JUDGMENT Hon'ble Mr. Justice S.C. Das 1. This appeal under Section 173 of M.V. Act, 1988 is directed against the judgment and award dated 22.05.2004, passed by learned Single Member, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, West Tripura, Agartala, in case No. TS (MAC) 199 of 1999, registered under Section 166 of M.V. Act, 1988. The material facts, relevant for disposal of this appeal, may be briefly noticed thus: Yunus Miah, the husband of claimant-petitioner No. 1 and father of claimant-petitioner Nos. 2 to 6 and respondent No. 3, was travelling with a bus vehicle, bearing No. TR-01-1355 through Assam-Agartala Road from Khowai to Ranirbazar on 22.08.1998, and at about 09.00 pm, when the vehicle reached near Sadhu Para Forest Office (Champaknagar), armed extremists indiscriminately fired on the vehicle, and as a result, Yunus Miah received bullet injury and died on the spot. Some other passengers also received such bullet injury and died. It was alleged in the claim petition that the road between Teliamura to Champaknagar was running through extremist infested areas, and therefore, the passengers of the vehicle including the deceased requested the driver and the conductor not to proceed with the vehicle during such night time without police escort but the driver did not pay any heed to the request of the passengers and was driving the vehicle, and therefore, for the negligence of the driver the incident occurred, and as a result, the deceased Yunus Miah and some other passengers, travelling in the vehicle, received bullet injuries and Yunus Miah and some other passengers died. After the incident, Jirania P.S. Case No. 116/98 was registered on the basis of the FIR lodged by a Forest Guard of the Forest Range Office, in front of which the incident occurred, and police investigated the case. The claimant-petitioners further stated that the deceased was aged 45 years and that he was a skilled and efficient cultivator and he was also a member of the Panchayat. He used to earn Rs. 3,000/- (rupees three thousand) per month. The claimant-petitioners claimed compensation of Rs. 6,34,000/- (rupees six lakhs thirty four thousand). 2. The claimant-petitioners further stated that the deceased was aged 45 years and that he was a skilled and efficient cultivator and he was also a member of the Panchayat. He used to earn Rs. 3,000/- (rupees three thousand) per month. The claimant-petitioners claimed compensation of Rs. 6,34,000/- (rupees six lakhs thirty four thousand). 2. Respondent No. 1, the owner of the vehicle submitted written statement, denying rash and negligent driving of the vehicle and further stated that the vehicle was insured with the National Insurance Company, covering the risk on the date of accident and, so liability, if any, should be borne by the Insurance Company. Respondent No. 2, the National Insurance Company also contested the case by filing written statement, denying the averments made in the claim petition and further stated that the accident occurred because of the extremists firing, and so the Insurance Company has no liability to pay compensation. Respondent No. 3, the son of the deceased, supported the claim of the claimant-petitioners and further asserted that he along with his wife were living separately and that he has no claim for compensation for the death of his father. 3. The Tribunal, considering the pleadings, framed following issues: "1. Whether Yunus Mia, aged about 45 years, succumbed to his injuries due to extremist attack on 22-08-98 at about 9 p.m. near Sadhupara Forest Office on Assam-Agartala road under Jirania PS while travelling by vehicle No. TR. 01-1355 (Bus)? 2. Are the claimant-petitioners entitled to get compensation under M.V. Act? If so, what should be the quantum of compensation and who is liable to pay it? 4. In course of trial, the claimant-petitioner examined herself as PW.1 and relied on the documents i.e. death certificate, FIR of police case, certificate issued by the 0/C of the P.S. and survivorship certificate, etc., and those were marked as Exbt.1 series. Respondents adduced no oral or documentary evidence. The owner of the vehicle produced copies of certificate of registration, tax token, insurance certificate, fitness certificate, etc. of the alleged offending vehicle, but the respondent took no step to formally prove the same. 5. The Tribunal decided the issues against the claimant-petitioners and held that the deceased died due to bullet injury, and there was no motor vehicle accident, and therefore, dismissed the claim petition. 6. of the alleged offending vehicle, but the respondent took no step to formally prove the same. 5. The Tribunal decided the issues against the claimant-petitioners and held that the deceased died due to bullet injury, and there was no motor vehicle accident, and therefore, dismissed the claim petition. 6. Having aggrieved, the present appeal was filed challenging the judgment and nil award passed by the Tribunal on different grounds. 7. I have heard learned counsel, Mr. A. Das for the appellants and learned counsel, Mr. K. Bhattacharjee for respondent No. 2, Insurance Company. None appeared for the other respondents. 8. It was submitted by learned counsel, Mr. Das that the deceased Yunus Miah was travelling as a passenger in the vehicle, while it was attacked by the extremists and the extremists opened firing on the vehicle indiscriminately, and the deceased received bullet injury and died on the spot. He was declared dead in the hospital. The incident occurred while the vehicle was in use and so the claimant-petitioners were entitled to get compensation. He relied on the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Bipal Bashi Das vs. Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. & Ors. reported in 2008 ACJ 1728 . 9. Learned counsel, Mr. Bhattacharjee for the respondent-Insurance Company refuted the argument of the appellants stating that it was a clear case of extremists attack and no motor vehicle accident was occurred and the incident of extremists attack cannot be termed as a motor vehicle accident and so the Tribunal rightly refused the claim petition, which does not deserve interference by this Court. 10. It is an undisputed rather an admitted fact that the deceased Yunus Miah was travelling with bus vehicle No. TR-01- 1355, belonged to respondent No. 1 on the date and time of accident, and that the armed extremists attacked the vehicle, spread bullet on the passengers, and as a result, the deceased Yunus Miah received bullet injury and died. 10. It is an undisputed rather an admitted fact that the deceased Yunus Miah was travelling with bus vehicle No. TR-01- 1355, belonged to respondent No. 1 on the date and time of accident, and that the armed extremists attacked the vehicle, spread bullet on the passengers, and as a result, the deceased Yunus Miah received bullet injury and died. It was further alleged by the claimant-petitioners that the road was extremists infested and that the deceased and other passengers requested the driver and conductor not to proceed with the vehicle during such night time without police escort, but the driver defying the request, drove the vehicle without police escort and due to such negligence on the part of the driver, the incident occurred and the armed extremists, taking advantage of the insecured condition of the vehicle, spread bullet on the passengers resulting which the deceased died. PW.1 is not an eye witness of the occurrence and she narrated about the accident as she came to know from others what is reflected in the FIR, which was lodged by a Forest Guard of the nearby Forest Range Office. PW.2 is an eye witness of the accident and he categorically stated that he and other passengers requested the driver not to proceed during such night time but the driver did not agree and when the vehicle reached near Forest Office, the extremists fired on the vehicle, and as a result, Yunus Miah and two others died on the spot and eleven others also were seriously injured. He also stated that the extremists kidnapped three Forest personnel from the Forest Office. The contention of PW.2 is supported by FIR, which was lodged by a Forest Guard. In the FIR, the Forest Guard stated that the extremists, apart from firing on the vehicle, set it to fire after throwing bombs on it. The evidence of the petitioners remained un-rebutted and the Tribunal had no scope to ignore such cogent evidence on record. 11. The word, 'accident' is not defined in the Motor Vehicles Act. This expression generally means some unexpected event, happening without design. The Apex Court, in the case of Regional Director, E.S.I. Corporation vs. Francis De Costa & Anr., reported in AIR 1997 SC 423, defined the word 'accident' stating that the expression 'accident' has not been defined in Workmen's Compensation Act. This expression generally means some unexpected event, happening without design. The Apex Court, in the case of Regional Director, E.S.I. Corporation vs. Francis De Costa & Anr., reported in AIR 1997 SC 423, defined the word 'accident' stating that the expression 'accident' has not been defined in Workmen's Compensation Act. This expression generally means some unexpected event happening without design. It can be said that the expression 'accident' has been used in a popular and ordinary sense, the 'mishap' or 'untoward event not expressed or designed'. This Court in the case of New India Assurance Co. Ltd. vs. Ajoy Medhi & Anr. reported in 1996 ACJ 727 has held that an occurrence resulting injury or death, which is unexpected or undersigned on the part of the workman, is an accident. The provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act is a piece of social security legislation and its various provisions ought to receive a liberal interpretation, which is most favourable to the person for whose benefit the legislature in its great wisdom has legislated it. The Division Bench of Gujarat High Court in the case of Ambalal vs. LIC of India, reported in 1999 (3) TAC 269 (Guj) has held thus: "The word 'accident' has a very wide significance in its ordinary sense. The word though easy to understand when used in any particular context, is found to be difficult to define in a manner that would encompass all its shades of meanings. The expression 'accident' generally means some unexpected events happening without design, even though there may be negligence and it is used, in a popular and ordinary sense of the word, as denoting an unlooked for mishap or an untoward event which is not brought about by intention or design. Accidents can broadly be divided into two categories, viz., where there is some external act, agency or mishap and those where there is no such external act, agency or mishap. In legal contemplation, accident happens without any designed, intentional or voluntary causation such as an occurrence which happens by reason of some violence, casualty or vis major without any design or