Judgment : This writ petition is instituted by a fair price shop dealer of Yarrabalem village, Mangalagiri Mandal, Guntur District challenging the correctness of the orders passed by the 3rd respondent – Revenue Divisional Officer, Guntur on 10.12.2009 cancelling the authorization of the writ petitioner for the alleged irregularities committed by him. In terms of clause 20(1) of the Public Distribution System Control Order, 2008, the writ petitioner carried the matter in appeal before the Joint Collector who by his order dated 3.3.2010 dismissed the appeal. The writ petitioner thereafter availed the remedy of revision available to him under Clause 21 of the PDS Control Order. The District Collector dismissed the said revision by his order dated 23.8.2010. The validity of these orders are under challenge in this writ petition. The Mandal Revenue Officer, Mangalagiri, filed a report against the petitioner on 3.5.2003 setting out that the petitioner has diverted 172.05 Quintals of rice meant for distribution under `Food for Work’ scheme and hence recommended initiation of disciplinary proceedings against the dealer. Immediately, realizing the gravity of the allegations, the authorization of the writ petitioner was suspended by the Revenue Divisional Officer on 25.6.2003 pending the disciplinary proceedings. A show-cause notice was issued on 21.10.2009 by the Revenue Divisional Officer alleging that the writ petitioner has been supplied with 106.20 quintals of rice under `food for work’ scheme on 25.5.2002 and again on 11.6.2007, another 141.60 quintals was also supplied. At the time of inspection of the fair price shop by the Civil Supplies Deputy Tahsildar, Mangalagiri, on 2.5.2003, there was only 15.75 quintals of stock available physically. After verifying the records, it is realized that the petitioner has not accounted for 172.05 quintals of the rice. Therefore, the writ petitioner was called upon to show-cause as to why his authorization shall not be cancelled for the mis-utilisation of the rice supplied to the petitioner for distribution to those who have participated under the `food for work’ scheme. The petitioner has asserted that that the rice supplied to him was meant for distribution amongst the coolies (workmen) engaged for laying of cement road in the village and hence he delivered the rice to the contractor concerned with good faith with the consent of the concerned Engineer who assured that the necessary coupons would be collected from them and would be handed over later on. But, that did not happen and it was misconstrued by the respondents as if the petitioner has misused the rice. The Revenue Divisional Officer, Guntur passed orders dt.10.12.2009 setting out that the explanation offered by the petitioner is not convincing. Since the petitioner has not accounted for 172.05 quintals of rice meant for distribution under food for work scheme which is worth Rs.23,77,073.10 and thus misappropriated money for his personal gain. The R.D.O passed orders canceling the authorization of the writ petitioner. In terms of Clause 20 of the Public Distribution System (Control) Orders, 1980, an appeal would lie to the Joint Collector against the orders of cancellation of RDO and accordingly, the writ petitioner availed the appellate remedy. The writ petitioner has alleged that no proper enquiry has been conducted in the matter and that only a presumption was sought to be drawn against the petitioner by the RDO that he has not accounted for the PDS rice supplied for the food for wok scheme. Before the Joint Collector, the Deputy Tahsildar, Civil Supplies, Mangalagiri appeared at the time of hearing of the appeal and produced a copy of statement said to have been made by the petitioner on 2.5.2003, at the time of inspection of his shop and in that statement, the petitioner has agreed that he sold away 172.05 quintals of rice in open market due to certain family problems. However, since the writ petitioner was not in a position to account for the huge quantity of rice supplied to him, the Joint Collector has considered it unnecessary to interfere with the orders of cancellation passed by the RDO on 10.12.2009, accordingly, the appeal was dismissed. Then the petitioner carried the matter further in revision to the District Collector in terms of Clause 21 of the PDS Control Orders. The District Collector passed final orders on 23.8.2010 rejecting the revision preferred by the petitioner as he could not find any infirmity in the orders of the RDO as confirmed by the Joint Collector in canceling the authorization of the fair price shop. Heard Sri K. Srinivas, learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Assistant Government Pleader for Civil Supplies and the learned Counsel for the 5th respondent Sri. Yadaiah Jetty. Heard Sri K. Srinivas, learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Assistant Government Pleader for Civil Supplies and the learned Counsel for the 5th respondent Sri. Yadaiah Jetty. Before proceeding further in the matter, I consider it apt to revisit the following principle enunciated by Supreme Court in State Bank of Patiala vs. S.K. Sharma AIR 1996 SC 1669 : “29. ………….There may indeed be any number of varying situations