ORDER 1. These Criminal revisions cases are filed against the order dated 08.11.2011 made in C.M.P. Nos. 1722, 1725, 1726, 1720, 1723, 1724 and 1721 of 2009 in C.C.Nos.72, 73, 71, 70, 69, 76 and 77 of 2002 on the file of the learned Judicial Magistrate, Coonoor, by which the petitions filed by the petitioners to discharge them from the purview of prosecution was negatived. 2. The only ground raised at the time of admission of these Criminal Revision Case is that the complaint was of the year 1992. The Calendar Cases have been filed in the year 2002 and that there is no progress at all in the criminal case. Therefore, in view of the protracted delay in proceeding with the criminal case, the petitioners have filed the petition to discharge them, but the lower court, without properly appreciating the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners, has dismissed the petitions for discharge. In this connection, the learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon the judgment of this Court reported in 2011 (3) MWN (Cr.) 42 (1.S.Semmel. 2.Pary. 3.S.Pynthodi Vs. 1.The State, rep. by the Inspector of Police, All Women Police Station Erode, Erode. 2.S.Usha) and (2011) 4 MLJ (Crl) 986 (A.Arunkumar and Another Versus State rep. by Inspector of Police, Special Police Establishment, CBI, Chennai) to contend that in the event of prolonged or inordinate delay in proceeding with the trial, the accused may be discharged 3. The Criminal Revision Cases are opposed by the learned Government Advocate (Crl. Side) on the ground that mere delay in commencing the trial will not be a ground to discharge the petitioners from the purview of criminal prosecution. In support of this contention, the learned Government Advocate relied on the judgments of the Honourable Supreme Court reported in (2012) 9 Supreme Court Cases 241 (Sudarshanacharaya versus Purushottamacharya and another) and 2012 Cri.L.J.4206 (Ranjan Dwivedi v. C.B.I., Through the Director General With A.C.Sudevnanda Avadhuta v. C.B.I., Through the Director General), wherein it was held that merely because there was delay in initiating the criminal proceedings or proceeding with the trial, the accused cannot be discharged. 4. I heard the counsel for both sides and perused the materials available on record. 4. I heard the counsel for both sides and perused the materials available on record. The point for consideration in these Criminal Revision Cases is whether the petitioner/accused are entitled for discharge from the criminal case initiated against them on the ground of delay in commencement of the trial. 5. A perusal of the records would indicate that the petitioners were employed in the Sub-Treasury Office and they were charged for the offences punishable under Section Sec.409, 477(A) r/w. Sec.34 r/w.109 IPC. During the course of trial, two of the accused died and that the records were retained by the disciplinary authority for being used in the disciplinary proceedings initiated against the petitioners. Hence, it is clear that the delay is not wilful or wanton but for the aforesaid reasons. Under those circumstances, notwithstanding the reasons for delay, the trial court rightly refused to discharge the petitioners on the ground that the innocence of the petitioners can be examined only after trial and that the petitioners cannot be discharged on the ground of delay in completing the trial. In this connection, as rightly pointed out by the learned Government Advocate (Crl. Side), mere delay in commencement of trial will not be a reason for discharge of the petitioners as has been held by the Honourable Supreme Court in the decision reported in (2012) 9 Supreme Court Cases 241 (Sudarshanacharaya versus Purushottamacharya and another) wherein in paragraph nos.18, 19 and 20 it was held as follows: "18. It is clear, therefore, that it is not open to a court to prescribe the time-limit for disposal of a case and direct that after termination of that period if the case does not get over, the accused should be acquitted or discharged. As held in P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 4 SCC 578 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 830, the court can always exercise its available powers under Sections 309, 311 and 253 of the Code to effectuate the right of an accused to speedy trial. Ina n appropriate case, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court can undoubtedly quash the proceedings. Ina n appropriate case, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court can undoubtedly quash the proceedings. Following the judgment in P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 4 SCC 578 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 