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2012 DIGILAW 4607 (MAD)

New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. G. Selvi

2012-11-06

M.VENUGOPAL

body2012
JUDGMENT : M. Venugopal, J. Appellant-respondent No. 2 (Insurance Company) has projected the instant civil miscellaneous appeal as against the award in M.C.O.P. No. 94 of 2011 dated 1.8.2011 passed by the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court), Vellore (Claims Tribunal). 2. The learned Additional District and Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court), Vellore (Claims Tribunal), while passing the award on 1.8.2011 in M.C.O.P. No. 94 of 2011 has, inter alia, observed that the petitioners have proved the case by letting in oral evidence and through Exhs. PI, P3 and P4. Though the respondent has stated that the deceased had invited the accident by crossing the road unmindful of the vehicular movement, there is no contra evidence on the side of the respondent to disprove the petitioners' case and resultantly, held that the accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the driver of the lorry owned by the respondent No. 1 bearing registration No. TN 23-AB 7719. 3. Further, it is also observed that the respondent No. 1, who is the owner of the offending vehicle, is vicariously liable for the negligent act of his driver. The said vehicle was insured with the respondent No. 2, which is evident from Exh. P8 and, consequently, held the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 liable to compensate the petitioners. 4. Moreover, it awarded Rs. 5,67,000/- as total compensation payable by appellant-respondent No. 2 (Insurance Company) to the respondent Nos. 1 to 3-claimants together with interest at 7.5 per cent per annum from the date of filing of the petition till the date of deposit. A sum of Rs. 12,670/- has been fixed as Advocate's fee. 5. Being dissatisfied with the award and decree in M.C.O.P. No. 94 of 2011 passed by the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court), Vellore (Claims Tribunal), the appellant-respondent No. 2 (Insurance Company), as an aggrieved person, has focused the present civil miscellaneous appeal before this Court. 6. Before the Claims Tribunal, during the trial of M.C.O.P. No. 94 of 2011, on behalf of respondent Nos. 1 to 3-claimants, witnesses PW 1 and PW 2 have been examined and Exhs. PI to P8 have been marked. On the side of the respondents (in claim petition), including the appellant Insurance Company, no one has been examined as a witness and no document has been marked. 7. 1 to 3-claimants, witnesses PW 1 and PW 2 have been examined and Exhs. PI to P8 have been marked. On the side of the respondents (in claim petition), including the appellant Insurance Company, no one has been examined as a witness and no document has been marked. 7. The points that arise for determination in this civil miscellaneous appeal are: (1) Whether the accident took place because of rash and negligent driving of the lorry bearing registration No. TN 23-AB 7719, by its driver? (2) Whether the respondent Nos. 1 to 3-claimants are dependents of the deceased (brother Baskaran)? (3) Whether the respondent Nos. 1 to 3-claimants are entitled to claim a sum of Rs. 30,00,000/- as compensation from the respondent No. 4-respondent No. 1 and the appellant-respondent No. 2 (Insurance Company) jointly and severally, along with interest at 18 per cent per annum from the date of accident till the date of payment? Contentions, discussions and findings on point No. 1: 8. It is the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant-respondent No. 2 (Insurance Company) that the Tribunal had erred in coming to the conclusion that the accident took place because of rash and negligent driving of the offending lorry driver bearing registration No. TN 23-AB 7719. 9. Learned Counsel for the appellant-respondent No. 2 (Insurance Company) urges before this Court that the Tribunal failed to appreciate the fact that the accident was only due to gross negligence of the deceased, who suddenly crossed the busy road unmindful of traffic. 10. Adding further, learned Counsel for the appellant-respondent No. 2 (Insurance Company) submits that the Tribunal should have held that there was gross and total contributory negligence on the part of the deceased, who suddenly crossed the busy road and, as such, ought to have apportioned the negligence between the deceased and the driver of the lorry suitably. 11. Per contra, it is the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent Nos. 1 to 3-claimants that the Tribunal had analysed the oral evidence of PW 1 and PW 2 coupled with Exhs. 11. Per contra, it is the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent Nos. 1 to 3-claimants that the Tribunal had analysed the oral evidence of PW 1 and PW 2 coupled with Exhs. PI, P3 and P4 (Xerox copy of the F.I.R., Xerox copy of MVI Report and photocopy of the charge-sheet) and came to the right conclusion that the accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending lorry owned by respondent No. 4-respondent No. 1 and the same need not be disturbed by this Court, in the absence of any contra evidence on the side of the appellant-respondent No. 2 (Insurance Company) to disprove the case projected by the respondent Nos. 1 to 3-claimants. 12. It is the evidence of PW 1 that the deceased brother on 17.11.2007 at about 9.45 p.m. was standing on the northern side of the Chennai-Bangalore National Highway near Sathuvacheri Bus Stand opposite to Coffee Bar, for the purpose of purchasing medicine, with a view to proceed to RTO road and at that time, the lorry bearing registration No. TN 23-AB 7719 came from Chennai-Vellore in a fast speed driven by its driver negligently and without sounding horn and dashed against him, as a result of which he suffered serious injuries on the head, ear, nose and mouth besides blood came out from his mouth and also he sustained severe injuries on the body. Immediately, he was taken to Vellore CMC Hospital and on examination, the doctor found that he had expired. 