ORDER S.C. Das, J. 1. This revisional application under Section 397 r/w Section 401 of Cr. P.C. is directed against the judgment, dated 25-01-2005, passed by learned Addl. Sessions Judge, West Tripura, Khowai, in Criminal Appeal No. 11 (3)/2004. By the impugned judgment learned Additional Sessions Judge upheld the judgment & order of conviction and sentence passed by learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Khowai in case No. G.R. 184/2003, whereby and where under the learned SDJM found the accused appellant guilty of committing offence punishable under Sections 279, 338 and 304(A) of I.P.C. and sentenced him to suffer SI for 1 (one) month under Section 279 of I.P.C. and RI for 3 (three) months and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/- (Rupees one thousand), in default of payment to suffer SI for 1(one) month under Section 338 of I.P.C. and again to suffer RI for 1 (one) year and to pay a fine of Rs. 3,000/- (Rupees three thousand), in default, to suffer SI for 3 (three) months under Section 304(A) of I.P.C. All the substantive sentences were directed to run consecutively. Heard Learned Counsel, Mr. D. Bhattacharjee for the petitioner and learned Additional Public Prosecutor. Mr. P. Bhattacharjee, for the State-respondent. 2. The prosecution case, in short, is that on 29-05-2003 Jeep Vehicle No. TR-01A-3501, loaded with passengers, was running between Khowai to Teliamura and on the way at about 5.15 p.m. at Trishabari on Khowai-Teliamura road the vehicle met an accident for rash and negligent driving with excessive speed and it dashed with the roadside tree and thereafter, collapsed by the side of the road in low land and as a result, 12/13 passengers, who were on board, all sustained more or less injuries. They were shifted to Teliamura Hospital and then to G.B. Hospital and at G.B. Hospital one of the passengers. SI of Police namely, Narayan Deb, succumbed to the injuries. One Sunirmal Baishya immediately after accident lodged the F.I.R. on the basis of which Teliamura PS Case No. 74/2003 under Sections 279 and 330 of I.P.C. was registered and police investigation was taken up. The vehicle was seized from the spot of accident, in damaged condition and it was mechanically examined by the Motor Vehicle Inspector, who submitted report that the vehicle was having with no mechanical disorder at the time of accident. The vehicle was seized from the spot of accident, in damaged condition and it was mechanically examined by the Motor Vehicle Inspector, who submitted report that the vehicle was having with no mechanical disorder at the time of accident. It is the further case of the prosecution that the accused Haradhan Gope was the driver of the vehicle at the time of accident and in the accident he was also injured and was treated in G.B. Hospital. The accused driver surrendered before the I.O. at Teliamura Police Station and he was arrested and forwarded to Court. Injury report of the injured passengers and the post mortem (PM) report of deceased Narayan Deb. Were collected and on completion of investigation I.O. submitted charge sheet against the accused for commission of offence punishable under Sections 279, 338 and 304(A) of I.P.C., on the basis of which cognizance was taken by the learned Magistrate and in course of trial the accused Haradhan Gope was examined under Section 251 of Cr. P.C., to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 3. In course of trial prosecution examined as many as 18 witnesses and out of them PWs. 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11 and 17 are all injured passengers of the vehicle. PW. 1 is the informant of the case. PWs. 4, 14, 15 and 16 are the local people of the place of accident, who gathered on the spot after the accident occurred and are the witnesses to the seizure of vehicle. PWs. 9, 10, 12 and 13 are the Medical Officers, who examined the injured passengers and done PM examination over the dead body of the deceased Narayan Deb. PW. 18 is the I.O. of the case. Defence adduced no evidence. Defence case, so far ascertained from the cross-examination of the prosecution witness and the statement of the accused made while examination under Section 313 of Cr. P.C., is that the accused was not driving the vehicle at the time of accident and that the accused is innocent. 4. In a revisional application this Court is to see the correctness, legality and propriety of a judgment/order, passed by inferior Court and to see the regularity of the proceeding before such Court. P.C., is that the accused was not driving the vehicle at the time of accident and that the accused is innocent. 4. In a revisional application this Court is to see the correctness, legality and propriety of a judgment/order, passed by inferior Court and to see the regularity of the proceeding before such Court. The revisional Court is not required to reassess or re-appreciate the evidence on record, which has already been considered by the trial Court and the appellate Court, unless it is shown that the finding of the Court below is perverse or that it is based on no evidence.' 