Judgment :- The petitioner is the accused in C.C. No. 335 of 2003 on the file of the learned District Munsif cum Judicial Magistrate, Perundurai and he stood charged for the offences under Sections 279 and 304-A of IPC. Upon completion of trial, the petitioner was convicted by the trial court for the offence under Section 304-A of IPC and sentenced to undergo six months rigorous imprisonment with fine of Rs.5,000/-, failing which to undergo three months rigorous imprisonement. The trial court further held that since punishment was imposed for the major offence for which the petitioner was tried upon namely Section 304-A of IPC, even though the offence under Section 279 of IPC was also proved, no punishment has been given separately for the offence under Section 279 of IPC. The conviction and sentence imposed on the petitioner was unsuccessfully challenged by him before the appellate Court by filing C.A. No. 237 of 2007. 2. The revision petitioner is the driver of a bus. On 16.09.2003, at about 14.00 hours, when the petitioner was driving the bus bearing Registration No. TN 39 D 3339, near Vijayamangalam Tiruppur Road, the bus hit against a pedestarian namely Sarasu @ Saraswathy. Pws 1 and 5, who were present on the spot, took the injured to the Government General Hospital, Erode for treatment, but inspite of the treatment, the injured succumbed to the injuries on the same day at 3.30 pm. In this connection, a complaint was given by PW1 based on which Ex.P4, First Information Report dated 16.09.2003 came to be registered against the petitioner/accused for the offences punishable under Section 279 and 304-A of IPC. 3. According to the learned counsel for the revision petitioner, the petitioner had driven the vehicle in a normal speed and he did not drive it in a rash and negligent manner, as alleged. Only due to the mistake of the deceased, who suddenly darted across the road, the accident took place. Even though the witnesses were examined on behalf of the prosecution, the deposition of Pws1, 2 and 5 are contradictory to each other, especially with regard to the place of the accident. Therefore, the courts below, instead of convicting the petitioner ought to have given the benefit of doubt in his favour especially when none of the prosecution witnesses have spoken about the rash and negligent driving of the petitioner. Therefore, the courts below, instead of convicting the petitioner ought to have given the benefit of doubt in his favour especially when none of the prosecution witnesses have spoken about the rash and negligent driving of the petitioner. Even otherwise, merely because the vehicle was driven at an abnormal speed, it cannot be said that such driving was a rash and negligent driving and it would not constitute the offence punishable under Sections 279 and 304-A of IPC. In other words, speed alone is not the criteria to fasten the liability on the petitioner. Further, even as per the version of the prosecution witnesses, at the time of accident, the deceased suddenly crossed the road and therefore, the deceased had adequately contributed to the accident and the petitioner cannot be found fault with. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner further vehemently contended that the Doctor, who performed the postmortem on the deceased, was not examined before the court below and the non-examination of the Doctor is fatal to the case of the prosecution. Though the postmortem report was maked as a document, Ex.P7, it was marked only through the Invesitgation Officer, PW7, who is not competent to depose about the postmortem report. In this context, the learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the decisions of this Court reported in (Jerald vs. State by Inspector of Police, Kancheepuram Taluk Police Station, Kancheepuram) 2001 2 Law Weekly (Crl) 615 and (Arumugam vs. State by Sub Inspector of Police, Uttukkuli Police Station, Erode Distric) 2001 2 Law Weekly (Crl) 773 to contend that non-examination of the Doctor and non-marking of the postmortem report through the Doctor, who performed the autopsy, is fatal to the case of the prosecution. 