JUDGMENT 1. This miscellaneous appeal has been filed against order of remand under Order 43 rule 1 of the CPC, the appellant being aggrieved by order dated 11.11.2011 passed by the 21st Additional District Judge, Indore in Regular Appeal No.12/2011 allowing the appeal and setting aside the impugned order. 2. Brief facts necessary for elucidation are that the respondent Abdul Gafar had filed a suit in the trial Court for eviction of suit accommodation situated at 24/2 Daulatganj, Bohre-ki-Chal, Indore, and was a shed (jhopda) of the area 8x18 ft. It did not contain any sanitation facility nor any facility of water connection and was being utilised on rent of Rs.500/- per month. The respondent Abdul Gafar claimed that he had obtained the disputed accommodation from the original owner Muman Ali (Abdul Karim) and after purchasing it had given to the appellant Smt. Shantibai on rent. Apparently the accommodation was temporary in nature and a suit was filed for eviction against her. Shantibai the appellant denied all the allegations and filed an application under Order 7 rule 11 of the CPC and stated that this accommodation was situated in an area declared to be a slum are under the Gandi Basti Nagar Palika, Indore, vide order bearing No.99, dated 22.9.1999 and the resolution of the Corporation No.415, dated 10.1.2001 declaring the land to be Gandi Basti and the land was so declared under the Act of 1976. The application stated that under the provisions of the said Act, there was a bar for the institution of such proceedings for eviction of tenant in an area declared to be slum area without proper consent from the competent authority. The trial Court accepted the objections so filed and dismissed the suit of the respondent owner. Being aggrieved respondent filed a miscellaneous appeal under Order 43 rule 1 of the CPC. The present appellant tenant filed objections before the appellate Court that the miscellaneous appeal was not maintainable since instead a regular appeal ought to have been filed. The objections were, however, dismissed and the miscellaneous appeal was allowed and the matter was remanded back to the trial Court. Against this order of remand a Miscellaneous Appeal bearing No.3270/2011 was filed in the High Court and the respondent was directed to file a regular appeal before the appellate Court. The respondent in consequence, filed the regular appeal and also paid the proper court-fees.
Against this order of remand a Miscellaneous Appeal bearing No.3270/2011 was filed in the High Court and the respondent was directed to file a regular appeal before the appellate Court. The respondent in consequence, filed the regular appeal and also paid the proper court-fees. The appellate Court, however, again passed the same order by accepting the appeal and remanding the matter to the trial Court and being aggrieved the appellant tenant has filed the present appeal. 3. Counsel for the appellant has vehemently urged the fact that the question of law that goes to the root of the matter is whether a suit for eviction of accommodation, situated in an area declared to be a slum area under the Gandi Basti Adhiniyam, 1976 can be filed without obtaining proper consent of the competent authority. Counsel urged that the appellate Court had, however, wrongly relied on the decision of this Court in the matter of Kanta Prasad v. Suvalal [ 2002(II) MPWN 108 p.216], whereby this Court had held that the permission to file suit for possession or execution under section 20 was not needed when the suit was based on relationship of landlord and tenant. And counsel stated that the trial Court had failed to consider that in the said case the proper ratio that was laid down was that there was no suit filed for execution. No execution was pending despite, which the appellant tenant had filed an application under section 47 of the CPC taking the same stand that no suit was competent without obtaining prior sanction from the competent authority and that the decree passed by the trial Court be declared to be nullity or incapable of execution. The plaintiff had opposed this application and the trial Court had held that the decree passed by the trial Court earlier could not be set aside only on the ground of non-compliance of this provision of the Act and counsel stated that the facts of the case were entirely different. A decree had been obtained by the owner and this High Court had, therefore, held that provision under section 20 would not apply to an application under section 47 of the CPC saying that a compromise had been arrived at between the parties and the decree passed by the trial Court in the said decision is a nullity or incapable of execution.
Whereas counsel vehemently urged that in the present case; the suit itself at the very initial stage was objected by filing an application under Order 7 rule 11 of the CPC, which is correctly allowed by the trial Court. It was the appellate Court, which has misinterpreted the provisions since no execution as such was pending against the appellant. Counsel prayed that the appellate Court had erred in applying the ratio of Kanta Prasad (supra), to the present case and prayed that the impugned order passed by the appellate Court be set aside and the suit be dismissed. 4. Counsel for the respondent on the other hand has opposed the contentions put forth by the counsel for the appellant and has vehemently urged the fact that this Court had in the matter of Kanta Prasad (supra), categorically held that the provisions in the said Act did not cover a suit filed on behalf of the landlord against his tenant for his eviction on the basis of relationship of landlord and tenant under the provisions of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act. And counsel prayed that the impugned order of remand passed by the appellate Court was perfectly in order and did not call for any interference. 5. On considering the above submissions, I find that the sole question that arises for consideration in the appeal is whether the order of remand passed by the appellate Court was in accordance with the provisions of law especially in the light of the protection available to the appellant under section 20 of the M.P. Gandi Basti Adhiniyam, 1976. More precisely, the interpretation that is required is whether in a suit for eviction of the accommodation situated in a “slum area” would require the sanction of the competent authority, and otherwise it would be barred under the Act. The first fact needed to be considered that is the appellant has categorically stated it is not a disputed position that the area in which the disputed accommodation is situated is an area declared to be slum area under the Act according to Order No.99, dated 22.9.1999 and by the resolution No.415, dated 10.1.2001 of the Municipal Corporation of Indore. This clearly clinches the issue. Moreover, the proceedings were taken under section 20 of the said Act.
This clearly clinches the issue. Moreover, the proceedings were taken under section 20 of the said Act. It begins with the non obstante clause and categorically filing the suit for eviction of accommodation in the slum area is barred without the permission of the competent authority. Moreover, there can be no deviation from the provision of section 20 of the M.P. Gandi Basi Adhiniyam, 1976, which categorically begins with the non obstante clause thus : “(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, no person shall except with the previous permission in writing of the competent authority -- (a) institute any suit or proceeding for obtaining any decree or order for the eviction of a tenant from any building or land in or a slum area; or (b) where any decree or order is obtained in any suit or proceeding instituted before declaration of such area to be slum area under section 3 of the eviction of a tenant from any building or land in such area, execute such decree or order.” 6. Thus, under the circumstances, I find that the learned Judge of the lower appellate Court has erred in interpreting the section 20 of the Gandi Basti Adhiniyam in the present case. The ratio of Kanta Prasad (supra), could not be applicable in the present case on two grounds primarily because, in the said case there was a decree obtained by the parties on the basis of compromise and the application under section 47 of the CPC had been moved by the tenant mala fidely to overcome the decree when no execution and eviction proceeding were filed by the owner. Thus, I have no hesitation in setting aside the order passed by the appellate Court and restoring that of the trial Court in Civil Suit No.18-A/2010, dated 6.8.2010. The appeal is allowed. Cost of Rs.1,500/- be paid to the appellant, if quantified.