5. Learned Counsel, Mr. D. Bhattacharjee, appearing on behalf of the accused petitioner concentrated his argument only on 2 (two) points namely : (a) Identity of the accused petitioner that he was on the steering of the vehicle at the time of the accident has not been established. For the first time, the witness identified him before the Court and that aspect of the evidence, learned trial Court and the appellate Court failed to appreciate. (b) The Motor Vehicle Inspector, who submitted report, was not examined. The examination of the damaged vehicle also was not done on the spot of accident and so the trial Court and the appellate Court were wrong in appreciating the Motor Vehicle Inspector's report. 6. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor. Mr. P. Bhattacharjee, on the other hand, has submitted that identification of the accused has clearly been established in the depositions of PWs. 7, 11 and 17. Further, the accused himself surrendered before I.O. and he was forwarded to the Court and the accused stated nothing that he did not surrender before the police and that he was not the driver of the vehicle at the initial stage. There is no evidence in support of his plea that he was the driver of the vehicle at the time of accident or that the witnesses, for any reason falsely impleaded him. He further submitted that Motor Vehicle Inspector's report has been exhibited and there was no objection raised by the defence at the time report was taken into consideration. There was also no prayer from the side of the defence to call the Motor Vehicle Inspector for his cross-examination and under such circumstances, at this revisional stage, defence cannot get advantage of this plea. 7. Burden lies on the prosecution to prove its case. There was also no prayer from the side of the defence to call the Motor Vehicle Inspector for his cross-examination and under such circumstances, at this revisional stage, defence cannot get advantage of this plea. 7. Burden lies on the prosecution to prove its case. Such burden cannot be shifted on the shoulder of the defence. When the burden of prosecution is discharged by adducing evidence defence may discard it either by way of cross-examining the prosecution witness or by adducing defence evidence. Admittedly, in the present case, defence adduced no evidence. They relied on the cross-examination part of the prosecution witnesses. 8. It is an undisputed fact that vehicle No. TR-01A-3501 (Jeep) met an accident on 25-09-2003 at about 5.15 p.m. at Trishabari on Teliamura-Khowai Road. According to the prosecution, accused was on the steering of the vehicle at the time of the accident. All the passengers travelling with the vehicle suffered more or less injuries due to the accident. Twelve injury reports and one PM examination report are on record which has been marked as exhibits. All the witnesses stated that the accused was driving the vehicle with excessive speed, negligently and rashly and the vehicle dashed with a roadside tree and then collapsed in the low land and as a result, the passengers received injuries and the vehicle was severally damaged. The rash and negligent driving of the vehicle has therefore been well established. There is no defence plea that the vehicle was not driven rashly and negligently. Only defence plea is that the accused was not the driver of the vehicle. Prosecution obtained a written declaration from the owner of the vehicle that the accused was the driver of the vehicle at the time of accident and that declaration has been brought on record as Exbt. 17 but the owner of the vehicle has not been examined. So that declaration has no evidentiary value at all. Non-examination of the owner of the vehicle is a serious lapse on the part of prosecution. Out of the injured passengers PWs. 7, 11 and 17 identified the accused in the dock. P.W. 7 in his deposition clearly stated that at the time of accident accused Haradhan Gope was the driver of the vehicle and he identified the accused in the dock. The evidence of this witness regarding identification of the accused has remained unrebutted. Out of the injured passengers PWs. 7, 11 and 17 identified the accused in the dock. P.W. 7 in his deposition clearly stated that at the time of accident accused Haradhan Gope was the driver of the vehicle and he identified the accused in the dock. The evidence of this witness regarding identification of the accused has remained unrebutted. Defence in cross-examination of this witness, only put a suggestion that the accused was not the driver of the vehicle. There is nothing brought on record by the defence to discard the oral evidence of this witness regarding identity of the accused. Learned defence counsel argued that none of the witnesses