JUDGMENT D.V. Shylendra kumar , J.—These appeals under Section 35G of the Central Excise Act, 1994 [for short 'the Act'] are directed against the order dated 3-2-2011 passed by the Customs, Excise & Service Tax Appellate Tribunal [for short "Tribunal"], South Zonal Bench at Bangalore. The Tribunal has set aside the adjudication order passed by the Commissioner in order-in-original No. 6/2009, dated 28-5-2009 whereunder the adjudicating authority had determined the duty liability on the assessee in respect of the clearance made from its factory of the goods manufactured, namely, gutkha for the period from April 2007 to August 2007 on the premise that such goods have been removed without payment of duty and also mulcted the assessee with penalty of the like sum of duty. 2. The assessee had sought for invoking the powers of the Settlement Commission and had filed an application under Section 32E of the Act. 3. The assessee had admitted before the Commission such illegal removal and had offered to pay duty and in fact paid duty amount in terms of its application before the Settlement Commission. 4. However, it appears that the Settlement Commission did not find application of the assessee, a fit matter for settlement before the Commission and therefore had rejected the application. 5. It is thereafter the adjudicating authority had issued show cause notice and passed order-in-original using the admission made by the assessee before the Tribunal relating to the illegal removal of the dutiable goods resulting in evasion of duty to the extent of Rs. 52,17,560/-. 6. In the appeal of the assessee before the Tribunal, the assessee sought to produce some material to indicate that the removal for the period from April 2007 to August 2007 was not a clandestine removal, but only after payment of duty and sought to place before the Tribunal the material to support this claim in terms of the returns and invoices said to have been filed and issued by the assessee for the relevant period etc. The Tribunal having in terms of the impugned order thought it fit to set aside the order-in-original as it thought such additional evidence could be received, but it is proper that it should be examined by the original authority and therefore having remanded the matter with a direction to the original authority to examine such materials sought to be placed by the assessee before the Tribunal and to pass orders afresh, the present appeals by the revenue. 7. Submission of Sri. Jeevan Neeralgi, learned senior standing counsel for the Central Government appearing for the Revenue is that it is well settled in law in terms of Section 32L of the Act that material placed before the Settlement Commission and an admission made by an assessee who could have the jurisdiction of the Settlement Commission can very well be used in any proceeding against the assessee under the Act and therefore when the very basis of the order for adjudication was such admission made by the very assessee before the Settlement Commission, it is not open to the assessee to go back on the same as it binds the assessee. 8. Alternatively, it is submitted that conduct of the assessee also does not behold acceptance as such material is sought to be placed more than three years after the event, that it was sought to be placed for the first time only before the Tribunal though proceeding was before the adjudicating authority and the appellate authority for more than three years etc. 9. The Tribunal has not opined either on the quality of the material sought to be placed by the assessee before the Tribunal by way of additional evidence or that it should necessarily be admitted and examined etc., but having regard to the nature of the claim and material sought to be placed, thought it proper that it should be examined by the adjudicating authority rather than the Tribunal and therefore has set aside the order-in-original and remanded the matter to the adjudicating authority to examine the material sought to be placed by the assessee in the form of additional evidence. 10. 10. In our considered opinion, when the Tribunal has such power and jurisdiction and even assuming that it could have itself admitted the additional evidence and could have disposed of the appeal, but if the Tribunal thought it was proper for the adjudicating authority to examine the material, it is an order reserving full freedom for the adjudicating authority and therefore we are of the opinion that it does not call for interference in an appeal under Section 35G of the Act which can only be on a question of law erroneously decided by the Tribunal and in matters which are remanded, we are of the opinion that unless the order of the Tribunal is one patently lacking jurisdiction or is vitiated by illegality, no interference is warranted. It is for this reason, these appeals are dismissed.