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2012 DIGILAW 461 (GAU)

Kiran Kakati v. State of Assam

2012-04-10

AMITAVA ROY, P.K.MUSAHARY

body2012
JUDGMENT P.K. Musahary, J. 1. These appeals, being directed against a common judgment rendered by the learned Single Bench, have been heard conjointly and are being disposed of by this common judgment. The much publicized cry was initially against an alleged move for removal of democratically (?) elected Chairman of a Registered State Level Co-operative Union which came to be challenged by the holder of the office in a Writ Petition, being W.P(C) No. 3147 of 2010 and while the said Writ Petition was sub-judice, the entire Executive Committee of the Union stood dissolved by an alleged illegal, arbitrary and malafide State action in a purported exercise of powers u/s 89(c)(3) of the Assam Co-operative Societies Act, 1949 (Act of 1949 in short). The prime mover, Sri Kiran Kakati as Chairman of the Union along with two other compatriots, as members of the Executive Committee (E.C. in short) confronted the respondents in W.P(C) No. 3588 of 2010 for setting aside and quashing the impugned dissolution order. The above writ petitions having stood dismissed vide impugned common judgment & order, dated 1.10.2010 rendered by the learned Single Bench, the appellant, this time, preferred the present appeals single handedly with 'Ekla Cholore' zeal; no matter whether his comrades are responding or not to his call. 2. Heard the learned counsel for the parties. Mr. I. Choudhury, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, at the out set submits that, he would like to concentrate his submissions on the facts and issues raised in Writ Appeal No. 344/2010, corresponding to W.P(C) No. 3588 of 2010, which relates to dissolution of E.C. of the Assam State Cooperative Union (ASCU in short), as according to him, as soon as the dissolved E.C. is restored on quashment of the impugned order, the appellant would automatically be allowed to continue as its Chairman till the end of the normal term. 3. The near undisputed consolidated facts, relevant for the purpose of disposal of the Writ Appeals, are as follows:- The ASCU is a registered State Co-operative Union primarily concerned with the promotion and development of the Co-operative movement in the State of Assam and to educate, guide and assist the people in their efforts to built up and expand co-operative sector. The near undisputed consolidated facts, relevant for the purpose of disposal of the Writ Appeals, are as follows:- The ASCU is a registered State Co-operative Union primarily concerned with the promotion and development of the Co-operative movement in the State of Assam and to educate, guide and assist the people in their efforts to built up and expand co-operative sector. As per the bye laws of the Union, there are four categories of members/share holders namely (1) the District Co-operative Union; (2) State Level Co-operative Societies; (3) Regional Co-operative Societies and (4) Individual having knowledge and distinction in the field of co-operative societies. The appellant was elected uncontested as Chairman of the ASCU in the Annual General Meeting held on 26.6.2009. The AGM/Election was duly approved by the Respondent Registrar Co-operative Societies (Registrar in short herein after) on 1.7.2009. After the E.C. assumed charge on 1.7.09, the respondents No. 9 and 10 made a complaint before the Registrar on 21.7.09 seeking review of the order approving the election. It was rejected by the Registrar on 22.9.2009 as because the complaint was not lodged before holding of the AGM/Election. The respondents No. 9 and 10 filed an appeal on 7.10.09 before the Govt. without intimating the appellant. During the pendency of the said appeal the Under Secretary to the Government of Assam, Co-operation Department issued a show cause notice dated 11.3.2010 under Section 39(B)(1) of the Act of 1949 leveling 4 (four) charges against the Appellant based on the reports of the Registrar and Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Assam. The said 4 charges relate to (i) financial irregularities/misuse (ii) holding of training programmes in violation of terms and conditions of sanction order (iii) failure in maintaining record on corpus fund and (iv) failure in maintaining record for holding AGM by the DCUs. As the said appeal before the Government was not disposed of, the respondents No. 9 and 10 filed W.P(C) No. 1885 of 2010. This court by order dated 19.3.2010, disposed of the said writ petition directing the respondent No. 1 to dispose of the appeal filed by the respondents No. 9 and 10 before the Government within 45 days. On 6.4.2010, the appellant submitted a reply written statement to the show cause notice dated 11.3.2010, contending inter alia that the purported enquiry was conducted behind his back. On 6.4.2010, the appellant submitted a reply written statement to the show cause notice dated 11.3.2010, contending inter alia that the purported enquiry was conducted behind his back. Pursuant to and in compliance of the order of this court dated 19.3.2010, the Deputy Secretary, Co-operation Department, asked all the parties, including the appellant to appear before the Secretary, Co-operation Department on 20.4.2010. On his appearance the appellant submitted a brief written reply and additional reply dated 29.5.2010 against the show cause notice dated 11.3.2010 with request to furnish copies of the report submitted by the Registrar and the enquiry report of the Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies on the basis of which the above 4 charges were brought against him. The said additional reply was received by the Respondent No. 1 on 31.5.2010 and the impugned removal order was issued on a back date i.e. 29.5.2010. The same was communicated to the appellant on 31.5.2010. The appellant then had to file W.P(C) No. 3147/2010 (corresponding to W.A. No. 345/10). While issuing notice on 8.6.2010, an interim order was passed by this court directing the respondents not to hold election to elect the new Chairman of the ASCU till disposal of the Writ Petition. In the said writ proceeding one Sri Sundar Deka was impleaded as respondent No. 6 as he filed a caveat and on being impleaded as party, he filed an