made any statement before I.O. about the identity of the accused and therefore, I have drawn my attention to the statement of this witness recorded by I.O. under Section 161 of Cr. P.C. wherein witness made categorical and clear statement that the accused was the driver of the vehicle at the time of accident. Identity of the accused, as the driver of the vehicle at the time of accident, has therefore, been established by the cogent evidence of this witness. Defence advanced a suggestion in cross-examination that the witness had a quarrel with the accused in respect of taking seat in the vehicle and as a result, the accused has been falsely implicated. This suggestion rather established the prosecution case that the accused was the driver of the vehicle. The suggestion denied cannot be termed as evidence and therefore, has no value at all. 9. PW. 11 and 17 also identified the accused-petitioner in the dock at the time of recording their evidence but in their earlier statements before I.O. there was no such statement made by them. It is however established that they were travelling with the vehicle at the time of accident. Identification made by them for the first time before the Court cannot be treated as sufficient to establish involvement of the accused but where the identification has already been established by the evidence of PW. 7, the identification so made by PWs. 11 and 17 may be accepted as corroborating evidence. Further. PW. 18 stated that the accused surrendered before him and he arrested the accused and forwarded him to Court. 7, the identification so made by PWs. 11 and 17 may be accepted as corroborating evidence. Further. PW. 18 stated that the accused surrendered before him and he arrested the accused and forwarded him to Court. This Statement of the witness has not been rebutted in cross-examination rather the record shows that the accused was forwarded to Court, on 04-06-2003 and a bail petition was filed on that day and he was released on bail by order of the Court. If the accused was not involved in the crime he would not surrender before the police in connection with the case. There was also no plea on the part of the accused before the Court that he was arrested otherwise than as alleged by I.O. and was falsely implicated in the case. In the evidence of I.O. it further transpires that the accused was also injured in the accident and his injury report also collected by I.O. which has also been brought on record and marked as Exbt. 6. The evidence on record, therefore, clearly established the identity of accused petitioner as driver of the vehicle on the alleged date and time of the accident. The argument of learned defence counsel, therefore, has no merit at all. The next argument of learned defence counsel that non-examination of Motor Vehicle Inspector vitiated the prosecution case, cannot be accepted in the facts and circumstances of this case. It is submitted by Learned Counsel that the accident occurred at Trishabari but the vehicle was lifted from the place of accident to Teliamura Police Station and was mechanically examined at Police Station compound. So, what was the position of the vehicle on the spot of accident cannot be ascertained with the mechanical report on record. Further, the Motor Vehicle Inspector since not produced before the Court, mere exhibiting that document cannot prove the legal requirement and in support of his contention Learned Counsel relied on a case law reported in (1998) 8 SCC 493 . (State of Karnataka v. Satish). 10. It is true that the Motor Vehicle Inspector has not been produced and examined before Court. The report of the Motor Vehicle Inspector has been exhibited by PW. 18 and marked as Exbt. 18. The report shows that the vehicle had no mechanical disorder. All the important part of the vehicle was serviceable and was in operating condition. 10. It is true that the Motor Vehicle Inspector has not been produced and examined before Court. The report of the Motor Vehicle Inspector has been exhibited by PW. 18 and marked as Exbt. 18. The report shows that the vehicle had no mechanical disorder. All the important part of the vehicle was serviceable and was in operating condition. Indisputedly, the accident occurred while the vehicle dashed against a road side tree and then collapsed in the low land away from the road. It suggests that either the vehicle had mechanical disorder or that it went off the road for rash and negligent driving as the driver could not control it. It was necessary for prosecution to examine the Motor Vehicle Inspector but, non-examination of the Motor Vehicle Inspector in the present case, cannot be said to have vitiated the total prosecution case when the Motor Vehicle Inspector's report was exhibited defence raised no objection. No prayer also was made before the trial Court that the report of the Motor Vehicle Inspector was not correct and therefore, the Inspector should