JUDGMENT (Per N.V. Ramana, J.) This appeal is directed against the conviction and sentence passed in S.C. No. 21 of 2007 by the Sessions Judge, Nellore on 20.02.2008. 2. The appellant herein was prosecuted for the offence under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short "IPC"). According to the prosecution, the deceased Dasari Syamala, who was working as Typist in Udayagiri Taluk Office and at that time the accused was working as Attender in Library at Udayagiri. The accused and the deceased fell in love and they married in the year 1979 and out of the wedlock they were blessed with three children. Later, the deceased was promoted to the post of MRO and posted at Dagadarthi Mandal. The accused became a Librarian. Both of them were residing in the house at Nellore and attending to their duties. After sometime, the accused felt that his wife is holding higher post than him and he developed jealousy towards the deceased. Since ten years prior to the death of the deceased, misunderstandings developed between the accused and the deceased. Both were not in talking terms even though they were residing in the same house. In the year, 2001, P.W.2 fell in love with Gobbilla Ravi Chandra and the deceased celebrated the marriage against the wishes of the accused. Since then the accused accelerated his grouse against the deceased and now and then the accused tried to yield the deceased to share his bed, but the deceased rejected him. Hence, the accused has been waiting for an opportunity to wreck vengeance against the deceased. On 16.05.2006 P.W.1 left Nellore for Hyderabad to bring his brother D.W.1, who was studying there. During the night of 17.05.2006 the accused and the deceased were alone in the house, taking advantage of the same, at 01.00 hours the accused went into the bed room of the deceased to have sexual intercourse with her but she refused for the same. Having frustrated with the attitude of the deceased, the accused wanted to execute his plan and poured petrol on the deceased, which was secured earlier by him. Then the deceased came out of the bed room to the hall and the accused set her ablaze by lighting a match stick. The accused was engulfed with the flames and she raised cries due to the burn injuries. Then the deceased came out of the bed room to the hall and the accused set her ablaze by lighting a match stick. The accused was engulfed with the flames and she raised cries due to the burn injuries. Having heard the cries, P.W.5, who is neighbour, rushed to the scene of offence and witnessed the occurrence and put off the flames by covering the deceased with the clothes. The accused also sustained burns at the time of occurrence. Thereafter, P.W.2 and her husband came there and shifted her to Bollineni Hospital, Nellore in an ambulance. On the information received by P.W.9, the A.S.I. rushed to the hospital and recorded the statement of the deceased at 4.30 hours on 18.05.2006 and returned back to the police station and registered the same as a case in Cr. No. 111 of 2006 under Section 307 of IPC and issued the FIR and P.W.12 took up the investigation. The Judicial First Class Magistrate, Nellore, P.W.8 has recorded the dying declaration of the deceased in the early hours of 18.05.2006. On 18.05.2006 P.W.1 and D.W.1 returned from Hyderabad to Nellore and noticed their mother with burn injuries in the hospital and learnt about the occurrence, tried to shift the deceased to Chennai for better treatment but she succumbed to burn injuries on the way to Chennai. The dead body was brought back to Nellore. On the information given by P.W.1, the section of law was altered to 302 of IPC and P.W.12 took up further investigation and held inquest over the dead body of the deceased in the presence of P.W.5 and another and the dead body was sent for post mortem examination and the doctor, P.W.6, who conducted post mortem examination over the dead body of the deceased, opined that the deceased died due to extensive burn injuries. On 19.05.2006 P.W.12 arrested the accused and sent to the Government Hospital, Nellore for examination and P.W.7 examined the accused and opined that he sustained simple burn injuries. P.W.12 has sent the material objects for Regional Forensic Science Laboratory, Guntur and received report stating that the item No. 1 is petrol and traces of hydrocarbons are found in item Nos. 2 and 3. Hence, he has filed the charge sheet against the accused. 3. P.W.12 has sent the material objects for Regional Forensic Science Laboratory, Guntur and received report stating that the item No. 1 is petrol and traces of hydrocarbons are found in item Nos. 2 and 3. Hence, he has filed the charge sheet against the accused. 3. The learned Sessions Judge, Nellore has framed a charge under Section 302 of IPC against the accused and the accused pleaded not guilty for the said charge. 4. The prosecution in order to establish the said charge examined P.Ws. 1 to 12 and got marked Exs.P-1 to P-17 and M.Os. 1 to 4. On behalf of the accused, D.W.1 was examined and Exs. D-1 and D-2 were marked. 5. Taking into consideration of said oral and documentary evidence, the learned Sessions Judge found the accused guilty for the charge under Section 302 of IPC, convicted and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment for life. Aggrieved by the said conviction and sentence, the present appeal is filed. 