JUDGMENT B.P. Katkey, J. 1. This appeal, under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 (in short "the Act"), is directed against the order dated 1st March, 2001 passed by the learned District Judge, Morigaon in Misc. Probate Case No. 26/1998 granting letter of administration in favour of the predecessors-in-interest of the respondent Nos. 1 (i) to 1 (iv) and also the respondent Nos. 2(i) to 2(v), who were the brothers of the predecessor-in-interest of the present appellants. The predecessors-in-interest of the present respondent Nos. 1 (i) to 1 (iv) and 2 (i) to 2 (iv), hereinafter referred to as the contesting respondents, filed an application for grant of letter of administration, in the Court of the learned District Judge, Morigaon, which was registered and numbered as Misc. Probate Case No. 26/1998, contending inter-alia that their father executed a Will on 5th July, 1968, which was registered under the provisions of the Indian Registration Act, being registration No. 4/1968, bequeathing his landed property, other than the land in possession of his son Cheniram Deka (predecessor in interest of respondent Nos. 3 to 7) being his share of land, in favour of 2 (two) other sons, namely the contesting respondents, as the other son Haneswar Deka (predecessor-in-interest of the appellant Nos. 1 to 5), hereinafter referred to as the original appellant, left the father's residence forever and did not look after his father and pay any maintenance, without however, appointing any executor. It was further contended that though the Will was executed in the year 1968, the application seeking letter of administration was filed in the year 1998, as Haneswar Deka, the original appellant, came in that year and started claiming the property by right of inheritance. 2. In the said proceeding, the original appellant, namely Haneswar Deka, who was the second son of the testator, Harai Deka, apart from the successors-in-interest of another son Cheniram Deka (respondent Nos. 3 to 4) were made parties. 2. In the said proceeding, the original appellant, namely Haneswar Deka, who was the second son of the testator, Harai Deka, apart from the successors-in-interest of another son Cheniram Deka (respondent Nos. 3 to 4) were made parties. While the original appellant contested the said proceeding by filing written objection, the said proceeding, however, was not contested by the successors-in-interest of another son of Harai Deka, namely Cheniram Deka, In the written objection filed basically it has been contended that no such Will was executed by Harai Deka bequeathing the property and even if the same was executed, it was not done out of free will, as he was not in good and sound health at the relevant point of time and was under the influence of the contesting respondents. It has also been contended that Harai Deka left behind 4 (four) sons, namely Haneswar Deka, the original appellant, Maneswar Deka, Dandi Deka, the contesting respondents, and Cheniram Deka (the predecessor-in-interest of the present proforma respondent Nos. 3 to 7), who after the death of their father amicably partitioned the landed property left behind by him in equal shares and possessing the same by constructing dwelling houses thereon. It has also been contended that only with a view to deprive the original appellant from his share of inherited property, the 2 (two) brothers created a forged Will without giving any schedule of the land and filed the application for grant of letter of administration. 3. The contesting respondents, namely Maneswar Deka and Dandi Deka in support of the prayer for grant of letter of administration examined 2 (two) witnesses, namely the applicant No. 1 himself (Maneswar Deka) and Rajendra Saikia, who was one of the attesting witnesses, to prove the due execution of the Will. Sri Haneswar Deka, the original appellant, also examined himself in the said proceeding in support of his case. The witnesses were cross examined by the respective parties. 2 (two) documents, namely the letter dated 3rd February, 1967 written by Haneswar Deka (original appellant) and the registered Will dated 5th July 1968, were exhibited by the contesting respondents. The learned District Judge, upon consideration of the evidences on record, has granted the letter of administration in favour of the contesting respondents by the aforesaid order. Hence the present appeal. 4. The learned District Judge, upon consideration of the evidences on record, has granted the letter of administration in favour of the contesting respondents by the aforesaid order. Hence the present appeal. 4. During pendency of the present appeal, Haneswar Deka (appellant), Maneswar Deka (respondent No. 1) and Dandi Deka (respondent No. 2) died and in their places their successors-in-interest were impleaded as appellants and respondents, respectively. 