ORDER : Leave granted. 2. In response to an advertisement issued by the Chandigarh Administration on 14.04.1981, the respondent applied for allotment of plot in Industrial Area Phase-II, Chandigarh and deposited Rs. 5000/- as earnest money. In all, 3735 applications were received by the administration for allotment of the plots of different sizes. In the draw held on 30.11.1982, the respondent was allotted Plot No.1289. However, possession of the plot could not be given to him because the Central Government had, after taking cognizance of the fact that large portion of Industrial Area Phase-II, Chandigarh had been declared as a reserved forest in 1961, directed the Chandigarh Administration to stop further action in the matter of allotment of plots. 3. Some of the allottees filed writ petitions in the Punjab and Haryana High Court in 1987 for issue of a direction to the appellants to deliver possession of the plots allotted to them in 1982. During the pendency of the writ petitions, the Chandigarh Administration decided to accommodate 250 allottees by giving them plots of smaller size at another location. In furtherance of that decision, letter dated 05.02.1991 was issued to the allottees and they were asked to give consent for allotment of the plots of smaller size. Some of the allottees gave their consent but many others did not do so. Instead they filed writ petitions and prayed for issue of a direction to the appellants to hand over possession of the plots already allotted. 4. All the writ petitions were dismissed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court on 15.11.1991. The letters patent appeals filed by the unsuccessful petitioners and fresh writ petitions filed by the non-consentees were disposed of by the Division Bench of the High Court vide judgment dated 30.08.2001, the relevant extracts of the operative portion of which read as under: "1. The prayer of the appellant-petitioners for directing the authorities of the Chandigarh Administration to hand over possession of the plots allotted on the basis of draw held in November 1982 is rejected. 2. However, the authorities of the Chandigarh Administration are directed to issue allotment letters to those appellant-petitioners who had given consent for allotment of alternative plots of smaller sizes and who were successful in the draw held on 27-3-1991. They should be charged price at the rate prevailing on the date of draw. 3. 2. However, the authorities of the Chandigarh Administration are directed to issue allotment letters to those appellant-petitioners who had given consent for allotment of alternative plots of smaller sizes and who were successful in the draw held on 27-3-1991. They should be charged price at the rate prevailing on the date of draw. 3. Those who were declared successful in the draw held on 27-3-1991 but cannot be allotted plots due to non-availability of sufficient land in the wake of prohibition imposed vide notification dated 5-1-1988 shall be allotted plots in any other scheme already framed or which may be framed hereafter by the Chandigarh Administration. 4. Those who were declared successful in the draw held in 1982, but did not give consent for allotment of alternative plots shall be refunded the amount deposited by them with interest at the rate of 12% from the date of deposit till the date of actual payment. 5. Within one month from the date of receipt of this order, the Chandigarh Administration shall get published in The Tribune the list of the applicants who had given consent for allotment of alternative plots and were declared successful in the draw held on 27-3-1991 specifying the number of plots earmarked for them. 6. Notification dated 28-4-2000 is held inapplicable and inoperative qua the allotments made to the appellant-petitioners on the basis of the draw held on 27-3-1991." 5. The special leave petitions filed against the aforesaid judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court were entertained and disposed of by this Court vide judgment titled Hira Tikkoo v. Union Territory, Chandigarh and others (2004) 6 SCC 765 : 2004 (2) HRR 152 S.C. The question whether the doctrine of estoppel could be invoked for compelling the Chandigarh Administration to deliver possession of the plots to the successful applicants was answered by this Court in negative by making the following observations: "The allottees of the plots are, no doubt, faced with an uncertain situation with loss already caused to them due to negligence and mistake on the part of the Planning Authorities of the Chandigarh Administration. In preparing the development scheme, the existing notification reserving major part of land as forest under the Indian Forest Act and restriction on construction in the periphery of 900 metres from the air force base under the Aircraft Act were overlooked. In preparing the development scheme, the existing notification reserving major part of land as forest under the Indian Forest Act and restriction on construction in the periphery of 900 metres from the air force base under the Aircraft Act were overlooked. As we have held above, on a representation that the land is available