voluntary co-operation. An unexpected personal injury resulting from an unlooked for mishap or occurrence would be an accident. The word 'accident' would get its colour from the context in which it is used." 12. An unexpected personal injury resulting from an unlooked for mishap or occurrence would be an accident. The word 'accident' would get its colour from the context in which it is used." 12. In the case in hand, the deceased was an innocent passenger travelling with the bus vehicle along with other passengers. There is nothing on record that the extremists had a particular intention to kill the deceased, picked him up from the passengers travelling in the vehicle and shot him dead. There was no intention of the extremists to kill a particular passenger. The facts and circumstances what were brought on record, as it transpires, the dominant intention of the attack by the extremists was not to kill the individual passenger but to attack the vehicle in order to create panic and to let loose a reign of terror taking the law in hands. Such an act cannot be termed as a murder simplicitor but an act of accidental murder. 13. The Supreme Court, in the case of Rita Devi & Ors. vs. New India Assurance Company Ltd. reported in 2000 ACJ 801, examined the actual legal import of the words, "death due to accident arising out of the use of motor vehicle". In that reported case the fact was that the deceased driver Dasarath Singh was waiting with his auto-rickshaw at Dimapur station and some passengers hired the vehicle, and subsequently, neither the auto-rickshaw nor the driver was traceable. On the following day, dead body of Dasarath Singh was recovered, who died a homicidal death but the auto-rickshaw was missing forever. The Tribunal considering the facts awarded compensation and the judgment was set aside by the High Court. The Supreme Court restored the order of the Tribunal and observed that the death was caused accidentally in the process of committing theft of the vehicle while it was in use. The Apex Court while deciding that case classified "murder simplicitor" and "accidental murder". In paragraph 10 of the judgment, the Apex Court observed thus: "10. The question, therefore, is can a murder be an accident in any given case? There is no doubt that 'murder', as it is understood, in the common parlance is a felonious act where death is caused with intent and the perpetrators of that act normally have a motive against the victim for such killing. The question, therefore, is can a murder be an accident in any given case? There is no doubt that 'murder', as it is understood, in the common parlance is a felonious act where death is caused with intent and the perpetrators of that act normally have a motive against the victim for such killing. But, there are also instances where murder can be by accident on a given set of facts. The differences between a 'murder' which is not an accident and a 'murder' which is an accident, depends on the proximity of the cause of such murder. In our opinion, if the dominant intention of the Act of felony is to kill any particular person then such killings is not an accidental murder but is a murder simplicitor, while if the cause of murder or act of murder was originally not intended and the same was caused in furtherance of any other felonious act then such murder is an accidental murder." 14. The law laid down in the case of Rita Devi (supra) may be applied in the facts and circumstances of this case. The pleadings and evidence what is placed on record clearly emerges that the intention of the extremists was not to kill a particular passenger, but was to attack the vehicle and to let loose a reign of terror in the passengers travelling in the vehicle and in the neighbourhoods. Therefore, considering the facts and circumstances and the legal position, as already settled by the Apex Court, we may safely arrive at a conclusion that the death of Yunus Miah was an accidental murder and was not a murder simplicitor. 15. While adjudicating upon claims for compensation in respect of accident involving the death or badly injury to persons arising out of "use of motor vehicles" is required to be established and the burden lies on the petitioners to prove that the motor vehicle was in use while the accident occurred. In the case in hand, it is an admitted fact that the vehicle was in employment when the extremists spread bullet on the vehicle and the deceased received the bullet injury. This issue has been settled by the Apex Court in the case of Samir Chanda vs. M.D., A.S.T.C. reported in 1998 ACJ 1351 : (1998) 6 SCC 605 . In the case in hand, it is an admitted fact that the vehicle was in employment when the extremists spread bullet on the vehicle and the deceased received the bullet injury. This issue has been settled by the Apex Court in the case of Samir Chanda vs. M.D., A.S.T.C. reported in 1998 ACJ 1351 : (1998) 6 SCC 605 . In that reported case the appellant was a passenger in a bus vehicle belonging to the respondent-Corporation and when the bus reached the last stoppage and the passengers were alighting from the bus, a bomb exploded inside the bus, as a result of which, the appellant sustained injuries on his leg and other passengers also sustained injury on their persons. The Tribunal awarded compensation in favour of the appellant but on appeal that decision was reversed by the High Court. On appeal by the appellant the Apex Court set aside the judgment passed by the High Court