P. Anjamma v. Sri Nirool Kumar Prasad, Vice Chairman and Housing Commissioner, A. P. Housing Board, Hyderabad
2012-04-27
C.V.NAGARJUNA REDDY
body2012
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment : This Contempt case is filed alleging willful disobedience of the order of this Court dated 16-9-2011 in W.P.N.25953/2011. The brief facts leading to the filing of the case are stated hereunder: The petitioners were occupants of shop rooms belonging to the Andhra Pradesh Housing Board (for short “the APHB”). They have filed W.P.No.25953/2011 feeling aggrieved by provisional notice/order dated 3-1-2011, order dated 17-5-2011 and final order dated 2-9-2011 passed by the APHB officials and for a consequential direction to continue them as tenants on payment of enhanced rent from September 2011 without prejudice to their right to question the enhanced rent. They have pleaded in their affidavit filed in support of the Writ Petition that petitioner Nos.1 to 10 are the original allottees of the shops in their occupation as mentioned in their affidavit and petitioner Nos.11 to 32 have been paying the rent fixed by the authorities from time to time and that even though there is no transfer of shops in their favour, they are paying rents under authorization for a number of years and that as the APHB officials have been receiving rents from these petitioners, there is landlord and tenants relationship between the APHB and petitioner Nos.11 to 32. That except one of the petitioners, all others have cleared the entire arrears of the enhanced rent till 31-8-2011 and that it is only after August 2011, that the APHB officials enhanced the rent unreasonably and arbitrarily with a view to ensure that the tenants cannot afford to pay such rent and to eventually evict them from the premises in their occupation. It was further averred that the respondents have locked the shop rooms purporting to rely upon a Judgment of the learned Judge of this Court. The petitioners further averred that the original allottees authorized the tenants to pay the rent and carry on business; that on 8-11-2010 a notice was given enhancing the rent and informing the petitioners that they can make representations against the proposed enhancement and that the enhanced rents were paid. It was also averred that respondent No.2 has again issued letter dated 3-1-2011 proposing to increase the rent from Rs.765/-to Rs.1148/-with effect from 1-4-2011 calling upon the petitioners to give their willingness to pay the enhanced rent and enter into fresh rental deeds failing which they have to vacate and handover the shops within one month.
It was also averred that respondent No.2 has again issued letter dated 3-1-2011 proposing to increase the rent from Rs.765/-to Rs.1148/-with effect from 1-4-2011 calling upon the petitioners to give their willingness to pay the enhanced rent and enter into fresh rental deeds failing which they have to vacate and handover the shops within one month. It was further averred that for non-acceptance of the proposal for enhancement of rent, eviction orders were passed on 17-5-2011. The petitioners further pleaded that by notice dated 2-9-2011, huge amount of arrears were demanded and that till 31-8-2011 there were no arrears. The petitioners gave details of the arrears of rents they have paid upto August 2011. It was further pleaded that respondent No.4 arbitrarily seized the shops and locked all the premises on 20-8-2011 and that on 22-8-2011, the petitioners requested respondent No.4 to open the locks and handover the premises to them, but the said request was not accepted. The petitioners have seriously disputed their liability to pay huge amounts towards the purported arrears. The petitioners also referred to filing of W.P.No.1732/2011 by some other tenants who are 12 in number the fact of and disposal of the said Writ Petition by this Court with the direction to the petitioners therein to pay the arrears failing which it shall be open to the respondents to evict them without initiating further proceedings. W.P.No.25953/2011 came up for admission and consideration of interlocutory application on 16-9-2011. On that day, Sri M. Brahma Reddy, learned Standing Counsel who has taken notice for the APHB and its officials has sought for time for filing counter affidavit. This Court, on the basis of the averments contained in the petitioners’ affidavit passed the following order: “The shops, in occupation of the petitioners as lessees, are allegedly, locked at the instance of respondent No.4 on the ground that there are huge arrears payable by the petitioners towards rents. It is the pleaded case of the petitioners that when demand notices were issued earlier for payment of arrears, they have promptly cleared the arrears and that they have also been paying enhanced rents with effect from 01-04-2011. As an instance, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners has drawn the attention of this Court to notice, dated: 8-3-2010, issued to petitioner No.3, wherein it is shown that she has to pay an amount of Rs.40,545/-as in March, 2010.