6. The point that arises for consideration is whether the prosecution could able to establish the charge under Section 302 of IPC against the accused beyond reasonable doubt? POINT: 7. The appellant's counsel has pleaded that there are no eye witnesses to the incident and the circumstantial evidence of P.W.5 also does pot disclose that the accused is responsible for the burns of the deceased and the only evidence available on record with regard to the cause of death of the deceased is dying declarations recorded by P.Ws. 8 and 9, but the said dying declarations cannot be relied upon as P.W.12 also recorded the statement of the deceased during the course of investigation and said statement was suppressed by the prosecution, as such adverse inference has to be drawn against the prosecution and the entire story of the prosecution cannot be accepted. He further pleaded that even the dying declarations and oral evidence adduced by the prosecution, there is a contradiction with regard to the use of petrol or kerosene by the accused for setting fire to the deceased and also about the admission of the deceased in the hospital. There is contradiction with regard to scene of offence between the oral evidence and the scene of offence panchanama. There is contradiction with regard to scene of offence between the oral evidence and the scene of offence panchanama. He further pleaded that the accused admitted the deceased in the hospital and the conduct of the accused shows that he has not committed the offence and the deceased has committed suicide as an enquiry is going on against her with regard to the caste certificate produced by her for getting the job. 8. The Additional Public Prosecutor, on the other hand, pleaded that the dying declarations recorded by P.Ws. 8 and 9 are consistent and the same was supported by the oral evidence of P.W.2, the daughter of the deceased, to whom the deceased has disclosed about the cause of her burn injuries and simply because the statement said to have been recorded by P.W.12 was not produced before the Court no adverse inference can be drawn against the prosecution to disbelieve the entire story of the prosecution. She further pleaded that there is no variation in the place of incident and the variation with regard to the using of petrol or kerosene and admission of the deceased in the hospital, are only minor discrepancies, which are not fatal to the case of the prosecution. She further pleaded that simply because the accused has admitted the deceased in the hospital, it cannot be said that he has not committed the offence and the accused has failed to establish the defence taken by him that the deceased has committed suicide by pouring petrol by herself. 9. According to the prosecution, there are disputes between the deceased and they are not in talking terms since more than 10 years even though they are residing in the same house and on 17.05.2006 the accused and the deceased were alone in the house. The accused entered into the bed room of the deceased and tried to have sexual intercourse with her. On her refusal he got frustrated and poured petrol on her, which was secured by him and then the deceased came outside from the bed room into the hall, there the accused lighted the match stick and put her in flames. On hearing the cries of the deceased, P.W.5, the neighbour came there and put off the flames and informed to her daughter and son-in-law, who came and admitted her in Bollineni Hospital, Nellore. 10. On hearing the cries of the deceased, P.W.5, the neighbour came there and put off the flames and informed to her daughter and son-in-law, who came and admitted her in Bollineni Hospital, Nellore. 10. P.W.1 is the son of the deceased and the accused. He has not supported the case of the prosecution. According to him, he was not present on 17.05.2006 at Nellore on the date of incident as he has gone to Hyderabad and on return the accused informed him that the deceased poured petrol on her, set fire to herself and she was admitted in Bollineni Hospital, Nellore, when he enquired with the deceased, she also stated that an enquiry is being held with regard to her caste certificate and she was tensed and poured petrol on her body and set herself on fire. 11. P.W.2, who is the daughter of the deceased and according to her, she married one Ravi Chandra against the will of her father. The deceased has performed their marriage about six years back and the accused was jealous towards the deceased as she was in higher post than him. They have no family life, though they are staying in the same house. At about one year three months back, when she was at her house, the accused came and informed her husband that the deceased was burnt herself and her husband went there first and then she followed him and found the deceased with bum injuries, then she was put in the ambulance, the deceased told her that the accused sprinkled petrol on her when she was in the bed room and when she questioned the same a quarrel took place between them and when she came out of the bed room, the accused set fire to her by lighting match stick and she also stated that on hearing the cries, the neighbour, who was a Pastor, came and got the locks opened and put off the flames. 12. P.W.3, who is the person put off the flames, has stated that about one year back during night time in the early hours, they heard cries and noticed that the cries are from the house of the accused and found the deceased in flames. He tried to open the door by pushing as it was locked. 