Iqbal Ahmed v. District Grand Lodge of Mark Master Mason of Bengal
2012-05-16
MRINAL KANTI CHAUDHURI, PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE
body2012
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JUDGMENT Pinaki Chandra Ghose, J. 1. This appeal is directed against an order passed by the learned 5th Judge, City Civil Court at Calcutta on 8th April. 2011. It appears that the learned Trial Court disposed of the injunction petition filed by the plaintiff under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 read with section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure and directed the parties to maintain status quo in respect of their respective possession over the suit premises till the disposal of the suit. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the said order the defendant/ appellant filed this appeal before this Court. 2. The facts of the case briefly are as follows:- The plaintiff, the District Grand Lodge of Mark Master Mason of Bengal prayed for a declaration of a suit that he is entitled to use. enjoy, operate. control, manage and administer the eastern hall with adjoining lawn at premises No. 19. Park Street. Calcutta-16 through its appointed operating agent. In the said suit for declaration the plaintiff also prayed for permanent injunction restraining the defendants, their men, agents and servants from creating or causing any disturbance, obstruction or interference with the plaintiff's free and peaceful enjoyment and full control over the property in question. In the said suit an application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been made for an order restraining the defendants, their men and agents and servants from making any obstruction in smooth running of the plaintiff's administration, management, supervision and control over the eastern hall with adjoining lawn of the premises. 3. It is stated by the plaintiff in the said application for injunction that the plaintiff is a registered society duly registered under the Society's Act. II is an association of persons as well as charitable organization and District Grand Master is the head of the association. It is further stated that English Free Masonry is a 300 years old Order spread all over the world with its head office in London. In Bengal, the English and Indian Free Masons are divided into two districts namely Free Mason (Craft) and Free Mason (Mark) headed by District Grand Master. It is further stated that these two districts are two wings of the same order having its head office in London. 4.
In Bengal, the English and Indian Free Masons are divided into two districts namely Free Mason (Craft) and Free Mason (Mark) headed by District Grand Master. It is further stated that these two districts are two wings of the same order having its head office in London. 4. It is further case of the plaintiff that since inception both the District Free Mason (Mark) and District Free Mason (Craft) in Bengal were being headed by one and single D.G.M. However, in the year 1998 by an internal arrangement the two D.G. Ms were selected for two District Grand Lodges i.e. District Grand Lodge (Mark) and District Grand Lodge (Craft). 5. The defendant No. 1 was appointed as District Grand Master (Craft) of the District Grand Lodge of Bengal. By an internal arrangement and by way of (sic) settlement the portion eastern hall of the building with adjoining lawn is in occupation, management and control of the plaintiff whereas the western hall of the building is under the occupation and management of the District Grand Lodge (Craft) of Bengal. The defendant No. 1 has been appointed as a District Grand Master. 6. It appears that the appellant/respondent filed written objection before the Trial Court and submitted that the plaintiffs and defendant No. 3 are separate organization of masonic order having different parent bodies and origin in England. It is further stated that they have their separate rules and bye laws and the defendant Nos. 3 and 4 are not guided by the plaintiffs organization or any other organization of masonic order. The defendant No. 4, Bengal Free Mason Trust Association (hereinafter referred to as the 'B.F.T.A.') is a company registered under section 25 of the Companies Act created by D.G.M. and upon whom all assets, land, building etc. at 19. Park Street have been vested. B.F.T.A. operates as trustee to look after the interest of the members of the craft bodies and not the bodies under Mark Master Mason. It is further stated that District Grand Lodge has formed a committee named Masonic Hall Committee which has been vested by D.G.A. with the power to look after the administration and management of various halls known as Temple Masonic Hall Committee and the said committee allotted the premises at its discretion. 7. It is the case of the defendant/appellant herein that the property at 19. Park Street.
7. It is the case of the defendant/appellant herein that the property at 19. Park Street. Calcutta-16 is owned by District Grand Lodge (defendant No. 3) and has been vested to the Bengal Free Mason Trust Association (B.F.T.A.) (defendant No. 4) and the office situated at premises No. 19. Park Street. Calcutta-16 belonging to District Grand Lodge of Bengal and Bengal Free Mason Trust Association. 8. It is further stated that the plaintiff was allowed to hold meeting in the building at the suit premises upon written request from time to time and the plaintiff is completely different, independent body having no direct connection with the defendants. It is stated out of courtesy and good gesture the plaintiffs and private lodges under it were allowed to hold meeting in the building at the suit premises. The defendant No. 1 /appellant herein as owner of the land and building at premises No. 19, Park Street, Calcutta had entered into an agreement with one Sumita Dutta, proprietress of M/s. S. Enterprise and appointed her as operating agent for management of a portion of the suit premises. The said agreement was expired on 31st March, 2009. 9. It is further stated that the instant suit is nothing but an attempt on the part of the plaintiff to protect the said Sumita Dutta in active collusion and conspiracy with each other. The possession of the plaintiff in respect of the eastern hall with adjoining lawn of the suit premises as a co-trustee is categorically denied by the defendants/appellants. 10. It is further staled that the injunction petition is without any merit and is liable to be rejected. 11. The learned Trial Court after considering the materials placed before it Held that the eastern hall along with adjoining lawn is in possession of the plaintiff. The learned Trial Court further held that where a person is in possession of property even on the assumption that he had no right to remain on the property he can not be dispossessed by the owner therefrom except by re-course of law. Therefore, the possession of the plaintiff lodge can not be disturbed without recourse of laws. 12.
