JUDGMENT S. Talapatra, J. 1. This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 28.01.2008 passed by the learned Judge, Family Court, Kailashahar, North Tripura, in Case No. T.S. 26 (Divorce)/2007, whereby the marriage between the appellant and the respondent has been dissolved. The factual matrix for disposal of this appeal may be encapsulated as under: The respondent filed an application under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 on the ground of cruelty alleging that after their marriage which was solemnised on 09.03.1991, the appellant treated him with cruelty on numerous occasions. Initially the impression that was given to the respondent that since the appellant being a State Government employee was earning a handsome amount even if the respondent was unemployed there would be no difficulty in managing the family after the marriage. But, after the marriage, the appellant had shown a turnaround and she started taking posting in far away places to avoid staying with the respondent. The respondent was compelled to find out an occupation for survival. It has been alleged in the petition that the appellant used to dig at the respondent for his being the unemployed. It was also the case of the respondent that he was not only mentally tortured but also physically assaulted many a times. Moreover, when the respondent went to stay with the appellant in her official residence, he was driven out therefrom by humiliating him publicly. In November, 1993 a twin were born in their wedlock, one being daughter and the other a son. There had been no change even thereafter. Ultimately the respondent failed to tolerate daily bout of humiliation and left for Guwahati to have mental peace. Before he shifted to Guwahati, the respondent tried to score out a settlement for living peacefully but the appellant did not respond or sound any positive note for a harmonious relationship, rather she flatly refused to stay with the respondent. On having some training in Homeopathy, the respondent started practising at Lumding and he was inducted as an honorary Homeopathic Doctor by the N.F. Railway on a fixed lump-sum basis. Situated thus, the respondent invited the appellant to stay with him with a hope that the appellant would mend. But while she joined the respondent for some time, the respondent did not find any change in her behaviour. Situated thus, the respondent invited the appellant to stay with him with a hope that the appellant would mend. But while she joined the respondent for some time, the respondent did not find any change in her behaviour. The respondent was thus pushed to the brink and he was not in a position to tolerate any further. By the deliberate act of the appellant, the respondent was deprived of the conjugal life and he had to suffer extreme cruelty. The appellant was so arrogant that when an initiative was taken by the father of the respondent to settle the dispute, the appellant misbehaved with his father also. Ultimately, the said petition for dissolution of marriage was filed in the Court of the said Family Judge. 2. To confront all these allegations as brought by the respondent, the appellant filed a written statement and stated that the allegations were untrue and the respondent did not take any endeavour to adjust with her. The appellant categorically denied the allegations that she had ever driven out the respondent from her official residence or did not allow him to stay with her in the place of her posting at Kailashahar or to carry on his medical profession. The appellant made certain allegations against the respondent in the said written statement that the respondent was pressurising the appellant to purchase a house at Dharmanagar. However, she admitted that in 1994 the respondent joined as a Medical Officer at the N.F. Railway and thereafter the relation between the appellant and the respondent was on the wane. She alleged further that the respondent was staying at his newly built house at Guwahati with one married lady who used to come with him from Lumding to Guwahati for such stay. According to the appellant, the petition has been filed to legalise the said relation. 3. On consideration of the rival pleadings, the learned Court framed the solitary issue which is as follows : Whether the respondent treated the petitioner with cruelty or whether there is any ground for allowing the petition of divorce? 4. Thereafter, the respondent, as the petitioner in the said proceeding being T.S. No. 26 (Divorce)/2007 adduced as many as four witnesses whereas the appellant adduced herself as OPW 1. The respondent appearing before the Court stated that since 1994 he was being deprived of the conjugal life as the appellant taking the advantage. 4. Thereafter, the respondent, as the petitioner in the said proceeding being T.S. No. 26 (Divorce)/2007 adduced as many as four witnesses whereas the appellant adduced herself as OPW 1. The respondent appearing before the Court stated that since 1994 he was being deprived of the conjugal life as the appellant taking the advantage. Of his unemployment extremely humiliated him and whenever he went to join the appellant in her official residence she used to treat him with mental and physical cruelty. There was no peace but a marauding unhappiness and pain was gathering in the name of marriage. Being deprived of the conjugal life he had to ultimately file the petition for dissolution of marriage. 