for allotment of industrial plots, the allottees staked their money and plans for setting up their industries. The representations made to them by the Planning Authorities have turned out to be misleading as a substantial part of the land could not have been included in the development scheme. The allottees paid price for the plots and incurred expenses in preparing their industrial projects. We have held above that the doctrines of "legitimate expectation" and "estoppel" cannot be applied against the Administration to compel it to allot the original plots because that would be permitting violation of statutes intended to conserve forest and restrictions imposed in the interests of general public and security of nation under the Aircraft Act. The doctrine of "estoppel" cannot, therefore, be allowed to be urged against the Administration. This Court cannot direct the Administration to commit breach of statutory provisions and thus harm general public interests. De Smith, Woolf and Jowell in their authoritative book Judicial Review of Administrative Action (5th Edn., at p. 565, para 13-028), have stated one of the principles of public law powers thus: "A public body with limited powers cannot bind itself to act outside of its authorised powers; and if it purports to do so it can repudiate its undertaking, for it cannot extend its powers by creating an estoppel. Surely, the doctrine of estoppel cannot be applied against public authorities when their mistaken advice or representation is found to be in breach of a statute and therefore, against general public interest. The question, however, is whether the parties or individuals, who had suffered because of the mistake and negligence on the part of the statutory public authorities, would have any remedy of redressal for the loss they have suffered. The "rules of fairness" by which every public authority is bound, require them to compensate loss occasioned to private parties or citizens who were misled in acting on such mistaken or negligent advice of the public authority. The "rules of fairness" by which every public authority is bound, require them to compensate loss occasioned to private parties or citizens who were misled in acting on such mistaken or negligent advice of the public authority. There are no allegations and material in these cases to come to a conclusion that the action of the authorities was mala fide. It may be held to be careless or negligent. In some of the English cases, the view taken is that the public authorities cannot be absolved of their liability to provide adequate monetary compensation to the parties who are adversely affected by their erroneous decisions and actions. But in these cases, any directions to the public authorities to pay monetary compensation or damages would also indirectly harm general public interest. The public authorities are entrusted with public fund raised from public money. The funds are in trust with them for utilisation in public interest and strictly for the purposes of the statute under which they are created with specific statutory duties imposed on them. In such a situation when a party or citizen has relied, to his detriment, on an erroneous representation made by public authorities and suffered loss and where the doctrine of "estoppel" will not be invoked to his aid, directing administrative redressal would be a more appropriate remedy than payment of monetary compensation for the loss caused by non-delivery of the possession of the plots and consequent delay caused in setting up industries by the allottees. (See Administrative Law by H.W.R. Wade and C.F. Forsyth, 8th Edn., at pp. 370-73. Also the book Judicial Review of Administrative Action by de Smith, Woolf and Jowell, 5th Edn., at p. 565, para 13-028.) In the predicament aforesaid, the Administration has adopted a fair attitude. It has come out with a proposal to give alternative plots but of smaller sizes because of the paucity of land available in development schemes in Phases I and II. The statutory compulsion and the rule of fairness have both to be evenly balanced. This Court cannot allow the Administration to commit breach of law and harm public interest. At the same time, it cannot be absolved of its liability to give appropriate redressal and compensation to the parties and citizens who have suffered loss because of their grossly mistaken decisions and actions. This Court cannot allow the Administration to commit breach of law and harm public interest. At the same time, it cannot be absolved of its liability to give appropriate redressal and compensation to the parties and citizens who have suffered loss because of their grossly mistaken decisions and actions. The allottees of the plots, when they were given option to accept alternative plots of smaller sizes, ought to have accepted the offer being the appropriate compensation to them in the circumstances obtaining. The allottees who have consented to accept alternative plots even of smaller sizes and others who did not consent, maybe, because they were in litigation and required plots of bigger sizes, constitute two different groups requiring different treatment in the matter of directing grant of appropriate redressal to them by the Administration." 