affidavit contending inter alia that it was he, who lodged the complaint, on the basis of which enquiries were conducted leading to initiation of proceeding under Section 39(B)(1). The said Sundar Deka, in order to establish his locus, contended in paragraph 13 of his affidavit that he was not the Chairman-cum-Managing Director of Kamrup Garments Product Co-operative Industries Ltd., which is a member society of the Guwahati District Co-operative Union. In response to the affidavit of respondent No. 6, the appellant filed an affidavit denying that Kamrup Garments Product Co-operative Industries Ltd is a member of the Guwahati District Co-operative Union. Interestingly, on the next day, i.e. 9.6.2010, the impugned order, dated 9.6.2010 was passed dissolving the E.C. of the ASCU u/s 80(3) of the Act of 1949. Consequently, the appellant had to file W.P(C) No. 3588 of 2010 (corresponding to W.A. No. 344/10). Interestingly, on the next day, i.e. 9.6.2010, the impugned order, dated 9.6.2010 was passed dissolving the E.C. of the ASCU u/s 80(3) of the Act of 1949. Consequently, the appellant had to file W.P(C) No. 3588 of 2010 (corresponding to W.A. No. 344/10). The learned Single Bench, upon hearing the parties, dismissed the aforesaid writ petition by the impugned common judgment and order dated 1.10.2010 resulting into filing of the present writ appeals. 4. In respect of Writ Appeal No. 344 of 2010, the learned counsel for the appellant makes the following submissions:- (i) The appeal before the Government under Section 80(3) of the Act of 1949 can be preferred only on law points and the respondents No. 9 and 10 having filed their appeal on 7.10.2009 purely on question of facts the learned Single Bench committed grave error in holding that question of law cannot be decided in violation of the facts involved and the question of law, necessarily, has to be decided on the basis of facts pleaded. (ii) The appeal dated 7.10.2009 before the Government under Section 80(3) of the Act of 1949 against Registrar's order dated 22.9.09 having been filed without joining the appellant and other elected members as parties merely asking them to be present on the date of hearing, cannot be construed as providing adequate/effective opportunities of hearing in a matter involving extreme action like dissolution of a democratically elected executive body. (iii) the Respondent Government while disposing the appeal vide impugned order dated 9.6.2010 proceeded entirely on the premises that a large number of members who were not entitled, cast their votes illegally in the election totally over looking the fact that the appellant and the vice Chairman were elected without contest. Even the other elected members got elected with an overwhelming majority. This stand of the appellant taken in paragraph 19(B) of the writ petition was not even controverted by the official as well as private respondents and as such, even assuming but not admitting that the appellant got lesser number of votes, the same could not have materially affected the result of the election. (iv) The issues framed and the findings recorded by the appellate authority, even on merits, are perverse. (iv) The issues framed and the findings recorded by the appellate authority, even on merits, are perverse. The appellant endeavours to justify his above submissions by drawing the attention of this court to the following pleaded facts:- (a) As regards issue No. 1 which relates to allegation that the notices for AGM were not served under the certificate of posting, it was submitted before the learned Single Bench that as per bye-law 9(e) of the society, notices should be served by post under certificate of posting? or by peon book as may be convenient. The appellant in his reply contended that the notices of AGM were issued through Issue register at SL. No. 108-166 dated 10.6.2009 and were served through peon book, which fact was never controverted by the Respondents. Moreover, the attendance register in the AGM itself demonstrates participation of the members in the AGM but the respondent authorities, while passing the impugned dissolution order dated 9.6.2010, did not take into consideration the provision under bye law 9(e). (b) As regard issue No. 2, which relates to allegation that some DCUs with less than 40 members, although not entitled, sent four representations. Such allegation is vague inasmuch as from the impugned order itself it is reflected that Sadiya DCU had as many as 42 members, some of which are registered under the Co-operation Department and Handloom and Textile Department. This contention of the appellant was not controverted, yet the Respondent authorities did not give due consideration to it and acted upon certain informations purportedly submitted by the private Respondents. (c) Regarding allegation of sending representation by DCUs without holding AGMs it was contended that DCUs being independent Co-operative Societies registered under the Act of 1949, the ASCU does not exercise any control over their internal management like holding of AGM as well as approval of such AGMs. It is the Registrar of Co-operative Societies who is responsible for looking after such affairs of DCUs. Non holding of AGM, even assuming to be a default on the part of the Managing Body of the DCUs, the same by itself would not make such Co-operative Society non existent. Moreover, there is no bar in the bye-laws of the ASCU to sending representatives by the DCUs for participation in the AGM. Non holding of AGM, even assuming to be a default on the part of the Managing Body of the DCUs, the same by itself would not make such Co-operative Society non existent. Moreover, there is no bar in the bye-laws of the ASCU to sending representatives by the DCUs for participation in the AGM. In fact the decision taken by such DCUs regarding sending of representations was duly approved by the concerned Assistant Registrar of Co-operative Societies (ARCS). In any case, it is the specifically pleaded stand of the appellant that in respect of DCU the AGM had been held as per statutory prescription in presence of representations of the Registrar and the proceeding has duly been approved from time to time. In fact, in February, 2011 an attempt was made to dislodge the elected body of DCU, which was challenged