Mahankal Footpath Hawkers' Union, Ujjain v. Municipal Corporation, Ujjain
2012-04-27
S.C.SHARMA, SHANTANU KEMKAR
body2012
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : Asper S.C. Sharma, J.:- Thepetitioners before this Court are pavement dwellers (Footpath Hawkers)representing their cause through Mahankal FootpathHawkers' Union, have filed this present petition for issuance of an appropriatewrit, order or direction restraining the authorities from dislodging theHawkers and Vendors from their present place of business. 2.It has been stated in the writ petition that the Hawkers/Vendors are carryingout their business activities in Freeganj , Purani Sabji Mandi , Amarsingh Marg , Ujjain , and they are providingvegetables and other goods at a cheaper rate to the local residents.Petitioners have further stated that in the Freeganj , Purani Sabji Mandi , Amarsingh Marg , Ujjain ,there are about 400 Hawkers and Vendors and in the old township of Ujjain ,there are about 5000 to 6000 Hawkers and Vendors. It has been further statedthat Municipal Corporation, Ujjain ,is earning about Rs . 1 ,80,000 /-per month as tax from the Hawkers by charging Bhumi Shulk @ Rs . 10/- per day. Thegrievance of the petitioners is that the respondents are taking action toremove the Hawkers from the Freeganj , Purani Sabji Mandi , Amarsingh marg , Ujjain and other areas of Ujjain city and the action of the respondents is violative of Articles 14, 19 (1) (g) and 21 of the Constitution of India. It has alsobeen stated that a "National Policy on Urban Street Vendors 2009" hasbeen framed in the year 2009 and as per the National Policy on the subject,vending zones are to be identified and the vendors are required to be providedspace in the vending zone and restricted vending zone. Petitioners have furtherstated that the action of the respondents is in clear violation of the"National Policy on Urban Street Vendors 2009". Petitioners have alsoraised a ground that the respondents are duty bound to implement the guidelinesissued by the Apex Court from time to time and they have relied upon thejudgments delivered by the Apex Court in the cases of Gainda Ram and others Vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and others, (2010) 10 SCC1715, Sodan Singh and others Vs. NewDelhi Municipal Committee and others, (1989) 4 SCC 155 and Olga Tellis and others Vs. Bombay Municipal Corporation andothers, (1985) 3 SCC 545 .
Municipal Corporation of Delhi and others, (2010) 10 SCC1715, Sodan Singh and others Vs. NewDelhi Municipal Committee and others, (1989) 4 SCC 155 and Olga Tellis and others Vs. Bombay Municipal Corporation andothers, (1985) 3 SCC 545 . 3.A detailed and exhaustive reply has been filed on behalf of MunicipalCorporation, Ujjain .It has been stated in the reply that Madhav Nagar , Freeganj , Ujjain is a densely populatedlocality of Ujjain township and the streets are overcrowded withvehicles. It has been further stated that earlier also the street wasencroached by the vegetable vendors and the respondent Corporation provided analternative place to the encroachers/street vendors to carry out their businessactivities. As many as 435 street vendors were transferred to New Sabji Mandi at Maksi Road , Ujjain .A list of vendors who have been transferred and provided space measuring 8 x12.5 meters is also on record as Annexure R-1. The respondents have furtherstated that after rehabilitating the street vendors, efforts were made toensure that no further encroachment takes place. Again the new vendors havestarted encroaching the public road which is resultingas an obstruction in free flow of traffic. The respondents have also statedthat as per the provisions of Sections 322. 322-A, 323 and 366 of the M.P.Municipal Corporation Act, 1956, they are entitled to remove the encroachmentsand by removing the encroachers and they are not violating the constitutionalrights guaranteed to the citizens of this country. It has also been stated thata survey was carried out by the Municipal Corporation in 2006 and now effortsare being made to provide alternative place of business to street hawkers andas many as 7 hawkers' zone are being established by the Corporation to providean alternative space. The respondent Corporation has prayed for dismissal ofthe writ petition. 4.A detailed and exhaustive reply has also been filed on behalf of respondent No.3-Collector, Ujjain and it has been stated that inpursuance to the "National Policy on Urban Street Vendors 2009", theState Government has formulated the Rules known as "Madhya Pradesh PathPar Vikray Karne Walon Ki Jivika Ka Sanrakshan Aur Vikray Ka Viniyaman Adhiniyam , 2011".
4.A detailed and exhaustive reply has also been filed on behalf of respondent No.3-Collector, Ujjain and it has been stated that inpursuance to the "National Policy on Urban Street Vendors 2009", theState Government has formulated the Rules known as "Madhya Pradesh PathPar Vikray Karne Walon Ki Jivika Ka Sanrakshan Aur Vikray Ka Viniyaman Adhiniyam , 2011". The aforesaid Act have been enactedto protect the rights of street vendors and for regulating the activities ofstreet vendors as per the provisions of the "Madhya Pradesh Path Par Vikray Karne Walon Ki Jivika Ka Sanrakshan Aur Vikray Ka Viniyaman Adhiniyam , 2011" and the Scheme "National Policyon Urban Street Vendors 2009" framed by the Government of India. Therespondent-Collector has further stated that a Scheme has also been framed bythe State Government known as " Mukhyamantri (Path Par Vikray Karne Wale) Shahari Garibon Ke Liye Kalyan Yojna , 2012" and the Scheme has been circulatedby the State Government vide letter dated 4-2-2012. The Scheme has to beimplemented in a phased manner and a time limit has also been prescribed underthe Scheme. The Scheme provides for survey and identification of vendors andissuance of identity cards. After identification of the vendors, the ' Nagar Vikraya Samiti 'is required to provide space in vendors' zone to the vendors, keeping in viewthe " Mukhyamantri (Path Par Vikray Karne Wale) Shahari Garibon Ke Liye Kalyan Yojna , 2012".The Nagar Vikraya Samiti includes representative of vendors and in pursuanceto the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Path Par Vikray Karne Walon Ki Ji vika Ka Sanrakshan Aur Vikray Ka Viniyaman Adhiniyam , 2011 and the " Mukhyamantri (Path Par Vikray Karne Wale) Shahari Garibon Ke Liye Kalyan Yojna , 2012", a District Level Committee hasbeen constituted comprising of Collector and various Government officials andtwo members of the society. The reply further reveals that appropriate actionhas been initiated by the Collector for implementation of the " Mukhyamantri (Path Par Vikray Karne Wale) Shahari Garibon Ke Liye Kalyan Yojna , 2012",in order to safeguard the interest of the vendors and to regulate their placeof business and the action of the State Government is in consonance with thevarious provisions of the Constitution of India.
