Judgment :- This Writ Petition is filed praying to issue a Writ of Certiorari, calling for the records of the first respondent's proceedings in k(k)M/2(1)/457/2012 dated 05.10.2012 signed on 5.11.2012 served the petitioner on 12.11.2012 and quash the same. 2. Heard the spirited arguments of Mr.A.Sivaji, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Mr.N.Srinivasan, learned Additional Government Pleader, appearing for the respondents. 3. The writ petition deserves to be allowed on the short point that the impugned order has been passed without application of mind and without stating any reasons. In this case the show-cause notice has been issued on 3.7.2012 and the petitioner submitted an explanation together with records on 24.7.2012. Thereafter, he submitted another detailed explanation on 16.8.2012 together with records, which was acknowledged by the authority. A personal hearing was granted on 10.9.2012. Further explanation was given on 14.9.2012. Thereafter, the impugned order came to be passed on 5.10.2012 and signed on 5.11.2012. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner pointed out that all the explanations supported by records produced by the petitioner were not considered at all while coming to the conclusion that the licence requires to be cancelled. In addition to that, the petitioner's plea is that the impugned order suffers on account of total non application of mind and non consideration of the replies/explanations and records. An English translated copy of the impugned order is submitted to this court and verified. Para 7 of the impugned order reads as follows:- “7. All the documents and statements were perused. The sale of liquor at 9.00 AM itself, and taking excess delivery over the permitted stock of 700 units by stating wrong stocks are proved as the stock was not recorded in the stock Register on 23.12.2011. The action of the above owner is against the rules and regulations of the Prohibition and Excise (Licence and permit). Hence it is ordered by cancelling the licence (Licence No.1/04-05) in F.L.3 under rule 22(1) of Tamil Nadu Liquor (Licence and Permit) Rules of Meenakshi Bar and Restaurant of this Rajendira Lodge of Periakulam Taluk of Theni District.” 5. While passing the impugned order, the first respondent was conscious of the reply/explanation given by the petitioner on 24.7.2012 with records. However, it is to be noticed that the further replies/explanations given with records on 16.8.2012 and 14.9.2012 have been totally ignored and have not been considered at all. While passing the impugned order, the first respondent was conscious of the reply/explanation given by the petitioner on 24.7.2012 with records. However, it is to be noticed that the further replies/explanations given with records on 16.8.2012 and 14.9.2012 have been totally ignored and have not been considered at all. Therefore, the impugned order suffers from total non application of mind. 6. Even on going through the impugned order, the findings given which has been extracted above, are not supported by reasons. There is no discussion on the records produced nor the explanations given. This is a classic case of total non application of mind and failure to consider the relevant records produced which is a mandate on an executive authority exercising administrative power. 7. The principle of audi alteram partem is the basic concept of principle of natural justice and it connotes that a person must be given an opportunity to defend himself. This principle covers various phases right from issuing of notice to the passing of the final order. The principle of audi alteram partem contemplates that a person against whom action is sought to be taken should be given a fair hearing, which includes: (i) a notice giving sufficient time clearly indicating the allegations against the person; (ii) such person should be permitted to present his case and produce evidence; (iii) all the adverse evidence relied on should be disclosed to the person; (iv) he should be permitted to rebut the evidence put against him; and (v) thereafter, a speaking order with reasons should be passed. Any violation of any one of the phases enunciated above, would cause substantial prejudice to the affected party and would result in violation of the principle of audi alteram partem. 8. To fortify the said view, it is appropriate to refer to a decision of the Supreme Court in K.I. Shephard - vs. - Union of India, (1987) 4 SCC 431 , wherein after referring to a plethora of earlier judgments, it was held as under: "12. 8. To fortify the said view, it is appropriate to refer to a decision of the Supreme Court in K.I. Shephard - vs. - Union of India, (1987) 4 SCC 431 , wherein after referring to a plethora of earlier judgments, it was held as under: "12. Mullan in Fairness: The New Natural Justice has stated: “Natural justice co-exists with, or reflected, a wider principle of fairness in decision-making and that all judicial and administrative decision-making and that all judicial and administrative decision-makers had a duty to act fairly.” In the case of State of Orissa v. Dr (Ms) Binapani Dei, AIR 1967 SC 1269 , this Court observed: "It is true that the order is administrative in character, but even an administrative order which involves civil consequences as already stated, must be made consistently with the rules of natural justice after informing the first respondent of the case of the State, the evidence in support thereof and after giving an opportunity to the first respondent of being heard and meeting or explaining the evidence. No such steps were admittedly taken: the High Court was, in our judgment, right in setting aside the order of the State." In A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India, (1969) 2 SCC 262 , a Constitution Bench quoted with approval the observations of Lord Parker in Re: (H) K (an infant), (1967) 1 All ER 226 (QBD). Hegde, J. speaking for the Court stated: (SCC p. 272, para 20) “Very soon thereafter a third rule was envisaged and that is that quasi-judicial enquiries must be held in good faith, without bias and not arbitrarily or unreasonably. But in the course of years many more subsidiary rules came to be added to the rules of natural justice. Till very recently it was the opinion of the courts that unless the authority concerned was required by the law under which it functioned to act judicially there was no room for the application of the rules of natural justice. The validity of that limitation is now questioned. If the purpose of the rules of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice one fails to see why those rules should be made inapplicable to administrative enquiries. Oftentimes it is not easy to draw the line that demarcates administrative enquiries from quasi-judicial enquiries. Enquiries which were considered administrative at one time are now being considered as quasi-judicial in character. Oftentimes it is not easy to draw the line that demarcates administrative enquiries from quasi-judicial enquiries. Enquiries which were considered administrative at one time are now being considered as quasi-judicial in character. Arriving at a just decision is the aim of both quasi-judicial enquiries as well as administrative enquiries. An unjust decision in an administrative enquiry may have more far-reaching effect than a decision in a quasi-judicial enquiry.” These observations in A.K. Kraipak case were followed by another Constitution Bench of this Court in Chandra Bhavan Boarding and Lodging, Bangalore