Judgment :- 1. The present writ petition is directed against the impugned award passed by the First Additional Labour Court, Chennai in C.P.No.132 of 2000 dated 10.3.2003, to quash the same as illegal and unsustainable in law for the reason that when the first respondent, namely, M.Krishnan filed a claim petition under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 even after his retirement in the year 1986, the Labour Court, without application of mind as to whether the claimant would be entitled to claim the benefit at all under the said provision, wrongly proceeded to allow the claim and directed the writ petitioner- Organisation to pay a sum of Rs.30,000/-, as against the claim of Rs.50,400/-, in spite of the finding that the first respondent retired from service during November, 1986 at the age of 58 years. 2. At the time of entertaining the writ petition, this Court granted interim order of stay on condition that the petitioner should deposit 50% of the award amount within six weeks from the date of receipt of copy of the order to the credit of C.P.No.132 of 2000 on the file of the second respondent and on such deposit, this Court also permitted the first respondent to withdraw 50% of the amount and directed the remaining 50% amount to be invested in fixed deposit. Subsequently, the interim order was made absolute and the first respondent had also withdrawn a sum of Rs.7,500/- out of Rs.15,000/-deposited by the petitioner. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner, placing three-fold submissions before the Court, firstly contended that even though the claim petition filed by the first respondent before the Labour Court should have been dismissed as not maintainable, yet, the Labour Court erroneously allowed the claim petition in spite of a detailed counter affidavit having been filed by the petitioner- Organisation refuting the claim. Secondly, it was contended that when no material whatsoever was produced by the first respondent to show that he worked even after his retirement in November, 1986 and in the absence of any evidence, oral or documentary, to show that the relationship of employer and employee continued, the Labour Court committed a serious mistake in allowing the false claim. Secondly, it was contended that when no material whatsoever was produced by the first respondent to show that he worked even after his retirement in November, 1986 and in the absence of any evidence, oral or documentary, to show that the relationship of employer and employee continued, the Labour Court committed a serious mistake in allowing the false claim. Thirdly, it was contended that in view of the settled legal position, the claim petition, which was filed on 7.3.2000 under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act without establishing any pre-existing right, should have been dismissed as not maintainable when the workman's entitlement itself was in great dispute. Adding further, he also took me through the findings recorded by the Labour Court and submitted that in paragraph-7, when the Labour Court found that in November, 2000, the first respondent was 72 years old and hence the first respondent would have retired in November, 1986 at the age of 58 years in the petitioner-Organisation and in the attendance register and salary register, which have been marked as Exs.R4 and R5 respectively, maintained by the company from the period 1989, the first respondent's name was not mentioned therein, ironically, the Labour Court, without any basis, allowed the claim petition. Therefore, it was contended that when the findings of the Labour Court also clearly show that the claim petition should not have been entertained for the simple reason that even in the year 2000, the first respondent was 72 years old and he also retired from service in November 1986 itself, for the reasons best known to the Labour Court, wrongly allowed the claim petition by directing the petitioner-Organisation to pay a sum of Rs.30,000/-. In support of his submission, the learned counsel relied upon the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in P.Arun and others v. The Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Salem and another, 2004 (3) LLN 579 for the proposition that unless the right to claim wages is established, no application or claim under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputed Act can be entertained. He also pressed into service yet another judgment of the Apex Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ganesh Razak and another, (1995) 1 SCC 235 to say that without a prior adjudication or recognition of the disputed claim of the workman, the proceeding for computation of wages as claimed by the workman is not maintainable under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. In the light of the above judgments, the learned counsel prayed for setting aside the award of the Labour Court. 4. Since the first respondent died during the pendency of the writ petition, the third respondent has been substituted in his place. In support of the impugned award, the learned counsel appearing for the third respondent submitted that when Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act enables any workman to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money, the first respondent, having worked in the petitioner-Organisation right from 1956, was compelled to file the claim petition invoking the said provision, since he was not paid huge money under various heads for the periods 1997, 1998 and 1999 and also for the entire period of service rendered in the petitioner-Organisation to which he was entitled to. Hence, he submitted that the award of the Labour Court requires no interference. 