The respondent Collector hasfurther stated that the State Authorities, in order to provide an alternativespace to the vendors to carry out their activities, are striving hard forimplementation of the provisions of Madhya Pradesh Path Par Vikray Karne Walon Ki Jivika Ka Sanrakshan Aur Vikray Ka Viniyaman Adhiniyam , 2011 and the" Mukhyamantri (Path Par Vikray Karne Wale) Shahari Garibon Ke Liye Kalyan Yojna , 2012" andthe process of identification is going on. The vendors will be relocated to thevending zone in a phased manner. The respondent Collector has prayed fordismissal of the writ petition. 5.An additional reply has also been filed by the Municipal Corporation on 4-4-12and the additional reply reveals that till 31-3-12 the survey work in respectof street vendors has been completed and as many as 1860 street vendors havebeen identified, the additional reply further reveals that proper notice was publishedin newspapers and after giving wide publicity, survey work has been concludedand a Committee is being constituted as per the provisions of Madhya PradeshPath Par Vikray Karne Walon Ki Jivika Ka Sanrakshan Aur Vikray Ka Viniyaman Adhiniyam , 2011 and in case any person who is aggrieved inthe matter of survey, meaning thereby, whose name does not find place, shallcertainly be free to approach the Committee for allotment of alternative spaceor for grant of permission to carry out his business in the hawkers'zone/vending zone, established by the Corporation. Learned Counsel for therespondent Municipal Corporation has vehemently argued before this Court thaton account of the present Public Interest Litigation, they are not able to finalise the Scheme and therefore, the writ petition bedismissed with liberty to the respondents to implement the provisions of"National Policy on Urban Street Vendors 2009" and the " Mukhyamantri (Path Par Vikray Karne Wale) Shahari Garibon Ke Liye Kalyan Yojna , 2012". 6.Heard learned Counsel for the parties at length and perused the record. 7.In the present case, the petitioner-Union is representing the cause of hawkersand vendors and has filed the present petition for issuance of an appropriatewrit, order or direction directing the respondent Authorities for not removing/dispossessing the hawkers and vendors from their present place. It has alsobeen prayed that they should not be dispossessed and their shifting should beregulated.
7.In the present case, the petitioner-Union is representing the cause of hawkersand vendors and has filed the present petition for issuance of an appropriatewrit, order or direction directing the respondent Authorities for not removing/dispossessing the hawkers and vendors from their present place. It has alsobeen prayed that they should not be dispossessed and their shifting should beregulated. It has also been prayed before this Court that the respondents bedirected to implement the "National Policy on Urban Street Vendors2009" as adopted by the Ministry of Housing & Urban PovertyAlleviation, Government of India, 2009. The petitioners have also prayed that aTown Vending Committee be constituted keeping in view the "National Policyon Urban Street Vendors 2009" and the vendors/hawkers be permitted tocarry out their business and trade within the State of Madhya Pradesh and proper identity cards be issued to them.Other reliefs have also been prayed for safeguardingthe interest of the hawkers/vendors. 8.The Law Commission, Government of India, has suo motu examined the problem pertaining to the plight of theslum and pavement dwellers facing the eviction at the hands of the localauthorities in the year 1990 when approximately 3.5 crores of citizens of India were living in slums and on pavements of metropolitan cities. At that point oftime, one out of every 25 citizens was so affected, the Law Commission takinginto account the eviction of slum dwellers and the eviction of pavementdwellers/vendors, by the local authorities without affording them anyalternative facility, has suo motu taken cognizance of the problem and in its 130th report of the Commission,captioned "Legislative Protection for Slum and Pavement Dwellers",introduced this humane concept in Indian jurisprudence. The Law Commission inChapter I of the report has held as under : - "1.1.Harnessing the law for the poor- a suo motu exercise- Can the conscientious members of thecommunity sleep in peace when millions of their brethren and sisters are deniedthe comfort of sleeping on the footpaths of the metropolises of India and that of living in conditions unfit even for mute animals in slums in the neighbourhood ? The Law Commission having been entrusted under Item 1 (b) of its Term ofReference "To take all such measures as may be necessary to harness lawand the legal process in the service of the poor" deems it to be its dutyto address itself to this problem by undertaking the present exercise suo motu .
The Law Commission having been entrusted under Item 1 (b) of its Term ofReference "To take all such measures as may be necessary to harness lawand the legal process in the service of the poor" deems it to be its dutyto address itself to this problem by undertaking the present exercise suo motu . 1.2.Scope and target- This report therefore, deals with a problem, which has beenprevalent for a long time in India ,a problem, which at some stage or other, must be seriously tackled by thesociety, a problem which is not one for mere academic discussion but isseriously connected with basic needs of human beings. The problem is that ofpersons who are destined to spend their lives on pavements or slums in thecities. Should such persons be evicted from the places where they dwell, merelybecause, in the eye of law, their occupation of the premises is unauthorised ? If the society permits such evictions, should it not provide a reasonablyadequate alternative accommodation to them so that the right to live, guaranteeby the Constitution, carries some meaning for them ? This question has come up before the Courts in India more than once. Generally, while ad hoc relief has been given to thesedwellers, it has not been possible so far to go into the heart of the matter.The Commission believes that the society must address itself directly to thequestions posed above and consider the question of incorporating, in thestatutory framework of India, a just and workable solutions within the limitsof the Constitution. An endeavour has, therefore,been made herein to examine the legal contours of the problem, to drawattention to the existing provisions on the subject, to suggest a solution tothe extent to which legislation on the subject is within the competence ofParliament and to make appropriate recommendations to relieve the distress ofthe suffering compatriots within the practical parameters of law. 1.3.Action by the local authorities- Pavements and slums exists in big cities.Eviction of dwellers in these premises is normally ordered by localauthorities, whether they are known by the name of the Municipal Corporation,Municipal Committee, Municipal Council, Cantonment orby any other names. In this report, we propose to confine ourselves to theeviction of such persons by the local authorities.