5. PW 2, PW 3 and PW 4, who were closely related to the parties in the proceeding, stated almost in unison that the marriage was disrupted by disputes and their initiative to sort out such disputes did not yield any positive result. The appellant appearing before the Court stated that the respondent was not incurring any family expenses from his income. In the year 1993, when she was transferred from Kanchanpur to Kumarghat, they were living in a rented house. Even though the respondent was earning well from the pharmacy shop, he did not spend anything for the family. She, however, denied all the allegations of cruelty and stated that she did not want divorce as prayed for by the respondent and she alleged that the respondent had been having an illicit relation with one lady. But did not adduce any witness or other evidence to prove such serious allegation. 6. Mr. Somik Deb, Learned Counsel appearing for the appellant strenuously submitted that the impugned judgment and decree has been granted on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage and on such ground no decree of dissolution of marriage can be passed by the Family Court. He further submitted that the Family Court not being a civil Court cannot exercise such power. Somik Deb, Learned Counsel appearing for the appellant strenuously submitted that the impugned judgment and decree has been granted on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage and on such ground no decree of dissolution of marriage can be passed by the Family Court. He further submitted that the Family Court not being a civil Court cannot exercise such power. In support of that contention he had drawn notice of this Court to paragraph-9 of the impugned judgment where the learned Court below provided reasons for allowing the petition for dissolution of marriage, profitably the same can be extracted : It is admitted position that the parties are living separately for the last 12 years, there was mis-understanding between the parties from the very initial stage of the marriage, the well wisher of the parties also tried to reconcile the dispute but they failed. Similarly, while proceeding with the case I also took efforts for reconciliation but could not succeed. Thus, I hold the view that the parties could no more live together because it broke down irretrievably 7. The Learned Counsel further submits that, since the said finding of the learned Court below has not been challenged by the respondent, if it was found by this Court that the ground for irretrievable break down of the marriage was not available in law, the impugned judgment and decree has to be interfered with and quashed. Alternatively he argued that the respondent as the petitioner in the proceeding could not establish the ground of cruelty and that would be apparent from the evidence. In support of this contention he has referred to the finding of the learned Family Court, available at paragraph-7 where it has been stated that from the entire evidence on record as well as the pleadings of the petitioner, it cannot be held that the petitioner was treated with cruelty by his wife. Learned Counsel appearing for the appellant strenuously argued that the Apex Court in exercise of its special powers as provided under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, has allowed dissolution of marriage on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of the marriage, but it was not under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act. Learned Counsel appearing for the appellant strenuously argued that the Apex Court in exercise of its special powers as provided under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, has allowed dissolution of marriage on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of the marriage, but it was not under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act. Since the legislator consciously has not provided irretrievable breakdown of the marriage as a ground for dissolution of marriage, no Court except the Supreme Court could grant a decree of dissolution of marriage on that ground. Else such action would be contrary to the legislative intent. 8. To buttress his contention, Mr. Somik Deb, Learned Counsel for the appellant has referred the following decisions of the Apex Court. (1) Vishnu Dutt Sharma v. Manju Sharma, as reported in (2009) 6 SCC 379 ; (2) Anil Kumar Jain v. Maya Jain, as reported in (2009) 10 SCC 415 ; (3) Manish Goel v. Rohini Goel, as reported in (2010) 4 SCC 393 ; (4) Neelam Kumar v. Dayarani, as reported in (2010) 13 SCC 298 . 9. In Vishnu Dutt Sharma (supra), the Apex Court held that on a bare reading of Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, it is crystal clear that no such ground of irretrievable break down of the marriage is provided by the legislature for granting a decree of divorce and the Court cannot add a ground to Section 13 of the Act as that would be legislating, not within competence of any Court. 10. In Anil Kumar Jain (supra), the similar issue fell for consideration of the Apex Court as to whether irretrievable break down of marriage can be availed of as the ground for divorce within ambit of Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act. The Supreme Court answered that issue in unequivocal terms as follows : In the ultimate analysis the aforesaid discussion throws up two propositions. The first proposition is that although irretrievable break-down of marriage is not one of the grounds indicated whether under Sections 13 or 13B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, for grant of divorce, the said doctrine can be applied to a proceeding under either of the said two provisions only where the proceedings are before the Supreme Court. The first proposition is that although irretrievable break-down of marriage is not one of the grounds indicated whether under Sections 13 or 13B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, for grant of divorce, the said doctrine can be applied to a proceeding under either of the said two provisions only where the proceedings are before the Supreme Court. In exercise of its extraordinary powers under Article 142 of the Constitution the Supreme Court can grant relief to the parties without even waiting for the statutory period of six months stipulated in Section 13B of the aforesaid Act. This doctrine of irretrievable break-down of marriage is not available even to the High Courts which do not have powers similar to those exercised by the Supreme Court under Article 142 of the Constitution. Neither the civil Courts nor even the High Courts can, therefore, pass orders before the periods prescribed under the relevant provisions of the Act or on grounds not provided for in Section 13 and 13B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. 