Judgment : HARISH TANDON, J. This revisional application is directed against an order dated 22.02.2010 passed by learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) 10th Court, Alipore in Title Suit No.62 of 2003 by which an application for amendment of the plaint is allowed. The plaintiff/opposite parties initially instituted a suit against the proforma opposite party No.3 herein praying for a decree for declaration that the said proforma opposite party entered into a concluded agreement for sale of the property mentioned in Schedule A to the plaint on the basis of the writings dated 19.04.2003, 29.04.2003 and 05.05.2003 and further declaration that the letter dated 27.08.2003 is null and void and be cancelled and delivered up and a permanent injunction directing the said proforma opposite party No.3 for selling, transferring and alienating the suit property to a third party. The facts as it appears from the plaint that one Cecile Lottie Grosser was the owner of the entire premises No.62/11, Bollygunge Circular Road, Kolkata-700019 previously known as premises No.8/1, Rainey Park, who died upon publishing his last Will and Testament dated 19.07.1927 bequeathing his properties to his friend namely J.W. Chippendale. The said will was duly probated in matter No.559 of 1944 by the High Court at Calcutta. Upon the death of the said J.W. Chippendale, his wife succeeded to the said estate who subsequently made and published her last will and testament dated 07.09.1968 before her death bequeathing 2/3 parts of the said property to Assembly of God Church and remaining 1/3 portion to St. Paul Cathedral Church, Kolkata. The proforma opposite party No.3 was the administrator appointed in a probate case by the District Delegate at Alipore, in Case No.24 of 1970 who approached the plaintiff/opposite parties for sale of the said property and the various correspondences were made in this regard which constitutes a concluded contract between the parties. It is further alleged in the said plaint that the said proforma opposite party No.3 issued a letter dated 27.08.2003 informing that he is negotiating with the others for sale of the said property. It is further alleged in the said plaint that the said proforma opposite party No.3 issued a letter dated 27.08.2003 informing that he is negotiating with the others for sale of the said property. During the pendency of the said suit an application under Order 22 Rule 10 read with Order 1 Rule 10 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure was taken out by the petitioners praying for their addition on the strength of the deed of conveyance dated 14.08.2006 executed by the said proforma opposite party No.3 whereby and whereunder the said premises was sold, transferred and conveyed in their favour. The said application was eventually allowed on 11.08.2009. Thereafter, an application for amendment of the plaint was filed by the plaintiff/opposite party on 08.05.2009 praying for amendment of the plaint by incorporating the necessary averment relating to the relief of specific performance of an agreement and further declaration that the deed of conveyance executed by the proforma opposite party No.3 in favour of the petitioner is null and void. The Trial Court allowed the said application for amendment as the same is necessary for the complete adjudication of the disputes and also to avoid the multiplicity of proceedings. Assailing the said order in this revisional application, Mr. Anindya Mitra, the learned Advocate General appearing for the petitioner submits that the Trial Court ought not to have allowed the said application for amendment when a relief for specific performance is barred by limitation. He strenuously submits that the relief which has become barred under the Limitation Act should not have been allowed to be brought by way of an amendment of the pleading and in support of such submission reliance is placed upon the judgment of the Apex Court in case of Alkapuri Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. vs. Jayantibhai Naginbhai reported in AIR 2009 SC 1948 and in case of K. Raheja Constructions Ltd. and Another Vs. Alliance Ministries & Ors. reported in 1995 Supp(3) SCC 17 and in case of Revajeetu Builders and Developers vs. Narayanaswamy & Sons & Ors. reported in (2009) 10 SCC 84 . Lastly it is contended that the suit for declaration and injunction cannot be converted into a suit for specific performance by way of an amendment of the pleading and placed reliance upon a judgment of the Apex Court in case of Vijendra Kumar Goel Vs. reported in (2009) 10 SCC 84 . Lastly it is contended that the suit for declaration and injunction cannot be converted into a suit for specific performance by way of an amendment of the pleading and placed reliance upon a judgment of the Apex Court in case of Vijendra Kumar Goel Vs. Kusum Bhuwania (Smt) reported in (1997) 11 SCC 457 . Mr. Jiban Ratan Chatterjee, the learned Senior Advocate appearing for the opposite party No.1 submits that where the court finds that it requires a consideration whether the relief sought by way of an amendment is barred by the limitation, the court should allow the amendment and places reliance upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in case of Ragu Thilak D. John Vs. S. Rayappan and Ors. reported in (2001) 2 SCC 472 . He further contends that it is a discretion of the court to allow the amendment to incorporate the relief if allegedly barred by limitation and placed reliance upon a judgment of the Apex Court in case of Pankaja and Another Vs. Yellappa (Dead) By Lrs. And Ors. reported in (2004) 6 SCC 415 . Having considered the respective submissions it is undisputed that initially a relief claimed in the plaint was a declaration that there exists concluded agreement for sale and consequential decree for permanent injunction. It is also undisputed that on the strength of the purchase of the property, an application is taken out by the petitioners for their addition on 17.10.2006 which came to be disposed of on 11.08.2009. By the proposed amendment the plaintiffs/opposite parties are seeking to incorporate the relevant facts relating to transfer pendente lite with the further prayer for