13. It is seen from F.I.R., Exh. P1, that in Sathuvacheri Police Station, Crime No. 395 of 2007, a criminal case under Sections 279 and 304A, Indian Penal Code, was registered on 17.11.2007 at 2300 hours against the driver of the lorry bearing registration No. TN 23AB 7719, based on the complaint of PW 2 (Raman). Exh. P2 is the post-mortem certificate dated 18.11.2007 in respect of the deceased Baskaran (aged 40 years), doctor in the report had opined that 'the deceased would appear to have died of consequences of the head injury sustained'. Exh. P3 is the Motor Vehicles Inspector's (Grade-I), Vellore, report dated 18.11.2007, wherein the Inspector had opined that the accident was not due to any mechanical defect of the vehicle. Exh. P4 is the charge-sheet laid against the offending lorry driver (Saravanan). Exh. P3 is the Motor Vehicles Inspector's (Grade-I), Vellore, report dated 18.11.2007, wherein the Inspector had opined that the accident was not due to any mechanical defect of the vehicle. Exh. P4 is the charge-sheet laid against the offending lorry driver (Saravanan). The charge-sheet was taken on the file by the learned Judicial Magistrate No. V. Vellore in C.C. No. 9 of 2008, under Sections 279 and 304A of Indian Penal Code. 14. The evidence of PW 2 (eye-witness) is to the effect that he had seen the occurrence on 17.11.2007 at about 9.40 p.m., when his brother Baskaran, near the Sathuvacheri Bus Stop at Chennai-Bangalore National Highway opposite to famous Coffee Bar, was attempting to cross the main road from northern side to southern side for the purpose of purchasing medicine, with a view to proceed to RTO road and at that time, one lorry bearing registration No. TN 23AB 7719 coming from hennai-Vellore on the same road being driven by its driver in a fast speed, rashly and without sounding horn and resultantly, dashed against his brother, who was walking. After seeing the incident, he along with Srinivasan and nearby people raised an alarm and ran towards Baskaran and lifted him and helped in taking him to Vellore Hospital. 15. The evidence of PW 2 (eyewitness) to the occurrence was natural, cogent, coherent and convincing in regard to the happening/manner of occurrence. His evidence was worthy of credence. As such, this Court accepts his evidence in regard to the happening of occurrence. To put it briefly, PW-2's (eyewitness) evidence was unshakable. Significantly, there was no rebuttal or contra evidence let in on the side of the appellant Insurance Company or by the respondent No. 4-respondent No. 1 (owner of the vehicle) to disprove/negate the stand taken by respondent-claimants. Therefore, this Court unhesitatingly comes to an inevitable conclusion that the accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the driver of offending lorry bearing registration No. TN 23-AB 7719 and, accordingly; the point No. 1 is so answered against the appellant-respondent No. 2 (Insurance Company). Contentions, discussions and findings on point Nos. 2 and 3: 16. The respondent Nos. 1 to 3-claimants in their claim petition had claimed a total compensation of Rs. 30,00,000 (Rs. Contentions, discussions and findings on point Nos. 2 and 3: 16. The respondent Nos. 1 to 3-claimants in their claim petition had claimed a total compensation of Rs. 30,00,000 (Rs. thirty lakh) from respondent No. 4-respondent No. 1 and the appellant-respondent No. 2 (Insurance Company) together with interest at the rate of 18 per cent per annum from the date of accident till the date of payment. In the claim petition, it was averred that the deceased Baskaran was working as air Auto Consultant and Real Estate Broker and earned Rs. 30,000 per month. According to the petitioners, they were dependent on the income of the deceased alone. Due to sudden demise of the deceased, their future was doomed. 17. Further, the deceased Baskaran spent his entire income on the respondent Nos. 1 to 3-claimants' family alone. The appellant-respondent No. 2 (Insurance Company) being the insurer of the offending lorry bearing registration No. TN 23-AB 7719 owned by respondent No. 4-respondent No. 1 are liable to pay the claimed compensation to the respondent Nos. 1 to 3-claimants along with interest at the rate of 18 per cent per annum from the date of filing of the petition till the date of deposit. 18. In the claim petition, it is mentioned that deceased Baskaran was aged 37 years at the time of his death. His occupation was Auto Consultant and Real Estate Broker and address of the employer was mentioned as Auto Consultancy. The appellant-respondent No. 2 (Insurance Company) in their counter to the claim petition had denied the age, occupation and monthly income of the deceased Baskaran and further, they pleaded that the amount of compensation claimed was an excessive one which has no basis. 19. The prime contention advanced by learned Counsel for appellant Insurance Company is that the respondent Nos. 1 to 3-claimants were not dependents of the deceased and as such, the claim petition filed by them before the Tribunal was not per se maintainable in law. 20. To lend support to the contention that the respondent Nos.-l to 3-claimants are all married sister and brothers, who have their separate families and they were not dependents of the deceased (Baskaran), learned Counsel for appellant-respondent No. 2 (Insurance Company) cites the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Hafizun Begum v. Md. 20. To lend support to the contention that the respondent Nos.