5. The learned Government Advocate appearing for the respondent would contend that the prosecution witnesses have given a cogent and correct version with respect to the accident. The deposition of the eye witnesses Pws 2 and 5 corroborates with each other. In fact, they have clearly stated that when the deceased was walking in the mud on the left side corner of the road, she was hit by the bus from behind, she was dragged to 20 feet and succumbed to the injuries in the hospital. There was no cross-examination to prove that due to any other reason, the bus was driven to the extreme end of the road on the left side. There was no cross-examination to prove that due to any other reason, the bus was driven to the extreme end of the road on the left side. The report of the motor vehicle inspector was marked as Ex.P3 to prove that there was no mechanical or technical defect in the bus at the time of accident and that the vehicle was in a good condition to drive. Merely because there was no evidence with regard to the rash driving of the bus, it cannot be stated that the bus was driven at a normal speed. Admittedly, the deceased was walking on the extreme left side of the road and inspite of the same, she was hit by the bus from behind and this itself would prove that the vehicle was not driven ordinarily and it was driven with extreme speed. In any event, the minor discrepancies in the version of the prosecution witnesses would not in any way vitiate the case put forward by the prosecution and therefore, the conviction and sentence imposed on the petitioner is sustainable and he prayed for dismissal of the criminal revision case. 6. As regards the non-examination of the Doctor, the learned Government Advocate would contend that the death was admitted and it was not disputed. Such death was caused only due to the rash and negligent driving of the driver of the bus namely the petitioner. Immediately after the death, the first information report came to be registered without any loss of time. Therefore, when the death of the deceased is not disputed or questioned, non-examination of the Doctor will not in any way vitiate the case of the prosecution. In fact, the investigation officer had examined the Doctor and obtained the postmortem certificate from him. The postmortem certificate was marked through the investigation officer and the investigation officer was not questioned in the cross-examination about the contents of the postmortem certificate. Therefore, the non-examination of the Doctor or the marking of the postmortem certificate through the investigation officer, will not in any way nullify the case of the prosecution. The postmortem certificate was marked through the investigation officer and the investigation officer was not questioned in the cross-examination about the contents of the postmortem certificate. Therefore, the non-examination of the Doctor or the marking of the postmortem certificate through the investigation officer, will not in any way nullify the case of the prosecution. The learned Government Advocate also relied on the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court reported in (State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Dayal Sahu) (2005) 8 Supreme Court Cases 122 to contend that non-examination of the Doctor is not fatal to the case of the prosecution Therefore, the learned Government Advocate would contend that the decision of this Court, relied on by the counsel for the petitioner, cannot be made applicable to the facts of the present case as it differs factually. 7. I heard the counsel for the both sides. According to the revision petitioner, the prosecution witnesses have not let in cogent or natural evidence and therefore, their evidence are not trustworthy and based on the same, the petitioner ought not to have been convicted. 8. In this context, when we analyse the evidence of Pws 2 and 5, it could be seen that PW1 categorically stated that one and half years prior to the date of accident, at about 2 pm, when he and PW5 were conversing with each other, they saw the bus driven by the accused in a rash and negligent manner and hit the victim, who was walking on the extreme left side of the road, from behind. It was further stated that in the impact, the deceased was dragged to 20 feet and thereafter, the bus stopped. PW1 also stated that the Vijayamangalam Tiruppur road is wide enough measuring 24 feet and it was a well laid tar road. PW1 also identified the deceased. PW1 is the person who gave the complaint, Ex.P1, dated 16.09.2003. In the cross-examination, PW1 would depose that at the time when he gave the complaint. The deceased was taken to the hospital by Pws 1 and 5 immediately after the accident and the deceased succumbed to the injuries at about 3.30 pm. Therefore, it is evident that Ex.P1 came into existence immediately after the accident without any loss of time and there is no reason to disbelieve the date, time or manner in which it came into existence. Therefore, it is evident that Ex.P1 came into existence immediately after the accident without any loss of time and there is no reason to disbelieve the date, time or manner in which it came into existence. The evidence of PW1 was also supported by PW6, who was the Sub-Inspector of Police, who stated that he received the complaint from PW1 and forwarded it to PW7, Inspector of Police, for further investigation. PW6 further deposed that the first information report came to be registered on 8.00 pm on the same day and immediately thereafter, PW7 had taken up the investigation. Based on such evidence of the prosecution witnesses, the court below came to the conclusion that it is the petitioner, who had driven the vehicle in a rash and negligent manner and hit the deceased, which resulted in her death. 