5. I have heard Mr. Z. Mukit, learned counsel for the appellants and Mr. B.K. Jain, learned counsel appearing for the respondent Nos. 1(i) to 1(iv) 2(i) and 2(v). None appears for the proforma respondent Nos. 3 to 7, who also did not contest the proceeding before the learned District Judge. 6. Mr. Mukit, learned counsel for the appellants referring to the deposition of witnesses examined in the proceeding before the learned District Judge and also the contents of the Will (Exhibit-2) submits that it is evident that Harai Deka, the testator, was not in a sound disposition of mind at the time of execution of the Will, which is evident from the contents of the Will (Exhibit-2) and was unable to understand the nature and affect of the disposition, as he was suffering from leprosy and unable to move. It has, therefore, been submitted that in view of such positive assertion in the Will, the depositions of Maneswar Deka as well as the attesting witness Rajendra Saikia that the testator was mentally sound and physically fit at the time of execution of the Will cannot be accepted. It has also been submitted that it is apparent from the deposition of witnesses examined by the respondents in the proceeding that the testator was under complete control of the respondents, who are the beneficiaries and took active part in execution of the Will, and because of such influence the Will got executed though the mental and physical condition of the testator was not such that the testator would understand the nature and affect of the dispossession. It is also the contention of the learned counsel that though the Will was alleged to be executed in the year 1968, the for application for grant of letter of administration was filed in the year 1997, i.e. after about 27 (twenty-seven) years from the date of death of the testator in the year 1971, which is beyond the period of limitation prescribed under Article 137 of the Limitation Act and as such the learned District Judge ought not to have granted the letter of administration. Mr. Mukit, the learned counsel, further submits that the said proceeding being in the nature of a suit, Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not applicable so as to condone the delay, though a single Bench of this Court in Kamakhya Prasad Gupta & Anr. v. Jibon Lal Gupta, reported in 2011 (1) GLT 435 has held that such delay can be condoned. In any case, according to the learned counsel, such long delay in filing application gives rise to serious suspicion about execution of the Will, which suspicion the contesting respondents could not remove by adducing any evidence, though the law requires removal of suspicion, in the event of having the suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of the Will, by its propounder from the mind of the Court. The learned counsel further submits that another suspicious circumstance is deprivation of one of the sons (the original appellant) from the property, though the other sons were given the property by means of that Will, the reason for which also could not be explained by the contesting respondents. 7. Referring to the evidences adduced by the contesting respondents for grant of letter of administration, it has been submitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that the execution of the Will as required under Section 63 of the Act read with Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act could not be proved. It has also been submitted that there being no description of the property bequeathed, the same is hit by Section 89 of Act and as such is void for uncertainty. The learned counsel submits that as the property bequeathed has not been described in the Will, the learned Court below ought to have made an enquiry under Section 75 of the Act to ascertain the property, which has been bequeathed, which exercise has not been done by the learned Court below. The learned counsel submits that as the property bequeathed has not been described in the Will, the learned Court below ought to have made an enquiry under Section 75 of the Act to ascertain the property, which has been bequeathed, which exercise has not been done by the learned Court below. The learned counsel in support of his contention has placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in Vrindavabai Sambhaji Mane v. Ram Chandra Vithal Ganeshkar, reported in AIR 1995 SC 2086 ; in Gopal Sardar v. Karuna Sardar, reported in (2004) 4 SCC 252 ; in Kunvarjeet Singh Khandpur v. Kirandeep Kaur &. Ors., reported in (2008) 8 SCC 463 ; in Krishan Kumar Sharma v. Rajesh Kumar Sharma, reported in (2009) 11 SCC 537 ; of this Court in Durlabh Ch. Bhattacharjee v. Atul Barthakur, reported in 2005 (4) GLT 306; in Kamakhya Prasad Gupta & Anr. v. Jibon Lal Gupta, reported in 2011 (1) GLT 435; of the Delhi High Court in Yashoda Gupta v. Suniti Goyal & Ors., reported in 2002 (Del) 20 and of the Jammu & Kashmir High Court in Guru Dutt Singh & Anr. v. Durga Devi & Anr., reported in AIR 1966 (J&K) 75 . 