12. P.W.3, who is the person put off the flames, has stated that about one year back during night time in the early hours, they heard cries and noticed that the cries are from the house of the accused and found the deceased in flames. He tried to open the door by pushing as it was locked. The deceased after searching the keys opened the door and came out and the accused also came out along with her. The flames were extinguished by putting some water given by his wife. The deceased wanted her daughter to be called. The deceased was laid on the floor and covered with clothes. The accused went and brought her daughter, he did not question the deceased about the cause of her bums. When P.W.2 questioned her as to the cause, the deceased said that what happened is happened and thereafter ambulance came and the deceased was taken to the hospital. After admission in the hospital, the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Nellore, i.e. P.W.8 on receipt of intimation from the hospital, recorded the dying declaration of the deceased. 13. According to P.W.8, the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Nellore that on 18.05.2006, at about 3.20 a.m. he received requisition from Bollineni Hospital for recording the dying declaration of one P. Syamala. Then he rushed to the Bollineni Super Specialty Hospital and the duty doctor identified the patient. In the presence of duty doctor, he has put some questions to the patient in order to ascertain the state of mind of the declarant, after recording the preliminary questions and answers given by the declarant, he satisfied that the patient is conscious, coherent and in a fit state of mind to give the statement. The duty doctor also certified the same. Thereafter, he recorded the statement of the deceased, obtained the toe impression of the victim as she cannot sign due to injuries and again obtained certificate from the duty medical officer. He read over the statement to the declarant and admitted by her to be correct. Ex.P-8 is requisition and Ex.P-9 is statement recorded by him. 14. Thereafter, P.W.9, the A.S.I., V-Town Police Station, Nellore has received intimation from the HC-751 of IV Town Police Station, Nellore, immediately he proceeded to Bollineni Hospital, found the injured and recorded the statement of the deceased in the presence of Dr. Ex.P-8 is requisition and Ex.P-9 is statement recorded by him. 14. Thereafter, P.W.9, the A.S.I., V-Town Police Station, Nellore has received intimation from the HC-751 of IV Town Police Station, Nellore, immediately he proceeded to Bollineni Hospital, found the injured and recorded the statement of the deceased in the presence of Dr. Ramesh Babu after satisfying about the conscious and coherence of the patient. He recorded the statement of the deceased, read over the same to her and obtained her toe impression. Ex.P-10 is the statement recorded by him. After returning to the Police Station registered the case in Cr. No. 11 of 2006 and issued the express FIR in Ex.P-11. Ex.P-12 is the intimation received by him. After receiving the information from P.W.1 under Ex.P-1 the section of law was altered to 302 of IPC. 15. The doctor, who certified Exs.P-9 and P-10 was examined as P.W.11. According to him on 18.05.2006 at 01.00 a.m. the patient by name Syamala was admitted in hospital with burns and the intimation was sent to police under Ex.P-12. He certified the consciousness of the deceased when her statement was recorded by police and also by the Magistrate. Exs.P-9 and P-10 are the statements certified by him. 16. Subsequent to the recording of the statements by P.Ws. 8 and 9, the deceased died on the same day at 8.00 p.m. when she was being taken to Chennai. Therefore, the said statements recorded by P.Ws. 8 and 9 became dying declarations and are admissible under Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act. Apart from the above said two dying declarations, the deceased also disclosed about the cause of burns to P.W.2 i.e. her daughter, and it also amounts to oral dying declaration of the deceased. In the oral dying declaration to P.W.2, the deceased has stated that the accused sprinkled petrol on her and when she questioned about the same, there was a quarrel, therefore, they came out of the bed room into the hall and the accused poured more petrol and set fire to her. 17. The first dying declaration was recorded by P.W.8 at 3.20 hours, which is marked as Ex.P-9. 