9. In Ex.P2, Observation Mahazar and Ex.P5, rough sketch, it was stated as follows:- VERNACULAR (TAMIL) PORTION DELETED 10. Thus it is evident that Exs. P2 and P5 categorically identify the place of the accident. Exs. P2 and P5 would also indicate that the accident spot was a well laid tar road and therefore the petitioner is expected to drive the vehicle in the middle of the road coupled with the fact that it was 2.00 pm when the accident occurred and therefore there was sufficient lighting to enable the petitioner to drive the vehicle. Exs. P2 and P5 also indicate that in the impact, the deceased was dragged to 20 feet and thereafter the bus was stopped. Exs. P2 and P5 were also corroborated by the PW1, who, in his evidence, has stated that the accident took place at 2.00 pm and there was no big crowd at that time. As there was sufficient light the driver could have identified the person who was crossing the road on the left side corner. There is no need for the petitioner to take the bus to the extreme corner of the road and he ought to have driven the vehicle on the middle of the road. Therefore, there is no necessity for the petitioner to have driven the vehicle to the extreme left side corner of the road i.e., mud road. There is no need for the petitioner to take the bus to the extreme corner of the road and he ought to have driven the vehicle on the middle of the road. Therefore, there is no necessity for the petitioner to have driven the vehicle to the extreme left side corner of the road i.e., mud road. When the petitioner had admittedly driven the vehicle in the extreme corner of the road, the argument of the counsel for the petitioner that there is no evidence let in to show that the vehicle was driven in a rash and negligent manner cannot be accepted. The fact that the petitioner had driven the vehicle on the extreme side of the road would itself show that he was negligent in driving the vehicle especially when there was not even a suggestion that there was any obstacle for taking the bus to the exteme left side of the road. Under those circumstances, the Court below is right in holding that the accident took place only due to the rash and negligent driving of the driver of the vehicle namely the petitioner herein. 11. The next question for consideration is whether the case of the prosecution is vitiated in view of the non-examination of the Doctor who performed the autopsy and in view of the marking of the postmortem report through the investigation officer. 12. In this case, the postmortem certificate, Ex.P7 issued by the Doctor was marked through the invesitgation officer, PW7. PW7 had obtained the statement from the Doctor. He also questioned the doctor as contemplated under Section 161 of Cr.P.C. The fact that the deceased died only due to the accident was not disputed by the petitioner by any oral or documentary evidence. The postmortem report was merely marked by PW7 and he has not spoken to about the contents of Ex.P7. 13. In this context, it is worthwhile to refer to the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court reported in (State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Dayal Sahu) (2005) 8 Supreme Court Cases 122 wherein in para Nos. 14 and 15, it was held as follows:- "14. 13. In this context, it is worthwhile to refer to the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court reported in (State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Dayal Sahu) (2005) 8 Supreme Court Cases 122 wherein in para Nos. 14 and 15, it was held as follows:- "14. A plethora of decisions by this Court as referred to above would show that once the statement of the prosecutrix inspires confidence and is accepted by the courts as such, conviction can be based only on the solitary evidence of the prosecutrix and no corroboration would be required unless there are compelling reasons which necessitate the Courts for corroboration of her statement. Corroboration of testimony of the prosecutrix as a condition for judicial reliance is not a requirement of law but a guidance of prudence under the given facts and circumstances. It is also noticed that minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies should not be a ground for throwing out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. Non-examination of doctor and non-production of doctor's report would not be a fatal to the prosecution case, if the statements of the prosecutrix and other prosecution witnesses inspire confidence. It is also noticed that the court while acquiting the accused on benefit of doubt should be cautious to see that the doubt should be a reasonable doubt and it should not reverse the findings of the guilt on the basis of irrelevant circumstances or mere technicalities. 