-l to 3-claimants are all married sister and brothers, who have their separate families and they were not dependents of the deceased (Baskaran), learned Counsel for appellant-respondent No. 2 (Insurance Company) cites the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Hafizun Begum v. Md. Ikram Hetjue, VII (2007) SLT 151, wherein it is held that "the Tribunal, as per Section 168 of Motor Vehicles Act, has a duty to make award, determine amount of compensation which is just and proper and specified person or persons to whom such compensation would be paid and that, the latter part relates to entitlement of compensation by a person who claims for same". 21. Further, it is observed that under Section 2(11) of Civil Procedure Code, definition of 'legal representative' is inclusive in character and its scope is wide and not confined to legal heir only and instead, it stipulates that a person, who may or may not be a legal heir, competent to inherit property of deceased, can represent estate of deceased person. Moreover, it includes heirs as well as persons who represent estate even without title either as executors or administrators in possession of estate of the deceased and further that, all such persons covered by expression 'legal representative' have a right to file a claim petition to be considered in the background of right to entitlement. 22. He also cites the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Manjuri Bera v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., 2007 ACJ 1279 (SC). In paras 14 and 16, it is observed as under: "(14) There are several factors which have to be noted. The liability under Section 140 of the Act does not cease because there is absence of dependency. The right to file a claim application has to be considered in the background of right to entitlement. While assessing the quantum the multiplier system is applied because of deprivation of dependency. In other words, multiplier is a measure. There are three stages while assessing the question of entitlement. Firstly, the liability of the person who is liable and the person who is to indemnify the liability, if any. Next is the quantification and Section 166 is primarily in the nature of recovery proceedings. As noted above, the liability in terms of Section 140 of the Act does not cease because of absence of dependency. Firstly, the liability of the person who is liable and the person who is to indemnify the liability, if any. Next is the quantification and Section 166 is primarily in the nature of recovery proceedings. As noted above, the liability in terms of Section 140 of the Act does not cease because of absence of dependency. (16) Judged in that background where a legal representative, who is not dependent, files an application for compensation, the quantum cannot be less than the liability referable in Section 140 of the Act. Therefore, even if there is no loss of dependency, the claimant if he or she is a legal representative will be entitled to compensation, the quantum of which shall be not less than the liability flowing from Section 140 of the Act. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent. There will be no order as to costs. We record our appreciation for the able assistance rendered by Mr. Jayant Bhushan, the learned amicus curiae." 23. In tire aforesaid decision at para 21, pages 1283 and 1284, it is observed as follows: "(21) ...'no fault liability', envisaged in Section 140 of the said Act, is distinguished from the rule of 'strict liability'. In the former, the compensation amount is fixed. It is Rs. 50,000 in cases of death [Section 140 (2)]. It is a statutory liability. It is an amount which can be deducted from the final amount awarded by Claims Tribunal. Since the amount is a fixed amount/crystallized amount, the same has to be considered as part of the estate of the deceased. In the present case, the deceased was an earning member. The statutory compensation could constitute part of his estate. His legal representative, namely, his daughter has inherited his estate. She was entitled to inherit his estate. In the circumstances, she was entitled to receive compensation under 'no fault liability' in terms of Section 140 of the said Act. My opinion is confined only to the 'no fault liability' under Section 140 of the said Act. That section is a code by itself within the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988." 24. Learned Counsel for the appellant-respondent No. 2 cites the decision of this Court in G. Deivasigamani v. Metropolitan Trans. Corpn. My opinion is confined only to the 'no fault liability' under Section 140 of the said Act. That section is a code by itself within the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988." 24. Learned Counsel for the appellant-respondent No. 2 cites the decision of this Court in G. Deivasigamani v. Metropolitan Trans. Corpn. Ltd., 2008 (1) MLJ 1107 , wherein it is observed as follows: "The liability under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 does not cease because there is absence of dependency and the brothers and sisters of the deceased would be entitled to receive compensation only under 'no fault liability' in terms of Section 140 of the Act." 25. Repelling the contention of learned Counsel for the appellant-respondent No. 2 (Insurance Company), the learned Counsel for the respondent Nos. 1 to 3-claimants cites the Division Bench judgment of this Court in Sarayu v. Surendra Vithal Nazare, 2012 ACJ 1230 (Madras), in which it is held as follows: "(12) The words 'legal representative' as defined in Section 2(11) of the Civil Procedure Code mean a person who in law represents the estate of a deceased person, and includes any person who intermeddles with the estate of the deceased and where a party sues or is sued in a representative character the person on whom the estate devolves on the death of the party so suing or sued. (15) We are, therefore, of the considered opinion that the Tribunal has committed grave error of law in holding that the parents of the deceased are not the legal representatives of the deceased to claim compensation amount as dependents. The Tribunal further committed serious illegality in holding that the appellant No. 1 who was the wife of the deceased is also not entitled to any compensation for the reason that after the death of the deceased she remarried her husband's brother. In our view all the claimant-appellants are entitled to compensation on account of death of the deceased in a car accident." 