JUDGMENT : Dev Darshan Sud, J. 1. All these petitions are being disposed of together as a common question has been raised with respect to the legality of the award passed by the learned Labour Court in proceedings instituted by the respondent u/s 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The respondents, in each of the petitions, was provided employment by the petitioner herein pursuant to the interim order passed by this Court in C.W.P. No. 488 of 1991, titled Desh Raj and Others v. National Hydroelectric Power Corporation Ltd. and Others directing: Learned counsel for the parties heard. The Deputy Commissioner, Chamba has not filed a copy. Mr. M.S. Guleria, learned Deputy Advocate General, prays for more time of four weeks. Allowed. Subject to final decision, we are of the opinion that it is not worthwhile to keep 18 posts vacant. The petitioners in this petition as well as in Civil Writ Petition No. 660 of 1992 appear to be eligible for engagement by the respondents. Accordingly, direction is issued to the respondents to engage the 19 petitioners in this case as well as two persons in Civil Writ Petition No. 660 of 1992 within fifteen days from today. The reply by the Deputy Commissioner, Chamba will include a statement pointing out the persons whose total land was acquired; those whose partial land was acquired, and those whose no land was at all acquired. In addition, the reply will also mention how many persons out of each such categories have been employed. Dasti copy, as prayed, on usual terms. To be listed alongwith C.W.P. No. 660 of 1992.... Subsequently a number of writ petitions involving the same point were taken up for decision by this Court on 20.12.1996 dismissing the writ petitions holding: 21. Hence, we are of the opinion that the remedy of the petitioners is not under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is open to them, if so advised, to approach the Civil Court or the State Government and seek to enforce the rights, which they claim to have. These writ petitions are dismissed as not maintainable. There will be no orders as to costs.... It is open to them, if so advised, to approach the Civil Court or the State Government and seek to enforce the rights, which they claim to have. These writ petitions are dismissed as not maintainable. There will be no orders as to costs.... This dismissal was challenged in appeal before the Hon'ble Supreme Court which affirmed the judgment of the Division Bench holding: .........It is now the admitted position that out of the 8 persons named in the Order dated 14.12.1998, 7 persons have already been given appointment, the 8th person Amar Nath is dead. Learned counsel stated that it is agreed that the Respondents' obligation is to give employment to 11 more. Of these, Shri Hans Raj, who has been impleaded in the SLP and has been sponsored shall be given employment forthwith. In regard to the remaining 10 vacancies, it is agreed that if any one or more of the remaining Petitions, who had already worked with the respondent secure sponsorship within 4 weeks from today, they shall be considered for employment by the respondents on priority basis. It is made clear that employment given pursuant to all the orders that we have passed is fresh employment..... Thereafter, the petitioners submitted the case for adjudication by the Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court on a reference u/s 10 of the Industrial Dispute Act (hereinafter "the Act"). The question for determination by the learned Tribunal in C.W.P. No. 5498 of 2010 titled G.M. Chamera Hydroelectric Project v. H.P. Labour-cum-Industrial Tribunal and Others was Whether the termination of services of Sh. Suneet Singh, S/o Shri Bangalu Ram, w.e.f. 13.4.1998 vide order dated 13.4.1998, by the General Manager, Chamera Hydro Electric Project, Stage-I, Khairi, Distt. Chamba, H.P. is legal and justified? If not, what relief of service benefits, seniority, back-wages and amount of compensation, the above workman is entitled to? In C.W.P. No. 5507 of 2010 titled G.M. Chamera Hydroelectric Project v. H.P. Labour Court-cum Industrial Tribunal and Others: Whether the termination of services of Sh. Desh Raj, S/o Shri Bangalu Ram, w.e.f. 13.4.1998 vide order dated 13.4.1998, by the General Manager, Chamera Hydro Electric Project, Stage-I, Khairi, Distt. Chamba, H.P. is legal and justified? If not, what relief of service benefits, seniority, back-wages and amount of compensation, the above workman is entitled to? Desh Raj, S/o Shri Bangalu Ram, w.e.f. 13.4.1998 vide order dated 13.4.1998, by the General Manager, Chamera Hydro Electric Project, Stage-I, Khairi, Distt. Chamba, H.P. is legal and justified? If not, what relief of service benefits, seniority, back-wages and amount of compensation, the above workman is entitled to? In C.W.P. No. 5508 of 2010 titled G.M. Chamera Hydroelectric Project v. H.P. Labour Court-cum Industrial Tribunal and Others (supra): Whether the termination of services of Sh. Gandhi Ram, S/o Shri Salo Ram, w.e.f. 13.4.1998 vide order dated 13.4.1998, by the General Manager, Chamera Hydro Electric Project, Stage-I, Khairi, Distt. Chamba, H.P. is legal and justified? If not, what relief of service benefits, seniority, back-wages and amount of compensation, the above workman is entitled to? In C.W.P. No. 5509 of 2010 titled G.M. Chamera Hydroelectric Project v. H.P. Labour Court-cum Industrial Tribunal and Others (supra): Whether the termination of services of Sh. Tara Chand S/o Shri Prabh Dayal, w.e.f. 13.4.1998 vide order dated 13.4.1998, by the General Manager, Chamera Hydro Electric Project, Stage-I, Khairi, Distt. Chamba, H.P. is legal and justified? If not, what relief of service benefits, seniority, back-wages and amount of compensation, the above workman is entitled to? In C.W.P. No. 5527 of 2010 titled G.M. Chamera Hydroelectric Project v. H.P. Labour Court-cum Industrial Tribunal and Others (supra): Whether the termination of services of Sh. Tilak Raj S/o Shri Fakiru Ram, w.e.f. 13.4.1998 vide order dated 13.4.1998, by the General Manager, Chamera Hydro Electric Project, Stage-I, Khairi, Distt. Chamba, H.P. is legal and justified? If not, what relief of service benefits, seniority, back-wages and amount of compensation, the above workman is entitled to? In C.W.P. No. 5528 of 2010 titled G.M. Chamera Hydroelectric Project v. H.P. Labour Court-cum Industrial Tribunal and Others (supra): Whether the termination of services of Sh. Mast Ram, S/o Shri Prabh Dayal, w.e.f. 13.4.1998 vide order dated 13.4.1998, by the General Manager, Chamera Hydro Electric Project, Stage-I, Khairi, Distt. Chamba, H.P. is legal and justified? If not, what relief of service benefits, seniority, back-wages and amount of compensation, the above workman is entitled to? In C.W.P. No. 5529 of 2010 G.M. Chamera Hydroelectric Project v. H.P. Labour Court-cum Industrial Tribunal and Others (supra): Whether the termination of services of Sh. Punnu Ram, S/o Shri Mohini Ram, w.e.f. 13.4.1998 vide order dated 13.4.1998, by the General Manager, Chamera Hydro Electric Project, Stage-I, Khairi, Distt. In C.W.P. No. 5529 of 2010 G.M. Chamera Hydroelectric Project v. H.P. Labour Court-cum Industrial Tribunal and Others (supra): Whether the termination of services of Sh. Punnu Ram, S/o Shri Mohini Ram, w.e.f. 13.4.1998 vide order dated 13.4.1998, by the General Manager, Chamera Hydro Electric Project, Stage-I, Khairi, Distt. Chamba, H.P. is legal and justified? If not, what relief of service benefits, seniority, back-wages and amount of compensation, the above workman is entitled to? In C.W.P. No. 2940 of 2011 titled G.M. Chamera Hydroelectric Project v. H.P. Labour Court-cum Industrial Tribunal and Others (supra): Whether the termination of services of Sh. Gandhi Ram, S/o Shri Barfo Ram, w.e.f. 13.4.1998 vide order dated 13.4.1998, by the General Manager, Chamera Hydro Electric Project, Stage-I, Khairi, Distt. Chamba, H.P. is legal and justified? If not, what relief of service benefits, seniority, back-wages and amount of compensation, the above workman is entitled to? On the evidence on the settled issues, the learned Tribunal allowed the petitions directing that termination of the petitioners was illegal, as it did not comply with the mandatory provisions of the Act and that the petitioners were ordered to re-engage at the same place and posts with continuity of service and also further directed that a sum of Rs. 20,000/- be paid as compensation for violating the provisions of the Act. In a nutshell, the learned Tribunal holds that dismissal of the petitioners dated 13.4.1998 was violative of the mandatory provisions of Section 25F of 'The Act'. The learned Tribunal held that each of the petitioners had been working continuously for more than one year with the respondent. 2. A number of contentions have been raised by learned counsel appearing for the petitioner before me. Learned counsel submits that the learned Tribunal was in grave error in not considering the fact that the employment of the petitioners was only because of the Court orders and they had not been retained/employed by virtue of any independent contract. Learned counsel submits that in this eventuality, once the writ petition was dismissed by this Court, as noticed supra, which order was affirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the relationship of master and servant ceased and in this eventuality, the petitioners could not claim the benefit of any violation of "The Act'. Learned counsel submits that in this eventuality, once the writ petition was dismissed by this Court, as noticed supra, which order was affirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the relationship of master and servant ceased and in this eventuality, the petitioners could not claim the benefit of any violation of "The Act'. The argument though attractive, cannot be accepted