which it is not possible for anyone to foresee. In our respectful opinion, the principles emerging from the decided cases can be stated in the following terms in relation to the disciplinary orders and enquiries: a distinction ought to be made between violation of the principle of natural justice, audi alteram partem, as such and violation of the facet of the said principle. In other words, distinction is between "no notice"/"no hearing" and "no adequate hearing" or to put it in different words, "no opportunity" and "no adequate opportunity". To illustrate take a case where the person is dismissed from service without hearing him altogether [as in Ridge v. Baldwin]. It would be a case falling under the first category and the order of dismissal would be invalid or void, if one chooses to use that expression (Calvin v. Carr). But where the person is dismissed from service, say, without supplying him a copy of the enquiry officer's report (Managing Director, E.C.I.L. v. B. Kanmakar) or without affording him a due opportunity of cross-examining a witness (K.L. Tripathi) it would be a case falling in the latter category -violation of a facet of the said rule of natural justice in which case, the validity of the order has to be tested on the touch-stone of prejudice, i.e., whether, all in all, the person concerned did nor did not have a fair hearing. It would not be correct -in the light of the above decisions to say that for any and every violation of a facet of natural justice or of a rule incorporating such facet, the order passed is altogether void and ought to be set aside without further enquiry. It would not be correct -in the light of the above decisions to say that for any and every violation of a facet of natural justice or of a rule incorporating such facet, the order passed is altogether void and ought to be set aside without further enquiry. In our opinion, the approach and test adopted in B. Kanmakar should govern all cases where the complaint is not that there was no hearing (no notice, no opportunity and no hearing) but one of not affording a proper hearing (i.e., adequate or a full hearing) or of violation of a procedural rule or requirement governing the enquiry; the complaint should be examined on the touchstone of prejudice as aforesaid. 30. The matter can be looked at from the angle of justice or of natural justice also. The object of the principles of natural justice -which are now understood as synonymous with the obligation to provide a fair hearing is to ensure that justice is done, that there is no failure of justice and that every person whose rights are going to be affected by the proposed action gets a fair hearing. The said objective can be tested with reference to Sub-clause (iii) concerned herein. It says that copies of statements of witnesses should be furnished to the delinquent officer "not later than three days before the commencement of the examination of the witnesses by the inquiring Authority". Now take a case -not the one before us -where the copies of statements are supplied only two days before the commencement of examination of witnesses instead of three days. The delinquent officer does not object; he does not say that two days are not sufficient for him to prepare himself for cross-examining the witnesses. The enquiry is con-eluded and he is punished. Is the enquiry and the punishment awarded to be set aside on the only ground that instead of three days before, the statements were supplied only two days before the commencement of the examination of witnesses? It is suggested by the Appellate Court that Sub-clause (iii) is mandatory since it uses the expression "shall". Merely because, word "shall" is used, it is not possible to agree that it is mandatory. We shall, however, assume it to be so for the purpose of this discussion. It is suggested by the Appellate Court that Sub-clause (iii) is mandatory since it uses the expression "shall". Merely because, word "shall" is used, it is not possible to agree that it is mandatory. We shall, however, assume it to be so for the purpose of this discussion. But then even a mandatory requirement can be waived by the person concerned if such mandatory provision is conceived in his interest and not in public interest, vide Dhirendra Nath Gorai v. Sudhir Chandra Ghosh and Ors. [1964]6SCR1001 . Subba Rao, J., speaking for the Court, held : Where the court acts without inherent jurisdiction, a party affected cannot by waiver confer jurisdiction on it, which it has not. Where such jurisdiction is not wanting, a directory provision can obviously be waived. But a mandatory provision can only be waived if it is not conceived in the public interests, but in the interests of the party that waives it………” The learned Counsel for the writ petitioner has placed strong reliance on the Judgments rendered by this Court in M. Sadasiva Sekhar vs. District Collector [ 2003 (3) ALT 68 ], Katamreddi Vasundhara vs. Joint Collector, Ananthapur [ 2008 (4) ALT 475 ], Ambati Srinivasulu vs. District Collector, Nellore [ 2006 (1) ALT 273 ] and Kalyani vs. District Collector, Prakasham District [2006 (5) ALD 796] in support of his contention that without conducting enquiry the petitioner’s authorization