in W.P(C) No. 1429 of 2011 wherein an interim order was passed on 11.3.2011 to maintain status-quo with regard to functioning of the Managing Committee. (d) Regarding the allegation of receiving money from NCUI and not accounting for in the cash book or not submitting audit report, it is submitted that the same is a subject matter of the other proceeding initiated against the Chairman. Moreover, as per bye-law 14(d)(iii), it is the CEO who is responsible for managing the Union's fund and maintaining the proper accounts thereof. Inspite of such provision in the bye-law the respondent authorities initiated no proceeding against the CEO. 5. Per contra Mr. U K Nair, learned counsel for the respondents No. 9 and 10 makes the following submissions: (i) The learned Single Bench is to confine itself to the decision making process only without going into the correctness of the decision taken by the authority concerned. However in the present case, the learned Single Bench had gone in to the merit of the decision and having found that the respondent authorities followed the due procedure, upheld the order dated 9.6.2010 passed by the respondent authorities which was challenged in the writ proceedings. Further the learned Single Bench rightly held that the question of law has to be decided on the basis of facts and, therefore, the proposition that appeal under Section 80(3) of the Act of 1949 can be preferred only on question of law is unfounded. Further the learned Single Bench rightly held that the question of law has to be decided on the basis of facts and, therefore, the proposition that appeal under Section 80(3) of the Act of 1949 can be preferred only on question of law is unfounded. (ii) The learned Single Bench, on examination of the available records came to a finding that some District Co-operative Unions (DCUs) having less than 40 members sent four representatives in clear violation of the amended bye laws of the ASCU and some DCUs, more particularly Guwahati, Nagaon, Barpeta and Sadiya, having not held their AGMs or their AGMs having not been approved, rightly held that participation of those DCUs in the AGM vitiated the entire AGM proceeding. Although it has been contended by the appellant that Sadiya DCU had 40 members, vide Annexure-R to the writ petition, no oath was sworn in support of it. Moreover in the affidavit in reply filed by the respondent no. 1 to the additional affidavit filed by the appellant in W.P(C) No. 3588/10, the respondent No. 1 furnished a list of members affiliated to Sadiya DCU relating to the fact that it had only 26 members and therefore, as per the provision under bye law the said union was entitled to send only two representatives. In respect of other DCUs, more particualry Guwahati, Nagaon, Barpeta, and Sadiay, they having not held their AGMs or their AGMs having not been approved, their participation in the AGM held on 26.9.09 vitiated the entire proceeding of the AGM. In view of such finding, the order dated 9.6.2010 cannot be held bad in law. (iii) The respondent No. 1 being the first appellate authority, his decision though restricted to question of law have to be founded on facts and circumstances of a given case and therefore the order dated 9.6.2010 passed by him cannot be bad in law. 6. In regard to W.A. No. 345 of 2010 the learned counsel for the appellant makes the following submissions: (a) It is an admitted fact that the enquiries made by the Registrar and the Joint Registrar were initiated at the instance of one Sri Sundar Deka u/s 39(b)(1) of the Act of 1949. 6. In regard to W.A. No. 345 of 2010 the learned counsel for the appellant makes the following submissions: (a) It is an admitted fact that the enquiries made by the Registrar and the Joint Registrar were initiated at the instance of one Sri Sundar Deka u/s 39(b)(1) of the Act of 1949. It has been conclusively established from the materials placed on record that Sri Sundar Deka has no locus standi even to lodge a complaint and as such the entire proceeding stood vitiated on that count alone, inviting interference by this Court. (b) Even assuming but not admitting that Sri Sundar Deka was competent to lodge complaint, it is an admitted fact that a copy of such complaint was never furnished to the appellant, not to speak of providing any opportunity of being heard, to controvert the allegation contained therein. Interestingly, in the affidavit filed by the Government in W.P(C) No. 3147 of 2010 (corresponding to W.A. No. 345/10), a letter dated 8.10.2009 was annexed, marked Annexure-VIII, informing the CEO of ASCU that an inspection/enquiry would be carried out in his office. A copy of the said letter was marked to aforesaid Sundar Deka, in an uncalled for manner, although he has no connection with the ASCU and whereas the same was not marked to the appellant, against whom the whole exercise was directed. These facts conclusively establish that the whole exercise was undertaken behind the back of the appellant and to his prejudice and on that count alone the said proceeding is liable to be interfered with. (c) The show cause notice dated 11.3.2010 leaves no room for any doubt that the same was entirely based on the reports submitted by the joint Registrar who conducted an enquiry behind the back of the appellant. The Registrar in his turn, submitted a report to the Govt., without even furnishing the copies of the enquiry report. It was the bounden duty of the respondent- authorities to put the appellant to notice under Section 39(b)(1) regarding purported enquiries and thereafter to furnish him the copies of the said enquiry reports and the same having not been done, the principle of natural justice has been violated with all impunity. It was the bounden duty of the respondent- authorities to put the appellant to notice under Section 39(b)(1) regarding purported enquiries and thereafter to furnish him the copies of the said enquiry reports and the same having not been done, the principle of natural justice has been violated with all impunity. This stand was taken by the appellant in his reply to show cause dated 6.4.2010 followed by an application dated 29.5.2010 wherein he made a prayer for furnishing copies of the enquiry report. To nullify the appellant's contention the respondent Secretary hurriedly served