JUDGMENT K. VENKATARAMAN, J 1. The present application is taken out to reject the election petition. 2. For the sake of convenience, the applicant will be referred as the returned candidate, the first respondent as the election petitioner and the other respondents as per their status in the election petition. 3. The Election petitioner has filed the Election Petition under Section 80-A, 81 to 84 r/w Section 100(1)(b), Section 101 and Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (herein after called as the Act). 4. The said election petition was filed questioning the election of the Returned candidate in the Tamil Nadu Assembly General Elections to 170, Thiruvidai Maruthur SC Assembly Constituency. The election petitioner was the candidate of the AIADMK, whereas the returned candidate belongs to the DMK party. 5. The grounds on which the election petition was filed are set out in paragraph 8 of the election petition. 6. In the ground no.(a) to (c) of the election petition, it is stated as follows: "(a) FIR was registered in Crime No.93/11 dated 09.04.2011 under Section 171E IPC at 11.30 P.M. by the Flying squad for the constituency alleged to have recovered Rs.1400/- from voters Jayalatchumi, Vikayalatchumi, Kanthimathi and Muthulatchumi of Kilaveedi, Thirumanagalakudi. (b) The 1400 Rs. notes and thin numbers were recorded by the Special Squad and signed by the officer also supported by "Dina Malar", "Thinathanthi Tamil Daily" at 09.04.2011 publications; (c) The complaints given to the Squad and authorities of Election Commission stating that each voter was given 200 rupees went unheeded by no action or reply by the Poll Authorities." 7. As regards the seizing of a sum of Rs.1400/-from the voters Jayalatchumi, Vikayalatchumi, Kanthimathi and Muthulatchumi of Kilaveedi, Thirumanagalakudi are concerned and also as regards the allegation regarding the complaints given to the Squad and authorities of Election Commission about the distribution of a sum of Rs.200/- to each of the voters are concerned, unless otherwise the election petitioner comes with a plea that the voters have been paid by the returned candidate or his election agent or by any other person with the consent of the returned candidate or his election agent, he cannot be succeeded in alleging corrupt practice against the returned candidate. In this connection, it would be useful to refer clause (b) of clause (1) of Section 100 of the Act which is usefully reproduced here under: "100. Grounds for declaring election to be void.- [(1) Subject to the provisions of subsection (2), if [the High Court] is of opinion- (a) ..... (b) that any corrupt practice has been committed by a returned candidate or his election agent or by any other person with the consent of a returned candidate or his election agent; or" 8. In the said ground raised by the election petitioner to set at naught the election of the returned candidate, nowhere it has been pleaded that the voters have been paid money by the returned candidate or his election agent or at least with their consent. In view of the above stated position, I am of the considered view that the election petition is liable to be dismissed as regards the filing of the same under Section 100(1)(b) of the Act. Further more, merely because an FIR has been registered against the third parties and money has been recovered from the voters, it may not be a ground to set at naught the election of the returned candidate, unless otherwise it has been pleaded that the corrupt practice has been committed by the returned candidate or his election agent or by any other person with their consent. 9. Hence, the aforesaid grounds raised in the election petition, viz., ground no.(a) to (c) is liable to rejected in limine. 10. The next ground on which the election petition was filed is set out in ground no.(d) and (e) which are reproduced here under: "(d) The respondents 10 and 11 will have to produce this Honourable Court as to why EVS machines in Booth Numbers 21, 27, 87, 102, 120, 138, 170 & 214 were shown as invalid and how it has got repaired by whom when the proof of repairs were not done in the presence of the petitioner and agents. (e) The complaint that control under No.L 12866 in EVM machine in Booth Nos.120 and 136 are one and same and it was not having different numbers. The petitioner still do not know." 11. (e) The complaint that control under No.L 12866 in EVM machine in Booth Nos.120 and 136 are one and same and it was not having different numbers. The petitioner still do not know." 11. Even the said grounds taken in the election petition have to be thrown out at the initial stage itself for the following reasons: (a) No document has been filed before this Court to establish the said allegations. (b) The election petitioner who could have made a complaint at the initial stage itself on the said allegations, failed to make any complaint to the election officer or the returning officer and for the first time he has made such allegation in the election petition. (c) The allegations are vague, without any material facts and material particulars. 