1.3.Action by the local authorities- Pavements and slums exists in big cities.Eviction of dwellers in these premises is normally ordered by localauthorities, whether they are known by the name of the Municipal Corporation,Municipal Committee, Municipal Council, Cantonment orby any other names. In this report, we propose to confine ourselves to theeviction of such persons by the local authorities. So far as eviction by theState Government is concerned, generally it takes place under the PublicPremises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act,either as enacted by the Centre or as enacted (by whatever name) by the State.Eviction ordered under such a law mostly relates to individual premises overwhich the private person is alleged to have established unauthorised or illegal occupation and it does not raise questions of social justice of thedimensions that are met with where the actions of eviction is taken by the local authorities." 9.The Commission in the same report under Chapter IX has drawn its conclusion andcertain recommendations have been made by the Commission : - "9.1.With nearly 3.5 crores of citizens of India living in sub-human condition in slums and on pavement of metropolitan citiesof India , therest of the members of the community cannot sleep in peace with an easyconscience. In any event the community cannot watch their plight nonchalantlywhen the slum and pavement dwellers are evicted by the local authoritieswithout providing them any alternative facility even from these slums andpavements, so often, razing their huts to the ground with the help of bulldozersin the course of their slum removal operations. 9.2.The existing slum clearance legislation enacted by different States by andlarge focus on protection of tenants of privately owned uninhabitable chawls , owners where of are not interested even inmaintaining the same in habitable conditions, inasmuch as these are liable tocollapse and result in loss of life and/or are rendered unfit for humanhabitation on account of falling in disrepair and in order to remedy prevailing insanitary conditions giving rise to diseases andepidemics. 9.3.Presently, there exists no Legislation affording any protection to the slum andpavement dwellers in the event of their being evicted from these slums orpavement by the local authorities, apart from the fact that there is no socialsecurity scheme designed to rehabilitate them on their eviction.
9.3.Presently, there exists no Legislation affording any protection to the slum andpavement dwellers in the event of their being evicted from these slums orpavement by the local authorities, apart from the fact that there is no socialsecurity scheme designed to rehabilitate them on their eviction. There is,therefore, a pressing need, in the light of constitutional values, humaneconsiderations and as a matter of social justice, for inserting into our legalsystem a requirement by way of a Central Legislation to the effect that beforeslum dwellers are evicted by local authorities, it shall be the duty of theconcerned local authority to provide alternative site, accommodation orfacility to such evictees, and providing that the pavement dwellers are notdisturbed unless it is inevitable to do so in the context of some emergentsituation. 9.4.It will also be appropriate to provide that slum dwellers are not denied civicfacilities such as water supply, street lighting, electricity etc., on theground that they are in illegal occupation of the land on which the slums havecome into existence." 10.The aforesaid report of the Law Commission though has extensively dealt withthe problems of slum dwellers, however, it has also dealt with the problems,which were being faced by the pavement dwellers and street vendors/hawkers andthey also fall under the same category. 11.The plight of the pavement dwellers/street vendors was also brought to thenotice of the Apex Court in the case of Olga Tellis and others (supra), and in Paras 31, 37, 42, 45, 51and 57 the Apex Court has held as under :-- "31.The scope of the jurisdiction of this Court to deal with writ petitions underArticle 32 of the Constitution was examined by a Special Bench of this Court in Ujjam Bai Vs. State of U.P.. That decision would show that, in three classes ofcases, the question of enforcement of the fundamental rights would arise,namely, (1) where action is taken under a statute which is ultra vires the Constitution; (2) where the statute is intra vires but the action taken is without jurisdiction; and (3)an authority under an obligation to act judicially passes an order in violationof the principles of natural justice. These categories are, of course, notexhaustive. In Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar Vs . State of Maharashtra , a Special Bench of nine learned Judges of thisCourt held that, where the action taken against a citizen is procedurally ultra vires , the aggrieved party can move this Court underArticle 32.
These categories are, of course, notexhaustive. In Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar Vs . State of Maharashtra , a Special Bench of nine learned Judges of thisCourt held that, where the action taken against a citizen is procedurally ultra vires , the aggrieved party can move this Court underArticle 32. The contention of the petitioners is that the procedure prescribedby Section 314 of the BMC Act being arbitrary and unfair, it is not"procedure established by law" within the meaning of Article 21 and,therefore, they cannot be deprived of their fundamental right to life byresorting to that procedure. The petitions are clearly maintainable underArticle 32 of the Constitution. 37.Two conclusions emerge from this discussion : one,that the right to life, which is conferred by Article 21 includes the right tolivelihood and two, that is established that if the petitioners are evictedfrom their dwellings, they will be deprived of their livelihood. But theConstitution does not put an absolute embargo on the deprivation of life orpersonal liberty. By Article 21, such deprivation has to be according toprocedure established by law. In the instant case, the law which allows thedeprivation of the right conferred by Article 21 is the Bombay MunicipalCorporation Act, 1888, the relevant provisions of which are contained inSections 312 (1), 313 (1) (a) and 314. These sections, which occur in ChapterXI entitled 'Regulation of Streets' read thus : - "312.Prohibition of structures or fixtures which cause obstruction in streets.- (1)No person shall, except with the permission of the Commissioner under Section310 or 317, erect or set up any wall, fence, rail, post, step, booth or otherstructure or fixture in or upon any street or upon or over any open channel,drain, well or tank in any street so as to form an obstruction to, or anencroachment upon, or a projection over, or to occupy, any portion or suchstreet, channel, drain, well or tank. 313.Prohibition of deposit, etc., of things in streets.- (1) No person shall,except with the written permission of the Commissioner,- (a) place or deposit upon any street or upon any openchannel, drain or well in any streets (or in any public place) any stall,chair, bench, box, ladder, bale or other thing so as to form an obstructionthereto or encroachment thereon.