15. Reverting back to the facts of the case, the testimony of the prosecutrix PW1 that she has been ravished by the accused at 4.00 a.m. on 01.04.1991 remains unimpeached. She was subjected to cross-examination but nothing could be elicited to demolish the statement-in-chief. Her statement was corroborated by the statements of Pws 2, 4 and 5 in material particulars, coupled with the FSL report Ext.P-8 and P-9, which has been accepted by the trial court and even by the High Court. The High Court totally erred in law in recording the acquittal of the accused by giving him benefit of doubt for non-examination of doctor, thereby committed grave miscarriage of justice." 14. The High Court totally erred in law in recording the acquittal of the accused by giving him benefit of doubt for non-examination of doctor, thereby committed grave miscarriage of justice." 14. In another decision of the Honourable Supreme Court reported in (Om Prakash and others vs. State of Uttar Pradesh) AIR 1983 Supreme Court 431, it was held by the Honourable Supreme Court that when the prosecution has proved the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, mere non-examination of the Doctor, who issued the Wound Certificate etc., is not fatal to the case of the prosecution. In Para No.14, it was held as follows:- "14. The learned counsel for the appellants next submitted that Dr. Mukherjee, who was in charge of the Primary Health Cenre, Ghatampur on 17.02.1996 and had examined P.Ws. 2, 7 and 8 on that day and issued the Wound Certificates Exhs. Ka-18 to Ka-20, has not been examined and that only the Compounder of that Primary Health Centre, P.W.13 has been called to prove those certificates. The reason given by the prosecution for the non-examination of Dr. Mukherjee is that he was not available and could not be examined without difficulty. The explanation for the non-examination of Dr. Mukherjee is no doubt not quite satisfactory. The learned Public Prosecutor should have taken steps to procure the attendance of Dr. Mukherjee for giving evidence about the injuries noted by him as per Exhs. Ka-18 to Ka-20 on the persons of P.Ws 2, 7 and 8. But the fact that these three witnesses had sustained injuries during the occurrence in this case was not and could not be disputed. Those witnesses have stated in their evidence that they sustained injuries during the occurrence. Therefore, the non-examination of Dr. Mukherjee for proving the injuries noticed by him on the bodies of P.Ws.2, 7 and 8 as per the wound certificate Exhs. Ka-18 to Ka-20 is not fatal to the prosecution. 14. In view of the aforesaid decisions of the Honourable Supreme Court referred to above, the contention of the counsel for the petitioner that non-examination of the Doctor is fatal to the case of the prosecution cannot be accepted and it is hereby rejected. 15. Ka-18 to Ka-20 is not fatal to the prosecution. 14. In view of the aforesaid decisions of the Honourable Supreme Court referred to above, the contention of the counsel for the petitioner that non-examination of the Doctor is fatal to the case of the prosecution cannot be accepted and it is hereby rejected. 15. Before parting with, the latest decision of the Honourable Supreme Court reported in (Guru Basavaraj @ Bennie Settappa vs. State of Karnataka) (2012) 8 Supreme Court cases 734 can also usefully be extracted hereunder wherein certain observations have been made by the Honourable Supreme as follows:- "32. We may note with profit that an appropriate punishment works as an eye-opener for the person who are not careful while driving vehicles on the road and exhibit careless attitude possibly harbouring the notion that they would be shown indulgence or lives of others are like 'flies to the wanton boys'. They totally forget that the lives of many are in their hands, and the sublimity of safety of a human being is given an indecent burial by their rash and negligent act. 33.There can hardly be any cavil that there has to be a proportion between the crime and the punishment. It is the duty of the Court to see that appropriate sentence is imposed regard being had to the commission of the crime and its impact on the social order. The cry of the collective for justice which includes adequate punishment cannot be lightly ignored...." 15. In the result, the Criminal Revision Case is dismissed. Consequently, the trial court is directed to take steps to secure the presence of the petitioner to undergo the remaining period of sentence. It is needless to mention that the period of sentence already undergone by him shall be given set off as contemplated under Section 428 of Cr.P.C.