the impugned order on the appellant on 31.5.2010 by antedating it to 29.5.2010 and as such malafide action writs large on the face of the records, particularly the anti-dated impugned order. (d) The basic allegation in the show cause notice dated 11.3.2010 was that no proper account was maintained in respect of funds received from the NCUI and instead, separate accounts and books of accounts were maintained. The appellant contended that it was done as per resolution No. 16 passed by the Managing Committee in its meeting held on 18.9.2009 whereby it was decided to maintain separate account in respect of funds received from NCUI and to operate the same jointly by the Chairman of the ASCU and the CEO. In view of such collective decision, a proceeding directed solely against the appellant u/s 39(b)(1) is not maintainable, more so, when the responsibility of managing the fund and maintaining the proper accounts was given to CEO under bye law 14(d)(iii). As stated earlier, since no action was ever initiated against the CEO, even assuming that the allegation against the appellant is correct, clearly demonstrates biased and predetermined action of the respondent-authorities against the appellant. (e) As regards the charge No. 1 mentioned in the show cause notice dated 11.3.2010 relating to allegation that different cash books were maintained in violation of financial discipline, it was contended by the appellant both before the respondent authorities as well as before the learned Single Bench that out of the amount received from NCUI before 31.3.2008, an amount of Rs. 2,41,000/-, was recorded in the main cash book of the Union. 2,41,000/-, was recorded in the main cash book of the Union. Since at that point of time the detailed guidelines of the NCUI was not available with the Union as per which, a separate account was to be maintained, amount received prior to 31.3.2008 was recorded in the main cash book of the Union. However, upon receipt of the guidelines, the Managing Committee adopted the said Resolution No. 16 for maintaining a separate account for the amount received from the NCUI and in fact a separate account was opened. It was also the contention of the appellant that the amounts received from the NCUI during 2007 to 2009 were duly audited by a Chartered Accountant as per the guidelines. Necessary utilization certificates were also sent to the NCUI. Till now no audit objection has been raised by the NCUI. In fact, as provided in clause (xxvi) of the guidelines, further funds were released by the NCUI upon receipt of satisfactory utilization certificates. In fact, the allegations raised against the appellant, although could not be substantiated, were accepted by the respondent authorities. They refused to consider the stand of the appellant, which clearly shows biased attitude and predetermined action on the part of the respondents against the appellant. As regards the allegation of cash disbursement of fund, it was contended that due to some technical difficulties, payments were to be made in cash. In support thereof, the appellant referred to the page 21 of the guidelines which provides for a particular head of account under which the expenditure incurred in training programmes should be met. (f) Regarding charge No. 2, it was replied, inter alia, that although the fund was released in cash, same was done against proper receipts and vouchers and on behalf of ACTI, ASCU. Separate audited accounts and cash book were maintained as per suggestion of the NCUI. In fact, in the charge itself it has been stated that as per report, due to lack of infrastructure the training was conducted through DCUs on behalf of the ACTI. Although the DCUs have not maintained separate accounts, all the records are maintained in the office of the ASCU. In fact, it was contended that the so called enquiry was confined only to the DCUs and the above aspect of the matter was not enquired at the ASCU. Although the DCUs have not maintained separate accounts, all the records are maintained in the office of the ASCU. In fact, it was contended that the so called enquiry was confined only to the DCUs and the above aspect of the matter was not enquired at the ASCU. (g) As against charge No. 3 that as per enquiry report no record was found in respect of the amount raised as corpus fund, it was contended that an amount of Rs. 1 lakh received as corpus fund have already been sent to the NCUI and all the receipt books are available in the office records. In fact, the amount deposited with NCUI was published in the mouthpiece of the NCUI. Although a copy of such document was provided, same was not considered and the authorities proceeded to rely on the purported reports which were prepared behind the back of the appellant. Although as a mere formality the appellant was asked to show cause, none of the contentions of the appellant was considered and hence the findings arrived at are perverse. (h) In respect of charge no. 4 which relates to failure to maintenance of records of holding the AGM by the DCUs, it was pleaded by the appellant that representatives of every DCU participated in the AGM upon receipt of due approval from the concerned ARCS. It was also contended that the DCUs, being independent cooperative societies, are under direct supervision of the concerned ARCS. 7. Mr. U K Nair, learned counsel appearing for the respondents No. 9 and 10 countered the above submissions as under: (i) The learned Single Bench passed the impugned judgment after elaborately discussing the materials on record. (ii) The appellant filed the written statement without any reservation regarding non-furnishing him with the reports of the Joint Registrar. No prejudice was caused to the appellant for not furnishing the report of the Joint Registrar inasmuch as he was furnished with a detailed statements dated 6.4.2010 clearly mentioning the charges brought against him. Moreover, the appellant did not ask for the said report in his written statement nor did he state in the additional written statement how he was prejudiced. It was not even pleaded by the appellant that he was prejudiced due to non-furnishing of enquiry report. Moreover, the appellant did not ask for the said report in his written statement nor did he state in the additional written statement how he was