6. On behalf of the non-consentees it was argued that by denying choice of alternative plots, the High Court had discriminated them vis-a-vis those who had given consent. This is evinced from paragraph 27 of the judgment, which is extracted below: "The learned counsel on behalf of non-consentees submitted that in denying choice of alternative plots to non-consentees at par with consentees, the High Court unreasonably discriminated the non-consentees. It is submitted that the non-consentees were legitimately fighting for their rights for the original plots allotted of required sizes and which suited their industrial projects. Merely because in the course of court proceedings, draw of lots for alternative plots was stayed and held up, is no ground to deny non-consentees the allotment of alternative plots, when in many of their cases, full prices have been paid, lease deeds executed and even formal possessions have been obtained although they could not set up industries. It is submitted that the rule of fairness requires consentees and non-consentees be treated at par for allotment of alternative plots. No prejudicial treatment could be meted out to non-consentees by completely depriving them of alternative plots and merely directing refund of their prices. In this respect, it is urged that pendency of court proceedings should harm no one and mere approach to the law courts for enforcement of their legal and constitutional rights should not be taken as a circumstance against the parties. The contention advanced is that discrimination between consentees and non-consentees is violative of the right of equality guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution." 7. The contention advanced is that discrimination between consentees and non-consentees is violative of the right of equality guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution." 7. The aforesaid arguments were repelled by the Court in the following words: "So far as the non-consentees are concerned, we are not prepared to accept that by their action and/or inaction, they can claim parity for allotment with the consentees. The consentees have to be considered in priority as, at the first available opportunity, they agreed to the offer of alternative plots of smaller sizes. The non-consentees not only questioned the offer made by the Administration to provide them plots of smaller sizes but even assailed the Government notification declaring major part of the land in the Scheme as reserved forest. They might have a legitimate right to approach the courts for necessary reliefs but having failed in their challenges in the court, they can claim no right of being treated similarly with consentees who right from the earliest opportunity were willing and trying through the Administration and the court for early allotment of alternative plots. The consentees and the non-consentees, on the basis of their actions and inactions, constitute two different classes of allottees and a differential treatment to them cannot be held to be unjustified or in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. On a just and reasonable ground, the consentees deserve a more favourable treatment than non-consentees more so because plots of small sizes available in the existing scheme in Phases I and II are extremely limited in number." (underlining is ours) 8. The applications for impleadment/intervention filed by some of the persons who were not parties before the High Court were dismissed and it was observed:- "Now we are left with the individuals and parties falling in none of the three categories i.e.: (1) consentees, (2) non-consentees, or (3) allottees of one kanal of plot. They were not parties before the High Court and were invited to participate in the discussions and negotiations which have taken place during pendency of these cases before us. They have approached by way of special leave petitions or applications seeking interventions or impleadment as parties in the present cases. They were not parties before the High Court and were invited to participate in the discussions and negotiations which have taken place during pendency of these cases before us. They have approached by way of special leave petitions or applications seeking interventions or impleadment as parties in the present cases. This group of individuals and parties, who were not parties before the High Court either as petitioners or respondents and who are merely intervenors or parties seeking impleadments and/or have sought permission to file special leave petitions cannot be allowed to join the race for allotment of available alternative plots. It will have to be presumed that having not ventilated their grievances and enforced their rights, if any, at any earlier stage, they have abandoned their claims. Merely because during pendency of court proceedings, some rounds of negotiations and discussions took place in which the Administration also invited them, would not furnish them a cause of action to raise their claims which they had earlier given up by their inaction and lapse. In adjusting