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2012 DIGILAW 472 (MAD)

S. Ramamurthy v. S. Parthasarathy

2012-01-31

G.RAJASURIA

body2012
Judgment :- 1. The second defendant in the suit filed this appeal as against the judgement and decree dated 31.8.2007 passed by the learned Fast Track Court Judge (Fast Track Court No.1), Chennai, in O.S.No.4428 of 2001, which was filed by the plaintiffs for recovery of possession and also for cancellation of the settlement deed dated 15.3.2002, executed in favour of the defendants. 2. The parties, for the sake of convenience, are referred to hereunder according to their litigative status and ranking before the trial Court. 3. A summation and summarisation of the relevant facts absolutely necessary and germane for the disposal of this appeal would run thus: (i) The plaintiffs filed the suit seeking the following reliefs: "(a) to direct the defendants to vacate and deliver vacant possession of the suit property, a portion of House, ground and premises bearing Door No.67, Muthiah Mudali St., Vella Teynampet, Chennai-600 086, of the extent of 781 sq.ft. (b) to declare and cancel the deed of settlement dated 15.3.2002, executed in favour of the defendants, as void, ab-initio, non-est in law, and not binding on the plaintiffs." (ii) The defendants resisted the suit by filing the written statement. Whereupon issues were framed. (iii) During trial, the first plaintiff examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.A1 to A15 were marked. On the defendants' side, the first defendant examined himself as D.W.1 along with D.W.2-the second defendant and D.W.3 and Exs.B1 to B19 were marked. (iv) Ultimately, the trial Court decreed the suit. 4. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the judgement and decree of the trial Court, this appeal has been filed by D2 on various grounds. 5. The learned counsel for the appellant/D2, placing reliance on the grounds of appeal would put forth and set forth his arguments, which could briefly be set out thus: (i) The trial Court failed to take into consideration the fact that the suit property itself is a very small one; that earlier on that ground only all the children of the deceased Ellammal executed release deeds in favour of Ellammal transferring their shares, which they inherited from their deceased father Sadagopa Mudaliar and as such, the said Ellammal became the absolute owner of the property measuring totally a small extent of 1,203 sq.ft, which is found described in the schedule of the plaint. (ii) Consequent upon the death of the original owner Sadagopa Mudaliar, his widow Ellammal and his six sons constituting totally seven legal heirs, felt that they could not enjoy the said small property, jointly, however, subsequently, it is found projected, at the instance of the plaintiffs, as though the said Ellammal executed four settlement deeds, as per Exs.A2 to A5, whereby she settled four small bits of portions totally measuring an extent of 731 sq feet on the Northern side out of the said 1203 sq.feet, retaining the remaining portion with her and that itself bespeaks artificial and unrealistic. (iii) The said Ellammal might not have intended to execute four such settlement deeds. While she was with the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs managed to get such settlement in their favour, detriment to the interest of the defendants. Subsequently, the said Ellammal, on coming to know of the said four settlement deeds, purported to have been executed by her, cancelled those settlement deeds and executed fresh settlement, as per Ex.B18 dated 15.3.2002, in favour of the defendants, the entire property, but the trial Court failed to appreciate all these facts and simply believed the version in the plaint for gospel truth and decreed the suit. (iv) The plaintiffs should have filed a suit for partition and not simply for recovery of possession and also for cancellation of the settlement deed-Ex.B18 dated 15.3.2002. (v) Delivery of possession was not given pursuant to the settlement deeds as contained in Exs.A2 to A5. That fact also was ignored by the lower Court. The said Ellammal, since she was lulled into the false belief earlier, at the time of executing Exs.A2 to A5, did choose to execute fresh settlement deed as per Ex.B18 in favour of the defendants, but the trial Court failed to look into all those aspects. (vi) The oral evidence as found on the side of the defendants would reveal that Ex.B18-the latest settlement deed executed by Ellammal in favour of the defendants was valid in law, but the trial Court simply rejected it. Accordingly, citing precedents, the learned counsel for the appellant/D2 prayed for setting aside the judgement and decree of the trial Court and for dismissing the original suit. 6. Accordingly, citing precedents, the learned counsel for the appellant/D2 prayed for setting aside the judgement and decree of the trial Court and for dismissing the original suit. 6. In a bid to shoot down and pulverise the arguements as put forth and set forth on the side of the appellant/D2, the learned counsel for the respondents/plaintiffs would develop his arguments, inviting the attention of this Court to the various portions of the records, which could tersely and briefly be set out thus: (i) The plea of the appellant/D2 is nothing but a load of baloney, fraught with mendacity and falsity, having no legs to stand. (ii) The trial Court appropriately and appositely, correctly and convincingly, in addition to legally disbelieved such evidence and decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiffs, warranting no interference in appeal. (iii) The trial Court applying the correct proposition