17. The first dying declaration was recorded by P.W.8 at 3.20 hours, which is marked as Ex.P-9. In the said dying declaration, she has stated that while she was sleeping in the bed room at about 1’ o clock she woke up as her husband has sprinkled something on her, she noticed that her husband poured kerosene on her and when he was lighting match stick she pulled the match stick, match box and questioned what he is doing, but without giving any answer he again snatched the match box and put her ablaze on flames. He closed both the doors and later having heard the cries, Prabhudas visited the house. She opened the doors with great difficulty and while he was trying to put off the flames, her husband came from inside and told that he does not know anything and she poured kerosene on herself and lit fire. When Prabhudas sent a message to her son-in-law Ravi Chandra, they came and brought her to the hospital. Subsequently, second dying declaration was recorded by P.W.9, A.S.I. at about 4.15 a.m. which is marked as Ex.P-10, wherein she has stated that on 18.05.2006 at about 1.00 a.m. she was alone lying in the bedroom. One of her sons Rakesh was studying in Hyderabad and Rajesh went to Hyderabad. Herself and her husband were in the house. Her husband entered into the room, put off light and poured kerosene and lit matchstick. Prabhudas, who is resident of opposite house, came and asked to open the door and she opened the door, then Prabhudas covered her with clothes and put of the fire. Later her son-in-law and daughter came and brought her to the hospital by 108 ambulance. Her husband poured kerosene on her and lit fire to her. 18. In the dying declaration, Ex.P-9 recorded by P.W.8 i.e., Judicial First Class Magistrate, Nellore before recording the statement obtained the certificate of the duty doctor P.W.11. He also certified that the patient is conscious and coherent to give statement. Again after completing the recording of statement he has obtained similar certificate from P.W.11. In the statement Ex.P-10 recorded by P.W.10, the doctor P.W.11 has made similar endorsement. He also certified that the patient is conscious and coherent to give statement. Again after completing the recording of statement he has obtained similar certificate from P.W.11. In the statement Ex.P-10 recorded by P.W.10, the doctor P.W.11 has made similar endorsement. Then, both the dying declarations Exs.P-9 and P-10 are consistent with regard to accused pouring kerosene, litting fire to the deceased and Prabhudas coming to the scene of offence, opening the door and extinguishing the fire. 19. In the oral dying declaration to P.W.2 also the deceased has stated the same fact of her husband setting fire to her but there she has stated that the accused sprinkled petrol and set fire to her. 20. P.W.12, the Investigating Officer, has stated that after receiving the FIR in Cr. No. 111 of 2006, he took up the investigation and visited Bollineni Hospital, Nellore at 8.00 a.m. along with A.S.I. Babu Rao, where the injured was undergoing treatment. Then he examined her and recorded her statement. But the said statement recorded by P.W.12 was not produced before the Court. 21. The appellant's counsel has pleaded that non-production of the said statement, which is also a dying declaration of the deceased, an adverse inference has to be drawn against the prosecution under Section 114 (g) of the Indian Evidence Act. In support of his contention, he relied upon the following decisions : 1. Harijana Mulinti Bhushanna and others v. State of A.P. (1) 2004 (2) ALT (Crl.) 571 (DB)(AP.), 2. Savithamma v. State of A.P. (2) 2009 (2) ALT (Crl.) 81. 3. Kalagatla Hasanaiah @ Hasan v. State of A.P. (3) 2011 (1) ALT (Crl.) 402 (DB)(A.P.). 22. In Harijana Mulinti Bhushanna's case referred above, the Investigating Officer P.W.14 has recorded the statement of the deceased Benjamin in the hospital and the said statement was not produced and no explanation was given by him for non-production of the said statement and thereby the appellant's counsel has pleaded that prejudice was caused to the accused for non-production of the said statement and presumption under Section 114, illustration (g) of the Indian Evidence Act has to be drawn against the prosecution and the Division Bench of this Court has held that an adverse inference can be drawn against the prosecution for non-production of dying declaration of Benjamin. But, adverse inference can be drawn only with regard to the attack made on Benjamin and not on Danam, because Benjamin was not present at the time Danam was attacked. It was further examined as to whether such an adverse inference can affect the entire case of the prosecution and observed that it will not. The reason is that the eyewitnesses consistently deposed before the Court about the incident in detail and as already held above, they are truthful witnesses. Therefore, the entire prosecution evidence cannot be thrown on that ground. Thus, the Division Bench of this Court in the above said decision held that when there is other evidence, simply because adverse inference can be drawn for non-production of the dying declaration, the entire prosecution evidence cannot be thrown out. 23. In Savithamma's case referred above, the Division Bench of this Court held that when an earlier statement given by the deceased is not produced by the prosecution, the accused was denied a fair trial and adverse inference has to be drawn against the prosecution under Section 114(g) of the Indian Evidence Act, and whereas in the case on hand, it is pleaded by the appellant that the statement given to P.W.12 i.e. police is not placed on record, and as such, fair trial is denied to the accused, which is fatal to the case of the prosecution. Therefore, the appellant is entitled to be given benefit of doubt and acquitted. 