26. He also places reliance on the decision of this Court in Managing Director, Tamil Nadu State Trans. Corpn. In our view all the claimant-appellants are entitled to compensation on account of death of the deceased in a car accident." 26. He also places reliance on the decision of this Court in Managing Director, Tamil Nadu State Trans. Corpn. Ltd. v. M. Shanthi, 2010 (5) MLJ 1039 , and at page 1040 it is held thus: "A claim petition made by a married son or daughter, in the absence of any other Class-I heir, is maintainable if the claimants adduce evidence that they are the legal representatives and that the deceased during his lifetime had contributed a portion of his income to them." 27. At this stage, this Court worth recalls the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Gujarat State Road, Trans. Corpn. v. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai, I (1987) ACC 475 (SC)=1987 ACJ 561 (SC), wherein it is held as follows: "(10)...The expression 'legal representative' has not been defined in the Act. However, a legal representative ordinarily means a person who in law represents the estate of a deceased person or a person on whom the estate devolves on the death of an individual. The proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 110A of the Motor Vehicles Act appears to be of some significance. It provides that the application for compensation shall be made on behalf of or for the benefit of all the legal representatives of the deceased. Section 110-A(1) thus expressly states that (i) an application for compensation may be made by the legal representatives of the deceased or their agent, and (ii) that such application shall be made on behalf of or for the benefit of all the legal representatives. Both the person or persons who can make an application for compensation and the persons for whose benefit such application can be made are, thus, indicated in Section 110A. This Section in a way is a substitute to the extent indicated above for the provisions of Section 1A of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 which provides that 'every such action or suit shall be for the benefit of the wife, husband, parent and child, if any, of the person whose death shall have been so caused, and shall be brought by and in the name of the executor, administrator or representative of the person deceased'. While the Fatal Accidents Act provides that such suit shall be for the benefit of the wife, husband, parent and child of the deceased, Section 110A(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act says that the application shall be made on behalf of or for the benefit of the legal representatives of the deceased. A legal representative in a given case need not necessarily be a wife, husband, parent and child. It is further seen from Section 110B that the Claims Tribunal is authorised to make an award determining the amount of compensation which appears to it to be just and specifying the person or persons to whom compensation shall be paid. This provision takes the place of the third para of Section 1A of the Fatal Accidents Act which provides that in every such action, the Court may give such damages as it may think proportioned to the loss resulting from such death to the parties respectively, for whom and for whose benefit such action shall be brought. Persons for whose benefit such an application can be made and the manner in which the compensation awarded may be distributed amongst the persons for whose benefit the application is made are dealt with by Section 110A and Section 110B and to that extent provisions of the Act do supersede the provisions of the Fatal Accidents Act insofar as motor vehicle accidents are concerned. These provisions are not merely procedural provisions. They substantively affect the rights of the parties. As the right of action created by the Fatal Accidents Act was 'new in its species, new in its quality, new in its principles, in every way new', the right given to the legal representatives under the Motor Vehicles Act to file an application for compensation for death due to a motor vehicle accident is equally new and an enlarged one. This new right cannot be hedged in by all the limitations of an action under the Fatal Accidents Act. New situations and new dangers require new strategies and new remedies." 28. This new right cannot be hedged in by all the limitations of an action under the Fatal Accidents Act. New situations and new dangers require new strategies and new remedies." 28. Further, this Court aptly points out the following decisions to prevent an aberration of justice and to promote substantial cause of justice: (a) In the decision of Jamna Devi v. Union of India, II (1993) ACC 407 (DB)=1995 ACJ 94 (P&H), at page 95 in para 5, whereby and where under, it is observed as follows- "(5) There is no challenge to the findings recorded by the Tribunal under issue No. 1. The only contention raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is that the claimant is entitled to more compensation than the one awarded by the Tribunal and affirmed by the learned Single Judge. As already noticed, the deceased was a bachelor and aged about 22 years at the time of accident and he was drawing a salary of Rs. 841 per month. He was living with his mother who is claimant herein. His minor brother and a minor sister were also living with the deceased. There is no quarrel with the