for this reason that the interim order which has been reproduced in some detail (supra) was passed on 13.1.1993 which was then set aside on 20.12.1996. The SLP was dismissed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on 10.1.1998. The termination order Annexure P1/T was passed on 13.4.1998 (in C.W.P. No. 2940 of 2011) and is identical in all respects in all petitions. There is no explanation on record as to why immediately after the writ petitions were dismissed no action for termination of the services of the petitioners was initiated/taken in case their services were not required by the respondent. What was urged before me was the fact that this action was postponed in deference to the Majesty of Law more especially when SLP against the order passed by the High Court had in fact been preferred before the Supreme Court. The petitioner herein did not want to complicate the matter resulting in multiplicity of litigations as also to avoid any proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act. 3. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has taken me through the pleadings before the learned Tribunal in detail to urge that in obedience to the interim order issued by this Court, the petitioners stayed their hands for taking any other or further action. I cannot accept this submission for the reason that since the judgment was passed by the Division Bench, it was open to the petitioner herein to have dismissed/dispensed with the services of each of the petitioners. The order of dismissal of the petitioners was passed on 13.4.1998 though the judgment of the Division Bench was delivered by this Court on 20.12.1996. There was no interim order passed by this Court protecting the petitioners till their appeal is admitted by the Supreme Court. No interim order/direction was issued by the Hon'ble Supreme Court staying the operation of the order passed by the Division Bench of this Court. There was no interim order passed by this Court protecting the petitioners till their appeal is admitted by the Supreme Court. No interim order/direction was issued by the Hon'ble Supreme Court staying the operation of the order passed by the Division Bench of this Court. Admittedly, the petitioners remained/continued in service for more than a year which employment was not pursuant to any order passed by this Court or the Supreme Court. In these circumstances, the contention as urged cannot be accepted. There is no explanation as to why the petitioners were retained in service. I do not find any basis in the pleadings before the learned Tribunal or the evidence to establish that the continuation of the workmen in service was pursuant to an order passed by the Court restraining the petitioner herein from dispensing with their services. The only pleading before the learned Tribunal to the claim of the workmen is: 3. That contents of para 3 are misconceived and misleading. Entire facts have already been disclosed under head Brief Facts of the Case. As already submitted the petitioner was not immediately disengaged so that any act of respondent may not be termed as contempt of Court. It is also submitted that mere continuance of petitioner for some time, does not entitle him to any relief in the facts and circumstances of the case. This pleading is not supported by any evidence on facts. The submission therefore deserves to be rejected. 4. Learned counsel then urges that the learned Tribunal was in grave error in not considering the fact that provision of Section 25F had been complied with as payment had accompanied the notice. Learned counsel submits that the petitioners have suppressed material facts by not admitting the payments of the retrenchment benefits having been paid to them contemporaneously with the issuance of the notice of termination. 5. Before adverting to this submission, I find that a number of documents have been filed by the petitioner herein which neither saw the light of the day nor were proved in accordance with law before the learned Tribunal. The course of action followed by Chamera Hydro Electric Project vide Annexure Exhibit RW1/A which has been placed on record of the Tribunal to show that compensation etc. The course of action followed by Chamera Hydro Electric Project vide Annexure Exhibit RW1/A which has been placed on record of the Tribunal to show that compensation etc. had been paid to those persons whose land had been deprived and that these persons willingly accepted the compensation, does not show that the petitioners have willingly accepted the monetary benefits granted pursuant to these proceedings (Exhibit RW1/A). It also does not show that the petitioners was a party to these proceedings. Exhibit RW1/C is a copy of judgment in C.W.P. No. 488 of 1991, Exhibit RW1/D is the notice of termination. The orders passed by the High Court and the Supreme Court also find place as a part of Court record of the Tribunal. I also find that in cross examination