11. In Manish Goel (supra), the Apex Court has taken a view poised differently from Anil Kumar Jain (supra) and Vishnu Dutt Sharma (supra). 11. In Manish Goel (supra), the Apex Court has taken a view poised differently from Anil Kumar Jain (supra) and Vishnu Dutt Sharma (supra). In para-11, the Apex Court held that the Court is alive of the fact that has been exercising the power under Article 142 of the Constitution for dissolution of marriage where it finds that marriage is totally unworkable, emotionally dead, beyond salvage and has broken down irretrievably, even if the facts of the case do not provide a ground in law on which the divorce could be granted Decree of divorce has been granted to put quietus to all litigations between the parties and to save them from further agony, as it is evident from the judgments in Romesh Chander v. Savitri, (1995) 2 SCC 7 ; Kanchan Devi v. Promod Kumar Mittal, (1996) 8 SCC 90 ; Anita Sabhaewal v. Anil Sabharwal, (1997) 11 SCC 490 ; Ashok Hurra v. Rupa Bipin Zaveri, (1997) 4 SCC 226 ; Kiran v. Sharad Dutt, (2000) 10 SCC 243 ; Swati Verma v. Rajan Verma, (2004) 1 SCC 123 ; Harpit Singh Anand v. State of West Bengal, (2004) 10 SCC 505 ; jimmy Sudarshan Purohit v. Sudarshan Sharad Purohit, (2005) 13 SCC 410 ; Durga Prasanna Tripathy v. Arundhati Tripathy, (2005) 7 SCC 353 ; Naveen Kohli v. Neelu Kohli, (2006) 4 SCC 558 ; Sanghamitra Ghosh v. Kajal Kumar Ghosh, (2007) 2 SCC 220 ; Rishikesh Sharma v. Saroj Sharma, (2007) 2 SCC 263 ; Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh, (2007) 4 SCC 511 ; and Satish Sitole v. Ganga, (2008) 7 SCC 734 . On discussing all these decisions, the Apex Court came to rescue the parties by granting divorce, even though the legislature in the statute did not make such provision. 12. In Neelam Kumar (supra), the Apex Court re-examined the issue of Vishnu Dutt Sharma (supra). 13. Mr. P.B. Dhar, Learned Counsel appearing for the respondent submitted that admittedly since 1994 the appellant and respondent are living separately and the cause for such separate living is rooted in the extreme cruelty that has been meted by the appellant. All endeavours as persuaded by the respondent were frustrated by the appellant. Her apparent intent to keep the marital tie intact is for turning the marital tie as the tool of prosecution against the respondent. All endeavours as persuaded by the respondent were frustrated by the appellant. Her apparent intent to keep the marital tie intact is for turning the marital tie as the tool of prosecution against the respondent. He submitted that under Order 41, Rule 33 of CPC, the Court is not debarred from granting relief on considering the evidence differently. Drawing attention of this Court to the provisions of Rule 10 of the Family Courts Act, 1984, he submits that subject to the other provisions of the Act, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and of any other law for the time being in force shall apply to the suits and proceedings [other than the proceedings under Chapter IX of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (2 of 1974)] before a Family Court and for the purposes of the said provisions of the Code, a Family Court shall be deemed to be a civil Court and shall have all the powers of such Court. 14. Learned Counsel for the respondent referred to the concept of cruelty as has been summarised in Halsburys Laws of England [Vol.1J, 417 Edition Para 1269] as under : The general rule in all cases of cruelty is that the entire matrimonial relationship must be considered, and that rule is of special value when the cruelty consists not of violent acts but of injurious reproaches, complaints, accusations or taunts. In cases where no violence is averred, it is undesirable to consider judicial pronouncements with a view to creating certain categories of acts or conduct as having or lacking the nature or quality which renders them capable or incapable in all circumstances of amounting to cruelty; for it is the effect of the conduct rather than its nature which is of paramount importance in assessing a complaint of cruelty. Whether one spouse has been guilty of cruelty to the other is essentially a question of fact and previously decided cases have little, if any, value. Whether one spouse has been guilty of cruelty to the other is essentially a question of fact and previously decided cases have little, if any, value. The Court should bear in mind the physical and mental condition of the parties as well as their social status, and should consider the impact of the personality and conduct of one spouse on the mind of the other, weighing all incidents and quarrels between the spouses from that point of view; further, the conduct alleged must be examined in the light of the complainant's capacity for endurance and the extent to which that capacity is known to the other spouse. Malevolent intention is not essential to cruelty but it is an important element where it exists. 