specific performance of an agreement upon declaration that the said transfer is illegal, null and void. To attract the provision of Limitation Act, in respect of a suit for specific performance of a contract, it would be profitable to quote Article 54 of the Limitation Act which read thus: “54. For Specific Three The date fixed performance of years for the performance a contract or, if no such date is fixed, when the plaintiff has notice that performance is refused.” Therefore, the limitation would reckon from the date fixed for the performance or if no such date is fixed when the plaintiff has noticed of refusal of such performance. For Specific Three The date fixed performance of years for the performance a contract or, if no such date is fixed, when the plaintiff has notice that performance is refused.” Therefore, the limitation would reckon from the date fixed for the performance or if no such date is fixed when the plaintiff has noticed of refusal of such performance. Original pleading as it stood was on the basis that the proforma opposite party No.3 was contemplating to negotiate with the others and as such the injunction was sought for restraining him from deleting with the suit property. The application for addition was filed by the petitioner on 17.10.2006 whereas an amendment application was taken out on 08.05.2009. Therefore, it is essentially a disputed question of fact when time limited under Article 54 of the Limitation Act commenced which the court should not embark to decide at the time of considering an application for amendment but to postpone the same at the time of hearing of the suit after allowing an amendment application as has been held by the Apex Court in case of Pankaja (supra) in these words: “17. Factually in this case, in regard to the stand of the defendants that the declaration sought by the appellants is barred by limitation, there is dispute and it is not an admitted fact. While the learned Counsel for the defendant-respondents pleaded that under Entry 58 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, the declaration sought for by the appellants in this case ought to have been done within 3 years when the right to sue first accrued, the appellant-plaintiff contends that the same does not fall under the said entry but falls under Entry 64 or 65 of the said Schedule of the Limitation Act which provides for a limitation of 12 years, therefore, according to them the prayer for declaration of title is not barred by limitation, therefore, both the courts below have seriously erred in not considering this question before rejecting the prayer for amendment. In such a situation where there is a dispute as to the bar of limitation this Court in the case of Ragu Thilak D. John v. S. Rayappan has held: “The amendment sought could not be declined. The dominant purpose of allowing the amendment is to minimize the litigation. In such a situation where there is a dispute as to the bar of limitation this Court in the case of Ragu Thilak D. John v. S. Rayappan has held: “The amendment sought could not be declined. The dominant purpose of allowing the amendment is to minimize the litigation. The plea that the relief sought by way of amendment was barred by time is arguable in the circumstances of the case. The plea of limitation being disputed could be made a subject-matter of the issue after allowing the amendment prayed for.” 18. We think that the course adopted by this court in Ragu Thilak D. John case applies appropriately to the facts of this case. The courts below have proceeded on an assumption that the amendment sought for by the appellants is ipso facto barred by the law of limitation and amounts to introduction of different relief than what the plaintiff had asked for in the original plaint. We do not agree with the courts below that the amendment sought for by the plaintiff introduces a different relief so as to bar the grant of prayer for amendment, necessary factual basis has already been laid down in the plaint in regard to the title which, of course, was denied by the respondent in his written which will be an issue to be decided in a trial. Therefore, in the facts of this case, it will be incorrect to come to the conclusion that by the amendment the plaintiff will be introducing a different relief. 19. We have already noted, hereinabove, that there is an arguable question whether the limitation applicable for seeking the relief of declaration on facts of this case falls under Entry 58 of the Limitation Act or under Entry 64 or Entry 65 of the Limitation Act which question has to be decided in the trial, therefore, in our view, following the judgment of this court in the case of Ragu Thilak D. John we set aside the impugned orders of the courts below, allow the amendment prayed for, direct the trial court to frame necessary issue in this regard and decide the said issue in accordance with law bearing in mind the law laid down by this Court in the case of L.J. Leach and Co. Ltd.” In case of Revajeetu Builders and Developers (supra) the Apex Court laid down the basic principle for consideration of an amendment application and held that although the claim being barred by law of limitation is one of the factor of exercising discretion to allow the amendment or not but does not affect the power of the court if the amendment is required in the interest of justice in these words: “63. On Critically analyzing both the English and Indian cases, some basic principles emerge which ought to be taken into consideration while allowing or rejecting the application for amendment: (1) whether the amendment sought is imperative for proper and effective adjudication of the case; (2) whether the application for amendment is bona fide or mala fide; (3) the amendment should not cause such prejudice to the other side which cannot be compensated adequately in terms of money; (4) refusing amendment would in fact lead to injustice or lead to multiple litigation; (5) whether the proposed amendment constitutionally or fundamentally changes the nature and character of the case; and (6) as a general rule, the court should decline amendments if a fresh suit on the amended claims would be barred by limitation on the date of application. These are some of the important factors which may be kept in mind while dealing with application filed under Order 6 Rule 17. These are only illustrative and not exhaustive. 