Research › Search › Judgment

Punjab High Court · body

2012 DIGILAW 455 (PNJ)

Happy @ Devinder v. State of U. T. Chandigarh

2012-03-16

RAKESH KUMAR GARG

body2012
JUDGMENT Mr. Rakesh Kumar Garg, J.: (Oral) - The petitioner was convicted by the trial Court vide its judgment dated 26.03.2007 under Sections 279/337/338/304A IPC and was ordered to undergo sentence as under:- Section Sentence 279 IPC 1 month rigorous imprisonment. 337 IPC 1 month rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs.500/- 338 IPC 6 months rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs.1000/- 304-A IPC 1 year rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs.1000/- 2. The Additional Sessions Judge, vide order dated 27.09.2011 upheld the sentence under Sections 279/337/304-A IPC. However, acquitted the petitioner under Section 338 IPC. The petitioner has filed the instant revision petition challenging the aforesaid judgments of the Courts below. 3. It may be noticed that learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has not challenged the findings of the Courts below with regard to conviction of the petitioner for the offences under Sections 279/337/304-A IPC as upheld by the Additional Sessions Judge, Chandigarh. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued on the basis of judgment of this Court passed in case of Gurcharan Singh vs. State of Punjab 2009(5) R.C.R(Criminal) 541 wherein similar circumstances for an offence under Section 304-A IPC, the sentence from one year RI was reduced to six months RI, that the sentence of the petitioner be reduced to the extent of already undergone and be acquitted as he has already undergone about six months of sentence. 5. This Court is unable to accept the arguments raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of State of Punjab vs. Balwinder Singh and others- Criminal Appeal Nos.47-48 of 2012 decided on 06.01.2012 after considering the various principles of sentencing, observed as under:- “It is settled law that sentencing must have a policy of correction. If anyone has to become a good driver, must have a better training in traffic laws and moral responsibility with special reference to the potential injury to human life and limb. Considering the increased number of road accidents, this Court, on several occasions, has reminded the criminal courts dealing with the offences relating to motor accidents that they cannot treat the nature of the offence under Section 304A IPC as attracting the benevolent provisions of Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. We fully endorse the view expressed by this Court in Dalbir Singh (supra). We fully endorse the view expressed by this Court in Dalbir Singh (supra). While considering the quantum of sentence to be imposed for the offence of causing death or injury by rash and negligent driving of automobiles, one of the prime considerations should be deterrence. The persons driving motor vehicles cannot and should not take a chance thinking that even if he is convicted he would be dealt with leniently by the Court. For lessening the high rate of motor accidents due to careless and callous driving of vehicles, the courts are expected to consider all relevant facts and circumstances bearing on the question of sentence and proceed to impose a sentence commensurate with the gravity of the offence if the prosecution is able to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In the light of the above principles, we express our inability to accept the reasoning of the High court in reducing the sentence of imprisonment to the period already undergone, that is, 15 days. Merely because the fine amount has been enhanced to Rs.25,000/- each, is also not a sufficient ground to drastically reduce the sentence, particularly, in a case where five persons died due to the negligent act of both the drivers of the bus and the truck. Accordingly, we set aside the impugned order of the High Court and impose a sentence of rigorous imprisonment for six months with a fine of Rs.5,000/-each. The trial Court is directed to take appropriate steps for surrender of the accused in both the appeals to serve the remaining period of sentence. The appeals are allowed to the extent mentioned above.” 6. Keeping in view the aforesaid judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, I find no ground to interfere in the impugned order. Dismissed. ------------------