8. Mr. Jain, learned counsel appearing for the contesting respondents in support of the order passed by the learned District Judge granting the letter of administration has submitted that it is no doubt true that if there is any suspicious circumstances surrounding execution of the. Will, the onus is on the propounder of the Will to remove such suspicion by leading appropriate evidence. In the case in hand, according to the learned counsel, it is evident from the deposition of witnesses examined by the respondents that though in the Will (Exhibit-2) it has been mentioned that the testator was suffering from leprosy and was unable to move, he was, however, in the sound disposing state of mind and was able to understand the nature and affect of the disposition. It has also been submitted that the said Will was registered under the provisions of the India Registration Act, 1908 and the Registrar has also endorsed that the testator admitted the execution and as such, it cannot be said that the mental and physical condition of the testator was such which did not allow him to understand the nature and affect of disposition or making him unable to execute the Will out of his free consent. The learned counsel further submits that deprivation of the natural heir would not be a suspicious circumstance, because the whole idea behind execution of a Will is to disturb the normal line of succession. 9. The further submissions of the learned counsel is that even assuming that the period of limitation to file the application for grant of probate or letter of administration is 3 (three) years, as prescribed by Article 137 of the Limitation Act, the reason for delay in filing the application seeking letter of administration having been explained in the application filed, i.e. claim of the property by the original appellant only in the year 1998 thereby disturbing the possession of the other brothers over the land which they were possessing in terms of the wishes of the testator, the learned District Judge has rightly granted the letter of administration, as the delay in filing the application can be condoned as held by a single Bench of this Court in Kamakhya Prasad Gupta (supra). The learned counsel, therefore, submits that the propounder of the Will could explain all such circumstances, which according to the appellants are the suspicious circumstances, surrounding the due execution of the Will. Relating to the submission of uncertainty of the property bequeathed it has also been submitted by the learned counsel that the same is not at all uncertain as by the said Will the entire landed property, except what was under the possession of another brother, namely Cheniram Deka, has been bequeathed and, therefore, there was no necessity on the part of the learned District Judge to make an enquiry under Section 75 of the Act. The learned counsel, therefore, submits that the Will is also not hit by Section 89 of the said Act. 10. The learned counsel, therefore, submits that the Will is also not hit by Section 89 of the said Act. 10. The learned counsel further submits that as because the testator and the contesting respondents stayed together, it does not mean that the beneficiaries exercised any control over the testator so as to influence him to execute the Will, more so, when such Will was registered and due execution of the same was certified by the registering authority under the provisions of the Registration Act. Referring to the deposition of the attesting witness, Rejendra Saikia, the learned counsel further submits that it is evident from such deposition that the Will was written as per instruction of Harai Deka, the testator, who was in the sound health and mind at the relevant point of time. According to the learned counsel, the due execution of the Will could be proved by the contesting respondents, as required by Section 63 of the Act read with Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act, by examining one of the attesting witness of the Will, namely Rajendra Saikia. The learned counsel, therefore, submits that the learned District Judge has rightly granted the letter of administration, which requires no interference in appeal. 11. The learned counsel in support of his contention has placed reliance on the decision of this Court in Mst. Sulochana Bhumiz & Ors. v. Bhat Kurmi, reported in AIR 1955 Gau 81 ; in Smti. Bishnu Maya v. Smti. Kishori Devi, reported in 1997 (2) GLT 182; in Durlabh Ch. Bhattacharjee v. Atul Barthakur, reported in 2005 (4) GLT 306; in Dilip Dutta Bhowmik & Ors. v. Mira Dutta Bhowmik & Anr., reported in 2007 (1) GLT 345; in Vidyasagar Sharma v. Jugal Kishore Sharma, reported in 2010 (2) GLT 666; and in Kamakhya Prasad Gupta & Anr. v. Jibon Lal Gupta, reported in 2011 (1) GLT 435. 12. I have considered the submissions of the learned counsel appearing for the parties and also perused the evidences on record, both oral and documentary. 