed of accordingly. 45. However, there shall be no order as to costs.