and allowed compensation holding that it was an accident because of negligence on the part of the driver/owner of the vehicle and the accident occurred while the vehicle was in use. In paragraphs 13 and 15 of the judgment, the Court held thus: "13. This Court while repelling various arguments put forward, repudiating the claim, held as follows:- "26. These decisions indicate that the word "use" in the context of motor vehicles, has been construed in a wider sense to include the period when the vehicle is not moving and is stationary, being either parked on the road and when it is not in a position to move due to some breakdown or mechanical defect. Relying on the above mentioned decisions, the appellate bench of the High Court has held that the expression "use of a motor vehicle' in Section 92-A covers accidents which occur both when the vehicle is in motion and when it is stationary. With reference to the facts of the present case, the learned Judges have observed that the tanker in question while proceeding along National Highway 4 (i.e. while in use) after colliding with a motor lorry was lying on the side and that it cannot be claimed that after the collision the use of the tanker had ceased only because it was disabled. We are in agreement with the said approach of the High Court. We are in agreement with the said approach of the High Court. In our opinion, the word "use" has a wider connotation to cover the period when the vehicle is not moving and is stationary and the use of a vehicle does not cease on account of the vehicle having been rendered immobile on account of a breakdown or mechanical defect or accident. In the circumstances, it cannot be said that the petrol tanker was not in the use at the time when it was lying on its side after the collision with the truck. 15. After going through the judgment of the High Court, we are of the view that the High Court was not right on facts that there was no negligence on the part of the owner or the driver of the bus especially when the appellant has specifically pleaded about the negligence which was accepted by the Tribunal in the light of the pleadings and of the evidence produced before it. The explosion took place inside the bus is an admitted fact and the usual police escort was not there. The High Court, except observing that there was no negligence, has not upset the finding of the Tribunal that the atmosphere during the period of accident was so polluted requiring care on the part of the conductor and driver of the bus. There cannot be any doubt that the accident arose out of the use of the motor vehicle justifying the claim of the appellant. We are satisfied with the assessment of the Tribunal in quantifying the compensation in a sum of Rs. 1,20,000 with interest at the rate of 12 percent." 16. In the case in hand, admittedly, the vehicle was in employment or in use when the extremists fired on the vehicle and the deceased Yunus Miah received the bullet injury in course of employment of the vehicle. It is already brought on record, which remained un-rebutted that the driver was driving the vehicle in the extremists prone road without police escort defying the request of the passengers and such act of the driver definitely amounts to negligence on the part of the owner cum driver, and therefore, the ingredients of rash and negligent act as contemplated in Section 166 of M.V. Act, brought on record, on the part of the claimants, may be accepted to have been established. 17. 17. The accident occurred because of the act of a stranger. The common law principle of the rule of strict liability propounded in Rylands v. Fletcher, 1861 73 All ER 1, is applicable to our jurisprudence. This issue has been considered by the Apex Court in the case of Kaushnuma Begum & Ors. vs. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. & Ors. reported in 2001 ACJ 428 : [ (2001) 2 SCC 9 ] The fact of that case was that a jeep vehicle while in motion got imbalanced for sudden burst of front wheel of the vehicle and the vehicle turned turtle crashing to death of a person walking on the road. The Tribunal held that there was no rash or negligent driving of the vehicle and refused compensation and that order was confirmed by the High Court, which was challenged before the Apex Court and in that case the Apex Court held that the accident occurred when the vehicle was in use and that the rule of strict liability propounded in Rylands v. Fletcher is applicable in claims for compensation made in respect of motor accident. The Apex Court held thus:- "Jurisdiction of the Tribunal is not restricted to decide claims arising out of negligence in the use of motor vehicles. Negligence is only one of the species of the causes of action for making a claim for compensation in respect of accidents arising out of the use of motor vehicles. There are other premises for such cause of action. Even if there is no negligence on the part of the driver or owner of the motor vehicle, but accident happens while the vehicle was in use, should not the owner be made liable for damages to the person who suffered on account of such accident? Like any other common law principle which is acceptable to our jurisprudence, the rule of strict liability propounded in Rylands v. Fletcher, 1861 73 All ER 1, can be followed at least until any other new principle which excels the former can be evolved, or until legislation provides differently. Hence, we are disposed to adopt the rule of strict liability in claims for compensation made in respect of motor accidents. 