JUDGMENT Sanjay Karol, J. Petitioner, inter alia, prayed for the following reliefs: “i) That the impugned punishment order (Annexure P/D) may kindly be quashed and set aside. ii) That the respondents may kindly be directed to release the salary and all consequential financial and other service benefits to the petitioner treating the period from the date of dismissal to date of reinstatement as duty period as the petitioner was not responsible for delaying the decision on his appeal pending with the appellate authority and for the delay on the part of appellate authority in deciding the appeal, the petitioner cannot be penalized.” 2. Facts are not much in dispute. Petitioner Sukh Ram Sharma was posted as a Senior Assistant in the office of Divisional Manager Forest Working Division, Solan. Criminal prosecution against him and other officials, including private persons was initiated by the State. The charge was that certain forest officials, including the petitioner, entered into a criminal conspiracy with one Rajesh Kumar and with an endeavour to cause unjust enrichment to him changed the rates of timber and also economics for the purpose of fixation of rates for the price of the timber, which resulted into excess payments being made to him. 3. With the completion of investigation in the criminal case, petitioner amongst others was charged for having committed offences punishable under Sections 471, 476A, 466 read with Section 120-B, IPC and Section 13(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act. Petitioner stands acquitted by the Court trying the criminal case and such findings stand upheld even by this Court. 4. Simultaneously, inquiry proceedings were initiated by the Disciplinary Authority against the petitioner and other delinquent officials. These proceedings were initiated separately. In case of petitioner, after due compliance of statutory provisions and principles of natural justice, the Inquiry officer submitted his report of inquiry on 26.6.2009. 5. Based on the said report, Disciplinary Authority, vide order dated 21.11.2009 (Annexure P-15) dismissed the petitioner from service with immediate effect. Petitioner preferred an appeal and in terms of impugned order dated 26.8.2010 (Annexure PD), appeal stands partly allowed and by taking a lenient view, penalty of dismissal from service was changed to that of “reduction to a lower stage of Rs.6400 in the time scale of Rs.6400-10640 (pre-revised) for further entire period of service with further directions that he will earn increments of pay during the period of such reduction. Further the period of dismissal shall be regulated in accordance with the leave of kind due”. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has made the following submissions, assailing the order passed by the appellate Authority (i) no action stands initiated against the other delinquent officials (ii) petitioner stands acquitted in criminal case and consequently he ought to be reinstated with full honour (iii) the findings of Inquiry officer are perverse. 7. With regard to the first point, it can only be observed that contention raised is not correct. A detailed inquiry was initiated against other delinquent official, namely, Shri L.R.Kashyap, who stands absolved by the Inquiry officer. 8. It be only observed that learned counsel has referred to and relied upon the decisions of the Apex Court in Vineet Narain and others vs. Union of India and another, (1998) 1 SCC 226 (para 44) and Man Singh vs. State of Haryana and others, (2008) 12 SCC 331 (paras 21 & 22). The ratio laid down in the aforesaid decisions is not applicable to the facts of the instant case. In any event, if action on the administrative side against any other delinquent official has not been so taken, then it is always open for the petitioner to point out this fact to the disciplinary authority and it shall be open for them to initiate appropriate proceedings, if required, in accordance with law, against such person(s). However, simply because no action has been taken against anyone of the delinquent official, that fact by itself could not be a ground for dropping the disciplinary proceedings initiated against the petitioner or absolving him in such proceedings despite findings of which affirmatively are against the petitioner. 9. Coming to the second contention, it be only noticed that petitioner’s dismissal from service was not solely on the ground that criminal proceedings were initiated against him. Independent disciplinary proceedings were initiated by the authorities and his dismissal is based on the inquiry report submitted by the Inquiry officer in which he has been found to be guilty. 10. 9. Coming to the second contention, it be only noticed that petitioner’s dismissal from service was not solely on the ground that criminal proceedings were initiated against him. Independent disciplinary proceedings were initiated by the authorities and his dismissal is based on the inquiry report submitted by the Inquiry officer in which he has been found to be guilty. 10. This Court in Bishan Singh vs. Union of India and another, (2007) 2 S.L.J. (HP) 1168, after taking into account the decisions rendered by the Apex Court in G.M.Tank vs. State of Gujarat and others, (2006) 5 SCC 446 ; State of Rajasthan vs. B.K.Meena and others, (1996) 6 SCC 417 ; Lalit Popli vs. Canara Bank and others, (2003) SCC 583 and Uttranchal Road Transport Corpn. and Ors. Vs. Mansaram Nainwal, AIR 2006 SC 2840 , has held as under:- “24. As far as acquittal of the appellant by a criminal court is concerned, in my opinion, the said order does not preclude the respondent from taking disciplinary action if it is otherwise permissible. Acquittal by a criminal court would not debar an employer from exercising power in accordance with the Rules and Regulations in force. The two proceedings, criminal and departmental, are entirely different. They operate in different fields and have different objectives. Whereas the object of criminal trial is to inflict appropriate punishment on the offender, the purpose of enquiry proceedings is to deal with the delinquent departmentally and to impose penalty in accordance with the service rules. In a criminal trial, in criminating statement made by the accused in certain circumstances or before certain officers is totally inadmissible in evidence. Such strict rules of evidence and procedure would not apply to departmental proceedings. The degree of proof which is necessary to order a conviction is different from the degree of proof necessary to record the commission of delinquency. The rule relating to appreciation of evidence in the two proceedings is also not similar. In criminal law, burden of proof is on the prosecution and unless the prosecution is able to prove the guilt of the accused ‘beyond reasonable doubt’, he cannot be convicted by a court of law. In a departmental enquiry, on the other hand, penalty can be imposed on the delinquent officer on a finding recorded on the basis of ‘preponderance of probability’. In a departmental enquiry, on the other hand, penalty can be imposed on the delinquent officer on a finding recorded on the basis of ‘preponderance of probability’. Acquittal of the delinquent official by the High Court, therefore, does not ipso facto absolve him from the liability under the disciplinary jurisdiction of the respondent. 