The learned Trial Court further held that where a person is in possession of property even on the assumption that he had no right to remain on the property he can not be dispossessed by the owner therefrom except by re-course of law. Therefore, the possession of the plaintiff lodge can not be disturbed without recourse of laws. 12. The learned Trial Court also raised a question that "Whether the defendant No. 4 on the strength of Indenture dated 28.9.1912 has acquired an exclusive right, title and interest in the premises in suit or not?" is the determining factor for granting an injunction in the matter. 13. According to the learned Trial Court the possession of the eastern hall with adjoining lawn is with the plaintiff and if an order directing both the sides to maintain status quo in respect of their respective possession in the suit premises, the same would not result in defeating the cause of natural justice and none will be affected. Hence, the learned Trial Court directed to maintain status quo in respect of their respective possession over the suit premises till the disposal of the suit. 14. The said decision has been questioned by the appellant and others and it is submitted before us that prima facie finding of the learned Trial Judge is wholly unsustainable in respect of the plaintiffs possession of eastern hall with adjoining lawn and it should be set aside. 15. It is submitted on behalf of the appellant that in paragraph 4 of the plaint it is stated that by an amicable settlement, portion of the building is being occupied by the plaintiff which includes eastern hall along with adjoining lawn, Such alleged settlement has not produced before the Court or no other documents have been produced before the Court to substantiate such settlement before the Court. Therefore, in the absence of such documents there was no settlement at all between the parties. 16. It is further pointed out that the plaintiff was making bookings against payment for hall for holding their meetings. It is also submitted that the plaintiff was admittedly having no right over the premises in question except for the permissive right to hold their meetings in the Grant Lodge at the suit premises against payment made to the appellants Nos. 3 and 4.
It is also submitted that the plaintiff was admittedly having no right over the premises in question except for the permissive right to hold their meetings in the Grant Lodge at the suit premises against payment made to the appellants Nos. 3 and 4. The said documents unequivocally prove the ownership of the appellants over premises No. 19. Park Street. Kolkata-700016. 17. It is further stated that the appellant No. 4 is a company registered under section 25 of the Companies Act and admittedly the owner of the land. The conveyance was also annexed to the paper book to which our attention has been drawn on behalf of the appellant. It is further stated that since the appellant No. 4 is a company without holding a Board Meeting and adopting resolution nobody can be authorized to entered into any such settlement. It is also stated that the plaintiff has not alleged any terms or conditions under which the said purported amicable settlement was entered into. It is further stated that that plaintiff has no right to allow a third party to use the property in question on payment. 18. It is further submitted that no date of amicable settlement is mentioned or no particulars have been furnished. Hence, it is submitted that the plaintiff has thus failed to make out a prima facie case to show they have any right to property or as to the possession of the property in question. 19. It is further pointed out that on the basis of Memorandum of Understanding between the appellant No. 4 and Mrs. Sumita Dutta. would clearly show that as on 1st July. 2005 the said contractor was handed over possession of the said eastern hall along with adjoining lawn on an undertaking to pay certain consideration for user thereof to the appellant No. 4. It is also admitted that Mrs. Sumita Dutta did not hand over possession of the eastern hall along with adjoining lawn after expiry of the period for which an arbitration proceeding have been instituted. 20. It is further submitted that the plaintiff filed a Title Suit No. 1618 of 2010 and in the said suit it is the specific case of the plaintiff that B.F.T.A. is the owner and they only hold meetings after obtaining permission and on payment of charges.
20. It is further submitted that the plaintiff filed a Title Suit No. 1618 of 2010 and in the said suit it is the specific case of the plaintiff that B.F.T.A. is the owner and they only hold meetings after obtaining permission and on payment of charges. Thereafter the stand of the plaintiff is that the plaintiff was a co-trustee in respect of the said premises without explaining that it the company was the owner of the property, how the plaintiff could become a co-trustee without the company creating a Trust and bring the said property within the Trust. An ex parte amendment order was obtained in the said suit which was specifically withdrawn by the plaintiff and thereafter the plaintiff filed the instant T.S. No. 3153 of 2010 with a new stand. Therefore, it is submitted that the plaintiff himself has taken different stand to suits its need. The plaintiff has miserably failed to prove that it has any ownership or occupancy right in the suit premises. 21. It is submitted that the plaintiff is not in possession of the eastern hall with adjoining lawn at the said premises. It is also submitted that the proceedings in Title Suit No. 3153 of 2010 was filed ostensibly to benefit the contractor Mrs. Sumita Dutta. According to the appellant the instant suit is a collusive litigation between Mrs. Sumita Dutta and the plaintiff. It is further submitted that the order of status quo does not assist the plaintiff. The present suit and the injunction application has been filed mala fide to circumvent the arbitration proceeding and with a view to avoid the award and/or make it a nullity. 22. It is further submitted that the order of status quo does not benefit the plaintiff at all as the plaintiff is not in possession of any portion of eastern hall with adjoining lawn but such order would benefit Mrs. Sumita Dutta. the contractor. 23. It is further submitted that the interim order should be vacated on the ground that the interim order was passed at the instance of a third party who has no ownership or possession of the suit property.