24. We would like to examine the facts and the ratio laid down by the Division Bench of this Court in the above referred case. The mother-in-law, the husband of the deceased were tried for the offence under section 304-B, 302 read with Section 34 IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. The learned Sessions Judge convicted the mother-in-law under Section 3 of the Act. Questioning the said judgment they preferred appeal before this Court. The facts of the case, as per the prosecution are that the deceased and 2nd accused are married four years before the incident and blessed with a daughter. There was demand of dowry from the accused and they never permitted the deceased to go to her parents house. On 05.04.2005, mother of the deceased received a phone call that the deceased was admitted in the hospital. She rushed to the hospital. There was demand of dowry from the accused and they never permitted the deceased to go to her parents house. On 05.04.2005, mother of the deceased received a phone call that the deceased was admitted in the hospital. She rushed to the hospital. Basing on her complaint, a case was registered by the police. P.W.13 recorded the statement. As the concerned Magistrate was on leave, requisition was sent to P.W.10-MRO to record the statement, and after P.W.10 recording the statement, the deceased died about 10.00 pm. 25. It was specifically contended that the statement recorded by the police was not placed before the Court and as such, an adverse inference has to be drawn against the prosecution. Except the statement given to the MRO, no evidence is made out to attract the provisions of Section 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. 26. Then this Court has considered Sirumalla Bhumesh's case (4) 2007 (3) ALT (Crl.) 302 (DB)(A.P.) = 2008 Crl.L.J. 223. Sayarabano Sulthana Begum v. State of Maharashtra (5) (2007) 12 SCC 562 at para 20 of the judgment and held that in view of suppression of earlier dying declaration by the prosecution, which was recorded by PW13, an adverse inference can be drawn against the prosecution under Section 114(g) of the Indian Evidence Act and further at para 22 discussed the judgment of Harijana Mulinn Bhushanna v. State of A.P. (6) 2004 (2) ALT (Crl.) 571. This Court then proceeded further discussing the judgment of the Apex Court in Paneer Selvam's case where the Apex Court after summing up all the principles laid down in its earlier judgments, governing the dying declaration held that dying declaration should be of such a nature as to inspire full confidence of the court in its correctness. The Court has to be guard that the statement of the deceased was not as a result of either tutoring or prompting or a product of imagination. The Court has to be guard that the statement of the deceased was not as a result of either tutoring or prompting or a product of imagination. The Court must be satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind, and finally came to the conclusion that the dying declaration was a result of tutoring to the deceased by the relatives who were present by the side of the deceased and this statement alone cannot be a basis for the conviction and further held that apart from this, there is no other corroborative evidence and held that withholding P.W13 statement is fatal to the case of the prosecution and an adverse inference has to be drawn against the prosecution. 27. When we have gone through the above judgment, we are not able to agree with the contention raised by the learned counsel that the ratio laid down by this Court in the above judgment is that when an important piece of evidence is not placed, an adverse inference has to be drawn as per Section 114(g) of the Act. In the above case, this Court has considered the scope of the dying declaration along with that as there is no other corroborative evidence to prove the dying declaration and in those circumstances held that not placing the statement is another lacuna on the part of the prosecution case. This decision in our considered opinion is not helpful to the facts of the present case on hand because apart from the dying declaration there is other cogent corroborative evidence on record to prove the guilt of the accused. 28. In Sirimulla Bhumesh's case, this Court has taken the view that even if some important documents are not placed on record by the prosecution, the accused cannot be acquitted by drawing a presumption under Section 114(g) of the Evidence Act, if there is other evidence available to accept the case of the prosecution. Finally appeal was allowed and the accused were acquitted as there was no other evidence on record and suppression of the statement recorded by PW3, assumed an important role. 29. Finally appeal was allowed and the accused were acquitted as there was no other evidence on record and suppression of the statement recorded by PW3, assumed an important role. 29. In Sayarabano Sultana Begum's case, where there were two inconsistent dying declarations wherein in one dying declaration the deceased stated that she suffered burn injuries accidentally while in the second dying declaration accused her mother-in-law of pouring kerosene on her pursuant to a quarrel, Court has accepted the second dying declaration as genuine one basing on the other evidence and also observed that the criminal cases are decided on facts and on evidence rather than on case law and precedents. 