313.Prohibition of deposit, etc., of things in streets.- (1) No person shall,except with the written permission of the Commissioner,- (a) place or deposit upon any street or upon any openchannel, drain or well in any streets (or in any public place) any stall,chair, bench, box, ladder, bale or other thing so as to form an obstructionthereto or encroachment thereon. 314.Power to remove without notice anything erected, deposited or hawked incontravention of Section 312, 313 or 313-A .- TheCommissioner may, without notice, cause to be removed- (a)any wall, fence, rail, post, step, booth or other structure or fixture whichshall be erected or set up in or upon any street, or upon or over any openchannel, drain, well or tank contrary to the provisions of sub-section (1) ofSection 312, after the same comes into force in the city or in the suburbs,after the date of the coming into force of the Bombay Municipal (Extension ofLimits) Act, 1950 or in the extended suburbs after the date of the coming intoforce of the Bombay Municipal Further Extension of Limits and Schedule BBA (Amendment) Act, 1956; (b)any stall, chair, bench, box, ladder, bale, board or shelf, or any other thingwhatever placed, deposited, projected, attached, or suspended in, upon from orto any place in contravention of sub-section (1) of Section 313; (c)any article whatsoever hawked or exposed for sale in any public place or in anypublic street in contravention of the provisions of Section 313-A and anyvehicle, package, box, board, shelf or any other thing in or on which sucharticle is placed or kept for the purpose of sale." BySection 3 (w), "street" includes a causeway, footway, passage, etc.,over which the public have a right of passage or access. 42.Having given our anxious and solicitous consideration to this question, we areof the opinion that the procedure prescribed by Section 314 of the BombayMunicipal Corporation Act for removal of encroachments on the footpaths orpavements over which the public has the right of passage or access, cannot beregarded as unreasonable, unfair or unjust. There is no static measure ofreasonableness which can be applied to all situations alike. Indeed, thequestion "Is this procedure reasonable ? "implies and postulates the inquiry as to whether the procedure prescribed isreasonable in the circumstances of the case.
There is no static measure ofreasonableness which can be applied to all situations alike. Indeed, thequestion "Is this procedure reasonable ? "implies and postulates the inquiry as to whether the procedure prescribed isreasonable in the circumstances of the case. In Francis Coralie Mullin, Bhagwati , J., said at p. 524: (SCC p. 615, Para 4) "......Itis for the Court to decide in the exercise of its constitutional power ofjudicial review whether the deprivation of life or personal liberty in a givencase is by procedure, which is reasonable, fair and just or it isotherwise." 45.It must further be presumed that, while vesting in the Commissioner the powerto act without notice, the Legislature intended that the power should beexercised sparingly and in cases of urgency which brook no delay. In all othercases, no departure from the audi alteram partem rule ("Hear the other side") couldbe presumed to have been intended. Section314 is so designed as to exclude the principles of natural justice by way ofexception and not as a general rule. There are situations which demand theexclusion of the rules of natural justice by reason of diverse factors liketime, place, the apprehended danger and so on. Theordinary rule which regulates all procedure is that persons who are likely tobe affected by the proposed action must be afforded an opportunity of being hear as to why that action should not be taken. The hearingmay be given individually or collectively, depending upon the facts of eachsituation. A departure from this fundamental rule of natural justice may bepresumed to have been intended by the Legislature only in circumstances whichwarrant it. Such circumstances must be shown to exist, when so required, theburden, being upon those who affirm their existence. 51.Normally, we would have directed the Municipal Commissioner to afford anopportunity to the petitioners to show why the encroachments committed by themon pavements or footpaths should not be removed. But, the opportunity which wasdenied by the Commissioner was granted by us in an ample measure, both sideshaving made their contentions elaborately on facts as well as on law. Havingconsidered those contentions, we are of the opinion that the Commissioner wasjustified in directing the removal of the encroachments committed by thepetitioners on pavements, footpaths or accessory roads.
But, the opportunity which wasdenied by the Commissioner was granted by us in an ample measure, both sideshaving made their contentions elaborately on facts as well as on law. Havingconsidered those contentions, we are of the opinion that the Commissioner wasjustified in directing the removal of the encroachments committed by thepetitioners on pavements, footpaths or accessory roads. As observed in S.L. Kapoor , ".....where on the admitted or indisputablefacts only one conclusion is possible and under the law only one penalty ispermissible, the Court may not issue its writ to compel the observance ofnatural justice, not because it is not necessary to observe natural justice butbecause Courts do not issue futile writs". Indeed, in that case, the courtdid not set aside the order of super session in view of the factual positionstated by it. But, though we do not see any justification for asking theCommissioner to hear the petitioners, we propose to pass an order which, webelieve, he would or should have passed, had he granted a hearing to them andheard what we did. We are of the opinion that the petitioners should not beevicted from the pavements, footpaths or accessory roads until one month afterthe conclusion of the current monsoon season, that is to say, until October 31, 1985 . In the meanwhile,as explained later, steps may be taken to offer alternative pitches to thepavement dwellers who were or who happened to be censused in 1976. The offer of alternative pitches to such pavement dwellers should bemade good in the spirit in which it was made, though we do not propose to makeit a condition precedent to the removal of the encroachments committed by them. 57.To summarise , we hold that no person has the right toencroach, by erecting a structure or otherwise, on footpaths, pavements or anyother place reserved or earmarked for a public purpose like, for example, agarden or a playground; that the provision contained in Section 314 of theBombay Municipal Corporation Act is not unreasonable in the circumstances ofthe case; and that, the Kamraj Nagar Basti is situated on an accessory road leading to theWestern Express Highway. We have referred to the assurances given by the StateGovernment in its pleadings here, which, we repeat, must be made good.