prejudiced. It was not even pleaded by the appellant that he was prejudiced due to non-furnishing of enquiry report. (iii) As regards the averments of the appellant that he was never made a privy to the whole enquiry, it is submitted that the respondent- Secretary issued the show cause notice on the appellant u/s 39(B)(i) of the Act of 1949 leveling four charges against the appellant on 11.2.2010. It was on record that as per back as on 8.10.2009 the CEO Assam ASCU was informed that the enquiry has been conducted with regard to financial irregularities in the NCUI funds for which adequate opportunities were given to the appellant to show cause. The aforesaid enquiry was not confined to Guwahati alone but it reached out the entire State Co-operative body and its affiliates. (iv) As regards the allegation that the order dated 29.5.2010 is a non speaking order, it is submitted that the same cannot be termed as non speaking order as it was passed taking into consideration all the material facts and circumstances including the show cause reply of the appellant. In regard to contention of the appellant that the learned Single Bench failed to take into consideration that the CEO is responsible under bye law 14(d)(iii) and the appellant cannot be held responsible, it has been submitted that in the enquiry conducted the C.Es concerned categorically stated that the fund received under the centrally sponsored schemes were not handled by him. (v) In respect of contention that the learned Single Bench did not go into the locus of the respondent No. 6, it has been submitted that the said respondent clearly established his locus by filing an affidavit in opposition in WP(C) No. 3147/10. In this regard reference was made to averments made in paragraph 13 of the said writ petition. (v) In respect of contention that the learned Single Bench did not go into the locus of the respondent No. 6, it has been submitted that the said respondent clearly established his locus by filing an affidavit in opposition in WP(C) No. 3147/10. In this regard reference was made to averments made in paragraph 13 of the said writ petition. (vi) In reply to contention of the appellant that the learned Single Bench ignored the NCUI guidelines, the learned counsel for the respondents refers to clauses (vi), (xxi), (xxii), (xxiv), (xxv), (xxvi), (xxx) and (xxxi) of the NCUI and submits that- (a) as per clause (vi) the concerned bodies would bear the expenses and the same would be reimbursed; (b) as per clause (xxi) the JTC would submit their claims to the respective State Cooperative Unions, (c) as per clause (xxii) there is no necessity of sending any voucher and the JTC would retain them for its record and inspection, (d) as per clause (xxiv) a separate account should be kept, (e) as per clause (xxv) JTCs would submit their audited utilization certificate at the end of each year, (f) as per clause (xxvi) grant of further fund is subject to receipt of utilization certificate; (g) as per clauses (xxx) and (xxxi) JTC should submit their course completion certificate with implementation report. 8. The learned counsel for the Respondents No. 9 and 10 further submits that ASCU, instead of following the procedure of incurring the expenses, has been violating the terms and conditions stipulated in the guidelines and thereby committed gross anomalies, as is evident from the report of the Registrar and the enquiry report submitted by the Joint Registrar, copies of which have been furnished as Annexures-V & VI to W.A. No. 345/10. Further the balance sheet of the ASCU (Annexures- 1 to WA No. 345/10), clearly shows how the anomalies took place. From the said balance sheet it is found that the District Co-operative Union of Nagaon and Guwahati derived the maximum benefit. 9. Further the balance sheet of the ASCU (Annexures- 1 to WA No. 345/10), clearly shows how the anomalies took place. From the said balance sheet it is found that the District Co-operative Union of Nagaon and Guwahati derived the maximum benefit. 9. On perusal of the pleadings and on consideration of the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties, so far as it relates to the order dated 9.6.2010 dissolving the E.C., which led to filing of W.P(C) No. 3588/10 and W.A. No. 344/10, the points for consideration and decision are as follows: (i) Whether the notice for holding AGM was served under "certificate of posting." (ii) Whether the DCUs having less then 40 members sent four representatives in clear violation of the amended bye laws of the ASCU. (iii) Whether the DCUs, more specifically, Guwahati, Nagaon, Barpeta and Sadiya did not hold their AGM and even if they held the AGMs, they obtained no approval from ARCS concerned and thereby their participation in the AGM dated 26.9.09 vitiated the entire proceeding of the AGM. (iv) Whether there were gross financial irregularities involving Rs. 15.30 lacs received from the NCUI. 10. The notable point is that in respect of 'certificate of posting' the respondent No. 1 did not pass any comment thereon. In regard to point No. (ii) above, it was held that the Sadiya DCU with only 26 members was not entitled to send four members. So was the case in respect of Nagaon, DCU as per information furnished by the Assistant Registrar of Co-operative Societies under the RTI. In regard to point No. (iii) above, the respondent No. 1 after going through the records, held that Guwahati DCU held its last AGM on 26.6.09 but it was not approved by the Assistant Registrar concerned. The Nagaon DCU did not submit the AGM proceeding for the years 2006-07, 2007-08 and 200809. The Sadiya DCU did not hold AGM for the years 2006-07, 2007-08 and 2008-09. In regard to point No. (iv) the respondent no. 1 was of the view that since it was a financial irregularity it was being dealt with separately. After an elaborate discussion, the respondent No. 1 held that the breaches of bye laws as set forth in the appeal were established and, therefore, set aside the order dated 22.9.2010 passed by the Registrar. 