'No fault liability' envisaged in section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act is distinguishable from the rule of strict liability. Hence, we are disposed to adopt the rule of strict liability in claims for compensation made in respect of motor accidents. 'No fault liability' envisaged in section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act is distinguishable from the rule of strict liability. In the former the compensation amount is fixed and is payable even if any one of the exceptions to the rule can be applied. It is a statutory liability created without which the claimant should not get any amount under that count. Compensation on account of accident arising from the use of motor vehicle can be claimed under the common law even without the aid of the statute. The provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act permit that compensation paid under 'no fault liability' can be deducted from the final amount awarded by the Tribunal. Therefore, these two are resting on two different premises. We are, therefore, of the opinion that even apart from section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, a victim in an accident which occurred while the motor vehicle was in use, is entitled to get compensation from the Tribunal unless any one of the exceptions would apply. Winfield has elaborated seven defences recognized in common law against action brought on the strength of the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher. They are: (1) Consent of the plaintiff, i.e., volenti non fit injuria; (2) Common benefit, i.e. where the source of the danger is maintained for the common benefit of the plaintiff and the defendant, the defendant is not liable for its escape; (3) Act of stranger, i.e., if the escape was caused by the unforeseeable act of a stranger, the rule does not apply; (4) Exercise of statutory authority, i.e., the rule will stand excluded either when the act was done under a statutory duty or when a statute provides otherwise; (5) Act of God or vis major; (6) Default of the plaintiff; and (7) Remoteness of consequences." 18. In the present case in hand, we find presence of stranger i.e. the extremists beside the owner/driver of the vehicle and the deceased. Had the extremists not fired on the vehicle the accident would not have occurred? In the present case in hand, we find presence of stranger i.e. the extremists beside the owner/driver of the vehicle and the deceased. Had the extremists not fired on the vehicle the accident would not have occurred? The third defence as recognized in Rylands v. Fletcher is not applicable in the present case, since the respondent-driver was cautioned by the deceased and other passengers including PW.2 but the respondent-driver did not pay any heed to such request and drove the vehicle taking the risk of such extremists attack, and therefore, the defense as propounded cannot be applied in the case. The ratio of decision of Kaushnuma Begum (supra) may also be fairly applied in the facts and circumstances of this case. 19. The Division Bench of this Court in the case of Bipal Bashi Das (supra) in paragraphs 11, 16 and 17 has held thus: "11. A close reading of the decision reached in Managing Director, Assam State Transport Corporation (supra), clearly reveals that the Division Bench of this Court did not agree with the Tribunal's conclusion that when the atmosphere is polluted and there is possibility of internal or external endanger to the vehicle, however, remote the cause might be, an extra vigilance and care is necessary even when the vehicle is found, properly parked and in stationary condition and that the driver and conductor were bound to take extra care, which were found lacking in the case; what on the other hand, the Division Bench held was that when there was a bomb, blast and the accident as caused due to bomb blast, it could not have been regarded as a case of negligence on the part of the owner or the driver of the vehicle inasmuch as such an incident of bomb blast is an incident over which the owner or the driver had no control and that such an accident can not be said to be the result of negligence or failure to do some duty. The conclusions go reached by the Division Bench, were impugned in an appeal before the Supreme Court. 16. The conclusions go reached by the Division Bench, were impugned in an appeal before the Supreme Court. 16. From a careful reading of the above observations made in the case of Samir Chanda (supra), it is abundantly clear that when on account of a particular prevailing situation, an extra care is required to be taken before or while using a vehicle at a public place and when, in such a grave situation if the owner or the driver as the case may be, does not take the required care and on account of the omission or failure of the owner or driver to take such care an injury is caused to, or death takes place of, a passenger, such injury or death must be held to have been caused on account of accident arising out of the use of the vehicle and such an accident would justify claim for compensation under the M.V. Act. 17. In the light of the law clearly laid down in Samir Chanda, (supra), when we consider the case at hand, as pleaded by the claimant, we notice that there was absolutely no dispute that Amarpur Teliamura road at Pathar Quarry was, at the relevant point of time, infested by extremists and possibility of attack by