12. In this connection, it would be useful to extract Section 83 of the Act. “83. Contents of petition:- (1) An election petition-- (a) shall contain a concise statement of the material facts on which the petitioner relies; (b) shall set forth full particulars of any corrupt practice that the petitioner alleges, including as full a statement as possible of the names of the parties alleged to have committed such corrupt practice and the date and place of the commission of each such practice; and (c) shall be signed by the petitioner and verified in the manner laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) for the verification of pleadings: Provided that where the petitioner alleges any corrupt practice, the petition shall also be accompanied by an affidavit in the prescribed form in support of the allegation of such corrupt practice and the particulars thereof. (2) Any schedule or annexure to the petition shall also be signed by the petitioner and verified in the same manner as the petition." 13. The said provision amply makes it clear that the election petition not only shall contain a concise statement of material facts on which the petitioner relies but also shall set out full particulars of corrupt practice which the election petitioner alleges. In the case on hand, as stated already, the ground no.(d) and (e) are made without any material facts and particulars. A vague allegation made like this cannot be entertained. 14. In the case on hand, as stated already, the ground no.(d) and (e) are made without any material facts and particulars. A vague allegation made like this cannot be entertained. 14. The next ground on which the election petition was filed is set out in ground no.(f) and the same is reproduced here under: "(f) The petitioner alleges manipulation of voting and changes were made to favour the first respondent and AIADMK votes went to DMK under the guise of repairs which will be more than 2000 votes in favour of AIADMK." 15. As regards the said ground is concerned, except saying that the returned candidate had manipulated the voting, no material facts or particulars have been given. Here again, the election petitioner has not complied with the requirements of Section 83 of the Act. As stated already, a vague allegation in this regard will not constitute a reason for filing the election petition and it will constitute a reason for setting aside the election of the returned candidate. 16. The next ground on which the election petition was filed is set out in ground nos.(g) and (h) which are reproduced here under: "(g) The 10th respondent will have to explain why the EVM's Video DVD does not correspond to the tables for which it is meant for example the Table NO.4 Video have to show Table No.4. But DVD shows 10th Table for the concerned booth. The 10th respondent will have to demonstrate the difference. (h) The petitioner alleges manipulation in respect of Booth No.214 when the Control Number is different in form 20." 17. As regards the said grounds are concerned, no corrupt practice has been urged against the returned candidate and only a vague reference about the same has been made. Here again, the election petitioner has not filed the election petition as required under Section 83 of the Act. The petitioner who has to establish the corrupt practice against the returned candidate has made a vague reference about the action of the 10th respondent without any material facts and particulars, which cannot be entertained. The election petitioner has not substantiated the allegations as required under the Act. No documents has been filed to substantiate the allegations made in the election petition. 18. The election petitioner has not substantiated the allegations as required under the Act. No documents has been filed to substantiate the allegations made in the election petition. 18. Further, on a fair reading of the entire election petition, it is evident that there are no fundamental facts or primary facts constituting material facts supported by all particulars, substantiating the allegations made in the election petition. In the absence of such material facts, this Court is of the view that there is no cause of action at all for filing the election petition and hence, it has to be rejected in limine under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC. 19. The election petition has been filed on frivolous grounds and no conscious and unambiguous grounds have been pleaded. The petitioner cannot have the luxury of proceeding with the trial. He cannot require this Court to make a rowing enquiry about the allegations made in the election petition on mere surmises and conjunctions. 