equities and on rule of fairness, those who have languished and slept over their rights have to be denied any relief more so when there has been such a time lag between the original allotment and the proposed allotment of alternative plots. In the meantime, there have been various developments including escalation of land prices. Any speculative deals and attempt to take chance of getting allotment by such parties have to be discouraged. We, therefore, refuse to grant any relief to remaining class of consentees or non-consentees and other allottees who were not parties in the litigation before the High Court." (underlining is ours) 9. This Court finally modified the judgment of the High Court and disposed of the appeals in the following terms: "As a result of the detailed discussion aforesaid, the appeals and connected matters are disposed of by partly maintaining the directions contained in the impugned order of the High Court but with the modifications, substitution and addition of directions as mentioned below: 1. The prayer of the appellant-petitioners for directing the authorities of the Chandigarh Administration to hand over possession of the plots allotted on the basis of draw held in November 1982 is rejected. 2. The prayer of the appellant-petitioners for directing the authorities of the Chandigarh Administration to hand over possession of the plots allotted on the basis of draw held in November 1982 is rejected. 2. The total available plots of different sizes as mentioned in Annexure A to the affidavit of the Administration of UTC, shall be allotted by draw of lots separately or jointly as per the procedure evolved by the Administration to 23 consentees found eligible in accordance with the new environmental norms and to 13 allottees of one-kanal plot. It is for the Administration of UTC to work out the manner in which draw of lots will be held between 23 consentees and 13 allottees of one-kanal plot for the available number of plots of different sizes as contained in Annexure A to the affidavit. It is made clear that the Administration of UTC will have liberty keeping in view the industrial projects submitted by the consentees and other restrictions if they make it necessary to suitably alter the sizes of plots to accommodate the identified 23 consentees. It is clarified that allotment of plots from the area of the Scheme which falls within restricted 900 metres zone from the airbase under the Aircraft Act, would be granted by the Administration with a condition that if in future, any such restriction is reimposed, the allotments may be cancelled and there would be no liability on the Administration of UTC to pay any damage or compensation to the parties due to non-utilisation of plots or its cancellation. If the allotments of plots in the restricted zone are cancelled due to the restriction aforesaid, the price paid for the plots shall be refunded to the parties concerned without any liability of interest on the price which remained as deposit with the Administration. 3. The consentees and allottees of one-kanal plot, who even though found eligible for allotment, because of limited number of plots (as mentioned in Annexure A), do not get accommodation in the available plots, they be considered on the same price paid by them for alternative plots in the new Industrial Area Phase III i.e. Mouli Jagran. 3. The consentees and allottees of one-kanal plot, who even though found eligible for allotment, because of limited number of plots (as mentioned in Annexure A), do not get accommodation in the available plots, they be considered on the same price paid by them for alternative plots in the new Industrial Area Phase III i.e. Mouli Jagran. It is made clear that the requirement of the Act and the Rules and the new environmental norms as existing on the date of fresh allotment of plots in Industrial Area Phase III would be made applicable to such consentees and allottees of one-kanal plot. 4. The non-consentees shall be granted by the Administration of UTC, option by asking them to submit their willingness in writing within a period of one month from the date of this order for considering allotment to each of them a suitable plot in the new Industrial Zone Phase III at Mouli Jagran. It is left to the Administration of UTC to evolve a fair and just method of allotment by draw of lots in accordance with the Act and the Rules. It is made clear that the allotment of plots in the new Industrial Area Phase III i.e. Mouli Jagran would be at the price prevailing on the date of fresh allotments. The price with interest already paid by the non-consentees for their original plots, if so far not refunded to them, shall be adjusted towards the total price payable for the new sites. It is also made clear that in accordance with existing industrial policy and the environmental norms, the allottees will have to submit their project reports for considering viability of their proposed industries by the Administration. In the event, the non-consentees are unwilling to take plots in the new Industrial Zone Phase III or their project reports are ultimately found to be not approvable, the price deposited by them for the original plots would be refunded to them with interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of initial deposit. 