cannot be cancelled. In M. Sadasiva Sekhar vs. District Collector the learned single Judge has summarized the relevant principles in para-24, as under: “24. The above sub-clause confers power on the appointing authority to suspend or cancel the authorization subject to conducting enquiry and recording reasons. The phrase "after making such enquiry as may be deemed necessary" makes it plain that discretion is vested in the appointing authority as to the nature, method and manner of conducting enquiry as is deemed necessary. There can be no hard and fast rule that in every case of suspension or cancellation, the appointing authority should afford an opportunity of being heard to the fair price shop dealer {See M.P.Jndustries Ltd. v. Union of India (supra)}. No doubt, the word "enquiry" into the allegations against a dealer has a broad connotation and takes in its fold an opportunity of filing explanation to the parties and/or affording a right of hearing. No doubt, the word "enquiry" into the allegations against a dealer has a broad connotation and takes in its fold an opportunity of filing explanation to the parties and/or affording a right of hearing. Because the legislature used the words "such enquiry as may be deemed necessary", we have to give a restricted meaning to the phrase and leave it to the appointing authority whether or not the fair price shop dealer should be heard. It is not possible to accept the submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner and supply the words so as to make Sub-clause (4) of Clause 3 read providing opportunity of being heard'. This conclusion also derives support from the various principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the cases discussed hereinabove and the same may be stated thus: 1. 'Personal hearing' is not considered as an incident of rule of audi alteram partem. A person is entitled to an opportunity of making a representation even if delegated legislation is silent on the same. The same is not, however, true with regard to affording a personal hearing to an aggrieved party. The law treats an opportunity to make a representation also as a personal hearing. {See M.P. Industries Ltd. v. Union of India and Indru Ramchand Bharvani v. Union of India (supra)}; 2. When delegated legislation excludes 'personal hearing' it is not permissible for the Court to read into the rule 'an opportunity of being heard by the authority'; 3. When the rule itself says that an authority is vested with the power to conduct "such enquiry as deemed fit", the discretion is left to the authority as to what is the nature of enquiry. If the authority, as a part of such enquiry, intends to give an opportunity of being heard, it must be treated as a manifestation of exercise of discretion in the facts of a particular case and not as a general rule; 4. Clause 3(4) of the A.P. Scheduled Commodities (Regulation of Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 does not require the appointing authority to afford an opportunity of being heard to the fair price shop dealer. Clause 3(4) of the A.P. Scheduled Commodities (Regulation of Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 does not require the appointing authority to afford an opportunity of being heard to the fair price shop dealer. However, if proposed action is both for cancellation/ suspension as well as forfeiture of the deposit under Clause 3(2) of the Control Order, it is a case where the appointing authority compulsorily is required to afford an opportunity of making a representation as well as an opportunity of being heard; 5. In all cases where an enquiry is conducted under Clause 3(4) of the Control Order and where an opportunity of personal hearing is not given, the burden is on the dealer to plead and prove the prejudice caused to him by not giving a personal hearing. Illegality of the order cannot be readily presumed wherever no personal hearing was given {See State Bank of Patiala v. S.K.Sharma, M.C.Mehta v. Union of India and Aligarh Muslim University v. Mansoor Ali Khan (supra)}; 6. (a) In a case where a show cause notice is issued requiring submission of explanation and also affording personal hearing, if desired, and the authority fails to afford such opportunity, the impugned order has to be scrutinized by applying the test of prejudice; and (b) In a case where a show cause notice is issued requiring submission of explanation and also affording personal hearing, if desired, and the aggrieved party fails to exercise such option for personal hearing, it should be deemed that he has waived such right of being heard {See State Bank of Patiala v. S.K.Sharma (supra)}. 