13. Section 63 of the Act provides the manner of execution of an unprivileged Will. It requires that to constitute a valid Will, the testator/testatrix shall have to sign or affix his/her mark to the Will in presence of 2 (two) or more witnesses, each of whom has seen the testator/testatrix signing or affixing his or her mark to the Will. Section 63 of the Act provides the manner of execution of an unprivileged Will. It requires that to constitute a valid Will, the testator/testatrix shall have to sign or affix his/her mark to the Will in presence of 2 (two) or more witnesses, each of whom has seen the testator/testatrix signing or affixing his or her mark to the Will. It also requires that each of the attesting witnesses shall have to sign the Will in presence of the testator or testatrix. It is, however, not necessary that more than 1 (one) attesting witness must be present at the same time. The attestation need not be in any particular form. 14. Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act provides the manner in which the due execution of a document; required by law is to be attested, is to be proved. To use such a document, like Will, as evidence, at least 1 (one) attesting witness has to be called for the purpose of proving its execution, if there being an attesting witness alive and subject to process of the Court and capable of giving evidence. 15. Will being a document has to be proved by adducing primary evidence, except where the Court permits proving of such documents by secondary evidence. As discussed above, Section 63 of the Act requires that the Will has to be executed by the Testator or Testatrix in presence of at least 2 (two) attesting witnesses, who have seen the execution of, such Will and are present and saw the testator or testatrix putting his or her signature or thumb impression. Those attesting witnesses are also required to put their signatures or thumb impressions in presence of the testator or testatrix. To prove the due execution of the Will, the propounder is required to prove the signature or the thumb impression of the testator or testatrix, its execution out of his or her own free will as well as that he/she was in sound disposing state of mind and understood the nature and affect of disposition, apart from proving that the testator/testatrix has put the signature or affixed the mark in presence of the attesting witnesses and that the attesting witnesses have also put their signature or affix their mark in presence of the testator/testatrix. The burden is also on the propounder of the Will to remove suspicion, by leading cogent evidence, if there is any suspicious circumstances surrounding the due execution of the Will. Once these elements are established, the onus, which rest on the propounder is discharged. The burden, however, is on the person, who alleges forgery or undue influence or coercion or fraud, to prove such allegations. 16. In the instant case, according to the appellants, the due execution of the Will could not be proved by the contesting respondents as there is no proof that the testator put his thumb impression in presence of each of the attesting witnesses and they have also put their signatures in the Will, as the attesting witnesses, in presence of the testator, as required by Section 63 of the Act. That apart, it is also the case of the appellants that the testator, at the relevant point of time, was not in disposing State of mind as he was suffering from various ailments including leprosy and was under complete control of the beneficiaries. The further case of the appellants is that though the Will was executed in the year 1968 and the testator died in the year 1971, the application seeking letter of administration was filed in the year 1998, i.e. after about 27 years and as such the said application is barred by limitation, the same having not been filed within 3 three) years from the date of death of the testator, as required by Article 137 of the Limitation Act, In any case, according to the appellants, such long delay itself is a suspicious circumstance, which the contesting respondents could not remove from the mind of the Court by leading any cogent evidence. According to the appellants, the Will is also hit by Section 89 of the Act for uncertainty as there is no description of the property bequeathed. 17. Section 89 of the Act provides that a Will or bequest not expressive of any definite intention is void for uncertainty. According to the appellants, the Will is also hit by Section 89 of the Act for uncertainty as there is no description of the property bequeathed. 