5. The reliefs in the nature of directions made in favour of consentees and non-consentees and allottees of one-kanal plot are restricted only to such of them who were parties before the High Court. All claims of remaining consentees or non-consentees or allottees of one-kanal plot, who were not parties in the cases before the High Court, stand rejected. 6. 5. The reliefs in the nature of directions made in favour of consentees and non-consentees and allottees of one-kanal plot are restricted only to such of them who were parties before the High Court. All claims of remaining consentees or non-consentees or allottees of one-kanal plot, who were not parties in the cases before the High Court, stand rejected. 6. Notification dated 28-4-2000 containing the new industrial policy would not be made applicable to the allottees of plots in Phases I and II who are successful in fresh draw of lots to be held under the above directions. 7. The Administration of UTC shall complete the requisite formalities and carry out the directions made above in accordance with law within a period of four months from the date of this order and hand over possession of the plots to the successful allottees. 8. All applications seeking interventions, impleadment as parties and special leave petitions filed by parties, who were not parties before the High Court, are, hereby, rejected." 10. The respondent, who neither gave consent for allotment of an alternative plot of smaller size nor approached the High Court or this Court for grant of appropriate relief filed complaint dated 10.7.2006 under Section 17 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (for short, `the Act') for issue of a direction to the appellants to hand over possession of the plot allotted to him in 1982 and also pay compensation of Rs. 27,14,000/-. He referred to letter dated 14.7.2004 sent to him by the Chandigarh Administration along with a cheque of Rs. 94,367/- by way of refund of the amount deposited with the application and interest at the rate of 12% per annum and pleaded that failure of the administration to hand over possession of the plot allotted to him amounted to deficiency in service and, as such, he was entitled to seek a direction for delivery of possession. In the counter filed on behalf of the appellants, it was pleaded that the complaint was not maintainable because the respondent had neither given consent for allotment of an alternative plot nor challenged the so-called failure of the administration to deliver possession of the plot allotted to him by filing writ petition in the High Court. It was further pleaded that in view of the judgment of this Court in Hira Tikkoo's case, the amount deposited by him was refunded with interest. 11. It was further pleaded that in view of the judgment of this Court in Hira Tikkoo's case, the amount deposited by him was refunded with interest. 11. The State Commission referred to the observations made by this Court in paragraph 39 of the judgment in Hira Tikkoo's case and held that the respondent is not entitled to any relief because he had not filed petition before the High Court or this Court and he cannot claim better right than those who had unsuccessfully sought intervention/impleadment in Hira Tikkoo's case. Paragraphs 18 to 20 of the order passed by the State Commission, which contain the reasons for its decision are reproduced below: "18. Therefore according to these observations, Hon'ble Supreme Court had refused to grant relief to remaining class of consentees, non-consentees, and other allottees who were not parties before the High Court. Even they did not consider the case of those consentees, non-consentees and other allottees who had tried to intervene before the Hon'ble apex court by making applications. The case of the complainant who had not filed any writ petition before the High Court cannot be put on higher pedestal than the persons or group of individuals who had tried to intervene at the level of apex court by way of applications Supreme Court has made it very much clear that they had not granted any relief to the remaining class of consentees/non-consentees and other allottees who were not parties to the litigation before the High Court. 19. It has been further observed in para-5 at page 37 that the reliefs in the nature directions made in favour of the consentees and non-consentees and other allottees of one kanal plot were restricted only to such of them who were parties before the High Court. All claims of remaining consentees or non-consentees or allottees of one kanal plot, who were not parties in the cases before the High Court stood rejected. 