As an instance, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners has drawn the attention of this Court to notice, dated: 8-3-2010, issued to petitioner No.3, wherein it is shown that she has to pay an amount of Rs.40,545/-as in March, 2010. The learned Senior Counsel has also shown to this Court the photocopies of two receipts evidencing payment of Rs.15,545/-and Rs.25,530/-towards payment of the said arrears. However, under the impugned notice, dated: 2-9-2011, the respondents have shown the principal amount of rent due at Rs.4,52,757/-from petitioner No.3 and by adding penal interest, a demand for Rs.9,82,302/-is made. Prima facie, this court is unable to apprehend (sic: comprehend) as to how the sum of Rs.40,545/-, which is shown to be arrears as in March, 2010, could swell to Rs.4,52,757/-within a period of 1½ years. In the light of the above facts, I find the elements of balance of convenience and irreparable injury in favour of the petitioners. Hence, the respondents are directed to forthwith open the locks applied to the petitioner’s shops. In the event, the respondents are able to satisfy this Court that the petitioners are in arrears, as demanded by them under the impugned notices, appropriate directions for payment of those arrears will be given.” Alleging that the above mentioned interim order was not complied with, the petitioners filed the present Contempt Case. In the affidavit filed in support of the Contempt Case, the petitioners averred that a copy of the interim order of this Court dated 16-9-2011 was secured by the petitioners and furnished it to the respondents on the same day i.e., 16-9-2011, which was acknowledged by respondent No.2 on 17-9-2011; that on the said date all the petitioners approached the respondents and persuaded them to take steps to comply with the direction of this Court by opening the locks and handing over possession of the shop rooms; that after making the petitioners wait till evening, respondent No.2 informed them that the APHB would file a counter affidavit after receiving the original order from the Court and that there is no question of opening the locks at that stage. The petitioners thereafter caused legal notice dated 18-9-2011 issued wherein they have informed the respondents that if the interim order is not complied with, Contempt Case will be filed on 20-9-2011.
The petitioners thereafter caused legal notice dated 18-9-2011 issued wherein they have informed the respondents that if the interim order is not complied with, Contempt Case will be filed on 20-9-2011. As the interim order was not complied with thereafter, the petitioners filed the present Contempt Case on 27-9-2011. The Contempt Case came up for admission on 23-9-2011. The learned Senior Counsel, Sri S.R. Ashok, took notice for the respondents and he has stated that W.V.M.P.No.3661/2011 is filed seeking vacation of the interim order dated 16-9-2011 and that the petitioners have suppressed material facts and secured the said interim order. The learned Senior Counsel has requested the Court to hear the Contempt Case along with the vacate stay petition. Accepting this request, this Court has directed the Contempt Case to be posted along with W.V.M.P.No.3661/2011 on 26-9-2011 for hearing. On the next adjournment date, the parties did not appear. Hence, the case was adjourned to 13-10-2011, on which date the case was heard in part and adjourned to 14-10-2011. On the next date of hearing, as the learned Senior Counsel was stated to have been hospitalized, the case was adjourned to 19-10-2011. The case was subsequently adjourned twice. On 27-10-2011, this Court directed the Registry to post the case before appropriate Bench in view of the change of roster. Subsequently, the hearing of the case was deferred as the main Writ Petition itself was taken up for hearing by another learned Judge. After the Writ Petition was disposed of, the respondents filed counter affidavit in the Contempt Case and the case was heard and Judgment was reserved subsequently. In the counter affidavit, the respondents averred that the petitioners have suppressed material facts. They have inter alia stated that most of the shop rooms constructed by the APHB were given on rent between 1982 and 1986 and a few shops during 1995-96; that the lease was for five years; that while in the case of a few shops, the lease period was extended by enhancement of rent by 50%, in case of the remaining shops there was no such extension and that even the extended leases also expired long time back.