20. In (2006) 13 Supreme Court Cases 353 – Sathi Vijay Kumar v. Tota Singh and others, the Hon'ble Apex Court held in paragraphs 33, 34 and 55 as follows:- "33. At the same time, however, it cannot be overlooked that normally a court cannot direct parties as to how they should prepare their pleadings. If the parties have not offended the rules of pleadings by making averments or raising arguable issues, the court would not order striking out pleadings. The power to strike out pleadings is extraordinary in nature and must be exercised by the court sparingly and with extreme care, caution and circumspection (vide Roop Lal Sathi v. Nachattar Singh Gill: K.K.Modi v. K.N.Modi, United Bank of India v. Naresh Kumar)" 34. More than a century back, in Knowles v. Roberts Bowen, L.J. said: "It seems to me that the rule that the Court is not to dictate to parties how they should frame their case, is one that ought always to be preserved sacred. But that rule is, of course, subject to this modification and limitation, that the parties must not offend against the rules of pleading which have been laid down by the law; and if a party introduces a pleading which is unnecessary, and it tends to prejudice, embarrass and delay the trial of the action, it then becomes a pleading which is beyond his right. It is a recognised principle that a defendant may claim ex debito justitiae to have the plaintiff's claim presented in an intelligible form, so that he may not be embarrassed in meeting it; and the Court ought to be strict even to severity in taking care to prevent pleadings from degenerating into the old oppressive pleadings of the Court of Chancery". "55. In our opinion, the High Court was not right in deleting the above para relying on Shiv Charan and Santosh Yadav. Neither of the above cases related to striking out pleadings. What was held by this Court in those cases was that when an election petitioner alleges that there was improper acceptance of nomination paper of some candidate and had the said illegal acceptance been not allowed, the voters would have voted in favour of the petitioner, the burden of proof was on the election petitioner. This Court observed that though it was very difficult for the election petitioner to prove such fact, nonetheless, the onus was on him and he had to discharge it. We are here not at the stage of trial but only at the stage of pleadings. The ratio laid down in the above cases, therefore, in our considered opinion, has no application in the case on hand and the High Court was wrong in invoking the law laid down in the aforesaid decisions." 21. In (2012) 4 Supreme Court Cases 194 – Jitu Patnaik v. Sanatan Mohakud and Others, the Hon'ble Apex Court, in paragraphs 43 to 46, has held as follows:- "43.Order VI Rule 2 of CPC, to the extent it is relevant, reads as under : 2. Pleading to state material facts and not evidence.- (1) Every pleading shall contain, and contain only, a statement in a concise form of the material facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim or defence as the case may be, but not the evidence by which they are to be proved. (2) ... (3) ... 44. Section 83(1)(a) of the 1951 Act is as follows : 83. Contents of petition.-(1) An election petition-(a) shall contain a concise statement of the material facts on which the petitioner relies; 45. A bare perusal of the above provisions would show that the first part of Order VI Rule 2, CPC is similar to clause 1(a) of Section 83 of the 1951 Act. Contents of petition.-(1) An election petition-(a) shall contain a concise statement of the material facts on which the petitioner relies; 45. A bare perusal of the above provisions would show that the first part of Order VI Rule 2, CPC is similar to clause 1(a) of Section 83 of the 1951 Act. It is imperative for an election petition to contain a concise statement of the material facts on which the election petitioner relies. What are material facts? All basic and primary facts which must be proved at the trial by a party to establish the existence of cause of action or defence are material facts. The bare allegations are never treated as material facts. The material facts are such facts which afford a basis for the allegations made in the election petition. The meaning of 'material facts' has been explained by this Court on more than one occasion. Without multiplying the authorities, reference to one of the later decisions of this Court in Virender Nath Gautam v. Satpal Singh and others shall suffice. 46. In Virender Nath Gautam, this Court referred to the case of Philipps v. Philipps and Others and the subsequent decision in Bruce v. Odhams Press Limited that referred to Philipps and observed in paragraphs 34 and 35 (Pg. 629) of the Report as follows: "34. A distinction between 'material facts' and 'particulars', however, must not be overlooked. 'Material facts' are primary or basic facts which must be pleaded by the plaintiff or by the defendant in support of the case set up by him either to prove his cause of action or defence. 'Particulars', on the other hand, are details in support of material facts pleaded by the party. They amplify, refine and embellish material facts by giving distinctive touch to the basic contours of a picture already drawn so as to make it full, more clear and more informative. 'Particulars' thus ensure conduct of fair trial and would not take the opposite party by surprise. 35. All 'material facts' must be pleaded by the party in support of the case set up by him. Since the object and purpose is to enable the opposite party to know the case he has to meet with, in the absence of pleading, a party cannot be allowed to lead evidence. Failure to state even a single material fact, hence, will entail dismissal of the suit or petition. Since the object and purpose is to enable the opposite party to know the case he has to meet with, in the absence of pleading, a party cannot be allowed to lead evidence. Failure to state even a single material fact, hence, will entail dismissal of the suit or petition. Particulars, on the other hand, are the details of the case which is in the nature of evidence a party would be leading at the time of trial." 