of law held that the subsequent revocation of the settlement deeds Exs.A2 to A5 by Ellammal as non-est in the eye of law and upheld those settlement deeds in favour of the plaintiffs and granted the relief. (iv) It is only by way of an after thought and due to pressure of the defendants, the said Ellammal executed various documents such as Exs.A10, A11, A12 and A13-the cancellation deeds and also Exs.B6, B7, B8 and B9-the revocation deeds, dated 31.3.2000, and the also Ex.B18-the settlement deed, dated 15.3.2002 and all those deeds subsequently executed by Ellammal are non-est in the eye of law, which the trial Court correctly appreciated in the factual matrix of this case and countenanced and upheld the contentions of the plaintiffs and rejected the contention of the defendants, warranting no interference in the appeal. Accordingly, the learned counsel for the plaintiffs would pray for dismissing the appeal. 7. Accordingly, the learned counsel for the plaintiffs would pray for dismissing the appeal. 7. The points for consideration are as follows: (i) Whether the trial Court treated Exs.A10 to A13-the cancellation deeds, Exs.B6 to B9the Revocation of settlement deeds as non-est in the eye of law and upheld the settlement deeds as contained in Exs.A2 to A5, dated 22.9.1997, based on mis-appreciation of facts and wrong application of law and that too allegedly ignoring the plea of the defendants that there was no handing over of possession of the properties under Exs.A2 to A5 in favour of the donees and also the fact that the old lady had no animus to execute those deeds in favour of the plaintiffs? (ii) Whether there is any perversity or illegality in the judgement and decree of the trial Court. 8. Both the points are taken together for discussion as they are interwoven and interlinked, interconnected and entwined with each other. 9. The indubitable and indisputable, the unassailable and unarguable or at least the undeniable facts could pithily and precisely be set out thus: (a) One deceased Sadagopa Mudaliar happened to be the original owner of the suit property, which is a house property, measuring an extent of 1203 sq.ft. He died, leaving behind his widow Ellammal and his six children, namely, the four plaintiffs and two defendants in the suit. The six sons of Ellammal thought fit to execute a release deed in favour of their mother Ellammal, relinquishing their right in the suit property. Whereupon the said Ellammal became the absolute owner. Subsequently, it so happened that Ellammal executed the four settlement deeds-Exs.A2 to A5 totally donating an extent of 781 sq.feet on the Northern portion of the entire portion of 1203 sq.ft., retaining the remaining Southern portion. (b) Exs.A10 to A13 are virtually the cancellation deeds, cancelling the settlement deeds Exs.A2 to A5, respectively, executed by Ellammal on the alleged ground that Ellammal was betrayed by her four sons-the plaintiffs herein without maintaining her. It so happened that thereafter those cancellation deeds Exs.A10 to A13 were revoked, vide Exs.B6 to B9 by the same Ellammal. In those cancellation and revocation deeds there is nothing to indicate that Exs.A2 to A5 were not acted upon, because allegedly possession of the property was not handed over by her in favour of the settlees. It so happened that thereafter those cancellation deeds Exs.A10 to A13 were revoked, vide Exs.B6 to B9 by the same Ellammal. In those cancellation and revocation deeds there is nothing to indicate that Exs.A2 to A5 were not acted upon, because allegedly possession of the property was not handed over by her in favour of the settlees. But only while executing Ex.B18-the fresh settlement deed in favour of the defendants, settling the entire suit property measuring an extent of 1203 sq.ft, the said Ellammal is purported to have averred as though the properties as found specified in Exs.A2 to A5 were not handed over to the setlees and that those settlement deeds were allegedly not acted upon etc. 10. It is ex facie and prima facie clear from the conduct of Ellammal that as an after thought alone, she did choose to dish out the plea as though Exs.A2 to A5 were not acted upon. The trial Court, considering the over all circumstances, disbelieved the version of the defendants. It so happened that D1 was earlier examined as D.W.1 and subsequently, he supported the case of the plaintiffs only. Thereafter, D2 examined himself along with D3, so as to prove unsuccessfully Ex.B18. The trial Court applying the correct proposition of law found Ex.B18-the fresh settlement deed in favour of defendants as non-est in the eye of law, because without approaching the Court and getting the Exs.A2 to A5 cancelled, Ellammal had no right to execute afresh Ex.B18. 11. It is the run of the mill or common or garden principle of law that 'witnesses might lie, but the circumstances would not lie'. Here, it is a case where Ellammal, the mother of the plaintiffs and defendants, at the first instance voluntarily executed Exs.A2 to A5 during the year 1997 and thereafter only, during the year 2000, she did choose to execute Exs.A10 to A13 and Exs.B6 to B9-the cancellation/revocation deeds, without citing any reason as found set out in Ex.B18, but on the sole ground that the plaintiffs did not maintain her. 12. The core question arises as to whether Ellammal had such a right to revoke the settlement deeds earlier executed by her. If at all Ellammal was in need of maintenance, she ought to have approached the Court and also sought for cancellation, but she did not do so. 12. The core question arises as to whether Ellammal had such a right to revoke the settlement deeds earlier executed by her. If at