JUDGMENT Rajiv Sharma, Judge (oral). Since common questions of law and facts are involved in all these review petitions, the same are taken up together for hearing and are being disposed of by a common judgment. 2. These review petitions are directed against the judgment rendered by this Court on 22.9.2011 in CWP No.8022/2010 and other connected writ petitions. Material facts necessary for the adjudication of these review petitions are that the respondent-company (hereinafter referred to as the ‘management’ for convenience sake) has framed a Voluntary Retirement Scheme, which came into force with effect from 2.3.2009. It has to remain operative till 15.5.2009. Petitioners, i.e. workmen sought voluntary retirement under the scheme. They were paid the agreed amount. Workmen had also applied for the release of provident fund, retiral benefits etc. Thereafter, they issued demand notices to the respondent-company on the ground that they were forced to seek voluntary retirement. They had also contended that their services were wrongly terminated and they were entitled to be reinstated in job with back wages and other benefits with interest @12% per annum. Thereafter, Labour-cum-Conciliation Officer after receiving the demand notices sent a notice to the management to settle the matter amicably. The management filed the reply. Case of the management was that since the workmen had sought voluntary retirement, they were estopped from issuing demand notices. However, on the basis of failure report submitted by the Labour-cum-Conciliation Officer, the State Government made the references to the Labour Court on 13.10.2010. The text of one of the references reads thus: “Whether voluntary retirement taken as per ‘Voluntary Retirement Scheme’ dated 2.3.2009 by Sh. Ashok Kumar Sharma son of Sh. Inder Sen Sharma, Operator from the management of M/s Federal Mogul Bearings India Ltd. Plot No.5, Sector-2, Parwanoo, District Solan, H.P. is legally maintainable and justified? If not, to what back wages, service benefits and relief the above named worker is entitled to from the above Employer/Management? If not, what are its legal effects?” 3. The management challenged the decision of the competent authority whereby the references were made by filing writ petitions. These writ petitions were allowed by us on 22.9.2011 and the references made by the State Government to the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal were quashed. 4. Mr. If not, what are its legal effects?” 3. The management challenged the decision of the competent authority whereby the references were made by filing writ petitions. These writ petitions were allowed by us on 22.9.2011 and the references made by the State Government to the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal were quashed. 4. Mr. V.D. Khidta has strenuously argued that the workmen were called in the Cabins by the officers and they were forced to accept the voluntary retirement under the scheme. This contention of Mr. V.D. Khidta has been repelled by this Court. The workmen have not led any tangible evidence to establish that they were forced to accept the voluntary retirement. They have not even named the officers who were responsible for forcing them to seek voluntary retirement. 5. Mr. V.D. Khidta has also argued that the workmen were ready and willing to refund the amounts, which they have received. There is no contemporaneous material on record to show that the workmen ever submitted any application to the management to refund the amounts paid to them by it. He also submitted that his clients have made oral submission before this Court to refund the amounts. The workmen should have filed an application if they were interested to refund the amounts paid to them by the management after they have sought voluntary retirement. The Court has already held that once the voluntary retirement scheme has come into force and the workmen have accepted their dues, the relationship of master-servant has come to an end. The workmen have sought voluntary retirement in the month of March, 2009 and have issued the demand notices only in the month of December, 2009. In these circumstances also they were estopped from challenging the voluntary retirement. 6. Mr. V.D. Khidta has lastly contended that this Court has not taken into consideration the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Man Singh versus Maruti Suzuki India Limited and another, 2011 LLR 1009. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in 2011 LLR 1009 has taken into consideration the earlier judgment in Ramesh Chandra Sankla and others versus Vikram Cement and others, (2008) 14 SCC 58 . The facts of these two cases are distinguishable. In these two cases, the Court itself has directed the workmen to refund the money to the management. 7. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in 2011 LLR 1009 has taken into consideration the earlier judgment in Ramesh Chandra Sankla and others versus Vikram Cement and others, (2008) 14 SCC 58 . The facts of these two cases are distinguishable. In these two cases, the Court itself has directed the workmen to refund the money to the management. 7. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma versus Aribam Pishak Sharma and others, AIR 1979 SC 1047 have held that it is true that there is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution of India to preclude the High Court from exercising the power of review which inheres in every Court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it. But there are definitive limits to the exercise of the power of review. The power of review may be exercised on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the persons seeking the review or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made, it may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is found, but it cannot be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. Their Lordships have held as under: “3. The Judicial Commissioner gave two reasons for reviewing his predecessor's order. The first was that his predecessor had overlooked two important documents Exhibits A/1 and A/3 which showed that the respondents were in possession of