Judgment :- The defendant, allegedly a trespasser, seeking mercy from the plaintiff, but complaining of acquiescence, capable of squatting on the property for more than twenty-five years, by claiming adverse possession, has filed this second appeal. 2. The defendant is the appellant. The plaintiff filed the suit in O.S.No.575 of 1994 seeking recovery of possession, mesne profits (for the period from 01.12.1991 to 30.11.1994, amounting to Rs.5,475/-with 12% interest) and damages at the rate of Rs.10/- per day for the subsequent period. The said suit was decreed. The appeal preferred by the defendant was dismissed with costs. As against the judgment and decree of the first appellate court, the defendant has preferred this second appeal. 3. The brief facts:- Prior to the filing of the suit in O.S.No.575 of 1994, the defendant / the appellant herein filed the suit, as plaintiff, against the respondent herein, in O.S.No.102 of 1993 seeking the relief of injunction from dispossession, excepting under due process of law. The suit was dismissed with costs, as against which no appeal was preferred. 3.1. The suit property is located at Udagamandalam Town in R.S.No.532, a small portion with a wooden shed in the total extent of 3 acres. The plaintiff is the owner of the property. During 1986, the defendant encroached a portion of the property and put up a wooden shed. The plaintiff wrote several letters asking him to vacate the property. The defendant sought permission to stay in the property on the ground of sympathy, till a suitable and alternative place could be found out. The defendant was permitted to stay in the property for a limited time. The indulgence shown was misused and the defendant is evading to vacate the property. Immediately after the receipt of notice issued by the plaintiff on 26.02.1993, the defendant filed the suit in O.S.No.102 of 1993. From 01.12.1991 to 30.12.1994, the defendant has to pay a sum of Rs.5,475/- as damages for use and occupation. For the subsequent period, he has to pay future damages at the rate of Rs.10/- per day. 3.2. The suit was resisted by the defendant on the following contentions:- (i) The defendant is in possession from 1982 in an extent of 4 cents in Survey No.532. The defendant has spent a sum of Rs.40,000/- towards construction of the house. (ii) It is located at the distance of 20 feet from the plaintiff's Church. 3.2. The suit was resisted by the defendant on the following contentions:- (i) The defendant is in possession from 1982 in an extent of 4 cents in Survey No.532. The defendant has spent a sum of Rs.40,000/- towards construction of the house. (ii) It is located at the distance of 20 feet from the plaintiff's Church. The plaintiff is guilty of acquiescence as they did not prevent the defendant from putting up the house. Hence the plaintiff is estopped from putting a claim for vacating the property. (iii) Since the defendant is in possession from 1982, the suit claim is barred by limitation. 3.3. Based on the pleadings, the trial court has framed the following issues:- (i) Whether the suit property belongs to the plaintiff? (ii) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to damages, if so, to what extent? (iii) To what other relief, is the plaintiff is entitled to? 3.4. The trial court has decreed the suit relying upon the following facts, circumstances and documents:- (i)Exs.A-1 to A-4 reveals that the defendant has sought for permission to reside in the suit property and as the plaintiff did not keep up the promise, the plaintiff has expressed displeasure for not vacating the property within the accepted time. Therefore, the title of the plaintiff over the suit property is an admitted fact. (ii) The defendant has admitted that he was working under Telecommunication Department and as such, till he retired during 1985, he was residing in the quarters allotted by the Department, and therefore, the plaintiff's contention that the defendant trespassed into the property and put up construction in the suit property during 1986 must be more probable. On the very same admission, the contention of the defendant that he entered into the suit property, during 1982, cannot be correct. (iii) The property tax has not been paid by the defendant from 1982, and had he paid house tax / property tax, it would have substantiated the contention that he was residing in the suit property from 1982, but it is not so. (iv) P.W.2 himself has stated that the construction in the suit property was over within a period of two days. (iv) P.W.2 himself has stated that the construction in the suit property was over within a period of two days. Exs.B-1 and B-2, photographs and negatives relating to the suit property covering the wooden shed, go to show that it would not have taken much time to complete the construction and it is possible to finish of the construction even within one night. (v) It is unbelievable that a sum of Rs.40,000/-should have been spent for the construction of suit house. (vi) There is no proof to show that the Church administration was watching the construction put up by the plaintiff without raising any objection. (vii) The defendant has no cause of action to file the suit in O.S.No.102 of 1993. 