We have referred to the assurances given by the StateGovernment in its pleadings here, which, we repeat, must be made good. Statedbriefly, pavement dwellers who were censured or who happened to be censused in 1976 should be given, though not as a conditionprecedent to their removal, alternate pitches at Malavani or, at such other convenient place as the Government considers reasonable butnot farther away in terms of distance; slum dwellers who were given identitycards and whose dwellings were numbered in the 1976 census must be givenalternate sites for their resettlement; slums which have been in existence fora long time, say for twenty years or more, and which have been improved anddeveloped will not be removed unless the land on which they stand or theappurtenant land, is required for a public purpose, in which case, alternatesites or accommodation will be provided to them; the "Low Income SchemeShelter Programme " which is proposed to beundertaken with the aid of the World Bank will be pursued earnestly; and, the"Slum Upgradation Programme (SUP)" under which basic amenities are to be given to slum dwellers willbe implemented without delay. In order to minimise the hardship involved in any eviction, we direct that the slums, whereversituated, will not be removed until one month after the end of the currentmonsoon season, that is, until October 31 ,1985 and, thereafter, only inaccordance with this judgment. If any slum is required to be removed beforethat date, parties may apply to this Court. Pavement dwellers, whether censused or uncensused , will notbe removed until the same date, viz., October 31, 1985 ." 12.The Apex Court in the aforesaid case directed the Bombay Municipal Corporationto implement Slum Upgradation Programme without delay and to provide alternative accommodation to slum dwellers. 13.The matter of the pavement hawkers also came up before the Apex Court in thecase of Sodan Singh and others (supra), and the ApexCourt in Paras 14, 18, 19, 20, 22, 23, 24 and 25 hasheld as under :- "14.The primary object of building roads is undoubtedly to facilitate people totravel from one point to another. Quoting several authorities Byron K. Elliottand William F. Elliott in their treatise on the Law of Roads and Streets havedefined a street as a road or public way in a city, town or village.
Quoting several authorities Byron K. Elliottand William F. Elliott in their treatise on the Law of Roads and Streets havedefined a street as a road or public way in a city, town or village. A way overland set apart for public travel in a town or city is a street, no matter bywhat name it may be called. If a way is free to all people it is a highway. P. Duraiswami Aiyangar in his bookdealing with the Law of Municipal Corporations in British India (1914 Edn .) has observed that the primary andparamount use of the street is public travel for man, beast and carriage forgoods. On behalf of the respondents reliance has been placed on theoft-repeated adage that public have a right of passing and re-passing through astreet but have no right "to be on it", which Shri Aiyangar also has mentioned at p. 542 of his book. Halsbury , relied upon by both sides, has stated (Vol. 21Para 107) that the right of the public is a right to pass along a highway forthe purpose of legitimate travel, not to be on it, except so far as thepublic's presence is attributable to a reasonable and proper user of thehighway as such. These statements certainly do not mean that a traveller has to be in perpetual motion when he is in apublic street. It may be essential for him to stop some time for variousreasons- he may have to alight from a vehicle or pick up a friend, collectcertain articles or unload goods or have to take some rest after a long andstrenuous journey. What is required of him is that he should not create anunreasonable obstruction which may inconvenience other persons having similarright to pass; he should not make excessive use of the road to the prejudice ofthe others. Liberty of anindividual comes to an end where the liberty of another commences. Subject tothis, a member of the public is entitled to legitimate user of the road otherthan actually passing or re-passing through it. 18.The provisions of the Municipal Acts should be construed in the light of theabove proposition. In case of ambiguity, they should receive a beneficialinterpretation, which may enable the municipalities to liberally exercise theirauthority both, in granting permission to individuals for making other uses ofthe pavements, and, for removal of any encroachment which may, in theiropinion, he constituting undesirable obstruction to the travelling public.
In case of ambiguity, they should receive a beneficialinterpretation, which may enable the municipalities to liberally exercise theirauthority both, in granting permission to individuals for making other uses ofthe pavements, and, for removal of any encroachment which may, in theiropinion, he constituting undesirable obstruction to the travelling public. The provisions of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957, are clearand nobody disputes before us that the Municipal Corporation of Delhi has full authority to permit hawkers and squatters on the sidewalks where theyconsider it practical and convenient. Insofar as the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911applying to the New Delhi area is concerned, the Bench constituted by threelearned Judges observed in Pyare Lal Case, that the provisions did not authorise themunicipality to permit stalls to be set up in the streets except temporarily onspecial occasions, like festivals etc., and that the permission to thepetitioner in that case had been wrongly granted initially. We do not agreewith these observations, although it appears that in the light of the othercircumstances, indicated in the judgment, the decision was a correct one. Theprovisions of both Sections 173 and 188 should receive liberal construction, sothat the New Delhi Municipal Committee may be in a position to exercise fullauthority. Indeed some of the documents on the records before ifs indicate thatthe Committee had been in the past actually permitting hawkers and squatters onpavements in certain areas. 19.The controversy in the present cases, however, cannot be settled by what hasbeen said earlier. The claim of the petitioners before us is much higher. Theyassert the right to occupy specific places on road pavements alleging that theyhave been so doing in the past. As has been stated earlier, the facts have beendisputed and individual cases will be considered separately in the light of thepresent judgment. The argument, however, which has been pressed on behalf ofthe petitioners is that they have their fundamentalrights guaranteed by Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution to occupy specificplaces demarcated on the pavements on a permanent basis for running theirbusiness. We do not think there is any question of application of Article 21and we will be briefly indicating our reasons therefore later. But can there beat all a fundamental right of a citizen to occupy a particular place on thepavement where he can squat and engage in trading business ? We have no hesitation in answering the issue against the petitioners.