25. In every case where the authorization is cancelled after affording an opportunity of making a representation/ filing explanation, even if oral hearing is not held, the dealer has to plead and prove the prejudice caused to him……” It is appropriate to notice the charges leveled against the petitioner and the explanation offered by him thereto. The first charge reads as under: “Charge-I:During inspection of F.P. Shop by the CSDT, Mangalagiri on 02.05.2003, it was found that the FFW rice of Qtls.172.05 Kgs. Short as detailed here under. The first charge reads as under: “Charge-I:During inspection of F.P. Shop by the CSDT, Mangalagiri on 02.05.2003, it was found that the FFW rice of Qtls.172.05 Kgs. Short as detailed here under. Commodity Date of receipt As per Stock Register As per ground balance Variation FFW Rice 25.05.2002 106.20 FFW Rice 11 -06-2007 141 -60 247.80 15-75 172-50 Thus the dealer diverted Qtls.172.05 of FFW rice to Black Market and misused for his personal gain by violating A.P. Control Orders 1973.” The explanation of the writ petitioner was that that he has supplied the Food for Work Scheme rice to the contractor with good faith and with the consent of the concerned engineer, for purposes of distribution of the same to the coolies who attended to the work for laying cement road in the village. But however, the contractor has not handed-over the coupons from the coolies even after completion of road works and thus, he was cheated by the contractor. The second charge is only an off-shoot of the first charge, in that it is alleged that the petitioner has not maintained properly the records which led to the misuse of rice supplied to him under Food for Work Scheme. From the above charge and explanation offered by the petitioner, it emerges that the writ petitioner has not denied or disputed the fact which formed the basis of charge number 1, laid against him. Significantly, the petitioner has not disputed that he has received huge quantities of stock of rice meant for distribution under Food for Work Scheme. When once the petitioner does not dispute the fact that he has received such a huge quantity of rice, supplied by the State, it is for him to account for the same. He has not made any entry in the sales registers or records nor did he produce any receipt from the contractor/engineer about his supplying rice meant for Food for Work Scheme for distribution to the coolies. It is the version of the writ petitioner that he has supplied the rice to the contractor in good faith and with the express consent of the engineer but he has not backed these statements with any credible or reliable material in support thereof. It is the version of the writ petitioner that he has supplied the rice to the contractor in good faith and with the express consent of the engineer but he has not backed these statements with any credible or reliable material in support thereof. Therefore, it is for the petitioner to establish that he has made available the rice received by him to the contractor/engineer for eventual distribution under the food for work scheme. It is, therefore, clear that the writ petitioner has failed to produce any reasonably acceptable material in defense of his plea, in discharge of the burden lying on him. The matter would have been entirely different if the petitioner has denied or disputed his being supplied with such huge quantities of rice meant for distribution under Food for Work Scheme. In such an event, the burden would have been lying on the disciplinary authority to establish the primary fact that such a huge quantity of rice has been supplied to the petitioner at the first instance. To my mind, when the dealer of a fair-price shop does not dispute his receiving such quantities of rice meant for distribution under food for work scheme, or for public distribution, it is for him to properly account for the same. If the disciplinary authority is disagreeing with his method of accounting for the quantities received, then, it is for the disciplinary authority to establish as to how the charge is liable to be held established. In other words, where a fair-price shop dealer tacitly admits his receiving huge quantities of subsidized food-grains, but fails to account for the same properly, the burden is lying heavily on him for his failure to account for the received quantities properly. That is what has happened in this case. When once the petitioner has asserted that, he has supplied the rice to the contractor/engineer, it is for him to establish this fact by either producing an appropriate receipt in acknowledgement thereof or by examining contractor/ engineer or the coolies who have received the food-grains. Failure to establish his defense makes his position vulnerable. It amounts to failure of the dealer to account for the received quantities. Therefore, the explanation offered by the petitioner in this case can only be described as not convincing. Failure to establish his defense makes his position vulnerable. It amounts to failure of the dealer to account for the received quantities. Therefore, the explanation offered by the petitioner in this case can only be described as not convincing. I, therefore, do not find any impropriety or illegality or infirmity in recording of the said finding by the disciplinary authority as well as the appellate and revisional authorities. For the sheer failure of the writ petitioner to properly account for a huge stock of rice received by him for distribution under the food for work scheme, the license/authorization granted in his favour is justifiably liable to be cancelled. Hence, I do not find any merit in this writ petition and it is accordingly dismissed. Consequently, all miscellaneous applications, shall stand disposed of with this order. No costs.