20. Therefore, in view of the Judgement of Hon'ble Supreme Court, the complainant cannot be granted any relief regarding possession of plot measuring 1.5 kanal being consentee as he had agreed to 1.5 kanal plot instead of 2 kanal plot which was originally allotted to him. 20. Therefore, in view of the Judgement of Hon'ble Supreme Court, the complainant cannot be granted any relief regarding possession of plot measuring 1.5 kanal being consentee as he had agreed to 1.5 kanal plot instead of 2 kanal plot which was originally allotted to him. It is true that the complainant had never a dispute with the Chandigarh Administration but in view of the judgment of Hon'ble Apex court dated 13.4.2004, he is not entitled to any relief from the Chandigarh administration as he was not party to the proceedings at any stage i.e. before the Hon'ble High Court or Hon'ble Supreme Court." 12. The National Commission reversed the order of the State Commission by observing that the judgment of this Court in Hira Tikkoo's case was not a judgment `in rem' and, as such, the same was not binding on the respondent. The National Commission further held that non-delivery of possession of the plot allotted to the respondent amounted to deficiency in service and he was entitled to relief in terms of the prayer made in the complaint. Accordingly, a direction was given to the appellants to handover possession of Plot No.1289, Industrial Area Phase II or allot an alternative plot of the same size. 13. Although, notice of the special leave petition has been duly served upon the respondent, he has not appeared either in person or through an advocate to contest the same. 14. We have heard learned counsel for the appellants and perused the record. We have also gone through the judgment in Hira Tikkoo's case, the relevant portions of which have been extracted herein above. In our view, the impugned order is legally unsustainable and is liable to be set aside because the same is based on total misreading of the judgment in Hira Tikkoo's case and also because while granting relief to the respondent, the National Commission failed to consider the issue relating to maintainability of the complaint filed by the respondent in 2006 for issue of a direction to the appellants to deliver possession of the plot allotted to him in 1982. 15. 15. In paragraphs 24 to 26 of the judgment in Hira Tikkoo's case, this Court specifically dealt with the question whether those who were allotted plots in Industrial Area Phase-II in 1982 were entitled to possession of the plots as of right and held that even though the applicants had suffered on account of negligence of the Chandigarh Administration in advertising the plots in an area which had already been declared as reserved forest, the High Court did not commit any error by refusing to invoke the doctrine of estoppel for the purpose of issuing a mandamus to the authorities to hand over possession of the plots. In paragraph 27 of the judgment, the Court noticed the argument advanced on behalf of the non-consentees and rejected the same by assigning detailed reasons in paragraph 31. The applications filed by those, who did not fall in the categories of consentee, non-consentee and allottees of one kanal plot were also rejected. 16. Notwithstanding this, the Court allowed one more opportunity to the non-consentees to opt for a suitable plot in new Industrial Zone Phase-III at Mouli Jagran. Therefore, the National Commission was not right in observing that the judgment in Hira Tikkoo's case was not a judgment 'in rem' and was not binding on the respondent. 17. We are also of the view that the complaint filed by the respondent in 2006 was hopelessly barred by time and the National Commission committed a jurisdictional error by entertaining the same by relying upon letter dated 14.7.2004 sent by the Chandigarh Administration. The cause, if any, in the matter of non-delivery of possession of the plot allotted to him had accrued to the respondent in 1982 and if he felt aggrieved by the failure/inaction of the Chandigarh Administration to deliver possession of the plot, then he could have availed remedy by filing civil suit for which the period of limitation is three years. However, the fact of the matter is that he neither filed civil suit within the prescribed period of limitation nor approached the High Court as was done by some of those who had given consent and others who had not given consent for allotment of alternative plot. However, the fact of the matter is that he neither filed civil suit within the prescribed period of limitation nor approached the High Court as was done by some of those who had given consent and others who had not given consent for allotment of alternative plot. Rather, he kept quiet for more than two decades and filed complaint only in July 2006, which was clearly beyond the period of limitation prescribed under Section 17 read with Section 24A of the Act. 18. In the complaint filed by him, the respondent had not pleaded that after the judgment in Hira Tikkoo's case, he had approached the Chandigarh Administration and conveyed his willingness to be considered for allotment of suitable plot in Industrial Zone, Phase-III at Mouli Jagran. Therefore, we do not consider necessary to go into the question whether the respondent is entitled to alternate plot in terms of clause 4 of the directions contained in Hira Tikkoo's case. 19. In the result, the appeal is allowed, the impugned order is set aside and the complaint filed by the respondent is dismissed. Appeal allowed.