It is further averred that under the A.P. Housing Board (Shops) Rental Regulations, 1975, only one extension for a period of five years was permitted by enhancement of rent by 50% and that after expiry of ten years, the occupants will be treated as being in unauthorized possession. It is further averred that out of the 49 shops given on lease, only 9 shops were found under unauthorized occupation of the original tenants, while out of rest of the shops, 25 shops were found to be under illegal occupation of the unauthorized tenants and 15 shops were found to be in occupation of unauthorized third parties who were inducted in possession by the original tenants to whom the shops were “sold”. It is further averred that the APHB has taken a policy decision to sell the shops after ascertaining the market value; that accordingly on the recommendations of a consultant, the market value of the shops was fixed between Rs.2900/-and Rs.3325/-per sq.ft.; that in the meetings held with the tenants on 19-11-2004 and 21-12-2004, the tenants did not accept the offer and consequently cases were filed before the competent authority for eviction and recovery of rents under Sections 52 and 53 of the A.P. Housing Board Act, 1956 (for short “the Act”); that when proposals before the Government were pending for allowing discount to the tenants, the eviction proceedings before the competent authority were kept in abeyance and that later the competent authority issued notice-cum-provisional order dated 18-11-2010 fixing the date of hearing as 10-12-2010, on which date the tenants remained exparte and the competent authority passed final eviction orders dated Nil-12-2010 and the same were served on the tenants on 3-1-2011.
It is further averred that these eviction orders were not challenged by the tenants by availing the right of appeal under Section 55 of the Act and accordingly those orders have become final; that being unaware of the passing of the final eviction order by the competent authority, the office of respondent No.2 issued fresh notice dated 3-1-2011 to the tenants asking them to give their willingness for enhancement of the rent by 50% with effect from 1-4-2011 and to execute fresh agreements or to vacate the premises; that questioning the said notices, the tenants filed W.P.No.1732/2011 and batch which were disposed of by this Court by order dated 31-1-2011 directing the tenants to pay arrears by 31-3-2011 and the enhanced rent from 1-4-2011, failing which the APHB can evict them without initiating any further proceedings; that as the tenants failed to comply with the said directions, the competent authority again passed eviction orders on 17-5-2011 for non-compliance with the order of this Court. It is further averred that in the face of the earlier order passed in December 2010, a fresh order of eviction was unnecessary; that however, the eviction orders were implemented under a panchanama on 20-8-2011 by evicting the unauthorized occupants and possession of the shops was taken after attaching the movables lying in the shops towards recovery of arrears and that thereafter notice dated 2-9-2011 was issued to all the tenants to pay the arrears of rent and questioning the said notice, the petitioners filed W.P.No.25953/2011. It is also averred that the contents of the interim order would reveal that this Court was led to believe by the petitioners that the shops were locked by the respondents on account of non-payment of the huge arrears shown in the impugned notices dated 2-9-2011 without revealing the fact that they were evicted by following due process of law on 20-8-2011 even before notices dated 2-9-2011 were issued and that even if the main prayer in the Writ Petition was allowed, notices dated 2-9-2011, 17-5-2011 and 3-1-2011 will be set-aside and in the absence of challenge to the eviction orders passed in December 2010, the petitioners would not be entitled for restoration of possession.