be called for cross-examination. The accused in his cross-examination under Section 313 of Cr. P.C. also raised no point that the vehicle had any mechanical disorder resulting the accident. Under such circumstances, the defence plea at the revisional stage has no merit at all. In the reported case, referred by learned defence counsel, neither the Motor Vehicle Inspector's report were brought on record nor the Inspector was examined and that was considered by the Hon'ble Apex Court but the fact of the case in hand is altogether different and the ratio of that decision, therefore, cannot be applied in this case. 11. We may quote here the observation of the Apex Court in the case of Dalbir Singh v. State of Haryana reported in AIR 2000 SC 1677 which corresponds to (2000) 5 SCC 82 : 2000 Cri LJ 2283. The Apex Court observed thus : Bearing in mind the galloping trend in road accidents in India and the devastating consequences visiting the victims and their families, Criminal Courts cannot treat the nature of the offence under Section 304-A, I.P.C. as attracting the benevolent provisions of S. 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act. The Apex Court observed thus : Bearing in mind the galloping trend in road accidents in India and the devastating consequences visiting the victims and their families, Criminal Courts cannot treat the nature of the offence under Section 304-A, I.P.C. as attracting the benevolent provisions of S. 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act. While considering the quantum of sentence, to be imposed for the offence of causing death by rash or negligent driving of automobiles, one of the prime considerations should be deterrence. A professional driver pedals the accelerator of the automobile almost through his working hours. He must constantly inform himself that he cannot afford to have a single moment of laxity or inattentiveness when his leg is on the pedal of the vehicle in locomotion. He cannot and should not take a chance thinking that a rash driving need not necessarily cause any accident; or even if any accident occurs it need not necessarily result in the death of any human being; or even if such death ensures he might not be convicted of the offence; and lastly that even if he is convicted he would be dealt with leniently by the Court. He must always keep in his mind the fear psyche that if he is convicted of the offence for causing death of a human being due to his callous driving of vehicle he cannot escape from jail sentence. This is the role which the Courts can play, particularly at the level of trial Courts, for lessening the high rate of motor accidents due to callous driving of automobiles. The Apex Court further held thus : When automobiles have become death trap any leniency shown to drivers who are found guilty of rash driving would be at the risk of further escalation of road accidents. All these who are manning the steering of automobiles, particularly professional drivers, must be kept under constant reminders of their duty to adopt utmost care and also of the consequences befalling them in cases of dereliction. One of the most effective ways of keeping such drivers under mental vigil is to maintain deterrent element in sentencing sphere. Any latitude shown to them in that sphere would tempt them to make driving frivolous and frolic. In the case in hand the trial Court has taken abnormally lenient view while imposing sentence which is contrary to the procedure prescription of law. 12. Any latitude shown to them in that sphere would tempt them to make driving frivolous and frolic. In the case in hand the trial Court has taken abnormally lenient view while imposing sentence which is contrary to the procedure prescription of law. 12. The Apex Court in the case of B. Nagabhusanam v. State of Karnataka reported in (2008) 5 SCC 730 : AIR 2008 SC 2557 while reiterating the ratio of the decision in Dalbir Singh (supra) has observed thus : We are of the opinion that six months' simple imprisonment and a direction to the appellant to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/-for commission of the offence punishable under Section 304A and simple imprisonment for one month and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/- for the offence punishable under Section 279 of the Indian Penal Code cannot be said to be shocking. While considering the quantum of sentence to be imposed for the offence of causing death by rash and negligent driving of automobiles, one of the prime considerations should be deterrence. The driver must always keep in his mind the fear psyche that if he is convicted of the offence for causing death of a human being due to his callous driving of vehicle he cannot escape from jail sentence. 13. In view of the discussion made above the re visional application fails and is dismissed. Send back the LC records along with a copy of this judgment. Application dismissed