Judgment :- 1. Though all these Writ Petitions have been disposed off by me by passing separate order today i.e. 29th February, 2012, since I am unable to agree with the view taken by the learned Single Judge (Coram: R. M.S. Khandeparkar J.) in the case of Shri Ravindra V. Gaikwad & others v/s. State of Maharashtra & others (2002 (2) All M. R. 489)I am passing this separate order requesting the Hon’ble Chief Justice to make a reference to a Larger Bench. In the said Judgment, in the case of Ravindra Gaikwad (supra), the learned Single Judge was considering the question whether the Secretary in the Ministry of Corporation has jurisdiction to hear and decide the Appeals filed under the MCS Act, 1960. Before the learned Single Judge, inter alia, the provision of Rule 105 of the MCS Rules 1961 were relied upon. 2. Rule 105 of the MCS Rules, 1961 reads thus:- “105. Constitution of authority by the State Government to hear appeals which lie to that Government. The appeals which let to the State Government under the Act may be heard by [the Secretary, the Additional Secretary or any of the Deputy Secretaries to Government, Co-operation and Rural Development Department.] 3. The argument based on Rule 105 has been rejected by the learned Single Judge who has decide the case of Ravindra Gaikwad (supra) that the following reasons contained in paragraph 21 of the said Judgment which reads thus:- “The contention that in view of the rule 105 of the said rules, exercise of appellate jurisdiction by the Secretary cannot be found fault with, is devoid of substance. It is well established that the rules framed under the Act cannot override the statutory provisions in the Act. When the stature specifically provides that the appeals lie to the State Government, they are necessarily to be heard and decided by the State Government or by the authority to which the State Government is empowered to delegate such powers under the Rules of Business considering the provisions contained in Article 166(3) of the Constitution of India. Undoubtedly, the Rules of Business and the Standing Orders framed thereunder do not empower the allocation of the said powers to the Secretary of any department. Indeed, in that regard, the observations of the Full Bench of this court are very clear in the matter of Sheikh Mohamed Fatemohamed and etc. Undoubtedly, the Rules of Business and the Standing Orders framed thereunder do not empower the allocation of the said powers to the Secretary of any department. Indeed, in that regard, the observations of the Full Bench of this court are very clear in the matter of Sheikh Mohamed Fatemohamed and etc. v. Raisuddin Azimuddin Katil and others reported in AIR 2000 BOMBAY 353. No doubt, the same are in relation to the provisions contained in Hyderabad Abolition of Inams and Cash Grants Act, 1954 but, are on the similar point relating to the jurisdiction or the power of the Secretary to exercise revisional or appellate jurisdiction under the Act when the Act empowers the State Government to perform such functions. It is always to be remembered, that if the stature prescribes a procedure for doing a thing, then the thing has to be done according to that procedure and all other modes are ruled out. (Vide: Haresh Dayaram Thakur vs. State of Maharashtra and others, AIR 2000 SC 2281 : (2000) 6 SCC 179 ). Being so, the impugned order which has been passed by the Secretary of Cooperation cannot be held to be good in law as the Secretary had no jurisdiction or authority to hear the appeal under section 152 of the said Act. On this count also, the impugned order dated 2nd August, 2001 cannot be sustained.” 4. I have carefully perused the Judgment of the Full Bench in the case of Sheikh Mohamed Fatemohamed (supra) which was relied upon by the learned Single Judge. In that case, the Full Bench has made observations in paragraphs 12 to15 which read thus:- “Para12: It is quite clear that what is meant by sub-article (3) is the convenient transaction of business of the Government and allocation amongst different Ministers of this business, so as to make the running of the Government smooth. It is difficult to visualize the situation under this sub-article, whether the concept of an appeal, arising out of a quash-judicial power can be termed as a business of the Government. Para13: So far as the said Act is concerned, there would not have been any question of there being any appeal in respect of inams tenure determining respective rights of the landlord and/or tenant or the occupant. Para13: So far as the said Act is concerned, there would not have been any question of there being any appeal in respect of inams tenure determining respective rights of the landlord and/or tenant or the occupant. This being entirely the field of the Statute, specifically enacted for the purpose, and right of appeal also having been given by it, in our opinion, it cannot be regulated by general power of rule making as provided under Article 166 of the Constitution of India, more so, when the Article 166, in our opinion, does not deal with the business of the nature of deciding quasi judicial disputes and appeals arising thereunder. Para14: The quasi judicial functions, thus, in or opinion, would be out of the purview of this Article, much less that would not be covered by the Rules of business under Rule 15, as sought to be done, as noted in the decision of Maruti Pandu’s case (cited supra). Para15: We are, therefore, of the view that there is a conflict between the two decisions. The conflict has to be resolved, in view of the aforesaid discussion, in favour of the view taken in Ganeshrao Kishanrao Deshmukh’s case reported in 1972 Mh. L. J. 661 = AIR 1972 Bom. 369 . As a consequence, the view taken in Maroti Pandu’s case reported in 1983 Mh. L. R. 148 is declared as unacceptable to this Bench.” 5. In fact, the observations of the Full Bench made in paragraph 13, Rule 105 of MCS Act, 1961 was applicable and according to me, the observations made in the Full Bench Judgment, in fact, supports the conclusion that Rule 105 is in the form of statutory delegation to the Officers named therein who have been empowered to hear Appeals arising out of the MCS Act, 1960. 6. In my opinion, therefore, the Judgment in the case of Ravindra Gaikwad (supra) requires reconsideration and I am unable to agree with the conclusion drawn by the learned Single Judge (Coram: R.M.S. Khandeparkar J.) in the case of Ravindra Gaikwad (supra) and I have to express my inability to agree with the view expressed in the said Judgment. 7. 6. In my opinion, therefore, the Judgment in the case of Ravindra Gaikwad (supra) requires reconsideration and I am unable to agree with the conclusion drawn by the learned Single Judge (Coram: R.M.S. Khandeparkar J.) in the case of Ravindra Gaikwad (supra) and I have to express my inability to agree with the view expressed in the said Judgment. 7. I, therefore, deem it fit to request the Hon’ble the Chief Justice to constitute a Larger Bench and refer the following issues for determination by the Larger Bench:- (i) Whether, irrespective of the provisions contained in Rule 105 of the MCS Rules, 1961, the Secretary in the Ministry of Cooperation can be not held to have jurisdiction to entertain, hear and decide the Appeals filed under the MCS Act, 1960; (ii) Whether the Judgment in the case of Ravindra Gaikwad (supra) lays down a correct proposition of law to the extent it holds that hearing of Appeals under Section 152 of the MCS Act, 1960 by the Secretary in the Cooperation Department was without jurisdiction. 8. Though Writ Petitions are disposed off since these important questions of law arise regularly and since in my opinion, the Judgment of learned Single Judge in the case of Ravindra Gaikwad (supra) virtually nullifies the provision on Rule 105 of the MCS Rules, 1961, I deem it fit and proper to make the aforesaid reference. 9. Registrar (Judl.) to take up the follow up action to place it before the Hon’ble the Chief Justice for considering the request for referring the issue to the Larger Bench.