830, this court has in Vakil Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar (2009) 3 SCC 355 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 95 observed that: (Vakil Prasad case (2009) 3 SCC 355 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 95, SCC pp. 363-64, para 25) "25. Where the court comes to the conclusion that the right to speedy trial of an accused has been infringed, the charges or the conviction, as the case may be, may be quashed unless the court feels that having regard to the nature of offence and other relevant circumstances, quashing of proceedings may not be in the interest of justice." This Court further observed that the power possessed by the High Courts under Section 482 of the Code is undoubtedly very wide but it has to be exercised in appropriate cases, ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone the courts exist. This Court further observed that the inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the High Court to act according to whim or caprice. This Court further observed that: (Vakil Prasad case (2009) 3 SCC 355 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 95, SCC p. 360, para 15) "15. ...... It is trite to state that the said powers have to be exercised sparingly and with circumspection only when the court is convinced, on the basis of material on record, that allowing the proceedings to continue would be an abuse of the process of the court or that the ends of justice require that the proceedings ought to be quashed." 19. We have already noted how the Sessions Court and the High Court have commented on the conduct of the appellant. It is true that from the affidavit filed by Mr.R.K.Chatturvedi, SSP, Faizabad, it appears that the complainant was also negligent and casual at some stage. We are prima facie of the view that this observation of Mr Chatturvedi does not appear to be wholly correct and runs counter to the observations made by the learned Magistrate and the Sessions Court in this case. We are prima facie of the view that this observation of Mr Chatturvedi does not appear to be wholly correct and runs counter to the observations made by the learned Magistrate and the Sessions Court in this case. Pertinently, the Sessions Court order in which the conduct of the accused has been severely criticised has been confirmed by the High Court. Besides, in this case, we are concerned with the Trust property. Prima facie we find that whenever the case was about to be heard, the appellant tried to put a spoke by filing an application for discharge. The Sessions Court and the High Court had directed that the case should proceed expeditiously or on day-to-day basis. Even by the impugned order, the High Court has directed that the case shall commence on day-to-day basis. The appellant has challenged the said order. Had the appellant not raised repeated challenges, the case would have proceeded and perhaps got over by now. Prima facie conduct of the appellant appears to us to be bad. In the facts of this case, we are unable to come to a conclusion that allowing the proceedings to continue would be an abuse of the process of the court. We are, therefore, no inclined to give any relief to the appellant. 20. Mr.Sanyal has raised two other legal points, one is regarding limitation and the other is regarding the proceedings having already been vitiated on account of death of Smt Hulasmani Devi, who had executed power of attorney in favour of the appellant. We do not want to express any opinion on these questions. They involve questions of facts. We would leave them open so that the trial court can decide them in accordance with law. It is, therefore, not necessary for us to discuss the other decisions of this Court cited by Mr Sanyal." 6. Similarly, in the decision reported in 2012 Cri.L.J.4206 (Ranjan Dwivedi v. C.B.I., Through the Director General With A.C.Sudevnanda Avadhuta v. C.B.I., Through the Director General), in paragraph nos.15, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22, 23, 24, it is held as follows: "15. Seven learned Judges of this Court in the case of P.Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka ( AIR 2002 SC 1856 : 2002 AIR SCW 1841) (supra), after an exhaustive consideration of the authorities on the subject, has observed (Para 30 of AIR, AIR SCW):- "29. Seven learned Judges of this Court in the case of P.Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka ( AIR 2002 SC 1856 : 2002 AIR SCW 1841) (supra), after an exhaustive consideration of the authorities on the subject, has observed (Para 30 of AIR, AIR SCW):- "29. For all the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion that in Common Cause case (1) ( AIR 1996 SC 1619 : 1996 AIRSCW 2279) [as modified in Common Cause (II) ( AIR 1997 SC 1539 ) and Raj Deo Sharma (I) and (II) ( AIR 1998 SC 3281 : 1998 AIR SCW 3208 and AIR 1999 SC 3524 l 1999 AIR SCW 3522) the Court could not have prescribed periods of limitation beyond which the trial of a criminal case or a criminal proceeding cannot continue and must mandatorily be closed followed by an order acquitting or discharging the accused. In conclusion we hold: (1) The dictum in A.R.Antulay case ( AIR 1992 SC 1701 : 1992 AIR SCW 1872) is correct and still holds the field. (2) The propositions emerging from Article 21 of the Constitution and expounding the right to speedy trial laid down as guidelines in A.R.Antulay case adequately take care of right to speedy trial. We uphold and reaffirm the said propositions. (3) The guidelines laid down in A.R.Antulay case are not exhaustive but only illustrative. They are not intended to operate as hard-and-fast rules or to be applied like a straitjacket formula. Their applicability would depend on the fact situation of each case. It is difficult to foresee all situations and no generalization can be made. (4) It is neither advisable, nor feasible, nor judicially permissible to draw or prescribe an outer limit for conclusion of all criminal proceedings. The time-limits or bars of limitation prescribed in the several directions made in Common Cause (I), Raj Deo Sharma (I) and Raj Deo Sharma (II) could not have been so prescribed or drawn and are not good law. The criminal courts are not obliged to terminate trial or criminal proceedings merely on account of lapse of time, as prescribed by the directions made in Common Cause case (I) Raj Deo Sharma (I) and (II). The criminal courts are not obliged to terminate trial or criminal proceedings merely on account of lapse of time, as prescribed by the directions made in Common Cause case (I) Raj Deo Sharma (I) and (II). At the most the periods of time prescribed in those decisions can be taken by the courts seized of the trial or proceedings to act as reminders when they may be persuaded to apply their judicial mind to the facts and circumstances of the case before them and determine by taking into consideration the several relevant factors as pointed out in A.R.Antulay case and decide whether the trial or proceedings have become so inordinately delayed as to be called oppressive and unwarranted. Such time-limits cannot and will not by themselves be treated by any court as a bar to further continuance of the trial or proceedings and as mandatorily obliging the court to terminate the same and acquit or discharge the accused. (5) The criminal courts should exercise their available powers, such as those under Sections 309, 311 and 258 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to effectuate the right to speedy trial. A watchful and diligent trial Judge can prove to be better protector of such right than any guidelines. In appropriate cases, jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution can be invoked seeking appropriate relief or suitable directions. (6) This is an appropriate occasion to remind the Union of India and the State Governments of their constitutional obligation to strengthen the judiciary – quantitatively and qualitatively – by providing requisite funds, manpower and infrastructure. We hope and trust that the Governments shall act." 17. Our Constitution does not expressly declare that right to speedy trial as a fundamental right. The right to a speedy trial was first recognised in the Hussainara Khatoon's case, AIR 1979 SC 1360 , wherein, the court held that a speedy trial is implicit in the broad sweep and content of Article 21 of the Constitution, Subsequently, in a series of judgments, this Court has held that 'reasonably' expeditious trial is an integral and essential part of the Fundamental Right to Life and Liberty enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution of India. 18. 18. The guarantee of a speedy trial is intended to avoid oppression and prevent delay by imposing on the court and the prosecution an obligation to proceed with the trial with a reasonable dispatch. The guarantee serves a three fold purpose. Firstly, it protects the accused against oppressive pre-trial imprisonment; secondly, it relieves the accused of the anxiety and public suspicion due to unresolved criminal charges and lastly, it protects against the risk that evidence will be lost or memories dimmed by the passage of time, thus, impairing the ability of the accused to defend him or herself. Stated another way, the purpose of both the criminal procedure rules governing speedy trials and the constitutional provisions, in particular, Article 21, is to relieve an accused of the anxiety associated with a suspended prosecution and provide reasonably prompt administration of justice. 