proposition of law that a brother or a sister in the presence of mother is not entitled to compensation on account of the death of their brother even if they are dependent upon him. This matter stands concluded by a decision of this Court in Hans Raj v. Neelam Chopra, 1986 ACJ 152 (P&H)." (b) In the decision of Latif Ahmad Khan v. U.P. State Road Trans. Corpn., II (1995) ACC 260 (DB)= 1995 ACJ 1241 (Allahabad), at para 4, it is observed as under- "(4) As regards the brothers and sisters of the two deceased, there is no doubt that they are legal representatives of the deceased persons. However, not a word has been breathed in evidence about the loss sustained by them. Corpn., II (1995) ACC 260 (DB)= 1995 ACJ 1241 (Allahabad), at para 4, it is observed as under- "(4) As regards the brothers and sisters of the two deceased, there is no doubt that they are legal representatives of the deceased persons. However, not a word has been breathed in evidence about the loss sustained by them. Though legal representatives are entitled to compensation, in the absence of materials in the present case, we are not able to award any compensation to them and affirm the award of the Tribunal in this respect." (c) In the decision of Kumudini Das v. Raj at Kumar Baliar Singh, 1996 ACJ 1182 (Orissa), and at pages 1184 and 1185, in para 7, it is observed as follows- "(7) Before proceeding further, the question whether or not a brother and sister of the deceased are 'legal representatives' within the meaning of Section 110A of the Motor Vehicles Act may be considered. The expression 'legal representative' has not been defined in the Motor Vehicles Act and indeed, there are divergent views of the High Courts as to whether or not the expression 'legal representative' includes brothers and sisters of the deceased. While some High Courts have held in the affirmative, others by making a reference to Section 1A of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855, which lays down that the suit for compensation may be filed by family of a person for the loss occasioned to it by his death by actionable wrong for the benefit of the wife, husband, parents and children of a person, whose death has been so caused, have held in the negative. No doubt in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Bhramar Rout, 1987 ACJ 1020 (Orissa), it has been held that the brothers and sisters of the deceased are not covered by the expression 'legal representative' in Section 110A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. But this decision which was delivered on 12.2.1987 is not binding in view of the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Gujarat State Road Trans. Corpn. v. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai, 1987 ACJ 561 (SC). But this decision which was delivered on 12.2.1987 is not binding in view of the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Gujarat State Road Trans. Corpn. v. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai, 1987 ACJ 561 (SC). The Apex Court in this case considered the scheme and object of Section 110A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, Sections 1A and 2 of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 and also the report of the Law Commission of India and concluded that Parliament intended that the expression 'legal representative' in Section 110A of Motor Vehicles Act should be given a wider meaning and that it should not be confined to the spouse, parents and children of the deceased. In para 12 of the judgment, the Supreme Court observed- '(12) ...Every legal representative who suffers on account of the death of a person due to a motor vehicle accident should have a remedy for realisation of compensation and that is provided by Sections 110A to 110F of the Act. These provisions are in consonance with the principles of Law of Torts that every injury must have a remedy. It is for Motor Accident Claims Tribunal to determine the compensation which appears to it to be just as provided in Section 110B of the Act and to specify the person or persons to whom i compensation shall be paid. The determination of the compensation payable and its apportionment as required by Section 11 OB of the Act amongst the legal representatives for whose benefit an application may be filed under Section 110A of the Act have to be done in accordance with well-known principles of law. We should remember that in an Indian family brothers, sisters and brothers' children and sometimes foster children live together and they are dependent upon the breadwinner of the family and if the breadwinner is killed on account of a motor vehicle accident, there is no justification to deny them compensation relying upon the provisions of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855, which, as we have already held, has been substantially modified by the provisions contained in the Act in relation to cases arising out of motor vehicle accidents. We express our approval of the decision in Megjibhai Khimji Vira v. Chaturbhai Taljabhai, 1977 ACJ 253 (Gujarat) and hold that the brother of a person, who died in a motor vehicle accident, is entitled to maintain a petition under Section 110A of the Act if he is a legal representative of the deceased.' In view of the above, the contention raised by the learned Counsel for tine insurer that the brothers and sisters of the deceased are not legal representatives within the meaning of Section 110A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, is to be overruled." (d) In the decision of Champa Sharma v. HP. State Electricity Board, 1999 ACJ 883 (HP), in para 15, it is observed thus- "(15) Be it stated that even though the claimant Champa Sharma may not be financially dependent on the deceased in view of her independent source of income, she being the widow of the deceased is his natural legal heir and there has been a loss of estate to her consequent upon the death of her husband. Being a natural legal heir, she is entitled to claim compensation for the death of her husband." (e) In the decision of Mati Bai v. South Eastern Coal Fields Ltd., 2001 ACJ 209 (MP), in para 9, it is held as follows: "(9) It must be seen that the expression 'legal representative' has not been defined in the Motor Vehicles Act. But there is no reason to give it a restricted meaning as was done under the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855. As observed by Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Gujarat State Road Trans. Corpn. v. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai, 1987 ACJ 561 (SC), in Indian society brothers, sisters and brother's children, etc., live together and they are dependent on the breadwinner of the family. There is no justification to deny them compensation. Following the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court, we hold that Mati Bai had an independent right to claim compensation. But in this case, she came to be substituted as an heir to the original claimant Bhikha Ram and in that capacity too is entitled to receive compensation. There is no justification to deny them compensation. Following the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court, we hold that Mati Bai had an independent right to claim compensation. But in this case, she came to be substituted as an heir to the original claimant Bhikha Ram and in that capacity too is entitled to receive compensation. The objection that she had no locus standi, has no force and is dismissed." (f) In the decision of Shaik Lalbi v. M. Balakrishnan, I (2009) ACC 180= 2009 ACJ 498 (AP), at pages 502 and 503, in para 18, it is held that "the view taken by the Tribunal that the claimants would not fall within the meaning of dependents cannot be a sustainable view and accordingly, the same is hereby set aside and this appeal is allowed to the extent of Rs. 50,000 under no fault liability at interest of 9 per cent per annum". 29. At this stage, this Court deems it appropriate to cite the decision in Mercy v. Aisha Ummal, 1987 (2) KLT 166 , wherein it is laid down as follows: "Legal heirs may be legal representatives but not always. Legal heirs are persons entitled to inherit the surviving estate of the deceased. Legal representatives as defined in Section 2(11) of the Civil Procedure Code are persons who in law represent the estate of a deceased person and includes any person who intermeddles with the estate of the deceased and where a party sues or is sued in a representative character the person on whom the estate devolves on the death of the party so suing or sued. If the deceased defendant had no right over the property against which relief is claimed and title was with his heirs or strangers even before suit, these persons cannot be brought on record as legal representatives of the deceased because they are not persons representing the estate of the deceased. Even if they are legal heirs of the deceased they are persons getting the estate not under the deceased but on independent claim of their own and they are not persons representing the estate of the deceased. Even if they are legal heirs of the deceased they are persons getting the estate not under the deceased but on independent claim of their own and they are not persons representing the estate of the deceased. In such a case where the deceased defendant had no right over the estate sued, the right to sue does not survive and there is no question of anybody being impleaded as his legal representative because nobody could represent the estate under him." 30. It is true that the term 'legal representative' has not been defined under the Motor Vehicles Act. But, in the decision of Hon'ble Apex Court in Gujarat State Road Trans. Corpn. v. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai, 1987 ACJ 561 (SC), it is observed that, "In Indian society brothers, sisters and brothers' children, etc., live together and they are dependent upon the breadwinner of the family". 31. The term 'legal representative' as per Section 2(11) of Civil Procedure Code means a person who in law represents the estate of a deceased person, and includes any person, who intermeddles with the estate of the deceased and where a party sues or is sued in a representative character the person on whom the estate devolves on the death of the party so suing or sued. 32. In short, the definition of 'legal representative' is inclusive in character and its scope is very wide. It is not limited to legal heirs only. It specifies any individual who may or may not be an heir if he/she is competent to inherit the property of the deceased, but he should represent the estate of the deceased person. It includes heirs, those in possession bona fide, without there being any fraud or collusion and are entitled to represent the estate. 33. It is to be borne in mind that Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, deals with intestate (Succession to a male. Class I heirs contains a list of 12 persons like son, daughter, widow mother, son of a pre-deceased daughter; daughter of a pre-deceased son, etc. 34. The Class II heirs are: I. Father II. (1) Son's daughter's son (2) son's daughter's daughter (3) brother (4) sister. III. (1) Daughter's son's son (2) daughter's son's daughter (3) daughter's daughter's son (4) daughter's daughter's daughter IV. (1) Brother's son (2) sister's son (3) brother's daughter (4) sister's daughter V. Father's father father's mother VI. 34. The Class II heirs are: I. Father II. (1) Son's daughter's son (2) son's daughter's daughter (3) brother (4) sister. III. (1) Daughter's son's son (2) daughter's son's daughter (3) daughter's daughter's son (4) daughter's daughter's daughter IV. (1) Brother's son (2) sister's son (3) brother's daughter (4) sister's daughter V. Father's father father's mother VI. Father's widow brother's widow VII. Father's brother father's sister VIII. Mother's father mother's mother IX. Mother's brother mother's sister Explanation-In this Schedule, references to a brother or sister do not include references to a brother or sister by uterine blood. 