1 was of the view that since it was a financial irregularity it was being dealt with separately. After an elaborate discussion, the respondent No. 1 held that the breaches of bye laws as set forth in the appeal were established and, therefore, set aside the order dated 22.9.2010 passed by the Registrar. The respondent No. 1 also held that the AGM was illegal and, therefore, the E.C. was dissolved with direction to elect a fresh body as per law. The learned Single Bench in the impugned judgment and order dated 1.10.2010 came to a finding that due notices were give to all parties and all of them appeared and submitted their written statements. It was also found that the proceeding was conducted as per procedure. Furthermore, the learned Single Bench found the grounds No. 2 and 3 set forth in the appeal proved. Notably the learned Single Bench also held that the question of law has to be on the basis of facts and, therefore, the proposition that appeal under Section 80(3) of the Act of 1949 can be preferred only on question of law is unfounded. In view of the above observations, the learned Single Bench dismissed the challenge made to the appellate order dated 9.6.2010. 11. First, we would like to consider the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant. The appellant, as we could understand, expected the writ court exercising power of judicial review, to examine the correctness of the impugned order of the Government, like an appellate court. For instance the appellant called upon the writ court to find out (i) as to whether some DCUs without having more than 40 members and without earning eligibility, sent four representatives in violation of the provision under the bye law and participated in the AGM. Secondly to identify the DCUs who have defaulted in holding their AGMS and the DCUs having held the AGM failed to obtain approval from the authority concerned as required under the Act of 1949 and to find out whether the respondents No. 9 and 10 were present in the AGM personally and as to whether appellant got elected as Chairman without contest and whether the other E.Ms also got elected with huge margin. Thirdly, the approval given by the authority to the proceeding of the AGM electing E.C. with the appellant as its Chairman, was sought to be recalled in the complaint made by the respondents No. 9 and 10. The Respondent Registrar rejected the complaint requiring the respondents No. 9 and 10 to make an appeal before the Govt. on 7.10.09. Admittedly the show cause notice was issued/served upon the appellant leveling charges based on report filed by the Joint Registrar. The said report of the Joint Registrar was purportedly prepared after a preliminary enquiry. The appellant made a grievance that a copy of the said report of the Joint Registrar was not furnished to him causing serious prejudice to him inasmuch as for want of said report he could not make effective representation. In our considered view, if the allegation/grievance of the appellant is correct, it would amount to violation of principle of natural justice. This is the only aspect which a writ court is required to examine and answer after taking into account all the relevant facts and circumstances of the case. As discussed earlier there is no manner of doubt that the learned Single Bench dealt with the said allegation elaborately. 12. The writ as well as the writ appellate courts are not required to examine the correctness or otherwise of the decision taken by the district authorities, either as original or appellate authority. In judicial review the only jurisdiction vested upon them is to examine as to whether in passing orders the administrative authorities have followed the law, rules or procedure prescribed under the law/rules. They have to examine whether the principle of natural justice have duly been followed. In the present case, admittedly, there is no law/rules framed by Legislature to govern the authorities in an enquiry proceeding in regard to financial/managerial irregularities of the Cooperative Societies Union. Departmental enquiry against a delinquent officer is guided by a set of rules and procedures prescribed there under and if any departmental proceeding is conducted in violation of the said rules and procedures and also in violation of the principle of natural justice, writ court has jurisdiction to declare the same as illegal and void. Departmental enquiry against a delinquent officer is guided by a set of rules and procedures prescribed there under and if any departmental proceeding is conducted in violation of the said rules and procedures and also in violation of the principle of natural justice, writ court has jurisdiction to declare the same as illegal and void. The absence of rules and procedures is to be filled up by the rules of natural justice, for, as per the settled law, the rule of natural justice operates in the areas not covered by any law validly made. We have no scope, in this case, to examine as to whether the order passed by the Government as an appellate authority is correct, erroneous or otherwise. This leaves us to examine and determine if the authorities concerned passed the impugned orders in accordance with the principle of natural justice. 13. There is no denial of the fact that a show cause notice was served on the appellant and he submitted the reply to the show cause notice. He also submitted an additional reply to the show cause. This shows that the appellant was given an opportunity to answer the charges/allegations brought against him and on consideration of his reply to show cause the impugned order of removal was issued. The question is whether the appellant was given reasonable and adequate opportunity. The concept of reasonable and adequate opportunity comes into play in cases of enquiry conducted in the departmental proceeding under the rules and procedures prescribed there under. In our considered view, the said concept would not come into play in an administrative action like the present one unguided by any codified Act or Rules. We have already observed that the show cause notice was issued and the appellant replied to the show cause and, therefore, we are of the view that the instant case is not a case of proceeding of "no notice" or "no opportunity" category. 