19. The reasons for the delay is one of the factors which courts would normally assess in determining as to whether a particular accused has been deprived of his or her right to speedy trial, including the aprty to whom the delay is attributable. Delay, which occasioned by action or inaction of the prosecution is one of the main factors which will be taken note by the courts while interjecting a criminal trial. A deliberate attempt to delay the trial, in order to hamper the accused, is weighed heavily against the prosecution. However, unintentional and unavoidable delays or administrative factors over which prosecution has no control, such as, over-crowded court dockets, absence of the presiding officers, strike by the lawyers, delay by the superior forum in notifying the designated Judge, (in the present case only), the matter pending before the other forums, including High Courts and Supreme Courts and adjournment of the criminal trial at the instance of the accused, may be a good cause for the failure to complete the trail within a reasonable time. This is only illustrative and not exhaustive. Such delay or delays cannot be violative of accused's right to a speedy tiral and needs to be excluded while deciding whether there is unreasonable and unexplained delay. The good cause exception to the speedy trial requirement focuses on only one factor i.e. the reason for the delay and the attending circumstances bear on the inquiry only to the extent to the sufficiency of the reason itself. The good cause exception to the speedy trial requirement focuses on only one factor i.e. the reason for the delay and the attending circumstances bear on the inquiry only to the extent to the sufficiency of the reason itself. Keeping this settled position in view, we have perused the note prepared by Shri Raval, learned ASG. Though, the note produced is not certified with copies of the order sheets maintained by the trial court, since they are not disputed by the other side, we have taken the information furnished therein as authentic. The note reveals that prosecution, apart from seeking 4-5 adjournments, right from 1991 till 2012, is not responsible for delay in any manner whatsoever. Therefore, in our opinion the delay in trial of the petitioners from 1991 to 2012 is solely attributable to petitioners and other accused persons. 20. The length of the delay is not sufficient in itself to warrant a finding that the accused was deprived of the right to a speedy trial. Rather, it is only one of the factors to be considered, and must be weighed against other factors. Moreover, among factors to be considered in determining whether the right to speedy trial of the accused is violated, the length of delay is least conclusive. While there is authority that even very lengthy delays do not give rise to per se conclusion of violation of constitutional rights, there is also authority that long enough delay could constitute per se violation of right to speedy trial. In our considered view, the delay tolerated varies with the complexity of the case, the manner of proof as well as gravity of the alleged crime. This, again, depends on case to case basis. There cannot be universal rule in this regard. It is a balancing process while determining as to whether the accused's right to speedy trial has been violated or not. The length of delay in and itself, is not a weighty factor. 21. In the present case, the delay is occasional by exceptional circumstances. It may not be due to failure of the prosecution or by the systemic failure but we can only say that there is a good cause for the failure to complete the trial and in our view, such delay is not violative of the right of the accused for speedy trial. 22. It may not be due to failure of the prosecution or by the systemic failure but we can only say that there is a good cause for the failure to complete the trial and in our view, such delay is not violative of the right of the accused for speedy trial. 