64. The decision on an application made under Order 6 Rule 17 is a very serious judicial exercise and the said exercise should never be undertaken in a casual manner. We can conclude our discussion by observing that while deciding applications for amendments the courts must not refuse bona fide, legitimate, honest and necessary amendments and should never permit mala fide, worthless and/or dishonest amendments.” Even in case of Alkapuri Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. (supra) the Apex Court did not lay down the proposition that the court cannot exercise its discretion in allowing an application for amendment where it appears to be a disputed question and accepted and applied the ratio laid down in Pankaja (supra) in these words: “14. The law in this regard is also quite clear and consistent that there is no absolute rule that in every case where a relief is barred because of limitation an amendment should not be allowed. The law in this regard is also quite clear and consistent that there is no absolute rule that in every case where a relief is barred because of limitation an amendment should not be allowed. Discretion in such cases depends on the facts and circumstances of the case. The jurisdiction to allow or not allow an amendment being discretionary, the same will have to be exercised on a judicious evaluation of the facts and circumstances in which the amendment is sought. If the granting of an amendment really sub-serves the ultimate cause of justice and avoids further litigation the same should be allowed. There can be no straitjacket formula for allowing or disallowing an amendment of pleadings. Each case depends on the factual background of that case. 15. This Court in the case of L.J. Leach and Co. ltd. v. Jardine Skinner and Co. has held: “16. It is no doubt true that courts would, as a rule, decline to allow amendments, if a fresh suit on the amended claim would be barred by limitation on the date of the application. But that is a factor to be taken into account in exercise of the discretion as to whether amendment should be ordered, and does not affect the power of the court to order it, if that is required in the interests of justice.” 16. This view of this Court has, since, been followed by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in the case of T.N. Alloy Foundry Co. Ltd. v. T.N. Electricity Board. Therefore, an application for amendment of the pleading should not be disallowed merely because it is opposed on the ground that the same is barred by limitation, on the contrary, application will have to be considered bearing in mind the discretion that is vested with the court in allowing or disallowing such amendment in the interest of justice.” Thus the ration laid down in the above noted reports is that if the point of limitation is disputed then the court should allow the amendment and decide the period of limitation at the time of hearing. The Apex Court in case of Vijendra Kumar Goel Vs. The Apex Court in case of Vijendra Kumar Goel Vs. Kusum Bhuwania (Smt) (supra) was considering a matter where there was no dispute that the suit was barred under Article 54 of the Limitation Act and in such perspective it was held that a suit simplictor for declaration and injunction cannot be converted into a specific performance suit when it is barred by limitation in these words: “4. In the instant case the High Court appears to have proceeded on the basis that in the plaint the plaintiff-respondent has made out a case for specific performance and nothing new had been sought for by way of amendment. We have perused the plaint. We are unable to agree with the said view of the High Court. It is no doubt true that in the plaint the plaintiff-respondent has made a reference to the agreement and his having requested the appellant to execute the sale deed. But there is nothing in the plaint to show that the plaintiff-respondent was seeking specific performance of the contract. The suit, as framed, is a suit for declaration and injunction only. It was sought to be converted into a suit for specific performance by the plaintiff-respondent by way of amendment in the plaint in 1993 when the claim for specific performance had become barred by limitation. The submission of Shri Dhavan is that even on the date of the filing of the suit, the claim for specific performance was barred by limitation. We do not propose to go into that question.” As indicated above the relief claim by way of an amendment cannot be thrown on the touchstone of limitation at the nascent stage of amendment but the same should be decided at the time of hearing of the said suit. Furthermore, the Trial Court exercised discretion in allowing an amendment application and unless such discretion is palpably beyond jurisdiction or de hors the legal parameters or irrational and illegal, the revisional court should not interfere with such discretionary order. In such view of the matter I do not find any illegality and/or infirmity in the impugned order. The revisional application is devoid of merit and is therefore dismissed. The plaintiff/opposite party is directed to file the amended plaint, if not already filed, within two weeks from date. In such view of the matter I do not find any illegality and/or infirmity in the impugned order. The revisional application is devoid of merit and is therefore dismissed. The plaintiff/opposite party is directed to file the amended plaint, if not already filed, within two weeks from date. The petitioners and other defendants/opposite parties are directed to file the additional written statement within four weeks from the date of service of the copy of the said amended plaint upon them. The time framed herein are peremptory and mandatory. There shall, however, be no order as to costs. Urgent Photostat certified copy of this order, if applied for, be given to the parties on priority basis. LATER After the judgment is delivered the petitioner prayed for stay of the operation of this judgment. The same is considered and rejected.