14. Now we would like to examine the correctness of the contention of the appellant that the principle of natural justice was not followed in removing him from the office of Chairmanship and dissolution of the entire E.C. Before dealing with this aspect of the matter, we would like to refer ourselves to the principle laid down by the Apex court in State Bank of Patiala & other Vs. SK Sharma, reported in (1996) 3 SCC 364 . In paragraph 33(5) it is held as follows:- 5. Where the enquiry is not governed by any Rules/regulation/statutory provisions and the only obligation is to observe the principles of natural justice or, for that matter, wherever such principles are held to be implied by the very nature and impact of the order/action the Court or the Tribunal should make a distinction between a total violation of natural justice (rule of audi alteram partem) and violation of a facet of the said rule, as explained in the body of the judgment. In other words, a distinction must be made between "no opportunity" and no adequate opportunity, i.e. between "no notice"/"no hearing" and "no fair hearing". (a) In the case of former, the order passed would undoubtedly be invalid (one may call it, void? or a nullity if one chooses to). In such cases, normally, liberty will be reserved for the authority to take proceedings afresh according to law, i.e., in accordance with the said rule (audi alteram partem). (b) But in the later case, the effect of violation (of a facet of the rule of audi alteram partem) has to be examined from the standpoint of prejudiced; in other words, what the Court of Tribunal has to see is whether in the totality of the circumstances, the delinquent officer/employee did or did not have a fair hearing and the orders to be made shall depend upon the answer to the said query. [It is made clear that this principle (No. 5) does not apply in the case of rule against bias, the test in which behalf are laid down elsewhere."] 15. There are certain restrictions on strict application of the principle of natural justice. The Apex court in the case of Board of Mining Examination vs. Ramjee, reported in AIR 1977 SC 965 , made an observation that: "natural justice is no unruly horse, no lurking land mine, nor a judicial cure-all. If fairness is shown by the decision maker to the man proceeded against, the form, features and the fundamentals of such essential processual propriety being conditioned by the facts and circumstances of each situation, no breach of natural justice can be complained of. Unnatural expansion of natural justice, without reference to the administrative realities and other factors of a given case, can be exasperating. Unnatural expansion of natural justice, without reference to the administrative realities and other factors of a given case, can be exasperating. We can neither be finical nor fanatical but should be flexible yet firm in this jurisdiction. No man shall be hit below the belt--that is the conscience of the matter." If any benefit is to be derived from the above observation, the respondent authorities are to show that there was a fairness shown by the decision maker to the appellant. From the pleadings and submissions of the parties, we are satisfied that the minimum requirement of the principle of natural justice has been followed by way of issuing show cause notice, receiving the reply from the appellant and passing a speaking order by the respondent authorities. There was no demand from the appellant for taking evidence to prove the allegations/charges brought against him. The only demand made by the appellant was that he should have been furnished with the copy of the preliminary enquiry report of the Registrar and the Assistant Registrar basing on which action was initiated against him. The appellant extended his demand by saying that non furnishing of such preliminary report caused prejudice to him vitiating the entire proceedings and the impugned orders as well. 16. The question of prejudice is to be considered seriously. In the State Bank of Patiala (supra) it was held that in respect of procedural provision other than a fundamental nature, the theory of substantial compliance would be available and in such cases, the complaint/objection on that score have to be judged on the touch stone of prejudice. The settled position of law is that the test of prejudice is the ultimate test to uphold or nullify the order passed by the decision maker. The court is therefore, bound to examine, if any prejudice has been caused to the person proceeded against. We have noticed that the appellant was served with show cause notice with details of allegations/charges brought against him. In the said show cause notice the Respondent-Secretary disclosed that the charges were based on records submitted by the Registrar of Cooperative Societies, Assam and enquiry report submitted by the Joint Registrar, Cooperative Societies. In the main show cause reply as well as the supplementary reply to show cause he expressed no intention for inspection of the enquiry report and to file further show cause reply. In the main show cause reply as well as the supplementary reply to show cause he expressed no intention for inspection of the enquiry report and to file further show cause reply. He reserved no right of inspection of the enquiry report and file further show cause reply at the later stage. What is apparent is that the appellant was in a position to file the show cause reply without being furnished the enquiry report. It was possible on his part to do so because of the nature of allegations, the details of which have been furnished in the charges communicated to him in the show cause notice. For instance, Charge No. 1, relating to receipt of Rs. 14,760,25/-, is an admitted fact and as per reply to show cause the said amount was received and deposited in the Bank Account of the ASCU. It was also admitted therein that out of the said amount an amount of Rs. 2,41,000/- was recorded in the main cash book of ASCU at the initial stage and the amount was paid as reimbursement against training programme conducted by various DCUs. In fact the details of receipt and expenditure are available with the ASCU and, therefore, there was no necessity of asking more details from the enquiry report. In regard to charge No. 2 which relates to irregularities in conducting of training programmes, the appellant in his reply stated that the training programmes were conducted "peripatetically" under the Principalship of ACTI, Joysagar and the fund released for the parties was distributed by way of" Cash Disbursement" against