17. Section 89 of the Act provides that a Will or bequest not expressive of any definite intention is void for uncertainty. Section 75 of the said Act provides that for the purpose of determining questions as to what person or what property is denoted by any words used in a Will, the Court shall inquire into every material fact relating to the persons who claim to be interested under such Will, the property which is claimed as the subject of disposition, the circumstances of the testator and of his family, and into every fact a knowledge of which may conduce to the right application of the words which the testator has used. In the instant case, by the Will (Exhibit-2) the testator he bequeathed the entire property belonging to him in favour of the contesting respondents, except the property which has already been given to the eldest son, Cheniran, Deka. There is, therefore, noun certainty about either the person in whose favour or the property sought to be bequeathed and hence, the Will cannot said to be hit by Section 89 of the consequently there was no requirement of making any inquiry as contemplated by Section 75 of the said Act. A single Bench of this Court in Sulochana Bhumiz (supra) has also taken the view that when the entire property left behind by a testator is bequeathed, the Will cannot be challenged on the ground of uncertainty for not describing the property bequeathed. 18. This leads to the question as to whether the respondents of the Will could prove its due execution. As discussed above, to prove the due execution of a Will, which is required to be attested by at least 2 (two) attesting witnesses, one of the attesting witness, if alive and subject to process of the Court and capable of giving evidence, has to depose relating to the due execution and also about the testator putting the signature or affixing his mark in the Will in presence of each of the attesting witnesses apart from proving that the attesting witnesses also put their signatures or affix their marks in presence of the testator. Unless both these conditions are satisfied, it cannot be said that the propounder of the Will is successful in proving its clue execution. 19. In the instant case, the Will (Exhibit-2) was written by Bhuban Mahanta, the deed writer and witnessed by 2 (two) persons, namely Golap Deka and Rejendra Saikia, who, according to the contesting respondents, were the attesting witnesses. It has also come out from the deposition of witnesses examined by the contesting respondents, namely Maneswar Deka, the predecessor-in- interest of the present respondent Nos. 1 (i) to (iv), and the witness No. 2, Rajendra Saikia, who is an attesting witness, that the deed writer Bhuban Mahanta and one of the attesting witness Golap Deka have, in the meantime, expired and hence, there is no question of recording their evidences in support of the due execution of the Will. Sri Rajendra Saikia, the sole surviving attesting witness, in his deposition has stated that he was present when the Will was executed by Harai Deka at his residence and the said Will was written by Bhuban Mahanta as per the directions of Harai Deka, the testator. He has further deposed that Harai Deka puts his thumb impression in his (Rajendra Saikia) presence and Golap Deka and Bhuban Mahanta also put their signatures in the Will in his (Rajendra Saikia) presence. This witness, however, has not stated anything as to whether he puts his signature as attesting witness in presence of the testator, Harai Deka, though one of the contesting respondents (Maneswar Deka) in his deposition has stated that his father Harai Deka and the witnesses put their signatures in the will in his presence, whose evidence in that respect, however, cannot be accepted, as the attesting witness (Rajendra Saikia) did not state in his deposition that the testator, Harai Deka, also puts his thumb impression in presence of the other attesting witness, namely Golap Deka, and he (Rajendra Saikia) and the other attesting witness put their signatures in presence of the testator, Harai Deka. That being the position, the contesting respondents could not prove that the testator, Harai Deka, puts his thumb impression in presence of each of the attesting witnesses and the attesting witnesses also put their signatures in presence of the testator, Harai Deka, as required under Section 63 of the Act, to constitute valid execution of the Will. 20. That being the position, the contesting respondents could not prove that the testator, Harai Deka, puts his thumb impression in presence of each of the attesting witnesses and the attesting witnesses also put their signatures in presence of the testator, Harai Deka, as required under Section 63 of the Act, to constitute valid execution of the Will. 20. That being the position, the question whether any suspicious circumstances in execution of the Will exist or not need not be gone into and hence, the decisions cited by the learned counsel for the parties in Vrindavabai Sambhaji Mane (supra); Durlabh Ch. Bhattacharjee (supra), Guru Dutt Singh (supra); Yashoda Gupta (supra); Dilip Dutta Bhowmik (supra); Vidyasagar Sharma (supra); Smti. Bishnu Maya (supra) : Mst. Sulochana Bhumiz (supra) have not been discussed. 