of the petitioner and in examination in chief of the witnesses of the respondents no attempt has been made to prove the payment of retrenchment benefits/salary except suggesting that these dues were in fact paid. Now these documents have been placed on record in these writ petitions to urge that such dues were in fact paid. To repeat I find no justification as to why when documents were available with the writ petitioners, as to why they were not placed on record and proved in accordance with law when it was admittedly in possession of the petitioners. It is in these circumstances that this Court is called upon to adjudicate the legality of the order of the learned Tribunal 6. The factual matrix does not present any difficulty to hold that the pleas as raised by the petitioners have not been established on record though documents on record were in possession. There is no explanation either before the learned Tribunal or furnished in this Court as to why such evidence which admittedly was in possession of the petitioners was not proved on record. The surest way of proving payment was to place on record the documents testifying payment in the nature of bank record etc. in accordance with law. Rather the course of action followed was merely suggesting to the petitioner witnesses that payment of terminal benefits have been made when such fact could have been established on record by positive evidence in the nature of accounts, bank records etc. in accordance with law. Rather the course of action followed was merely suggesting to the petitioner witnesses that payment of terminal benefits have been made when such fact could have been established on record by positive evidence in the nature of accounts, bank records etc. In fact, despite a number of opportunities having been available to the petitioner, no evidence in support of the contention was placed on record. In these circumstances, I find that this Court has to deal with the evidence afresh in writ proceedings. 7. It is well settled that documents cannot be taken on record for the first time in the writ proceedings against the orders passed by the statutory body when such material/documents/evidence could have been produced before that Body/Court where an opportunity was in fact available. This Court in writ proceedings cannot be turned into a Court of original jurisdiction for a trial de-novo. This is obviously for the reason because it is the body/statutory body/Court which should and ought to have an opportunity to decide upon the effect of such documents when ample opportunity was given to an individual/body to produce such record. It is not the case in this petition that the Tribunal refused to accept the evidence or did not grant an opportunity to any party to do so. The pleadings though voluminous cannot be used for fresh adjudication. In Shivajirao Nilangekar Patil Vs. Dr Mahesh Madhav Gosavi and Others, AIR 1987 SC 294 the Supreme Court holds: 27. The additional evidence as we have mentioned hereinbefore consist of certain report in India Today and certain other magazines and certain affidavits. The basic principle of admission of additional evidence is that the person seeking the admission of additional evidence should be able to establish that with the best efforts such additional evidence could not have been adduced at the first instance. Secondly the party affected by the admission of additional evidence should have an opportunity to rebut such additional evidence. Thirdly, that additional evidence was relevant for the determination of the issue. The additional evidence sought to be introduced mainly consists of alleged instances when the Chief Minister on previous occasions had in respect of some criminal proceedings and other matters pending used his influence to drop those proceedings. Now about these, these are controversial allegations. Thirdly, that additional evidence was relevant for the determination of the issue. The additional evidence sought to be introduced mainly consists of alleged instances when the Chief Minister on previous occasions had in respect of some criminal proceedings and other matters pending used his influence to drop those proceedings. Now about these, these are controversial allegations. There is no satisfactory explanation that these so called material in the form of additional evidence could not have been obtained before the institution of the petition in the High Court. To this Mr. Tarkunde's submission was that it was difficult to gather evidence against a Chief Minister in office but as the case had gathered momentum, people had come in and after decision of the learned trial Judge, the Chief Minister had resigned and there was an atmosphere of belief for offering to adduce evidence which people were hesitant to give before that. We are of the opinion that at this belated stage there was not sufficient material ground on which additional evidence should be admitted for the determination of the issue involved in these appeals. 32. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts as we have mentioned hereinbefore, we are of the opinion that the allegations of alleged conduct of the appellant in similar cases would not be a safe basis upon which to admit additional evidence, in this case having regard to the issues involved and nature of the issues involved in these matters and at the stage when these were sought to be introduced. In Nicks (India) Tools Vs. Ram Surat and Another, AIR 2004 SC 4348 the Hon'ble Supreme Court holds: 14. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and having perused the records we notice that the factum that the workman was in the service of the management till 22.4.1993 is not disputed. While the workman contends that his services from that day were wrongfully terminated, the appellant contends that the workman voluntarily left the services of the appellant having taken all his dues. Since the respondent workman was in the service of the appellant management at least up to the 22.4.1993, the burden of proving that he voluntarily left the services then falls on appellant management. Since the respondent workman was in the service of the appellant management at least up to the 22.4.1993, the burden of proving that he voluntarily left the services then falls on appellant management. This the appellant contends is satisfied by the oral evidence adduced by the management and the documentary evidence produced in the form of the receipt M/X (M-3) purportedly executed by the workman and the entries in the bonus register, Exhibit M/X. The Labour Court considering the said document, which is said to be a receipt executed by the respondent, noticed the fact that the original of this document was never produced by the appellant and what was produced was only a photocopy. Even this photocopy was not confronted to the workman when he was in the witness box and the signature found in the said photocopy as also in the photocopy of the bonus register shows that though two documents came into existence simultaneously the ink with which the respondent workman is supposed to have signed the two documents was different. In such circumstances, it held that it was not safe to rely upon the said document to accept the case of the appellant. The High Court in this regard held though it may not be necessary to apply the strict rule of evidence in regard to production and proof of a document still the workman ought to have been provided with an opportunity to explain his version as to the alleged receipt having been executed by him and such opportunity not having been offered by confronting the document to the workman the appellant in effect has violated the principles of natural justice and hence by its act of default the workman's case cannot be prejudiced. 16. We are unable to accept this argument because if we look into the overall proceedings before the Labour Court, we notice that though the management did take the stand that the workman had left the services of the appellant management voluntarily by receiving his total dues in full and final settlement it did not, at the stage of filing of its written statement, contend that the workman had executed a receipt which is now sought to be produced as Et. M/X (M-3). M/X (M-3). This coupled with the fact that the said document was not confronted to the respondent workman, in our opinion is sufficient to hold that this document cannot be relied upon for establishing the fact that the management has proved its case that the workman had voluntarily left his services. The trial Court has further buttressed this finding by noticing the difference in the ink in the receipt as well as the bonus register as also the absence of revenue stamp in the receipt from which it drew an inference that the receipt in question may have been signed previously but was filled up subsequently. This finding of the Labour Court has been accepted by the High Court and this being a finding of fact and which cannot be said to be perverse, we are not inclined to interfere with the same in this appeal. I do not find that the writ petitioner has been able to make out a case for admitting the material/documents on record for the first time in these writ petitions. There is thus no merit in these writ petitions which are dismissed. However, the order of learned Tribunal in each case imposing cost/fine on the petitioners is set aside. No order as to costs. It is urged by learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that this would preclude the petitioner from dispensing with the services of the respondents under any circumstance. This submission cannot be accepted. Needless to say that service conditions of the respondents are governed by law and it is always open to the petitioner to regulate the relationship with the respondents in accordance with the provisions of 'The Act' and any other law, which is applicable.