proper receipts and vouchers. It is further stated that the ACTI and ASCU maintained a separate account and separate cash book which were audited as per the suggestion of NCUI. From the reply of the appellant there is no doubt at all that he had the required records and knowledge about the training programmes and the expenditures incurred for the said training. Therefore, it was possible on the part of the appellant to reply the Charge No. 2 without looking at the enquiry report. Charge No. 3 relates to non maintenance of record on Corpus Fund. The appellant replied that an amount of Rs. 1 lakh was received from the NCUI. It was recorded in the Receipt Book and the records are available in the office. Charge No. 3 relates to non maintenance of record on Corpus Fund. The appellant replied that an amount of Rs. 1 lakh was received from the NCUI. It was recorded in the Receipt Book and the records are available in the office. The appellant, therefore, could reply the Charge No. 3 without looking at the enquiry report. Similarly the appellant was in a position to reply the Charge No. 4 which relates to lapses in maintaining the record of holding AGM by the district Unions. In reply to Charge No. 4, the appellant stated, amongst other, that the DCUs are affiliated to ASCU as per the national policy. In other words, the ASCU is the controlling body of the DCUs. If it is so, the appellant as Chairman of the ASCU had access to the record of the DCUs and he was definitely in a position to call for the relevant records and examine them whenever there was any necessity to do so. From the above discussion, we are not persuaded to accept the grievances of the appellant that he was prejudiced for not being supplied with the enquiry report(s) mentioned in the show cause notice. Moreover, the very fact that the appellant filed the show cause reply without any objection amply proves that he was not prejudiced at all. 17. This brings us close to observations and findings of the learned Single Judge of the impugned judgment: 15. The written statement dated 06.04.2010 will go to show that the petitioner submitted the same in great details clearly understanding the charges leveled against him. In the said written statement there was no whisper regarding any prejudice due to non-furnishing of the enquiry reports. Thus, no prejudice was caused to the petitioner. Even in the additional reply dated 29.05.2010 except asking for the copies of the enquiry reports, no prejudice was shown and also there was no explanation as to how the petitioner could submit the detailed written statement without any reservation on 06.04.2010. It is in this context, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the purported additional reply after nearly two months and that too, without any leave of the authority, was an after thought being aware of the adverse situation and likelihood of the impugned order being passed with the sole purpose for making out of the case on technicalities. It is in this context, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the purported additional reply after nearly two months and that too, without any leave of the authority, was an after thought being aware of the adverse situation and likelihood of the impugned order being passed with the sole purpose for making out of the case on technicalities. Unhesitatingly, we are in agreement with the above observations and conclusions of the learned Single Judge. 18. A step ahead, established law now requires the complainant to show "real" prejudice as against the mere prejudice in Natwar Singh vs. Director of Enforcement & another reported in (2010) 13 SCC 255 , wherein it is held that there must have been caused some real prejudice to the complaint. It was a case where the appellants were proceeded with under the Foreign Exchange Management ACT, 1999 (for short FEMA). On receipt of show cause notice they demanded supply of copies of all documents in possession of the Department but the authorities concerned declined to do so. Yet the appellants filed a preliminary/short reply to the show cause notice insisting again with the demand for copies of the documents whereupon the adjudicating authority made it clear that the provisions of FEMA and the Rules provide for supply of the grounds, nature of contravention and copies relied upon the documents only in order to enable the notice to make effective representation and the said requirement has been met. In fact, it was found that the copies of all documents as relied upon by the adjudicating authority were furnished and, therefore, the authority concerned declined to furnish copies of other documents and decided to hold an enquiry in accordance with the provisions of FEMA and Rules framed there under. In the instant case, there is no Rule prescribing the procedure for conducting the enquiry into the alleged misappropriation of fund or irregularities in holding the AGM by the Cooperative Society Bodies unlike the position in the above cited case where the Act, namely the FEMA the Rules framed there under provides for detailed procedure for holding enquiry. In the instant case, there is no Rule prescribing the procedure for conducting the enquiry into the alleged misappropriation of fund or irregularities in holding the AGM by the Cooperative Society Bodies unlike the position in the above cited case where the Act, namely the FEMA the Rules framed there under provides for detailed procedure for holding enquiry. The appellants in the above cited case submitted their preliminary/short reply to show cause and it was found that no real prejudice was caused to them whereas in the present case, admittedly, the appellant submitted his detailed show cause reply followed by an additional reply to the show cause notice. This shows that the present petitioner was in a better position and he, by his own conduct, demonstrated that he was not prejudiced at all and he has no case of real prejudice. 19. This being the position, we find no error in the impugned judgment passed by the learned Single Judge warranting interference in appeal. For the reasons stated above, we uphold and affirm the judgment and order rendered by the learned Single Judge. The appeals stand dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs. Appeal dismissed.