30. In Kolagatla Hasanaiah @ Hasan's case referred above, the Division Bench of this Court has examined two issues; first, whether the variation between two dying declarations is trivial in nature and explanatory with each other or substantially different and; second, whether the third dying declaration said to have been recorded by P.W.10, Inspector of Police, leads to any adverse inference if it was favourable to the accused. They examined the dying declaration Ex.P-8 recorded by the Sub-Inspector of Police basing on which the FIR was issued and subsequent dying declaration Ex.P-20 recorded by the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Giddalur at 11.30 p.m., observed that both the dying declarations are at variance and do not inspire confidence of the Court and further observed that the Investigating Officer P.W.10 has recorded the statement of the deceased under Section 161 of Cr.P.C. but the same was not produced before the Court. Since the said statement would become dying declaration and non-furnishing of the statement of the deceased to the accused would cause prejudice to the accused. Finally, the Division Bench has given the benefit of doubt to the accused on the ground that the conviction cannot be sustained solely basing, on two dying declarations, which are at variance. More so, the third dying declaration is suppressed and not furnished. 31. Finally, the Division Bench has given the benefit of doubt to the accused on the ground that the conviction cannot be sustained solely basing, on two dying declarations, which are at variance. More so, the third dying declaration is suppressed and not furnished. 31. In M. Venkarta Ramama v. State of AP (7) 2004 (2) ALT (Crl.) 444 (D.B.) (A.P.), in a identical set of facts as that of the case on hand, where the statement given to the police was not placed on record by the prosecution, this Court has held that when nothing is suggested to PW 15 i.e. police officer in the cross-examination that the statement of the deceased recorded by him has been suppressed and that it caused prejudice to the accused and particularly no prejudice has been pleaded by the accused does not in any way dwindle the evidentiary value when the other evidence on record clearly establishes that husband has poured kerosene on the deceased and lit the match box. 32. In view of the contention raised by the appellant counsel and considering the case law, discussed by us supra, we deem it appropriate to discuss the scope and ambit of Section 114(g) of the Evidence Act, which reads as follows : 114. Court may presume existence of certain facts. - The Court may presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business, in their relation to the facts of the particular case. Court may presume existence of certain facts. - The Court may presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business, in their relation to the facts of the particular case. The Court may presume : (a) That a man who is in possession of stolen goods soon after the theft is either the thief or has received the goods knowing them to be stolen, unless he can account for his possession; (b) That an accomplice is unworthy of credit, unless he is corroborated in material particulars; (c) That a bill of exchange, accepted or endorsed, was accepted or endorsed for good consideration; (d) That a thing or state of things which has been shown to be in existence within a period shorter than that within which such things or state of things usually cease to exist, is still in existence; (e) That judicial and official acts have been regularly performed; (f) That the common course of business has been followed in particular cases; (g) That evidence which could be and is not produced would, if produced, be unfavourable to the person who withholds it. (h) That if a man refuses to answer a question which he is not compelled to answer by law, the answer, if given, would be unfavourable to him; (i) That when a document creating an obligation is in the hands of the obligor, the obligation has been discharged. On a careful consideration of the above provision, it is crystal clear that there is no compulsive element in the provision to draw an adverse inference against a party whenever or wherever it fails to produce available document or evidence. The section itself starts with Courts may presume, which provides discretion to the Court whether to draw or not to drawn an adverse inference. Drawing of inference will depend upon facts and circumstances of each case. 33. The section itself starts with Courts may presume, which provides discretion to the Court whether to draw or not to drawn an adverse inference. Drawing of inference will depend upon facts and circumstances of each case. 33. The scope of Section 114(g) of the Evidence Act was dealt by the Apex Court in State of Karnataka v. Moin Patel (8) AIR 1996 SC 3041 , and held that: ...We have given our anxious consideration to this aspect of the matter, and in our view, the approach in such a case would be to find an answer to the question whether the evidence actually produced is reliable or not and not to the question whether non-examination of such witness ipso facto vitiates the entire prosecution case, if the presumption under Section 114(g) of the Evidence Act were to be drawn. In other words, if in a given case, it is found that there are independent witnesses whose evidence is reliable and trustworthy to prove the charges levelled against the accused, the infirmities arising out of non-examination of other independent witnesses will not be sufficient to put the prosecution case out of the Court... 