Sumita Dutta. the contractor. 23. It is further submitted that the interim order should be vacated on the ground that the interim order was passed at the instance of a third party who has no ownership or possession of the suit property. It is also submitted that it is the settled law that no injunction could be directed against the owner at the instance of the third party or a non-owner who has no right in respect of the suit property and reliance has been placed on a decision of Kishore Kumar Khaitan & Anr. v. Praveen Kumar Singh reported in (2006) 3 SCC 312 Pr. 5 & 6. 24. It is further submitted that the interim order should also be vacated in view of section 41(j) of the Specific Relief Act. as the plaintiff has no personal interest in the matter. It is also submitted that the whole proceeding is misconceived and the suit has been filed by the plaintiff at the instance of the contractor Mrs. Sumita Dutta. It is further submitted that the steps have been taken with vexatious motives and reliance has been placed on a decision of T. (sic) v. T.V. Satyapal reported in (1977) 4 SCC 467 . It is further submitted that the suit is not maintainable and liable to be dismissed. 25. The present suit which has been tiled in the name of a registered society staled to be registered under the Indian Societies and Registration Act, XXVI of 1961. There is no such Act prevailing at the moment and a society should be registered either under the Societies Registration Act. 1860 or under West Bengal Societies Registration Act, 1961. It is further submitted that the suit is not maintainable and the facts as pleaded on the basis of this the interim order should be vacated. 26. It is submitted on behalf of the respondent that one Subroto Chaterji was appointed as the Secretary to District Grand Master (Mark) since then who is still functioning the said post. The appellant Iqbal Ahmed is the District Grand Master (Craft), has instituted this appeal. It is further submitted that he has retired from the said post on 4th February and hence. this appeal becomes infructuous unless the present District Grant Master (Craft) files a fresh appeal. 27.
The appellant Iqbal Ahmed is the District Grand Master (Craft), has instituted this appeal. It is further submitted that he has retired from the said post on 4th February and hence. this appeal becomes infructuous unless the present District Grant Master (Craft) files a fresh appeal. 27. It is further submitted that the position of the possession of the eastern hall and adjoining lawn is in possession of the respondent. It is also submitted that the injunction petition should be decided on a balance of convenience and inconvenience: the prima facie case; and irreparable loss and injury. It is further submitted that the Court after taking into consideration of those criteria has passed this status quo order and reliance was also placed on decisions Skyline Education Institute (India) (P) Ltd. v. S.L. Vaswani reported in (2010) 2 SCC 142 and (sic) Kumar & Anr. v. Prahlad Singh & Ors. reported in 1993 SC 276. 28. After having heard the learned counsel for both the parties and the materials placed before the Court, it appears to us that the discretion, which has been exercised by the learned Trial Court, is that since the suit is pending and the right, title and interest of the parties are yet to be decided the status quo order should be maintained. The learned Trial Court has already decided the question on the basis of the reasons given in the said order. The said exercise of discretion is based upon objective consideration of the materials placed before the Court and in our considered opinion, we do not find any reason to interfere with the said order. 29. Accordingly, we do not find any illegality or irregularity in the order so passed by the learned Trial Court and we further find that discretion has been applied in this matter property and not capriciously. Hence, we find no merit in this appeal and the appeal is dismissed. 30. Before we part, we have been informed that arbitration proceeding. which was pending before the learned arbitrator, has already been concluded and adjudicated upon. The order so passed by us is absolutely at the interlocutory stage and if the award so passed by the arbitral tribunal regarding the right, title and interest in respect of the property in question.
30. Before we part, we have been informed that arbitration proceeding. which was pending before the learned arbitrator, has already been concluded and adjudicated upon. The order so passed by us is absolutely at the interlocutory stage and if the award so passed by the arbitral tribunal regarding the right, title and interest in respect of the property in question. in our considered opinion, the parties shall be at liberty to proceed in the matter in accordance with the provisions of law. Since the appeal is dismissed, the connected application being C.A.N. No. 8844 of 2011 has become infructuous and the same is also dismissed. Xerox certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, be supplied to the parties on usual undertakings. I agree. Appeal dismissed