The respondents further explained that on receipt of the interim order of this Court, the APHB officials took the opinion of the Standing Counsel who opined that since the petitioners have persuaded this Court to pass the interim order by suppressing the material facts and misleading this Court, it is advisable to immediately file a counter affidavit along with vacate-stay petition bringing the correct facts to the Court’s notice and that accordingly the counter affidavit with vacate-stay petition was filed on 23-9-2011. The respondents have also sought to explain the time lag of one week between the date of passing of the interim order and the filing of the vacate-stay petition by stating that in view of ‘sakala janula samme’ the employees were not allowed to attend the office and thereby they could not secure the relevant record for preparation of the counter affidavit. The respondents further averred that the learned single Judge of this Court disposed of the Writ Petition by order dated 28-11-2011 wherein it was inter alia declared that the petitioners are unauthorized occupants; that the provisions of the A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 1960 are not applicable to the APHB’s premises and that the petitioners were evicted by following due process of law. It is further stated that the learned Judge has not interfered with the notice-cum-provisional order dated 8-11-2010 and the eviction order dated Nil-12-2010, but however, the learned Judge has set-aside the demand notices dated 2-9-2011 and 17-5-2011 and the attachment of the movables on the ground that before issuing such notices, the procedure prescribed by Rule 32 of the A.P. Housing Board Rules, 1959 (for short “the Rules”) for determining the amount of damages was not followed and that the relief was declined with regard to redelivery of possession by the APHB. The respondents offered unconditional apology for non-compliance of the interim order of this Court dated 16-9-2011, forthwith, as directed by this court in view of the above narrated circumstances. At the hearing, Sri M.R.K. Chowdary, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners, submitted that the respondents have committed willful violation of the above mentioned interim order of this Court which contained peremptory direction to open the locks of the shops and handover possession thereof to the petitioners “forthwith” and that therefore they are liable for punishment under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
In support of his submission, the learned Senior Counsel has placed reliance on the following Judgments : Unioin of India Vs. Subedar Devassy P.V. AIR 2006 S.C. 909 , Midnapore Peoples’ Co-op. Bank Ltd. Vs. Chunilal Nanda AIR 2006 S.C. 2190 , Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla Vs. Hind Rubber Industries Pvt. Ltd. AIR 1997 S.C. 1240 and Prithawin Nath Ram Vs. State of Jharkhand (2004) 7 SCC 261 . Opposing the above submissions, Sri S.R. Ashok, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents, submitted that the petitioners secured the interim order in question by suppressing the material facts; that an order of eviction was passed as far back as December 2010 itself and that the said fact was brought to the notice of this Court by the respondents at the earliest possible time by filing a counter-affidavit and vacate-stay petition within one week from the date of passing of the order. The learned Senior Counsel further submitted that non-compliance with the interim direction of this Court by the respondents, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, cannot be termed as deliberate or willful, attracting the charge of contempt. The learned Senior Counsel placed reliance on the Judgments of the Apex Court in State of Jammu and Kashmir Vs. Mohd. Yaqoob Khan (1992) 4 SCC 167 and R.N. Dey Vs. Bhagyabati Pramanik (2000) 4 SCC 400 . I have carefully considered the respective submissions of the learned Senior Counsel and perused the record. A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Supreme Court Bar Association Vs. Union of India (1998) 4 SCC 409 , described the contempt jurisdiction as an unusual type of jurisdiction combining “the jury, the judge and hangman”. It has further held that the contempt jurisdiction is not exercised to protect the dignity of an individual Judge but to protect the administration of justice from being maligned; that in the general interest of the community it is imperative that the authority of Courts should not be imperiled and there should be no unjustifiable interference in the administration of justice and that no act can be permitted which may have the tendency to shake the public confidence in the fairness and impartiality of the administration of justice. It has also held that the contempt is a matter between the Court and the contemnor and that third parties cannot intervene. In Anil Ratan Sarkar Vs.
It has also held that the contempt is a matter between the Court and the contemnor and that third parties cannot intervene. In Anil Ratan Sarkar Vs. Hirak Gosh (2002) 4 SCC 21 , the Supreme Court held that the Contempt of Courts Act is a powerful weapon in the hands of the Courts introduced for the purpose of securing a feeling of confidence in the people in general and to ensure due and proper administration of justice in the country. In Baradak Anta Mishra, Ex-Commissioner of Endowments Vs. Bhimsen Dixit (1973) 1 SCC 446 , the Supreme Court held that the contempt of court signifies a willful disregard or disobedience of the Court by acting in opposition to the authority of Justice and dignity thereof and that it also signifies such conduct as tending to bring the authority and administration of law into disrepute. In Niaz Mohd. Vs. State of Haryana (1994) 6 SCC 332 , the Supreme Court held that before a contemnor is punished for non-compliance of the directions of the Court, it must not only be satisfied about the disobedience of a judgment, decree, direction or writ but should also be satisfied that such disobedience is willful and intentional. In Chhotu Ram Vs. Urvashi Gulati (2001) 7 SCC 530 , the Supreme Court held that a proceeding under the extraordinary jurisdiction of the Court in terms of the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act is quasi-criminal in nature and as such the standard of proof required is that of a criminal proceeding and the breach shall have to be established beyond all reasonable doubt. This view was reiterated in Mrityunjoy Das Vs. Sayed Hasibur Rahama (2001) 3 SCC 739 . Keeping in view the above noted settled legal principles, the issue that needs to be considered in this Contempt Case is whether there is violation of the interim order of this Court dated 16-9-2011, and if so, such violation is willful or deliberate. It is not in dispute that the respondents have not complied with the interim order of this Court. Therefore, it cannot be gainsaid that the order of this Court was not violated. But, in order to punish the respondents for Contempt of Court, mere violation of the order is not sufficient; such violation shall be shown to be willful or deliberate.