But can there beat all a fundamental right of a citizen to occupy a particular place on thepavement where he can squat and engage in trading business ? We have no hesitation in answering the issue against the petitioners. Thepetitioners do have the fundamental right to carry on a trade or business oftheir choice, but not to do soon a particular place. The position can beappreciated better in the light of two decisions of this Court in FertilizerCorporation Kanigar Union Vs .Union of India and K. Rajendran Vs. State of T.N. 20.In the Fertilizer Corporation case, the workmen of the respondent Corporation challengedthe legality of the sale of certain plants and equipments of the Sindri Fertilizer Factory inter alia on the ground that a large number of workers would be retrenched as a result ofthe sale. They argued that the sale would deprive them of their fundamentalright under Article 19(1) (g) to carry on their occupation as industrialworkers. A Bench of five Judges of this Court rejected the plea holding thatArticle 19 (1) (g) confers a broad and general right which is available to allpersons to do work of a particular kind and of their choice, but it does notconfer the right to hold a particular job or to occupy a particular post ofone's choice. The right to pursue a calling or to carry on an occupation is notthe same thing as the right to work in a particular post. If the workers wereretrenched consequent upon and on account of the sale it would be open to themto pursue their rights and remedies under the labour laws. But the closure of an establishment in which a workman for the time beingwas employed did not by itself infringe his fundamental right to carry on anoccupation which is guaranteed by Article 19 (1) (g). "The choice andfreedom of the workers to work as industrial workers is not affected by thesale. The sale may at the highest affect their locum, but it does not affecttheir locus, to work as industrial workers." (SCC p.576, Para 14). This decision was followed in K. Rajendran Vs . State of T.N., which arose out of a policydecision taken by the State of Tamil Nadu to abolish all the posts of part-time Village Officers. An Ordinance waspromulgated for this purpose and was later replaced by an Act.
This decision was followed in K. Rajendran Vs . State of T.N., which arose out of a policydecision taken by the State of Tamil Nadu to abolish all the posts of part-time Village Officers. An Ordinance waspromulgated for this purpose and was later replaced by an Act. Rejecting theappeal of the appellants this Court held that the impugned Act did not violateArticle 19(1 )( g) as it did not affect the right of theincumbents of posts to carry on any occupation of their choice, even thoughthey may not be able to stick on to the posts which they were holding. Theratio of these decisions apply with full force to the cases where the right topursue a trade or business is involved. If the opposite view is taken and theplea of the petitioners is allowed a chaotic situation may follow. They may beentitled to insist that they would carry on their business anywhere they like,either on the roads or in the Government schools or hospitals or other publicbuildings. They may like to enter the classrooms or the patient wards or anypublic office to advance their prospects. As was observed in the BombayHawkers' case, they cannot hold the society to ransom by squatting on the busythoroughfare, thereby paralysing all civic life. 22.On behalf of some of the petitioners, it was contended that in view of theinclusion of the word "socialist" in the Preamble of the Constitutionby the 42nd Amendment greater concern must be shown to improve the condition ofthe poor population in the country, and every efforts should be made to allowthem as much benefit as may be possible. There cannot be any quarrel with thisproposition, but that by itself cannot remedy all theproblems arising from poverty. Even the Constitution as it stood originally wascommitted to economic justice and welfare of the needy. But for that reasoneither then or now the other provisions of the Constitution and the laws cannotbe ignored. It is, therefore, not possible to interpret the decision in Olga Tellis , in the manner suggested on behalf of the petitionerto bolster their case with the aid of Article 21. 23.During his argument, Mr. Tarkunde fairly staled thatthe Municipal Committee may be entitled to regulate the squatting business ofthe petitioners, but they must make detailed schemes in this regard.
It is, therefore, not possible to interpret the decision in Olga Tellis , in the manner suggested on behalf of the petitionerto bolster their case with the aid of Article 21. 23.During his argument, Mr. Tarkunde fairly staled thatthe Municipal Committee may be entitled to regulate the squatting business ofthe petitioners, but they must make detailed schemes in this regard. A seriousconcern was shown in the argument of the other learned Advocates also allegingthat corruption at large scale was rampant and huge amounts to money were being realised illegally by some of the servants of themunicipalities from the poor hawkers. No rules have been framed with respect tothe choice of the persons, the area to be allowed to them or the rate of Tehbazari charges. The permission to squat was beinggranted on daily basis or for very short periods to the great inconvenience tothe hawkers and no machinery was available to hear their grievances. A draftscheme has been prepared and filed on behalf of the petitioners with asuggestion that the respondents may be directed to adopt it. On behalf of therespondents, it was said that statutory provisions are already there in thisregard, but they had to concede that they are too sketchy and incapable ofmeeting the need. We are, in the circumstances, of the view that detailednecessary provisions, dealing with all relevant aspects, and capable of solvingthe problems arising in the situation in a fair and equitable manner, should bemade; and, the respondents should proceed as soon as may be possible. They willbe well advised to consider the suggestions of the petitioners while finalising the schemes. Due regard to the requirements ofthe relevant laws, e.g., Delhi Police Act, 1978 and the Delhi Control ofVehicular and other Traffic on Road and Streets Regulations, 1980 will have tobe given. 24.We would, however, make it clear that the demand of the petitioners that thehawkers must be permitted on every road in the city cannot be allowed. If aroad is not wide enough to conveniently manage the traffic on it, no hawkingmay be permitted at all, or may be sanctioned only once a week, say on Sundayswhen the rush considerably thins out. Hawking may also be justifiablyprohibited near hospitals or where necessity of security measures so demands.There may still be other circumstances justifying refusal to permit any kind ofbusiness on a particular road.
Hawking may also be justifiablyprohibited near hospitals or where necessity of security measures so demands.There may still be other circumstances justifying refusal to permit any kind ofbusiness on a particular road. The demand on behalf of the petitioners thatpermission to squat on a particular place must be on a permanent basis also hasto be rejected as circumstances are likely to change from time to time. Butthis does not mean that the licence has to be grantedon the daily basis; that arrangement cannot be convenient to anybody, except inspecial circumstances. 25.The authorities, while adopting a scheme, should also consider the question asto which portions of the pavements should be left free for pedestrians and thenumber of the squatters to be allowed on a particular road. There should berational basis for the choice of the licensees. A policy decision should betaken in regard to the articles which should be permitted to be sold on thepavements. It is common knowledge (as was taken note of in Bombay Hawkers'case) that some of the hawkers in big cities are selling very costly luxuryarticles including sophisticated electronic goods, sometimes imported orsmuggled. The authorities will be fully justified to deny to such hawkers any facility.They may frame rules in such a manner that it may benefit only the poor hawkersincapable of investing a substantial amount for starting the business. Attemptshould be made to make the scheme comprehensive, dealing with every relevantaspect, for example, the charges to be levied, the procedure for grant andrevocation of the licences , etc." 14.The problems of street vendors were looked into by the Apex Court and it washeld that right to carry on trade or business mentioned in Article 19(1 )( g) of the Constitution of India, on street pavement, ifproperly regulated, cannot be denied on the ground that the streets are meantexclusively for passing of vehicles and repassing ofvehicles and for no other use. It is noteworthy to mention that pursuant to thejudgment delivered in the case of Sodan Singh(supra), the matter was placed before the National Commission for enterprisesin the unorganised sector and based upon the reportsubmitted by the Commission, a policy was framed knownas, "National Policy on Urban Street Vendors 2009" by the Governmentof India. The policy provides for rehabilitating the hawkers/street vendors andalso for constitution of a Town Vending Committee.
The policy provides for rehabilitating the hawkers/street vendors andalso for constitution of a Town Vending Committee. Para 8 of the Policy reads as under:- "8.Monitoring & Review : Monitoringof street bending activities, action plans and promotional measures for streetvendors in accordance with this policy will be carried on at the followinglevels :- (A) Towrt Vending Committee : Aselaborated earlier, the TVC will be responsible for monitoring theimplementation of this policy at the city/town/ward/locality levels. (B)Chief Executive Officer/Commissioner of Municipal Authority : TheExecutive Officer/Commissioner of each Municipal Authority shall maintain aregister containing ward-wise list of registered street vendors(stationary/mobile) exhibited in Municipal website. The Municipal Authority,would continuously monitor the function and activities of the TVC and wardvending committees (wherever set up) and shall send an annual report on thesame to the Street Nodal Officer and Secretary of the concerned Department ofthe State Government containing the following details :- ( i ) Number of vending zones/vendors markets ear marked/developed; (ii)Number of registered street vendors; (iii)Revenue Collected; (iv) Expenditure incurred; (v)Promotional and other measures undertaken; (vi) Complaints registered and redressed; and (vii)Any other matter as prescribed by the State Nodal Officer/ Concerned Departmentof the State Government. (C)State/UT Nodal Officer : TheSecretary of the concerned Department or State UT Nodal Officer designatedshall send an annual report to the Ministry of Housing and Urban PovertyAlleviation in the Central Government containing relevant statistics on streetvendors for cities/towns number of vending zones ear marked/developed, numberof registered street vendors, number provided with vending spaces, details ofTVC and conditions of street vendors in the State." 15.Thus, a Scheme was framed by the Government of India for rehabilitating thevendors and in Delhi , StreetVendors (Protection of Livelihood and Regulation of Street Vending) Bill, 2009,was enacted. The aforesaid ordinance was subjected to judicial scrutiny beforethe Apex Court in the case of Gainda Ram and othersVs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and others (supra), and the Apex Court in Paras 6, 45, 46, 47 and 67 has held as under :- "6.However, this Court in Sodan Singh took a very broadview of a citizen's right under Article 19(1 )( g)following its decisions in Fertilizer Corpn . Kamgar Union Vs. Union of India and also the decision ofthis Court in K. Rajendran Vs. State of T.N. and thedecision of this Court in Bombay Hawkers' Union Vs. Bombay Municipal Corpn . and the Constitution Benchdecision of this Court in Olga Tellis Vs. BombayMunicipal Corpn .
Kamgar Union Vs. Union of India and also the decision ofthis Court in K. Rajendran Vs. State of T.N. and thedecision of this Court in Bombay Hawkers' Union Vs. Bombay Municipal Corpn . and the Constitution Benchdecision of this Court in Olga Tellis Vs. BombayMunicipal Corpn . This Court in Sodan Singh, came to the conclusion that the hawkers andsquatters have a fundamental right to carry on business on the public streets,but the same should be regulated. 45.It has been held by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Sodan Singh that right to hawk on the streets of Delhi in a fundamental right underArticle 19 (1)(g) of the Constitution but such right is not absolute and issubject to reasonable restrictions under Article 19 (6) of the Constitution. 46.On a perusal of the aforesaid Constitutional provision, it is clear that therights under Article 19(1 )( g) can only be controlledby law as contemplated in Article 19 (6). Such law can impose reasonablerestrictions. The relevant constitutional provisions are set out:- "19.(6) Nothing in sub-clause (g) of the said clause shall affect the operation ofany existing law insofar as it imposes, or prevent the State from making anylaw imposing, in the interests of the general public, reasonable restrictionson the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause, and, inparticular, nothing in the said sub-clause shall affect the operation of anyexisting law insofar as it relates to, or prevent the State from making any lawrelating to,- ( i ) the professional or technicalqualifications necessary for practising anyprofession or carrying on any occupation, trade or business, or (ii) the carrying on by the State, or by a Corporationowned or controlled by the State, of any trade, business, industry or service,whether to the exclusion, complete or partial, of citizens or otherwise." 47.On an analysis of the provisions under Article 19 (6), it is clear that theprovisions under Article 19 (6) are broadly in two parts. The first part authorises that nothing in sub-clause (g) of Article 19 (1)shall affect the operation of existing law insofar as it imposes reasonablerestrictions, in the interest of general public, on rights conferred by Article19 (1) (g). The second part is that nothing contained in Article 19(1)(g) shallprevent the State from making any law imposing, in the interest of generalpublic, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of rights conferred by Article19 (1) (g).