15. The Learned Counsel further submits that the mental cruelty is a course of unprovoked conduct towards one's spouse which causes embarrassment, humiliation and anguish so as to render the spouse's life miserable and unendurable. The plaintiff must show that the course of conduct on the part of the defendant which so endangers the physical or mental health of the plaintiff as to render continued cohabitation unsafe or improper, although the plaintiff need not establish actual instances of physical abuse.' Learned Counsel further submits that in the instant case though the instances of mental cruelty is not elaborately enumerated but from the cogent effect of marital misconduct as committed by the appellant, it is well established that the appellant had been resisting conjugal life with the respondent. Taking this Court to the decision as rendered in N.G. Dastane v. S. Datane as reported in (1975) 2 SCC 326 , Learned Counsel for the respondent contended that 'the enquiry therefore has to be whether the conduct charges as cruelty is of such a character as to cause in the mind of the petitioner a reasonable apprehension that it will be harmful or injurious for him to live with the respondent....." If the evidence in entirety is considered, it would be available that the respondent was treated with extreme humiliation. It has been well settled in Shobha Rani v. Madhukar Reddi, as reported in (1988) 1 SCC 105 that intention is not a necessary element in cruelty and the party cannot be denied on the ground that there has been no deliberate or wilful ill-treatment. It has been well settled in Shobha Rani v. Madhukar Reddi, as reported in (1988) 1 SCC 105 that intention is not a necessary element in cruelty and the party cannot be denied on the ground that there has been no deliberate or wilful ill-treatment. Learned Counsel for the respondent further referring to V. Bhagat v. D. Bhagat, as reported in (1994) 1 SCC 337 , would contend that the mental cruelty in terms of Section 13(1)(i-a) be broadly perceived as the conduct which inflicts upon the other party such mental pain and suffering as would make it not possible for that party to live with the other. In other words, mental cruelty must be of such a nature that the parties cannot reasonably be expected to live together. The situation must be such that the wronged party cannot reasonably be asked to put up with such conduct and continue to live with the other party. It is also well settled that what is cruelty in one case may not amount to cruelty in another case, determination of cruelty differs from fact and circumstances of one case to another and there is no universal rule for determining the cruelty. In Chetan Dass v. Kamala Devi, as reported in (2001) 4 SCC 250 , the Apex Court aptly put the following words : Matrimonial matters are matters of delicate human and emotional relationship. It demands mutual trust, regard, respect; love and affection with sufficient play for reasonable adjustments with the spouse. The relationship has to conform to the social norms as well. The matrimonial conduct has now come to be governed by statute framed, keeping in view such norms and changed social order. It is sought to be controlled in the interest of the individuals as well as in broader perspective, for regulating matrimonial norms for making of a well-knit; healthy and not a disturbed and porous society. The institution of marriage occupies an important place and role to play in the society, in general. Therefore, it would not be appropriate to apply any submission of "irretrievably broken marriage" as a straitjacket formula for grant of relief of divorce. 16. In Savitri Pandey v. Prem Chandra Pandey, as reported in (2002) 2 SCC 73 , the similar observation has been made by the Apex Court. 17. Therefore, it would not be appropriate to apply any submission of "irretrievably broken marriage" as a straitjacket formula for grant of relief of divorce. 16. In Savitri Pandey v. Prem Chandra Pandey, as reported in (2002) 2 SCC 73 , the similar observation has been made by the Apex Court. 17. The Learned Counsel for the respondent finally took this Court to the decision as rendered in Naveen Kohli v. Neelu Kohli, as reported in (2006) 4 SCC 558 , where the Apex Court observed as under : 75. Public interest demands not only that the married status should, as far as possible, as long as possible, and whenever possible, be maintained, but where a marriage has been wrecked beyond the hope of salvage, public interest lies in the recognition of that fact. 76. Since there is no acceptable way in which a spouse can be compelled to resume life with the consort; nothing is gained by trying to keep the parties tied for ever to a marriage that in fact has ceased to exist. 77. Some jurists have also expressed their apprehension for introduction of irretrievable breakdown of marriage as a ground for grant of the decree of divorce. In their opinion, such an amendment in the Act would put human ingenuity at a premium and throw wide open the doors to litigation, and will create more problems then are sought to be solved. 78. The other majority view, which is shared by most jurists, according to the Law Commission Report, is that human life has a short span and situations causing misery cannot be allowed to continue indefinitely. A halt has to be called at some stage. Law cannot turn a blind eye to such situations, nor can it decline to give adequate response to the necessities arising therefrom. 18. Both in Manish Goel (supra) and Naveen Kohli (supra), the Apex Court held in no uncertain terms that where the marriage has broken down irretrievably, it causes insurmountable agony and misery. In view of this Court, the state of suffering agony and misery cannot be excluded from the general sweep and connotation of the word 'cruelty'. 