Therefore, it cannot be gainsaid that the order of this Court was not violated. But, in order to punish the respondents for Contempt of Court, mere violation of the order is not sufficient; such violation shall be shown to be willful or deliberate. From the admitted facts, it is evident that after issuing notice-cum-provisional order dated 8-11-2010, the competent authority passed final eviction orders dated Nil-12-2010 and the same were served on the petitioners/tenants on 3-1-2011. As noted above, the respondents have pleaded in their counter-affidavit that without noticing the said fact, the office of respondent No.2 has once again issued notices dated 3-1-2011 calling upon the petitioners/tenants to enhance the rents by 50% with effect from 1-4-2011 and purporting to act on the directions contained in the common order dated 31-1-2011 in W.P.No.1732/2011 & batch, another eviction order was passed on 17-5-2011 without noticing the previous order dated Nil-12-2010 passed by the competent authority. It is also not in serious dispute that on 20-8-2011, the unauthorized occupants were evicted and possession of the shops was taken after attaching movables for recovery of the arrears. It is only thereafter that notices dated 2-9-2011 were issued calling upon the petitioners/tenants to pay the arrears of rents accumulated over the years. The above mentioned facts were not mentioned by the petitioners in the Writ Petition. As rightly contended by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents, the reasons contained in the interim order of this Court suggest that the premise on which the respondents were directed to remove the locks and handover possession was that the shops were locked for non-payment of the arrears of rents and that huge arrears shown in the demand notices were quite improbable in the light of the receipts produced by the petitioners paying off all the arrears upto 31-8-2011. Had it been brought to the notice of this court that an eviction order was already passed in December 2010 and that the unauthorized occupants were evicted under the panchanama dated 20-8-2011, this Court probably would not have granted the interim order dated 16-9-2011, as it did, at that stage. The respondents have averred, and it has not been denied by the petitioners that immediately on receipt of the interim order, they have taken legal advice and started making efforts to file a counter-affidavit and vacate stay petition.
The respondents have averred, and it has not been denied by the petitioners that immediately on receipt of the interim order, they have taken legal advice and started making efforts to file a counter-affidavit and vacate stay petition. The fact that there was a general strike in the name of ‘sakala janula samme’ during that period, during which administration in the State was almost paralysed, is also undisputed. Inspite of all these set-backs, the respondents were able to file the counter-affidavit within a week from the date of passing of the interim order by this Court. It is trite that a judicial order passed by a competent Court at whatever level has the same efficacy as a final Judgment so long as it continues to be in force. When a direction to do a particular act is given even by way of an interim order, the authority to which such a direction is given is ordinarily bound to comply with the same howsoever it may not be to its liking. But in the opinion of this Court, this principle has some exceptions. For example, an interim direction is secured by a party by playing fraud on the Court or by suppressing the material facts, which, if were disclosed, the Court would not have passed such interim order without hearing the other side. In such a situation, if the respondents to whom the interim direction was given, act swiftly and bring to the notice of the Court which issued the interim direction the true facts without complying with the interim direction, can it be said that there was willful or deliberate violation of the interim order? In my opinion, the answer should be in the negative. While the State and its officers owe great responsibility towards the Courts to religiously comply with the orders and Judgments for upholding the rule of law, at the same time, they have equal responsibility to see that persons who secure orders by not disclosing the material facts will not derive undue benefit on account of the exparte interim orders. This Court, however, hastens to add that such situations are confined to cases where interim orders to do something are passed, but not in cases where orders to refrain from doing certain things to be done are made.