22. In (2001) 8 Supreme Court Cases 233 – Hari Shanker Jain vs. Sonia Gandhi, the Hon'ble Apex Court in paragraphs 23, 24 and 33 has held as follows:- "23. Section 83(1)(a) of RPA, 1951 mandates that an election petition shall contain a concise statement of the material facts on which the petitioner relies. By a series of decisions of this Court, it is well settled that the material facts required to be stated are those facts which can be considered as materials supporting the allegations made. In other words, they must be such facts as would afford a basis for the allegations made in the petition and would constitute the cause of action as understood in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The expression "cause of action" has been compendiously defined to mean every fact which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of court. Omission of a single material fact leads to an incomplete cause of action and the statement of claim becomes bad. The function of the party is to present as full a picture of the cause of action with such further information in detail as to make the opposite party understand the case he will have to meet. (see Samant N. Balkrishna v. George Fernandez, Jitendra Bahadur Singh v. Krishna Behari.) Merely quoting the words of the section like chanting of a mantra does not amount to stating material facts. Material facts would include positive statement of facts as also positive averment of a negative fact, if necessary. In V.S.Achuthanandan v. P.J.Francis this Court has held, on a conspectus of a series of decisions of this Court, that material facts are such preliminary facts which must be proved at the trial by a party to establish existence of a cause of action. In V.S.Achuthanandan v. P.J.Francis this Court has held, on a conspectus of a series of decisions of this Court, that material facts are such preliminary facts which must be proved at the trial by a party to establish existence of a cause of action. Failure to plead "material facts" is fatal to the election petition and no amendment of the pleadings is permissible to introduce such material facts after the time-limit prescribed for filing the election petition. 24. It is the duty of the court to examine the petition irrespective of any written statement or denial and reject the petition if it does not disclose a cause of action. To enable a court to reject a plaint on the ground that it does not disclose a cause of action, it should look at the plaint and nothing else. Courts have always frowned upon vague pleadings which leave a wide scope to adduce any evidence. No amount of evidence can cure basic defect in the pleadings. 33. Without further burdening this judgment by dealing with each and every other averment made in the two election petitions, it would suffice to say that we have carefully read each of the two election petitions and heard each of the two election petitioners (appellants) in very many details especially on the aspect of the election petitions suffering from the vice of not satisfying the mandatory requirement of pleading material facts as required by Section 82(1)(a) of RPA, 1951 and we are satisfied that the two election petitions do not satisfy the requirement statutorily enacted and judicially explained in umpteen number of decisions. The petitions are hopelessly vague and completely bald in the allegations made, most of which could not possibly be within the personal knowledge of the petitioners but still verified as "true" to their knowledge, without indicating the source. Such pleadings cannot amount to disclosing any cause of action and are required to be rejected/dismissed under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC." 23. Thus, the provisions of the Representation of the People Act and the dictum laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court makes it clear that the election petition shall contain a concise statement of material facts on which the election petitioner relies and also the material particulars. If material facts and particulars are not found, the election petition shall be dismissed. 24. If material facts and particulars are not found, the election petition shall be dismissed. 24. Therefore, considering the totality of the circumstances referred to above, I am of the considered view that the election petitioner has not made out any prima facie case against the returned candidate and the election petition that has been filed by the election petitioner on presumption and surmises cannot be entertained by this Court. The election petitioner has filed the election petition in a lethargic manner without taking serious note of the provisions of the Act. 25. Hence, the application filed by the returned candidate in O.A.No.727 of 2012 to reject the election petition is liable to be allowed and accordingly allowed. Though exemplary costs has to be awarded for filing such an Election Petition, this Court refrains from imposing heavy costs on the election petitioner.