22. Prescribing a time limit for the trial court to terminate the proceedings or, at the end thereof, to acquit or discharge the accused in all cases will amount to legislation, which cannot be done by judicial directives within the arena of judicial law making power available to constitutional courts; however, liberally the courts may interpret Articles 21, 32, 141 and 142. (Ramachandra Rao P. v. State of Karnataka (2002) 4 SCC 578 : ( AIR 2002 SC 1856 : 2002 AIR SCW 1841). The Seven Judges Bench overruled four earlier decision of this Court on this point: Raj Deo (II) v. State of Bihar (1999) 7 SCC 604 : ( AIR 1999 SC 3524 : 1999 AIR SCW 3522), Raj Deo Sharma v. State of Bihar (1998) 7 SCC 507 : ( AIR 1998 SC 3281 : 1998 AIR SCW 3208); Common Cause, A Registered Society v. Union of India (1996) 4 SCC 33 : ( AIR 1996 SC 1619 : 1996 AIR SCW 2279). The time limit in these four cases was contrary to the obsers of the Five Judges Bench in A.R.Antulay (supra). The Seven Judges Bench in Ramchandra Rao P. v. State of Karnataka, (supra) has been followed in State through CBI v. Dr.Narayan Waman Nerukar (2002) 7 SCC 6 : ( AIR 2002 SC 2977 : 2002 AIR SCW 3484) and State of Rajasthan v. Ikbal Hussen (2004) 12 SCC 499 : (2004 AIR SCW 5196). It was further observed that it is neither advisable, feasible nor judicially permissible to prescribe an outer limit for the conclusion of all criminal proceedings. It is for the criminal court to exercise powers under Sections 258, 309 and 311 of the Cr.P.C. to effectuate the right to a speedy trial. In an appropriate case, directions from the High Court under Section 482, Cr.P.C. and Article 226/227 can be invoked to seek appropriate relief. 23. In view of the settled position of law and particularly in the facts of the present case, we are not in agreement with the submissions made by learned Senior Counsel, Shri T.R. Andhyarujina. In an appropriate case, directions from the High Court under Section 482, Cr.P.C. and Article 226/227 can be invoked to seek appropriate relief. 23. In view of the settled position of law and particularly in the facts of the present case, we are not in agreement with the submissions made by learned Senior Counsel, Shri T.R. Andhyarujina. Before we conclude, we intend to say, particularly, looking into long adjournments sought by the accused persons, who are seven in number, that accused cannot take advantage or the benefit of the right of speedy trial by causing the delay and then use that delay in order to assert their rights." 7. It is pertinent to note in the discharge petition it is not even pleaded that the petitioners have to be discharged only on the ground of delay and it is also not known as to whether this plea was raised at the time of argument before the trial court. What was mainly argued was the petitioners are departmentally enquired into which caused delay in commencement of the trial in the criminal case. It was also contended that the alleged loss caused to the department has been compensated by payment of money and therefore if any further punishment is imposed on them, it would amount to double jeopardy. Such a contention urged on behalf of the petitioners was rightly rejected by the trial court by holding that mere payment of money alleged to have been misappropriated by the petitioners will not be a ground for discharging them from the criminal prosecution. 8. As far as the delay is concerned, the court below pointed out that originally, non-bailable warrant was issued against A-1 and A-3 and it was pending execution for quite some time and it was re-called later. Similarly, during the course of trial A6 died. It was further pointed out by the court below that the petitions filed by the petitioners for discharging them were pending and the petitioners, in order to drag on the case, have filed one petition or the other under Section 311 of Cr.P.C. seeking adjournment. As far as C.C. No. 76 of 2012 is concerned, the Court below pointed out that the accused therein have filed C.M.P. No. 1469 of 2005 and that was pending till 2011. As far as C.C. No. 76 of 2012 is concerned, the Court below pointed out that the accused therein have filed C.M.P. No. 1469 of 2005 and that was pending till 2011. Therefore, as per the impugned orders passed by the trial court, the delay is due to the non-cooperation of the petitioners herein in protracting the proceedings. Therefore, at this stage, it is futile on the part of the petitioners to contend that there was a delay in commencing the trial and therefore the petitioners have to be discharged. I do not find any reason to interfere with the reasoned orders of the lower court. 9. In the result, the Criminal revision cases are dismissed and the order dated 08.11.2011 passed in C.M.P.Nos.1722, 1725, 1726, 1720, 1723, 1724 and 1721 of 2009 in C.C.Nos.72, 73, 71, 70, 69, 76 and 77 of 2002 on the file of the Judicial Magistrate Coonoor are confirmed. The learned Judicial Magistrate, Coonoor is directed to dispose of the C.C.Nos.72, 73, 71, 70, 69, 76 and 77 of 2002 as expeditiously as possible, preferably within a period of one year from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. Consequently, the connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.