21. The Apex Court in Kunvarjeet Singh Khandpur (supra), placing reliance on its earlier judgment in Kerala SEB v. T.P. Kunhaliumma, reported in (1976) 4 SCC 634 , has held that the application filed under Section 264 of the Indian Succession Act, in view of the definition of District Judge under Section 2 of the said Act is covered by Article 137 of the Limitation Act, which prescribes the period of limitation for filing any application, for which no period of limitation is prescribed elsewhere, as 3 (three) years when the right to apply accrues. The Apex Court in the said judgment while holding that the decision of the Bombay High Court in Vasudev Daulatram Sadaranqani v. Sajni Prem lalwani, reported in AIR 1983 Bom 268 that an application for grant of probate or letter of administration being for the Court's permission to perform a legal duty created by a Will or for recognition as a testamentary trustee and is a continuous right which can be exercised any time after the death of the deceased as long as the right to do so survives or the object of the trust exists or any part of the trust, if created, remains to be executed, is the correct proposition of law, has, however, held that the assumption that under Article 137 of the Limitation Act the right to apply necessarily accrues of the date of the death of the deceased, is unwarranted, is not the correct proposition of law. In the said case, the Apex Court has held that the application filed for grant of letter of administration was not barred by time in view of the factual position that after the death of the testator on 5th October, 1995 an application was earlier filed seeking probate of the Will in the year 1996, which, however, was subsequently withdrawn on 9th August, 1999 and the application for grant of the letter of administration was filed thereafter on 7th August, 2002, that is within 3 (three) years of withdrawal of the application filed for grant of probate of the Will. 22. In Krishan Kumar Sharma (supra) the Apex Court has reiterated that in an application filed for grant of letter of administration the provision of Article 137 of the Limitation Act applies. The Apex Court has also held that such an application is filed merely seeking recognition from the Court to perform a duty and the right to apply is a continuing right. The question whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act applies to such proceeding, however, has not been gone into, having not raised. 23. The Apex Court In Gopal Sardar (supra) upon consideration of the provisions contained in West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 and the application filed under Section 8 of the said Act, to enforce the rights of pre-emption has held that such proceeding being in the nature of a suit, the provision of Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not applicable. 24. A single Bench of this Court in Karnakhya Prasad Gupta (supra) while considering the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, in a proceeding filed for grant of probate or letter of administration, has held that such application being not a suit, Section 5 of the said Act is applicable, as, such proceeding is treatable as a suit only after it becomes a contentious proceeding within the meaning of Section 295 of the Act. 25. Section 295 of the Act provides the procedure in contentious cases. 25. Section 295 of the Act provides the procedure in contentious cases. It provides that in any case before the District Judge in which there is contention, the proceeding shall take, as nearly as may be, the form of a regular suit, according to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, in which the petitioner for probate or letters of administration, as the case may be, shall be the plaintiff, and the person who has appeared to oppose the grant shall be defendant. Most of the proceedings for grant of probate or letter of administration are contentious. Such proceeding on the date of filing of the application though is not contentious but subsequently becomes so as soon as the opposite party opposes the prayer for grant of probate or letter of administration by raising certain contentions. The said proceeding then partakes the character of a suit. The question whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act would still be applicable in such contentious proceeding has not been gone into in Karnakhya Prasad Gupta (supra). The said question has also not been gone into in this case being not required to do so in view of the finding recorded above that the due execution of the Will could not be proved by the contesting respondents. 26. For the aforesaid discussions, the order dated 1st March, 2001 passed by the learned District Judge, Morigaon in Misc. Probate Case No. 26/1998 cannot be sustained and hence set aside. The appeal stands allowed. However, keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case the parties are directed to bear their own costs through out. The Registry is directed to send down the records. Appeal allowed.