them on public vehicles very high. Placed in such situation, the passengers of the vehicle, in question, including the claimant's husband, Kartik Das, had requested the driver to proceed towards Udaipur from Taidubazar via Amarpur and from Amarpur to Teliamura via Agartala, for, the road to Teliamura from Amarpur via Agartala was free from extremists' attack. As the route, so suggested by the passengers, was a longer one the driver of the said vehicle, opted to follow Amarpur-Teliamura road merely because the same was a shorter road. Driving the vehicle with his mind affected by consideration of distance alone and ignoring the care, which he as a driver, ought to have taken in the situation prevailing in the area aforementioned, when the driver was taking his vehicle through Patthar Quarry, the vehicle was attacked by the extremists, which led to the causing of injuries to the passengers and death of the claimant's husband. Omission to take requisite care in the use of the vehicle by its driver, thus, amounted to rash and negligent driving of the said vehicle and the death of the claimant's husband must be held to have been caused in the accident arising out of rash and negligent driving of the said vehicle by its driver." The case of Bipal Bashi Das (supra) and the case in hand are almost of similar nature and the law laid down in that case is therefore applicable in the facts and circumstances of this case. 20. It is, therefore, established that Yunus Miah, the deceased died due to an accident arising out of the use of motor vehicle No. TR-01-1355 and the accident occurred for the rash and negligent driving of the vehicle. The appellants/claimant petitioners, therefore, are entitled to get compensation. 21. Let us now determine the amount of compensation, which the appellants/claimant-petitioners are entitled for the death of Yunus Miah. I do not like to send back the case records to the Tribunal again for determination of compensation since, in the meantime, already about fourteen years have gone. According to the claim petition and depositions of PWs.1 and 2, the deceased was aged 45 years at the time of accident. No age proof certificate was produced. The postmortem certificate shows that the deceased was aged about 45 years. So, we may apply a multiplier of 14 (fourteen) for determination of compensation. It is the definite case of the claimant-petitioners that the deceased was a skilled and efficient cultivator and used to earn Rs. 3,000/- (rupees three thousand) per month. The deceased used to maintain his family consisting of seven members out of his income as a cultivator. Claimant-petitioner Nos. 2 to 6, were all minors. So, definitely, they were depending on the income of the deceased. It may be presumed that the claimant-petitioner No. 1 would support the family having some income or otherwise. Be that as it may, I find nothing to disbelieve the contention of the petitioners regarding income of the deceased though there is nothing in details regarding the income, derived from cultivation. If we take the monthly income of the deceased @Rs. 3,000/- (rupees three thousand), yearly income stands at Rs. 36,000/- (rupees thirty six thousand). We may deduct 1/4th of the income towards personal and living expenses of the deceased and the amount stands at Rs. If we take the monthly income of the deceased @Rs. 3,000/- (rupees three thousand), yearly income stands at Rs. 36,000/- (rupees thirty six thousand). We may deduct 1/4th of the income towards personal and living expenses of the deceased and the amount stands at Rs. 27,000/- (rupees twenty seven thousand). This amount of Rs. 27,000/- may be taken as the yearly loss of income on the part of the claimant-petitioners for the death of the deceased. If we multiply it with the multiplier of 14 (fourteen), the amount stands at Rs. 3,78,000/-. The appellants/claimant-petitioners, therefore, entitled to get Rs. 3,78,000/- (rupees three lakhs seventy eight thousand) as compensation. Further, the claiant-petitioner No. 1, being the wife, entitled to a consortium of Rs. 7,000/- (rupees seven thousand), which shall be the personal compensation of claimant-petitioner No. 1. Further, an amount of Rs. 5,000/- (rupees five thousand) is awarded towards loss of estate. In total, the claimant-petitioners are entitled to get Rs. 3,90,000/- (rupees three lakhs ninety thousand). 22. The insurance of the vehicle is established, covering the risk on the date of accident and so the respondent No. 2, the National Insurance Company is to bear the responsibility of making payment. In the circumstances of the case, the amount shall carry 6% simple interest from the date of presentation of the claim petition i.e. 26.04.1999 and the Insurance Company shall make payment within 45 days from today, failing which it shall carry interest @ 12% per annum. 23. In the claim petition, the claimant-petitioners stated that petitioner Nos. 2 to 6 were all minors. It is now difficult to ascertain, who of them are still minor. At the time of making payment, the Tribunal should ascertain, who of the claimant-petitioners are minor and in the case of a minor, the minor's share shall be kept in a fixed deposit scheme till attaining majority. The claimant-petitioner No. 1, being the mother, will be entitled to draw the interest for maintenance of the minors. All the claimant-petitioners shall be entitled to the compensation in equal shares. Send back the L.C. records along with a copy of this judgment.