This Court, however, hastens to add that such situations are confined to cases where interim orders to do something are passed, but not in cases where orders to refrain from doing certain things to be done are made. To illustrate, when the Court gives a direction not to demolish a structure, the authority to which such an order was directed, cannot violate the same by demolishing the structure even if it is fully satisfied that the party has secured the order by misleading the Court or suppressing the material facts, because by postponing the act of demolition for some time, no prejudice is caused to public interest. But in cases where positive directions are given to do a particular act, as in the present case, the considerations would differ. In deed, the Supreme Court in State of Jammu and Kashmir Vs. Mohd. Yaqoob Khan (1992) 4 SCC 167 has recognized such a distinction. In that case, the High Court gave interim direction for delivering half quantity of timber as per the decree passed by the Civil Court. Granting the said exparte interim direction on 19-3-1990, the High Court has fixed second week of May 1990 as the date for further hearing. In the meantime, the petitioner therein has filed Contempt Case alleging contempt for not delivering the timber as directed by the Court. The contempt proceedings initiated by the High Court were challenged before the Supreme Court. While quashing the proceedings, the Supreme Court has drawn a distinction between a case in which an interim order in the nature of a restraint order forbidding taking any further step has been made and a case where a direction to do something in pursuance of the interim order has been made. The Supreme Court on the facts of the said case felt that when the vacate-stay petition was filed, the High Court ought to have first decided the same before proceeding with the Contempt Case. In the instant case, as the pleading and material which was available before the Court did not disclose that an eviction order was already passed following which the petitioners/occupants were evicted, this Court passed the interim order dated 16-9-2011. Therefore, putting the petitioners/tenants back into possession in pursuance of the exparte interim order, would have placed a premium on the persons who did not disclose the material facts before the Court.
Therefore, putting the petitioners/tenants back into possession in pursuance of the exparte interim order, would have placed a premium on the persons who did not disclose the material facts before the Court. As noted above, the respondents felt that it is their responsibility to bring the correct facts to the notice of this court and accordingly they have lost no time in filing the counter-affidavit along with the vacate-stay application. This Court while seeing force in the plea of the learned Senior Counsel that the interim order was secured by not placing the material facts before this Court, directed the Contempt Case to be heard along with the vacate-stay application. Thus, on the facts of this case, non-opening of the locks and not redelivering possession to the petitioners/tenants by the respondents cannot be termed as intentional or willful. While the outcome of the main case was not really relevant for adjudicating the Contempt Case, as held by the Supreme Court in Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla (3-supra), the same however constitutes a relevant fact while taking a final view in the Contempt Case. In the counter-affidavit, the respondents categorically averred that this Court while declining to grant relief of redelivery of possession against the eviction order, upheld the notice-cum-provisional order dated 8-11-2010 and confirmed order dated Nil-12-2010 and that the petitioners were also declared as unauthorized occupants and are liable to pay damages fixed by following the procedure under Rule 32 of the Rules. These averments are not denied by the petitioners. Thus, in retrospect, the stand initially taken by the respondents that the petitioners are not entitled to redelivery of possession, stood vindicated by the Judgment in the Writ Petition. Therefore, on the facts of the present case, I am of the opinion that the respondents established their bonafides in not complying with the interim order of this Court and that their non-compliance with the interim order was neither driven by malice nor disrespect to this Court. Accordingly, it needs to be held that the respondents have not willfully or deliberately violated the interim order of this Court. The Judgments cited by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners have been carefully considered. While the propositions laid therein are well settled, they are of no help to the petitioners on the facts of the present case.
Accordingly, it needs to be held that the respondents have not willfully or deliberately violated the interim order of this Court. The Judgments cited by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners have been carefully considered. While the propositions laid therein are well settled, they are of no help to the petitioners on the facts of the present case. For the above mentioned reasons, I do not find any merit in this Contempt case and the same is accordingly dismissed.