all Ellammal was in need of maintenance, she ought to have approached the Court and also sought for cancellation, but she did not do so. The fact also remains that as on the date of filing of the suit, she was very much alive. No doubt, at least, at the instance of the defendants the evidence of Ellammal could have been got recorded beneesse as contemplated under Order 18 Rule 16 of CPC. But that was not done so. Pendentelite alone Ellammal died. 13. At the time of execution of Ex.B18 during the year 2004 Ellammal was a nonagenarian, so to say, 92 years old. At the time of execution of Exs.A2 to A5 during the year 1997 no doubt, she was an octogenarian and must be around 85 years old. 14. As has been already highlighted supra between 1997 and 2002, as many as eight registered documents emerged without any basis. The contention on the side of the defendants that possession was not handed over under Exs.A2 to A5, in my opinion, is not a sound plea for the simple reason that while executing Exs.A10 to A13-the cancellation deeds as well as Exs.B6 to B9-the revocation deeds, there is no whisper about all those facts. Only in Ex.B18 artificially such alleged non-handing over of possession of the properties concerned under Exs.A2 to A5 was taken and that was not even worth the paper on which it was written. The parties are close relatives and it is evident that under Ex.A2 to A5-the settlor settled the properties in favour of her sons, while they were all living together and in such a case, the conduct of the parties alone should be taken note of, as already highlighted supra. 15. The learned counsel for the appellant/D2 cited the following decisions. (i) AIR 2003 ORISSA 123 – Smt.Nishamani Singh v. Nishamani Dibya and others; (ii) AIR 1973 ORISSA 18 (V 60 C 7) – Bancha Bhol and others vs. Sana Bewa and others; (iii) 1998 (III) MLJ 267 – Govindammal and others v. Ammasi Kounder; (iv) AIR 1985 ALLAHABAD 160 – Smt.Mallo vs. Smt.Bakhtawari and others; 16. (i) AIR 2003 ORISSA 123 – Smt.Nishamani Singh v. Nishamani Dibya and others; (ii) AIR 1973 ORISSA 18 (V 60 C 7) – Bancha Bhol and others vs. Sana Bewa and others; (iii) 1998 (III) MLJ 267 – Govindammal and others v. Ammasi Kounder; (iv) AIR 1985 ALLAHABAD 160 – Smt.Mallo vs. Smt.Bakhtawari and others; 16. The above precedents in my considered opinion have been cited out of context because in this case, Ellammal herself has not approached this Court for cancellation, however, based on Ex.B18, the settlees under it, namely, the defendants tried their level best to resist the suit of the plaintiffs, who wanted to assert their right under Exs.A2 to A5. 17. The Electricity receipts and property tax receipts all would reveal that despite emergence of those deeds, the property in the public records continued to stand in the name of Sadagopa Mudaliar and that itself would evidence that the parties simply allowed Sadagopa Mudaliar's name to continue and that would not in any way speak against Exs.A2 to A5, because of the close relationship of the parties. 18. The Full Bench judgement of this Court in LatifEstate Line India Ltd., rep.by its Managin Director Mr.Habib Abvdul Latif vs. 1. Hadeeja Ammal 2. The Inspector General of Registration, Santhome, Chennai-3 reported in 2011(2) CTC 1 would highlight the point that once a sale deed is registered, the question of unilaterally cancelling the same would not arise. The ratiocination adhered to in deciding the said case by the Full Bench would also be applicable to irrevocable settlement deeds. In this case, in Exs.A2 to A5, the settlor lady expressly stated that the settlements are irrevocable. 19. The trial Court, considering the oral and documentary evidence upheld the plea of the plaintiffs that the defendants were permitted to occupy the former's share, that as per Ex.A6 such leave and licence was terminated, that no reply to Ex.A6 was given by the defendants. I could see no perversity or illegality in such a finding and such finding also would negative the plea of the defendants that possession was not given by settlor to settlees under Exs.A2 to A5. The recitals in Ex.A2 to A5 would reveal that the settlor parted with possession of the properties concerned and those settlements are irrevocable. 20. I could see no perversity or illegality in such a finding and such finding also would negative the plea of the defendants that possession was not given by settlor to settlees under Exs.A2 to A5. The recitals in Ex.A2 to A5 would reveal that the settlor parted with possession of the properties concerned and those settlements are irrevocable. 20. As such, I am of the considered view that the trial Court was justified in disbelieving the case of the defendants and in upholding the case of the plaintiffs and decreeing the suit. 21. The contention on the side of the appellant/D2 was to the effect that the property was so small and it could not be beneficially put into use. 22. The learned counsel for the respondents/plaintiffs would contend that the smallness of the property would not come in the way of enjoyment and it is for the plaintiffs to decide their own fate. 23. The Court is concerned with the legal aspect of the matter and not about the alleged inconvenience in enjoyment and in such a case, I could see no merit in the appeal and accordingly, the appeal stands dismissed. However, there is no order as to costs. 24. On hearing the judgement, the learned counsel for the appellant/D2 would pray for six months' time to vacate the premises and hand over delivery of possession in favour of the plaintiffs. 25. Accordingly, six months' time is granted from this date. To that effect affidavit shall be filed within 15 days from this date.