34. In another judgment in Harpal Singh v. Devinder Singh (9) 1997 JT SC 610, the Apex Court held that : The illustration (g) in Section 114 of the Evidence Act is only permissible inference and not necessary inference unless there are other circumstances also to facilitate the drawing of an adverse inference it should not be a mechanical process to draw the adverse inference. 35. There cannot be any dispute that it is the prima facie duty of the prosecution to call all the witnesses and place all the relevant material in connection with the alleged occurrence, but in several cases where the prosecution was not diligent in prosecuting the case or by oversight are not placing, certain material evidence on record or not examining the witnesses who are crucial to bring home the guilt of the accused. In such cases, the accused are taking shelter under Section 114(g) of the Evidence Act and seeking acquittal on this ground. 36. In such cases, the accused are taking shelter under Section 114(g) of the Evidence Act and seeking acquittal on this ground. 36. After elaborately discussing the precedents, both by this Court and the Hon'ble Apex Court, we are of the considered opinion that whenever an important evidence is not produced by the prosecution, ipso facto, it will not give any right to the accused to seek shelter under Section 114(g) of the Evidence Act that an adverse inference should be drawn and it is fatal to the case of the prosecution. 37. As held by the Apex Court, if there are independent witnesses whose evidence is reliable and trustworthy to prove the charges leveled against the accused, the infirmities arising out of non-examination of other independent witnesses will not be sufficient to put the prosecution out of the Court. Therefore, in such an event, the presumption under Section 114(g) of the Evidence Act, will not come to the rescue of the accused. To analyze this aspect, the Courts have to specifically look into the facts and circumstances of each case, the other important evidence available on record, the prejudice that is caused to the accused and then only the Courts have to come to a definite conclusion whether to draw or not to draw adverse inference. 38. Coming to the facts of the case on hand, apart from the statement said to have been recorded by P.W.12, there are two other earlier statements/dying declarations of the deceased. Even if adverse inference is drawn that the said statement recorded by P.W.12 is favourable to the accused, the two earlier dying declarations cannot be thrown out when they are consistent and inspire the confidence of the Court. Therefore, the entire case of the prosecution cannot be thrown out when there is other reliable evidence available on record. Since the two dying declarations Exs.P-9 and P-10 are consistent with regard to the cause of death and pointing out the guilt of the accused and the oral dying declaration given to P.W.2 supports the cause of death of the deceased as stated in Exs.P-9 and P-10, the prosecution could able to establish the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubt. 39. 39. No doubt, the police officer has admitted in his evidence that he has recorded the statement of deceased and no explanation was given by the prosecution for not placing the same on record. It is also noteworthy that at no point o time, the accused has raised any objection with regard to non-placing of the statement nor it was suggested to PW.12 that as it is prejudicial to the case of the prosecution, that statement was not placed and non placing the same has caused prejudice to him. 40. "Adverse inference" does not mean that all the evidence of the prosecution must be disbelieved merely because a particular evidence is not placed. A criminal court is not lean to draw an adverse inference that it would be given contrary version to that of the prosecution case. Even assuming for a moment that the statement recorded by P.W.12 is in favour of the accused, that itself will not be a basis for the Court to acquit the accused. 41. The appellant's counsel has further pleaded that there is variation with regard to the place of incident. As per the prosecution witnesses, the incident has taken place in the bed room and whereas as per the rough sketch of the scene of offence Ex.P-15 burnt saree pieces and match sticks were found in the hall. 42. The said contention of the appellant's counsel cannot be accepted. P.W.5., who has seen the deceased in flames in the house of the accused, has categorically stated that when he tried to open the door by pushing it when it was locked from inside, the deceased opened with great difficulty, then she came out and he extinguished the flames by pouring water and by covering with clothes. As per the scene of offence, the bed room is not visible from outside and only hall is visible through the windows from outside and it is not the case of the prosecution that the deceased set fire to her in the bed room and the deceased has stated to P.W.2 that the accused sprinkled petrol on her while she was on the bed and when she questioned the same, a quarrel took place in between them and she came out of the bed room into the hall, there again the accused poured petrol and set fire to her. Therefore, from the above, the place of incident of burning has taken place in the hall and not in the bed room of the deceased. 43. The next contention of the appellant's counsel is that there is variation with regard to the use of kerosene or petrol. 44. According to prosecution and the oral dying declaration of the deceased given to P.W.2, the daughter of the deceased, that her mother has informed her that the accused has sprinkled petrol on her. The Investigating Officer P.W.12 has stated that his investigation disclosed that the petrol was sprinkled when the deceased was on the bed. But, whereas in the dying declarations of Exs.P-9 and P-10, the deceased has stated that the accused poured kerosene on her and set fire to her. The cause of death of the deceased was setting fire to her by the accused as per the dying declarations. The minor discrepancy in the dying declarations with regard to the use of petrol or kerosene is not fatal to the case of the prosecution. In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Santosh Kumar and others (10) (2009) 9 SCC 626 , the Apex Court held that the minor contradictions in the testimony of witnesses and dying declarations are not fatal to the case of the prosecution and the dying declarations must be construed in proper perspective. Therefore, in view of the above said decision, the minor contradictions in the dying declaration with that of the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, are not fatal to the case of the prosecution. 45. The appellant's counsel has pleaded that the conduct of the accused in admitting the deceased in the hospital after the incident shows that the accused has no intention to cause the death of the deceased and strengthens the version of the accused that the deceased has set fire on her own as she was humiliated in view of the enquiry into the caste certificate produced by her for getting employment. 46. P.W.2 has stated that she took the deceased to the hospital in an ambulance. But in Ex.P-12 the intimation to the police, it was mentioned that the deceased was brought by the accused. In the dying declarations, the deceased has stated that her daughter and son-in-law brought her to the hospital. 46. P.W.2 has stated that she took the deceased to the hospital in an ambulance. But in Ex.P-12 the intimation to the police, it was mentioned that the deceased was brought by the accused. In the dying declarations, the deceased has stated that her daughter and son-in-law brought her to the hospital. Except in Ex.P-12, there is no other evidence to show that the accused has brought the deceased to the hospital. 47. The accused has taken a defence that the deceased has committed suicide by pouring petrol on herself as she was facing an enquiry with regard to the caste certificate produced by her for getting the employment and in support of the case of the defence, the accused examined his second son as D.W.1 and according to him, the deceased belongs to Balija caste; his father belongs to Scheduled Caste but she claimed as Scheduled Tribe by producing a certificate for getting the employment. The deceased was under mental depression because enquiry about her caste and that she also disclosed to him that as there was an enquiry about the caste certificate she has committed suicide. The department people of the deceased were present and she informed the same to them also. P.W.1, who is another son of the deceased, has stated that when he asked the deceased she has stated to him that an enquiry being held with regard to her caste status, as she was tensed about this, she poured kerosene on herself and set fire to herself. Apart from the oral evidence of both the sons of the deceased and the accused, there is no other documentary evidence to establish that the deceased was facing an enquiry with regard to her caste status as on the date of incident. If really deceased was facing any enquiry with regard to her caste status, the accused could have secured the documents concerned with the enquiry which the deceased should have been possessed and produced the same. In the absence of the same, it cannot be said that the deceased was facing an enquiry with regard to her caste status as on the date of occurrence of the incident. Moreover, from the dying declarations Exs.P-9 and P-10, it is clearly established that the accused poured kerosene on the deceased and set her on fire. Therefore, it cannot be said that it is a case of suicide. Moreover, from the dying declarations Exs.P-9 and P-10, it is clearly established that the accused poured kerosene on the deceased and set her on fire. Therefore, it cannot be said that it is a case of suicide. Hence, we hold that the accused could not establish the defence set up by him. 48. In view of the consistent dying declarations i.e. Exs.P-9 and P-10, and the evidence of P.Ws. 2 and 3, the prosecution could able to establish that the accused is responsible for causing the burn injuries, which led her to death. Thus, the prosecution could able to establish the offence under Section 302 of IPC against the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The lower Court has rightly found the accused guilty for the offence under Section 302 of IPC after analyzing the evidence available on record and the said finding recorded by the lower Court does not warrant any interference by this Court in this appeal. 49. In the result, the criminal appeal is dismissed and the conviction and sentence passed against the appellant-accused, in S.C. No. 21 of 2007 on the file of the Sessions Judge, Nellore, is hereby confirmed.