5. Heard the learned counsel on either side and considered the submissions. At the outset, it is to be mentioned that the first respondent himself, in the claim petition, has categorically admitted that he was terminated from service on 15.10.99 without any prior notice. Since the first respondent himself has admitted that he was terminated from service on 15.10.99, he should not have resorted to make the claim under Section 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act without even challenging the order of termination. This law has been settled by various judgments of this Court as well as the Apex Court, suffice to refer to one of the judgments of the Apex Court in Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Limited v. The Workmen and another, (1974) 4 SCC 696 , where the Apex Court held as follows:- "12. This law has been settled by various judgments of this Court as well as the Apex Court, suffice to refer to one of the judgments of the Apex Court in Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Limited v. The Workmen and another, (1974) 4 SCC 696 , where the Apex Court held as follows:- "12. It is now well-settled that a proceeding under Section 33-C(2) is a proceeding, generally, in the nature of an execution proceeding wherein the Labour Court calculates the amount of money due to a workman from his employer, or if the workman is entitled to any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money, the Labour Court proceeds to compute the benefit in terms of money. This calculation or computation follows upon an existing right to the money or benefit, in view of its being previously adjudged, or, otherwise, duly provided for. In Chief Mining Engineer East India Coal Co. Ltd. v. Rameswar, AIR 1968 SC 218 , it was reiterated that proceedings under Section 33-C(2) are analogous to execution proceedings and the Labour Court called upon to compute in terms of money the benefit claimed by workmen is in such cases in the position of an executing court. It was also reiterated that the right to the benefit which is sought to be computed must be an existing one, that is to say, already adjudicated upon or provided for and must arise in the course of and in relation to the relationship between an industrial workman and his employer." 6. The above ratio clearly shows that a proceeding under Section 33-C(2) is in the nature of an execution proceeding, wherein the Labour Court calculates the amount of money to be paid to a workman from his employer. It was also reiterated that the right to the benefit which is sought to be computed must be an existing one, that is to say, already adjudicated upon or provided for and must arise in the course of and in relation to the relationship between a workman and his employer. But, in the present case, without there being any right accrued to the first respondent-workman to claim the benefit, as it was not already adjudicated upon or provided for, straight-away, the Labour Court entertained the claim petition under Section 33-C(2) and ordered for payment of money. But, in the present case, without there being any right accrued to the first respondent-workman to claim the benefit, as it was not already adjudicated upon or provided for, straight-away, the Labour Court entertained the claim petition under Section 33-C(2) and ordered for payment of money. Since the proceeding under Section 33-C(2) is in the nature of an execution proceeding, it should follow that an investigation of the nature of determination is normally outside its scope. This position has been further made clear in the judgment in State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. R.L.Khandelwal, 1968 (1) LLJ 589 holding that a workman cannot put forward a claim in an application under Section 33-C (2) in respect of a matter which is not based on an existing right and which can be appropriately the subject matter of an industrial dispute which requires a reference under Section 10 of the Act. Therefore, when the workman's entitlement had not been earlier adjudicated upon between him and the management for the payment of money claimed in the claim petition, the Labour Court has no jurisdiction to first decide the workman's entitlement and then proceed to compute the benefit so adjudicated on that basis in exercise of its power under Section 33-C(2) of the Act. Further, when it is an admitted fact by the first respondent himself that he was terminated from service and that the Labour Court has also given a finding that he was 72 years old on the date of making the claim and he also retired from service in November, 1986 after attaining the age of superannuation, I fail to understand as to how the Labour Court proceeded to entertain the claim petition under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and passed an award for a sum of Rs.30,000/-when he was neither a workman nor challenged the order of termination and that no such right has accrued to him to make any claim. 7. In view of the above, this Court has no other option except to set aside the impugned award of the Labour Court on the ground of non-application of mind. Accordingly, the impugned award is set aside and the writ petition stands allowed. Since the first respondent had died, the petitioner is permitted to withdraw the balance amount lying in deposit along with the interest accrued thereon on production of a copy of this order. Accordingly, the impugned award is set aside and the writ petition stands allowed. Since the first respondent had died, the petitioner is permitted to withdraw the balance amount lying in deposit along with the interest accrued thereon on production of a copy of this order. There shall be no order as to costs.