25. In the departmental proceedings, the question is whether the delinquent official is guilty of such conduct as would necessitate his removal from service or lesser punishment, as the case may be, whereas in the criminal proceedings, the question is whether the offences registered against him are established and if established what sentence should be imposed upon him.” 11. Consequently, the second contention merits rejection. 12. Coming to the third point, it be only noticed that the Apex court in State of A.P. vs. S. Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723 , has held that while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the High Court does not act as an appellate authority. Its jurisdiction is circumscribed by limits of judicial review to correct errors of law or procedural errors leading to manifest injustice or violation of principles of natural justice. Judicial review is not akin to adjudication of the case on merits as an appellate authority. 13. It is also a settled proposition of law that the High Court would not reverse finding of the inquiring authority on the ground that the evidence adduced before it is insufficient. If there is some evidence/material to reasonably support the view of the inquiry officer, it is not the function of the Court to review the evidence and arrive at its own independent finding. Adequacy or reliability of the evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the Court in writ proceedings. Now in the instant case, petitioner was charged for having committed the following irregularities:- “1. Gross irregularities or negligence in discharging of official duties with a dishonest motive. 2. Tempering of official record. 3. Connivance with Attorney Shri Rajesh Thakur of lot No.30&31/97-98Pvt.(Solan)and causing loss to the Corporation to the tune of Rs.9,41,218/-includinginterest.” 15. No doubt, petitioner stands acquitted by the criminal Court, but then the findings returned in the criminal trial cannot be made basis for holding the petitioner not guilty in the disciplinary proceedings. 2. Tempering of official record. 3. Connivance with Attorney Shri Rajesh Thakur of lot No.30&31/97-98Pvt.(Solan)and causing loss to the Corporation to the tune of Rs.9,41,218/-includinginterest.” 15. No doubt, petitioner stands acquitted by the criminal Court, but then the findings returned in the criminal trial cannot be made basis for holding the petitioner not guilty in the disciplinary proceedings. The purpose of and stand of proof, in both the proceedings are distinct and separate. The departmental inquiry is initiated to maintain discipline in the service and to bring efficiency therein. The conduct of breach of duties of delinquent official is a matter, which is required to be looked into in the disciplinary proceedings. It is not the case of the petitioner that principles of natural justice or statutory provisions were not complied with by the inquiry officer in the course of inquiry instituted against him. 16. The Inquiry Officer has clearly held that the petitioner, who was working as a Senior Assistant was functioning in the branch of Works Department at Solan. Petitioner was authorized to take charge of possession of the trees which were to be felled. Permission for felling of trees was accorded in two lots. The timber was extracted and measured. Payments were released. Petitioner wrongly applied the sale rate of the timber causing loss to the tune of several lacs of rupees to the State. The amount was released in favour of Shri Rajesh Kumar far in excess of what was actually due to him. Petitioner specifically put up a note for release of the amount clearly mentioning that the conversion work in lots stood completed. This was contrary to the factual position on the ground level. I find that the Inquiry Officer has come to its conclusion after taking into account the material so placed on record by the parties. He has answered each of the issues so framed him. The Inquiry Officer has categorically held that loss to the tune of Rs.9,41,218/- was caused to the State. Though it could not be verified as to who had tampered with the record, but since petitioner was Incharge of the Works Branch it was held that he was fully responsible for keeping the file safe from tampering. I find there is nothing perverse about such findings. 17. Though it could not be verified as to who had tampered with the record, but since petitioner was Incharge of the Works Branch it was held that he was fully responsible for keeping the file safe from tampering. I find there is nothing perverse about such findings. 17. Learned counsel for the petitioner has invited my attention to the decision of the Apex court in Union of India and others vs. Gyan Chand Chattar, (2009) 12 SCC 78 (paras 21 and 35). The ratio of law laid down therein, in my respectful view, is not applicable at all. It is not the petitioner’s grievance that penalty imposed is unduly harsh, shocks the conscious of the Court or that principles of natural justice have not been complied with during the course of conduct of disciplinary proceedings. 18. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also invited my attention to a decision of a Coordinate Bench of this Court in Ashok Rana vs. State of H.P. and others, Latest HLJ 2010(HP) 723 (paras 9 and 23). It be only observed that in the said case, the Court was dealing with the facts where despite release of the police officials, after conviction, under the provisions of Probation of Offenders Act, departmental proceedings were initiated only against one person, who was also dismissed from service. In these circumstances, the Court remanded the matter back to the disciplinary authority for reconsideration and that too on the question of quantum of punishment. Significantly even in this case proceedings qua the delinquent official were not held to be either void or illegal or were quashed. 19. I do not find that findings of fact are perverse or are not based on any material whatsoever. As such the third contention also merits rejection. 16. I am of the considered view that the respondent, keeping in view the fact that the petitioner was on the verge of retirement has already taken a lenient view. Petitioner stands reinstated and penalty imposed is not shockingly disproportionate to the charged conduct. As such, present petition devoid of any merit is dismissed.