35. It is not out of place for this Court to point out that the parents of the deceased (Baskaran) are not alive and, as such, the respondent Nos. 1 to 3-claimants are the heirs/legal representatives of the deceased brother (Baskaran) and their filing of the claim petition M.C.O.P. No. 94 of 2011 is just and legally valid in law. 36. Under Hindu Law, Class II heirs get only in the absence of any one of the Class I heirs. Under the present Hindu Succession Act a sister ranks equally with the brother. Therefore, the respondent Nos. 1 to 3-claimants, sister and brothers of the deceased are no doubt Class II heirs as per Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and legal representatives of the deceased. As such, this Court holds that they are entitled to file claim petition in M.C.O.P. No. 94 of 2011 on the file of the Tribunal since they come within the purview and ambit of the term 'legal representative' as per Sections 166/ 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act, the said petition filed by them claiming compensation is perfectly legal. Moreover, the deceased was a bachelor and left no other heirs/legal representatives other than the respondent Nos. 1 to 3-claimants, as informed by the learned Counsel for the respondent Nos. 1 to 3-claimants. Viewed in that perspective, the point No. 2 is answered in favour of the respondent Nos. 1 to 3-claimants. 37. PW 1 (sister of the deceased) in her evidence had deposed that the deceased Baskaran died as a bachelor and the deceased Baskaran resided with them and that she had produced the family card to show the age of the deceased Baskaran and that she had not filed any document to show the income earned by the deceased brother. 37. PW 1 (sister of the deceased) in her evidence had deposed that the deceased Baskaran died as a bachelor and the deceased Baskaran resided with them and that she had produced the family card to show the age of the deceased Baskaran and that she had not filed any document to show the income earned by the deceased brother. Further, she had denied the suggestion that they were not dependent on the income of the deceased brother. 38. PW 2 (eye-witness) in his evidence had deposed that the brothers of the deceased Baskaran are earning a sum of Rs. 6,000 per month. 39. In photocopy of the family ration card, Exh. P6, the name of the deceased brother is mentioned as M. Baskaran, aged 34 years. In post-mortem certificate, Exh. P2, the age of the deceased is mentioned as 40 years. In the claim petition, the respondent Nos. 1 to 3-claimants have stated that at the time of death, the deceased was 37 years. 40. The Tribunal, based on the post-mortem certificate, Exh. P2, had determined the age of the deceased Baskaran at the time of accident as 40 years and it applied the multiplier of 15'. It fixed the monthly income of the deceased at Rs. 4,500. It deducted a sum of Rs. 1,500 towards personal expenses of the deceased. It has taken into consideration, the dependency at Rs. 3,000 per month (viz., 2/3rd). Accordingly, it fixed the compensation amount for the loss of income (Rs. 3,000 x 12 x 15 = Rs. 5,40,000). It awarded a sum of Rs. 25,000 for loss of love and affection and for loss to estate. It awarded Rs. 2,000 towards funeral expenses. In aggregate, it awarded a sum of Rs. 5,67,000 as compensation payable by the appellant-respondent No. 2 (Insurance Company) and the respondent No. 4-respondent No. 1 jointly and severally to the respondent Nos. 1 to 3-claimants together with interest at 7.5 per cent per annum from the date of filing of the petition till the date of deposit. 41. It is the evidence of PW 1 (sister of the deceased) that her deceased brother, during his lifetime prior to the accident, worked as Auto Consultant and Real Estate Broker and earned a monthly income of Rs. 41. It is the evidence of PW 1 (sister of the deceased) that her deceased brother, during his lifetime prior to the accident, worked as Auto Consultant and Real Estate Broker and earned a monthly income of Rs. 30,000 and further that, their family were depending upon his income and after her brother's demise, since there was no income, they were finding it difficult for their daily sustenance. Indeed, PW 1 had not breathed in her evidence as to the monthly amount contributed by the deceased brother to their family during his lifetime. No salary certificate was produced on the side of the respondent Nos. 1 to 3-claimants before the Tribunal as to the monthly income derived by the deceased. Although the appellant-respondent No. 2 (Insurance Company) had disputed about the monthly income and occupation of the deceased and further, they disputed that respondent Nos. 1 to 3 were dependents of the deceased, yet, no one witness was examined on their side to adduce any rebuttal evidence to displace the claim made by respondent Nos. 1 to 3-claimants. Moreover, in this regard no acceptable documentary proof was also produced on the side of the appellant-respondent No. 2 (Insurance Company). 42. The ipse dixit evidence of PW 1 (sister of the deceased) that they were depending upon his monthly income of Rs. 30,000, etc. is not sufficient on record to prove that they were depending on his income. Irrespective of the fact, whether they are dependants or not, the respondent Nos. 1 to 3-claimants are heirs/legal representatives of the deceased representing his surviving estate and hence, they are entitled to claim the compensation, as opined by this Court. 