v. State of Mysore, (1969) 3 SCC 84 . In Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India, (1981) 1 SCC 664 , a three Judge Bench of the Apex Court examined this aspect of natural justice. Sarkaria, J. who spoke for the court, stated: “During the last two decades, the concept of natural justice has made great strides in the realm of administrative law. Before the epoch-making decision of the House of Lords in Ridge v. Baldwin, 1964 AC 40 it was generally thought that the rules of natural justice apply only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; and for the purpose, whenever a breach of the rule of natural justice was alleged, courts in England used to ascertain whether the impugned action was taken by the statutory authority or tribunal in the exercise of its administrative or quasi-judicial power. In India also, this was the position before the decision dated February 7, 1967, of this Court in Dr Binapani Dei case; wherein it was held that even an administrative order or decision in matters involving civil consequences, has to be made consistently with the rules of natural justice. This supposed distinction between quasi-judicial and administrative decisions, which was perceptibly mitigated in Binapani Dei case was further rubbed out to a vanishing point in A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India. . . .” On the basis of these authorities it must be held that even when a State agency acts administratively, rules of natural justice would apply. This supposed distinction between quasi-judicial and administrative decisions, which was perceptibly mitigated in Binapani Dei case was further rubbed out to a vanishing point in A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India. . . .” On the basis of these authorities it must be held that even when a State agency acts administratively, rules of natural justice would apply. As stated, natural justice generally requires that persons liable to be directly affected by proposed administrative acts, decisions or proceedings be given adequate notice of what is proposed so that they may be in a position (a) to make representations on their own behalf; (b) or to appear at a hearing or enquiry (if one is held); and (c) effectively to prepare their own case and to answer the case (if any) they have to meet." 9. Further, it is well established principle in law that Administrative authority exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions is required to record reasons for its decision. In S.N.Mukherjeev. Union of India reported in AIR 1990 Supreme Court 1984, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held in paragraphs 35, 38 and 39 as follows:- "35. Reasons, when recorded by an administrative authority in an order passed by it while exercising quasi-judicial functions, would no doubt facilitate the exercise of its jurisdiction by the appellate or supervisory authority. But the other considerations, referred to above, which have also weighed with this Court in holding that an administrative authority must record reasons for its decision are of no less significance. These considerations show that the recording of reasons by an administrative authority serves a salutary purpose, namely, it excludes chances of arbitrariness and ensures a degree of fairness in the process of decisions-making. The said purpose would apply equally to all decisions and its application cannot be confined to decisions which are subject to appeal, revision or judicial review. In our opinion, therefore, the requirement that reasons be recorded should govern the decisions of an administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions irrespective of the fact whether the decision is subject to appeal, revision or judicial review. It may, however, be added that it is not required that the reasons should be as elaborate as in the decision of a Court of law. The extent and nature of the reasons would depend on particular facts and circumstances. It may, however, be added that it is not required that the reasons should be as elaborate as in the decision of a Court of law. The extent and nature of the reasons would depend on particular facts and circumstances. What is necessary is that the reasons are clear and explicit so as to indicate that the authority has given due consideration to the points in controversy. The need for recording of reasons is greater in a case where the order is passed at the original stage. The appellate or revisional authority, if it affirms such an order, need not give separate reasons if the appellate or revisional authority agrees with the reasons contained in the order under challenge." "38. The object underlying the rules of natural justice "is to prevent miscarriage of justice" and secure "fair play in action". As pointed out earlier the requirement about recording of reasons for its decision by an administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions achieves this object by excluding chances of arbitrariness and ensuring a degree of fairness in the process of decision-making. Keeping in view the expanding horizon of the principles of natural justice, we are of the opinion, that the requirement to record reason can be regarded as one of the principles of natural justice which govern exercise of power by administrative authorities. The rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. The extent of their application depends upon the particular statutory framework whereunder jurisdiction has been conferred on the administrative authority. With regard to the exercise of a particular power by an administrative authority including exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial functions the legislature, while conferring the said power, may feel that it would not be in the larger public interest that the reasons for the order passed by the administrative authority be recorded in the order and be communicated to the aggrieved party and it may dispense with such a requirement. It may do so by making an express provision to that effect as those contained in the Administrative Procedure Act, 1946 of U.S.A. and the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act, 1977 of Australia whereby the orders passed by certain specified authorities are excluded from the ambit of the enactment. Such an exclusion can also arise by necessary implication from the nature of the subject matter, the scheme and the provisions of the enactment. Such an exclusion can also arise by necessary implication from the nature of the subject matter, the scheme and the provisions of the enactment. The public interest underlying such a provision would outweigh the salutary purpose served by the requirement to record the reasons. The said requirement cannot, therefore, be insisted upon in such a case." "39. For the reasons aforesaid, it must be concluded that except in cases where the requirement has been dispensed with expressly or by necessary implication, an administrative authority exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions is required to record the reasons for its decision." 10. In view of the above, the impugned order, which is a non speaking order and passed totally without application of mind to relevant issues and without reasons, is set aside and the matter is remitted to the first respondent to consider and pass a reasoned order on all issues raised by the petitioner expeditiously. 11. This Writ Petition is allowed by way of remand as above. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.