3.5. Rejecting the contention of the defendant that the plaintiff is guilty of acquiescence the suit has been decreed. 3.6. The first appellate court concurred with the observations and findings of the trial court. The contention that the plaintiff was guilty of acquiescence and that therefore, the plaintiff can only seek the relief of compensation and not the recovery of possession was rejected. 3.7. The first appellate court considered the following two decisions:- (i) AIR 1981 Madras 220 (R.S.Muthuswamy Gounder v. Annamalai and others); (ii) AIR 1977 Madras 342 (S.Palanivelu v. V.K.Varadammal). 3.8. The first appellate court also found that, as there was no issue framed with regard to acquiescence, there is no necessity to consider the plea and there was also no evidence to support the plea of acquiescence. On these findings, the judgment of the trial court was confirmed. 4. The second appeal has been admitted on the following substantial question of law:- “1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any damages without adducing any evidence to substantiate the quantum of the claim? 2. Has not the appellant perfected title to the suit property by adverse possession?” 5. The first contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the defendant has prescribed title by adverse possession and therefore he has become the owner of the property and hence recovery of possession cannot be ordered. 5.1. This contention cannot be accepted, because the documents and evidence available, in this case, do not prove the defence of adverse possession. The crucial documents in fact would disprove the plea of adverse possession. 5.1. This contention cannot be accepted, because the documents and evidence available, in this case, do not prove the defence of adverse possession. The crucial documents in fact would disprove the plea of adverse possession. Under Ex.A-1, the plaintiff has required the defendant to appear in the office in connection with encroachment of Church property. Under Ex.A-2, the defendant has solicited the mercy of the plaintiff seeking permission to stay in the suit property; it is also stated that the suit property belongs to the Church, and that he had spent money as he was told that the place belonged to Municipality and the Revenue Departments. Under Ex.A-3, the plaintiff has expressed displeasure for not having vacated the property, inspite of the expiry of the time granted by the plaintiff. Under Ex.A-4, 45 days further time has been granted to vacate the property. 5.2. It may not be out of place to point out that there are no pleadings with the specific details, in order to substantiate the claim for adverse possession. 5.3. Pleadings with regard to plea regarding adverse possession is lacking. No doubt, possession, actual, open, notorious, exclusive and adverse for the statutorily prescribed period is one of the mode of acquisition of title recognised by the statute of limitation, but pleadings and proof are necessary to substantiate the same. 5.4. Pleadings are statements in writing, drawn up and filled by each party to a case stating, what his contentions will be at the trial and giving all such details as his opponent needs to know in order to prepare his case in answer. It is not sufficient to plead that a party has been in adverse possession for over twelve years. It must be specifically pleaded that the defendant has been in possession openly, peacefully and continuously without any interruption for more than twelve years, so openly that either the plaintiff was aware of his possession or ought to have been aware, had he exercised due diligence (Chandra v. Baijnath 1935 Privy Council 36). 5.5. It was held in AIR 1987 Kerala 42 (Roseli Mathew v. Joseph) that adverse possession must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and extent and a plea is required at the least to show when possession becomes adverse, so that the starting point of limitation against the party affected can be found. Therefore, the plea regarding adverse possession has been rightly rejected. Therefore, the plea regarding adverse possession has been rightly rejected. 6. The next contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the appellant is in permissive possession and therefore, he cannot be evicted. 6.1. Who gave permission, what is the duration of permission and what are the terms and conditions of permission are not explained. Therefore, that contention cannot be accepted. 6.2. Learned counsel for the appellants cited the following two decisions, as relied on by the first appellate court, and contended that the plaintiff having exhibited acquiescence is not entitled to seek recovery of possession and he is only entitled to seek compensation:- (i) AIR 1981 MADRAS 220 (referred to supra). In this decision, it has been held that suit for vacant possession based on title and for mandatory injunction directing demolition of construction made by defendant on suit land; held, plaintiff could have come to know in time about defendant putting up construction on suit land had he cared to find out; principle of acquiescence applied and plaintiff was entitled only to decree for compensation. (ii) AIR 1977 MADRAS 342 (referred to supra). In this decision, it has been held that acquiescence by owner while trespasser built on trespassed land and owner should be compensated and trespasser should not be evicted. 6.3. Title of the plaintiff over the suit property is an admitted fact. Therefore, the plaintiff will have the undoubted right to recover possession of it from the trespasser albeit that the defendant has put up construction upon it. But an exception exists to such a rule, where the owner is precluded by his conduct on his part from claiming possession. This exception is called the rule of estoppel which prevents the owner from claiming the property to be as that of him, so far as the other side is concerned. 6.4. Whether the plaintiff herein is estopped by his conduct is the issue to be considered. 6.5. As rightly pointed out by the first appellate court, there is no pleading with regard to acquiescence. There is neither evidence too. The mere silence on the part of the plaintiff will not amount to acquiescence. 6.4. Whether the plaintiff herein is estopped by his conduct is the issue to be considered. 6.5. As rightly pointed out by the first appellate court, there is no pleading with regard to acquiescence. There is neither evidence too. The mere silence on the part of the plaintiff will not amount to acquiescence. Acquiescence which will deprive a party of his legal right, must amount to a fraud and the following are the elements necessary to constitute such fraud as held in Shaw v. Applegate 1978 (1) All England Reporter 123:- (a) defendant or the party pleading acquiescence must have made a mistake as to his legal rights, i.e., must have acted in a bona fide but mistaken belief of his right; (b) he must have spent money or must have done some act on the faith of such belief; (c) the plaintiff or the party possessing the legal right must know of the existence of his own legal right which is inconsistent with the right claimed by the defendant; (d) he must also know of the defendant's mistaken belief of his right; and (e) the plaintiff must have encouraged the defendant in his expenditure of money or in the other act which he has done, either directly or by abstaining from asserting his legal right. 6.6. The defendant should plead full facts establishing the element constituting acquiescence. 6.7. So far as this case is concerned, it is not a case where the defendant made a mistake as to his legal right. Unmistakably the defendant entered into the possession, knowing fully well that it is not his property, yet believing that it is the property belonging to either Municipality or Revenue Department. He spent money knowing fully well that he has no right over the property, but somebody else has the right over the property. Neither there is mistaken belief of his right nor there is bona fide in putting up the construction over the suit property. There is absolutely no proof to show that the plaintiff encouraged the defendant in the expenditure of money in putting up the construction. Therefore the contention that the plaintiff acquiescenced in the conduct of the defendant has no basis. Therefore, the facts and evidence do not support the plea of acquiescence. Hence the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant cannot be accepted. 7. Therefore the contention that the plaintiff acquiescenced in the conduct of the defendant has no basis. Therefore, the facts and evidence do not support the plea of acquiescence. Hence the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant cannot be accepted. 7. Section 51 of the Transfer of Property Act will be applicable only in case of improvement made by bonafide holder under defective title. Hence there is no scope of invoking Section 51 of the Transfer of Property Act. 8. Yet another contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the Courts below have awarded damages without any evidence to substantiate the quantum of the claim. 8.1. Admittedly, the defendant is a trespasser of the suit property. Therefore, there is no lease deed available to fix the exact amount of lease. The plaintiff has asked for only damages for use and occupation. When there is no documentary evidence available due to the conduct of the defendant, then the other option available to the Court is to take judicial notice of certain facts and to arrive at the quantum of damages. 8.2. Admittedly the defendant is in possession of property from 1986. It is not his case that he paid any damage for use and occupation. It is also not his case that he also paid any rent. He is residing in Udagamandalam, which is known as queen of hills. Because of Tourist attraction, the availability of place and the rate of rent has increased manifold. The trial court has fixed only the reasonable amount, which may even be the minimum, as the damage for use and occupation. The plaintiff has also claimed future damage at the very nominal rate of Rs.10/-per day. Therefore, the contention that the fixation of damages is without evidence cannot be accepted. 9. In the result, the second appeal is dismissed with costs throughout. The concurrent judgments of the Courts below are confirmed. Time to handover vacant possession is fixed at two months.