The second part is that nothing contained in Article 19(1)(g) shallprevent the State from making any law imposing, in the interest of generalpublic, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of rights conferred by Article19 (1) (g). Here we are not concerned with clauses ( i )and (ii) of Article 19 (6). 67.In the background of the provisions in the Bill and the 2009 Policy, it isclear that an attempt is made to regulate the fundamental right of streethawking and street vending by law, since it has been declared by this Courtthat the right to hawk on the streets or right to carry on street vending ispart of fundamental right under Article 19 (1) (g). However, till the law ismade the attempt made by NDMC and MCD to regulate this right by framing schemeswhich are not statutory in nature is not exactly within the contemplation of constitutionalprovisions discussed above. However, such schemes have been regulated from timeto time by this Court for several years as pointed out above. Even, orderspassed by this Court, in trying to regulate such hawking and street vending, isnot law either. At this same time, there is no denying the fact that hawkingand street vending should be regulated by law. Such a law is imminentlynecessary in public interest." 16.It was held by the Apex Court that reasonable restrictions can be imposed on a citizen's fundamental right tocarry on hawking under Article 19(1) (g) of the Constitution of India. It wasalso observed that hawking and street vending should be regulated by law. 17.The State of Madhya Pradesh has also enacted Madhya Pradesh Path Par Vikray Karne Walon Ki Jivika Ka Sanrakshan Aur Vikray Ka Viniyaman Adhiniyam , 2011 and based upon the "National Policy onUrban Street Vendors 2009", a Town lending Committee also finds placeunder the Adhiniyam of 2011. 18.The Ujjain Municipal Corporation, keeping in view the"National Policy on Urban Street Vendors 2009" and Madhya PradeshPath Par Vikray Karne Walon Ki Jivika Ka Sanrakshan Aur Vikray Ka Viniyaman Adhiniyam , 2011, has framed a time bound schedule forrehabilitating the street hawkers and vendors specially keeping in view thefact that a Mela is organised in Ujjain known as ' Simhastha Mela ' and the obstructions on the roads of Ujjain are to be removed for permitting free flow oftraffic.
Not only this, a Scheme known as " Mukhyamantri (Path Par Vikray Karne Wale) Shahari Garibon Ke Liye Kalyan Yojna 2012" has also been introduced and theentire survey work of the street vendors/beneficiary under the Scheme has been completed on 31-3-12 . A list of 1860 beneficiaries has been preparedand objections have also been invited from public at large in the matter. Ithas also been brought to the notice of this Court that in case any person isaggrieved and whose name does not find place in the list is again free to approach the Committee/Authorities. A list ofvendors has also been brought on record and the authorities are shifting thevendors to various vending zones in the township of Ujjain . 19.Ms. N. Geeta , IAS, Collector, Ujjain ,as well as Mr. M.C. Choudhary , Commissioner,Municipal Corporation, Ujjain , who were present atthe time of final hearing, have drawn attention of this Court towards theScheme framed by the State Government and the manner and method it is beingimplemented in the township of Ujjain . It has alsobeen assured before this Court by the learned Collector and the Commissionerthat they are taking action in the matter strictly in consonance with thepolicy issued by the Government of India, i.e., "National Policy on UrbanStreet Vendors 2009"; read with the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh PathPar Vikray Karne Walon Ki Jivika Ka Sanrakshan Aur Vikray Ka Viniyaman Adhiniyam , 2011; and, with the provisions of " Mukhyamantri (Path Par Vikray Karne Wale) Shahari Garibon Ke Liye Kalyan Yojna 2012". 20.This Court has minutely gone through the various documents filed along with thereturn and the same establishes that in a phase manner, the streetvendors/hawkers are being allotted space at other places and the streets whichhave become bottleneck are being feed from encroachers/street hawkers in orderto have free flow of traffic and to avoid stampede during the ' Simhastha Mela '. The work ofallotting land/alternative place is being carried out in a very systematicmanner, as explained before this Court by the learned District Magistrate andtherefore, this Court does not find any reason to interfere with the processwhich has been initiated by the respondents in translocating the street hawkers/vendors to various vending zones ear marked for them.
The work ofallotting land/alternative place is being carried out in a very systematicmanner, as explained before this Court by the learned District Magistrate andtherefore, this Court does not find any reason to interfere with the processwhich has been initiated by the respondents in translocating the street hawkers/vendors to various vending zones ear marked for them. 21.Resultantly, as the action of the respondents is in consonance with the"National Policy on Urban Street Vendors 2009"; read with the " Mukhyamantri (Path Par Vikray Karne Wale) Shahari Garibon Kc Liye Kalyan Yojna 2012" andalso in consonance with the Madhya Pradesh Path Par Vikray Karne Walon Ki JivikaKa Sanrakshan Aur Vikray Ka Viniyaman Adhiniyam , 2011, nofurther orders are required in the present writ petition and the same isdisposed of accordingly. However, this Court hopes and trusts that theauthorities will strictly adhere to the provisions of the "National Policyon Urban Street Vendors 2009" and the provisions of Madhya Pradesh PathPar Vikray Karne Walon Ki Jivika Ka Sanrakshan Aur Vikray Ka Viniyaman Adhiniyam , 2011 framed by the State Government whileproviding alternative place to the street vendors to carry out their livelihoodas every citizen of this country is having constitutional right under Article19(1)(g) to carry out business/profession of his choice, subject to reasonablerestrictions, as held by the Apex Court in the case of Gainda Ram and others Vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and others, (2010) 10 SCC1715. The writ petition is accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.