43. In the absence of any satisfactory and acceptable evidence being let in on the side of the appellant-respondent No. 2 (Insurance Company), this Court comes to an inevitable conclusion that in any event the deceased (Baskaran) certainly would have been in a better and good position to effect a net saving from Iris income (since he was unmarried and remained as a bachelor), after maintaining himself and this would make an accretion from his income. Because of his untimely, unfortunate death, there had occasioned a loss of such accretion which, in the eye of law, would be construed as a loss to the estate. 44. The term 'estate' includes every interest in property, person, expectant or future, whether vested or contingent. Because of his untimely, unfortunate death, there had occasioned a loss of such accretion which, in the eye of law, would be construed as a loss to the estate. 44. The term 'estate' includes every interest in property, person, expectant or future, whether vested or contingent. In fact Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, enjoins that 'loss to estate' is not covered by exception specified in the section. In the present case, the respondent Nos. 1 to 3-claimants who are heirs/legal representatives had inherited the estate of the deceased (Baskaran). The Tribunal had rightly determined the monthly income of the deceased Baskaran at Rs. 4,500 in the absence of proof of his monthly income of Rs. 30,000 as alleged by the respondent Nos. 1 to 3-claimants. It had rightly deducted 1/3rd sum of Rs. 1,500 for personal expenses of the deceased. Even though it had determined the monthly dependency at Rs. 3,000, this Court opines that the said sum could rightly be taken towards loss to estate/economic loss and per year the same works out to Rs. 3,000 x 12 = Rs. 36,000. Since the deceased (Baskaran) was aged 40 years at the time of his death as per postmortem certificate, Exh. P2, it would be safe for this Court to adopt a multiplier of 15' (inasmuch as the Second Schedule under Section 163A of Motor Vehicles Act prescribes a multiplier of 15' to be adopted for a person who died above the age of 40 years but not exceeding 45 years). Applying the said multiplier of 15', the economic loss/loss to estate would be computed at a sum of Rs. 5,40,000 (Rs. 36,000 x 15 = Rs. 5,40,000). Towards loss of love and affection and towards loss to estate, in these two heads, the Tribunal had awarded a sum of Rs. 25,000 and towards funeral expenses, it awarded a sum of Rs. 2,000, which are found just and reasonable by this Court and hence, they are sustained. Thus, in all, this Court awards a sum of Rs. 5,67,000 as compensation payable by the appellant-respondent No. 2 (Insurance Company) (as an insurer of the offending vehicle) to the respondent Nos. 1 to 3-claimants together with interest at 7.5 per cent per annum from the date of filing of the petition till the date of deposit. Thus, in all, this Court awards a sum of Rs. 5,67,000 as compensation payable by the appellant-respondent No. 2 (Insurance Company) (as an insurer of the offending vehicle) to the respondent Nos. 1 to 3-claimants together with interest at 7.5 per cent per annum from the date of filing of the petition till the date of deposit. To put it briefly, there is no impropriety or illegality in the award passed by the Claims Tribunal. Per contra, the same is legal and valid in law. The lawyer's fee fixed by the Tribunal at Rs. 12,670 is left undisturbed by this Court. Accordingly, the point No. 3 is so answered. Consequently, the civil miscellaneous appeal fails. 45. It is an axiomatic principle in law that while awarding just compensation neither sentiments nor emotions or misplaced sympathy play an operative role. In fixing the quantum of compensation to be awarded to the kith and kin of the deceased, etc., there is likelihood of margin of error. Certain guesswork is permissible in regard to the calculation of amount and to a certain extent the exercising of conjecture is permissible, yet, dispassionate determination of compensation with mathematical precision/accuracy is an eluding factor in the considered opinion of this Court. Indeed, it is the duty of a Court of law to award a just, fair and reasonable compensation exercising its wide discretion and inherent power to the maximum possible extent so that the family members of the deceased are not made to suffer owing to the untimely death of the deceased. 46. As on date, there is high inflation prevailing in the macro-economic and monetary scenario. Reducing/lowering inflation is the task of powers-that-be/economists/experts as seen from the people's welfare point of view and equitable considerations for the ultimate aim of the sustained growth of a nation. 47. In the result, the civil miscellaneous appeal is dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs. Consequently, the award and decree passed by learned Additional District and Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court), Vellore, in M.C.O.P. No. 94 of 2011, dated 1.8.2011, are affirmed by this Court for the reasons assigned in this appeal. Connected miscellaneous petition is closed. 48. It is open to the respondent Nos. Consequently, the award and decree passed by learned Additional District and Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court), Vellore, in M.C.O.P. No. 94 of 2011, dated 1.8.2011, are affirmed by this Court for the reasons assigned in this appeal. Connected miscellaneous petition is closed. 48. It is open to the respondent Nos. 1 to 3-claimants to receive their respective share of award amount in equal terms lying to the credit of M.C.O.P. No. 94 of 2011 by filing an application for payment as per Civil Rules of Practise in the manner known to law (if not already received by them from the Tribunal). The Tribunal is directed to collect the deficit Court-fee of Rs. 5,042.50 from the respondent Nos. 1 to 3-claimants (if not already collected) before disbursing the award amount.