the sites even in the year 1948-49 and that the grants must have been made even by then. The second was that there was a patent illegality in permitting the appellant to question, in a single Writ Petition, 'settlement' made in favour of the different respondents. We are afraid that neither of the reasons mentioned by the learned Judicial Commissioner constitutes a ground for review. It is true as observed by this Court in Shivdeo Singh v. State of Punjab ( AIR 1963 SC 1909 ) there is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution to preclude a High Court from exercising the power of review which inheres in every Court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it. But, there are definitive limits to the exercise of the power of review. The power of review may be exercised on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the person seeking the review or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made;it may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is found; it may also be exercised on any analogous ground. But, it may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. That would be the province of a Court of appeal. A power of review is not to be confused with appellate power which may enable an Appellate Court to correct all manner of errors committed by the Sub-ordinate Court.” 8. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in M/s Northern India Caterers (India) Ltd. versus Lt. Governor of Delhi, AIR 1980 SC 674 have held that an error apparent on the face of record exists if of two or more views canvassed on the point it is possible to hold that the controversy can be said to admit of only one of them. If the view adopted by the Court in the original judgment is possible view having regard to what the record states, it is difficult to hold that there is an error apparent on the face of the record. Their Lordships have held as under: “9. Now, besides the fact that most of the legal material so assiduously collected and placed before us by the learned Additional Solicitor General, who has now been entrusted to appear for the respondent, was never brought to our attention when the appeals were heard, we may also examine whether the judgment suffers from an error apparent on the face of the record. Such an error exists if of two or more views canvassed on the point it is possible to hold that the controversy can be said to admit of only one of them. If the view adopted by the Court in the original judgment is a possible view having regard to what the record states, it is difficult to hold that there is an error apparent on the face of the record.” 9. If the view adopted by the Court in the original judgment is a possible view having regard to what the record states, it is difficult to hold that there is an error apparent on the face of the record.” 9. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Meera Bhanja (Smt) versus Nirmala Kumari Choudhury (Smt) (1995) 1 SCC 170 have held that an error apparent on the face of record must be such an error which must strike one on mere looking at the record and would not require any long-drawn process of reasoning. Their Lordships have held as under: “8. It is well settled that the review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47, Rule 1, CPC. In connection with the limitation of the powers of the court under Order 47, Rule 1, while dealing with similar jurisdiction available to the High Court while seeking to review the orders under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, this Court, in the case of Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharmal, speaking through Chinnappa Reddy, J., has made the following pertinent observations: (SCC p. 390, para 3) "It is true as observed by this Court in Shivdeo Singh v. State of Punjab2, there is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution to preclude the High Court from exercising the power of review which inheres in every Court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it. But, there are definitive limits to the exercise of the power of review. The power of review may be exercised on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the person seeking the review or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made; it may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is found; it may also be exercised on any analogous ground. But, it may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. That would be the province of a court of appeal. But, it may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. That would be the province of a court of appeal. A power of review is not to be confused with appellate power which may enable an appellate court to correct all manner of errors committed by the subordinate court." 9. Now it is also to be kept in view that in the impugned judgment, the Division Bench of the High Court has clearly observed that they were entertaining the review petition only on the ground of error apparent on the face of the record and not on any other ground. So far as that aspect is concerned, it has to be kept in view that an error apparent on the face of record must be such an error which must strike one on mere looking at the record and would not require any long-drawn process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions. We may usefully refer to the observations of this Court in the case of Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde v. Mallikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale3 wherein, K.C. Das Gupta, J., speaking for the Court has made the following observations in connection with an error apparent on the face of the record: An error which has to be established by a long-drawn process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record. Where an alleged error is far from self-evident and if it can be established, it has to be established, by lengthy and complicated arguments, such an error cannot be cured by a writ of certiorari according to the rule governing the powers of the superior court to issue such a writ.” 10. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dokka Samuel versus Dr. Jacob Lazarus Chelly, (1997) 4 SCC 478 have held that the omission on the part of counsel to cite an authority of law does not amount to error apparent on the face of the record so as to constitute ground for reviewing prior judgment. Their Lordships have held as under: 4. Jacob Lazarus Chelly, (1997) 4 SCC 478 have held that the omission on the part of counsel to cite an authority of law does not amount to error apparent on the face of the record so as to constitute ground for reviewing prior judgment. Their Lordships have held as under: 4. It is seen that by an order passed by court on 24th November, 1995, liberty was given to the appellant, in the event of the High Court was justified in reviewing the earlier order and reversing the find recorded by the appellate Court? It is not in dispute that the sale deed is for a small sum of Rs. 300/- and odd and that the property sold commands good market value. The questions arises: whether the document was a sale deed or is only a document for collateral purpose? The respondent himself in an earlier suit had pleaded that it was an agreement of sale, In view of such an admission, the High Court has wrongly reversed the decree of the appellate court holding the transaction to be a real sale, In the second appeal, the High Court confirmed, in the first instance, the decree of the appellate Court. Subsequently, the High Court has reviewed the judgment and reconsidered the matter holding that relevant precedents were not cited. Since this court had given liberty to raise the questions of reviewability of the judgment of the High court, the question arises whether the High Court could not have embarked upon appreciation of evidence and considered whether there was an error apparent on the face on record? It was contended before the learned single Judge that various decisions were not cited; proper consideration was paid; in fact the sale deed was acted for valid consideration. The omission to cite an authority of law is not a ground for reviewing the prier judgment saying that there is an error apparent on the face of the record, since the counsel has committed an error in not bringing to the notice of the Court the relevant precedents. In fact, since the respondent had claimed that it is not a sale deed but was executed for collateral purpose, it was for the respondent to establish that the sale was for real consideration and he had a valid sale deed duly executed by the appellant. In fact, since the respondent had claimed that it is not a sale deed but was executed for collateral purpose, it was for the respondent to establish that the sale was for real consideration and he had a valid sale deed duly executed by the appellant. The High Court wrongly placed Burden on the appellant and reviewed the order and heard the matter on merits. The entire approach of the learned single judge is not correct in law.” 11. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Parsion Devi and others versus Sumitri Devi and others, (1997) 8 SCC 715 have held that the review jurisdiction cannot be used as appellate jurisdiction. Their Lordship have explained the phrase “mistake or error apparent on the face of the record” as under: 9. Under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC a judgment may be open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. An error which is not self evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its power review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be "reheard and corrected". A review petition, it must be remembered has limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be "an appeal in disguise." 10. Considered in the light of this settled position we fine that Sharma, J. clearly over-stepped the jurisdiction vested in the court under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. The observation of Sharma, J. that "accordingly", the order in question is reviewed and it is held that the decree in question is reviewed and it is held that the decree in question was of composite nature wherein both mandatory and prohibitory injunction were provided" and as such the case was covered by Article the scope of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. There is a clear distinction between an erroneous decision and an error apparent on the face of the record. While the first can be corrected by the higher forum, the later only can be corrected by exercise of the review jurisdiction. There is a clear distinction between an erroneous decision and an error apparent on the face of the record. While the first can be corrected by the higher forum, the later only can be corrected by exercise of the review jurisdiction. While passing the impugned order, Sharma, J. found the order in Civil Revision dated 25.4.1989 as an erroneous decision, though without saying so in so many words. Indeed, while passing the impugned order Sharma, J. did record that there was a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record which not of such a nature, "Which had to be detected by a long drawn process of reasons" and proceeded to set at naught the order of Gupta, J. However, mechanical use of statutorily sanctified phrases cannot detract from the real import of the order passed in exercise of the review jurisdiction. Recourse to review petition in the facts and circumstances of the case was not permissible. The aggrieved judgment debtors could have approached the higher forum through appropriate proceedings, to assail the order of Gupta, J. and get it set aside but it was not open to them to seek a "review of the order of petition. In this view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the impugned order of Sharma, J. cannot be sustained and accordingly accept this appeal and set aside the impugned order dated 6.3.1997.” 12. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dr. Janak Raj Jai versus H.D. Deve Gowda, (1997) 10 SCC 462 have held that in a review petition new grounds cannot be urged. 13. Consequently, there is no mistake or error on the face of record in the judgment dated 22.9.2011. Accordingly, there is no merit in the review petitions and the same are dismissed. Pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of. No costs.