19. In V. Bhagat (supra), the Apex Court has approved the ratio as laid down in Sheldon v. Sheldon, that "the categories of cruelty are not closed. Each case may be different. In view of this Court, the state of suffering agony and misery cannot be excluded from the general sweep and connotation of the word 'cruelty'. 19. In V. Bhagat (supra), the Apex Court has approved the ratio as laid down in Sheldon v. Sheldon, that "the categories of cruelty are not closed. Each case may be different. We deal with the conduct of human beings who are not generally similar. Among the human beings there is no limit to the kind of conduct which may constitute cruelty. New type of cruelty may crop up in any case depending upon the human behaviour, capacity or incapability to tolerate the conduct complained of. Such is the wonder realm of cruelty." In the considered opinion of this Court that the irretrievable of marriage even though cannot be availed of as a ground directly for grant of divorce under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, but continuance of such category of marriage inflicts the spouse with cruelty within the meaning of Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Hindu Marriage Act and it constitutes 'cruelty' attributable to the spouse who resisted the prayer for granting divorce. Agony of the breakdown of marriage cannot be excluded from the realm and category of cruelty. 20. The submission of the Learned Counsel appearing for the appellant that since irretrievable break down of marriage cannot be availed of as the ground for dissolution of marriage, in view of the Apex Court decision as cited, the impugned judgment and decree has to be reversed by this Court, does not hold much force inasmuch as if it can be found by this Court that the breakdown of marriage constituted cruelty, then on substitution of findings, the decree can be maintained. It is no more res integra that the power of the appellate Court is not confined and restricted to the findings of the Court subordinate to it but the appellate Court has the power to pass any decree and make any order which ought to have been passed or made and to pass or make such further or other decree or order as the case may require, and this power may be exercised by the Court notwithstanding that the appeal is against the part or the whole of the decree and may be exercised in favour of all or any of the respondents or parties, although such respondents or parties may not have filed any appeal or objection, and may, where there have been by decrees in cross-suits or where two or more decrees are passed in one suit, be exercised in respect of all or any of the decrees, although an appeal may have been filed against such decrees. This provision as made under Order 41, Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure has acquired a paramount importance in doing the substantive justice. 21. It would be apparent from the submission of Learned Counsel appearing for the respondent that 'cruelty' qua the breakdown of the marriage cannot be brushed aside. In this context, the spectrum of cruelty, as the Apex Court has sarcastically referred in V. Bhagat (supra) may be reproduced profitably. We, the Judges and Lawyers, therefore, should not import our own notions of life. We may not go in parallel with them. It would be better if we keep aside our customs and manners. It would be also better if we less depend upon precedents. As such, this Court cannot concur to the submission in regard to cruelty in the backdrop of this case as advanced by the Learned Counsel for the appellant. A set of facts constitutes cruelty in one case, but the same may not do so in another case. The cruel alleged may largely depend upon to category of life the parties are accustomed to or on their economic and social conditions. It may also depend upon their culture and human values to which they attach importance. 22. From the conduct of the appellant, it is apparent that she had forsaken the marital relation. The cruel alleged may largely depend upon to category of life the parties are accustomed to or on their economic and social conditions. It may also depend upon their culture and human values to which they attach importance. 22. From the conduct of the appellant, it is apparent that she had forsaken the marital relation. Despite interventions of the well-wishers on several occasions the fracture relation could not be put together and the discord continued unabated. No doubt, these indicators do well establish the 'breakdown' principle and thereby a new category of cruelty against the respondent, who complained of against the appellant for grinding the relation in tatters by her conducts, has been well established. Even if the irretrievable breakdown of marriage cannot be availed of as the ground for seeking divorce under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 but this Court is of the opinion that the same can be availed of as cruelty within the meaning of the said provision if it is demonstrated that continuance of such 'dead' marriage perpetrates insurmountable agony. As such, the impugned decree of divorce as passed by the learned Judge, Family Court, Kailashahar, North Tripura on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage even though is not affirmed by this Court, but this Court finds that irretrievable breakdown of marriage for the conduct of the appellant has been well proved' and it has been demonstrated that the respondent has been continuously suffering 'cruelty' for continuance of such shattered or dead marriage. For the reasons as stated, this Court is not inclined to interfere with the impugned decree. As consequence thereof, this appeal fails and accordingly the same is dismissed. In the circumstances there would be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed