Dipak Chakraborty v. Board of Councillors, Bhadreswar Municipality
2012-05-18
SOUMITRA PAL
body2012
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment :- Soumitra Pal, J. In this writ petition, the petitioner, the Chairman of Bhadreswar Municipality, has challenged the resolution adopted on 24th March, 2012 by the councillors of the said Municipality removing him from the post. Facts which require to be considered are that the total strength of the councillors in the said Municipality is 22. Pursuant to the election in 2010, on 18th June, 2010 Board was constituted. The petitioner was elected the Chairman. Subsequent to the election of councillors and after formation of the Board, one councilior expired. Therefore, at present the Board consists of 21 councillors. On 20th March, 2012, 9 councillors issued a notice for removal of the petitioner from the post of Chairman. On 24th March, 2012 10 members adopted a resolution for removal of the petitioner. Nine councillors voted against the resolution. 2 councillors abstained from voting. After resolution was passed, the petitioner addressed a letter dated 24th March, 2012, to the District Magistrate, Hooghly, the respondent no.3, being annexure P4 to the writ petition, alleging that his removal by less than fifty per cent of the elected councillors was unethical and against the scheme of the West Bengal Municipal Act, 1993 (for short “the Act”), particularly section 18(3) thereof. Thereafter, the Sub-Divisional Officer, Chandernagore, Hooghly, by memo dated 26th March, 2012 directed the Executive Officer of the Municipality, the respondent no.4, to take charge from the petitioner and hand over the same to the Vice-Chairman. It has been stated that on 26th March, 2012 the respondent no.4 had issued the impugned letter requesting the petitioner to hand over charge on 26th March, 2012 at 5 P.M. Mr. Hirak Mitra, learned senior advocate, appearing on behalf of the petitioner, relying on the statements in the writ petition and in the affidavit in reply had submitted that section 18(3) of the Act along with the proviso should be given a harmonious construction. No part of the statute can be disregarded. Though section 18(3) was amended, as even after amendment proviso remains intact, it explains what the parent section is. Submission was amendment of section 18(3) did not meet the desired objective and even after amendment, total number of elected members present and voting by them means total number of elected members. In this regard the provisions contained in West Bengal Municipal Corporation Act, 2006 were referred to.
Submission was amendment of section 18(3) did not meet the desired objective and even after amendment, total number of elected members present and voting by them means total number of elected members. In this regard the provisions contained in West Bengal Municipal Corporation Act, 2006 were referred to. Learned senior advocate had relied on the judgment by the House of Lords in Jennings vs. Kelly, 1939 (4) AII ER 4 in support of the proposition that proviso controls the section. Mr. Ashok Kumar Banerjee, learned Government Pleader, relying on the affidavit in opposition and refuting the submission made on behalf of the petitioner, had submitted that while section 18(3) lays down the procedure for removal of Chairman, the proviso to the said section creates a restriction regarding removal as it stipulates that no resolution regarding removal of the Chairman shall be moved before the expiry of six months from the date of assumption of office by a Chairman and if such resolution is not carried out by a majority of the total number of elected members, no further resolution for such purpose shall be moved before the expiry of a period of six months from the date on which the former resolution was passed. As the language in section 18(3) is clear and unambiguous and proviso to the said section operates on a different field, relying on the meaning of the word “Proviso” in Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary, submission was proviso to a section cannot be used to import into the enacting part something which is not there. Learned Government Pleader had relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in Tribhovandas Haribhai Tamboli vs. Gujarat Revenue Tribunal: AIR 1991 SC 1538 in support of his submission. Learned senior counsel for the parties have also relied on the judgment passed in Bhagawan Dutt Tiwari & Ors vs Kabita Sarkar & Ors. : 2002 (1) CHN 327 in support of their arguments.
Learned senior counsel for the parties have also relied on the judgment passed in Bhagawan Dutt Tiwari & Ors vs Kabita Sarkar & Ors. : 2002 (1) CHN 327 in support of their arguments. The issues which require consideration - i) Whether after amendment of section 18(3) with effect from 15th December, 2003, “majority” means total number of elected members “present and voting” or “majority of the total number of elected members” as contained in the proviso to the said section; ii) Whether the 10 councillors who had voted in favour of the resolution for removal of the Chairman constitute the majority of the councillors or not; iii) Whether proviso can override section 18(3) of the Act and iv) Whether proviso to section 18(3) is only with regard to the bar in removing the Chairman within six months from the date of assumption of office. In order to deal with the issues, it is appropriate to refer to section 18(3) of the Act which is as under :- “18. Terms of office of Chairman.(1) …….. (2) ……. (3) The Chairman may be removed from office by a resolution carried by a majority of the total number of [elected members] of the Board of Councillors holding office for the time being [present and voting by them,] at a special meeting to be called for this purpose in the manner prescribed upon a requisition made in writing by not less than one-third of the total number of [elected members] of the Board of Councillors, and the procedure for the conduct of business in the special meeting shall be such as may be prescribed : Provided that no such resolution shall be moved before the expiry of six months from the date of assumption of office by a Chairman, and if such resolution is not carried by a majority of the total number of [elected members], no further resolution for such purpose shall be moved before the expiry of a period of six months from the date on which the former resolution was moved”. (Emphasis supplied) As seen section 18(3) deals with the procedure for removal of the Chairman. So far as the first issue is concerned, it is to be noted that consequent to the amendment of section 18(3), the words “present and voting by them” were inserted.
(Emphasis supplied) As seen section 18(3) deals with the procedure for removal of the Chairman. So far as the first issue is concerned, it is to be noted that consequent to the amendment of section 18(3), the words “present and voting by them” were inserted. Prior to amendment of section 18(3), the issue whether the Chairman could be removed from office by a resolution carried by the majority of the total number of elected members of the Board of Councillors came up for consideration in Bhagawan Dutt Tiwari (supra) and it was held that it would mean the “majority of total number of elected members of the Board of Councillors” (paragraph 7) and not the total number of elected members present and voting. The Division Bench went on to hold that “In section 18(3) of the Act, however, the words ‘present’ and ‘voting’ have been deliberately omitted by the legislature to give a dictionary meaning of the words “majority of the total number of elected members of the Board of Councillors”(paragraph 7). Ultimately dealing with unamended provisions in section 18(3) it was held that a resolution carried by 11 elected members of the Board of Councillors could not be said to be carried out by majority of elected members of the Board of Councillors as the Municipality was having 22 elected members in the Board. Subsequent to the judgment in Bhagawan Dutt Tiwari (supra) section 18(3) was amended and significantly, the words “present and voting by them” were inserted which are not there in the proviso. In the said section the words “by them” refer to the “majority” of the “elected members” who shall not only be “present” but shall also participate in the “voting” for removal of the Chairman. Keeping this interpretation in mind, as in the instant case 19 out of 21 councillors of the Board who constituted the “majority” of the elected members were “present” and the said councillors had participated in the “voting”, it would mean under the amended section 18 (3) that the majority of the elected members were “present and voting”. Any other interpretation of the amended section 18(3) would negate the intention of the legislature. The words “majority of the total number of elected members” as contained in the proviso which operates on a different field, as discussed later while dealing with the fourth issue, have no manner of application.
Any other interpretation of the amended section 18(3) would negate the intention of the legislature. The words “majority of the total number of elected members” as contained in the proviso which operates on a different field, as discussed later while dealing with the fourth issue, have no manner of application. So far as the second issue is concerned, in view of the amended section 18(3), as 19 councillors constituting the majority of the elected councillors were “present” and of the said 19, 10 councillors had voted for removal of Chairman, it constituted the “majority” of the said 19 councillors. So far as the third issue is concerned as to whether proviso can override section 18(3) of the Act, it is to be noted that in Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary “proviso” has been defined in the following manner:- “A proviso to a section cannot be used to import into the enacting part something which is not there, but where the enacting part is susceptible of several possible meanings it may be controlled by proviso”. In this regard it is also appropriate to refer to the law laid down by the Apex Court in Tribhovandas Haribhai Tamboli (supra) where it has been held as under:- “6. It is a cardinal rule of interpretation that a proviso to a particular provision of a statute only embraces the field, which is covered by the main provision. It carves out an exception to the main provision to which it has been enacted by the proviso and to no other. The proper function of a proviso is to except and deal with a case which would otherwise fall within the general language of the main enactment, and its effect is to confine to that case. Where the language of the main enactment is explicit and unambiguous, the proviso can have no repercussion on the interpretation of the main enactment, so as to exclude from it, by implication what clearly falls within its express terms. The scope of the proviso, therefore, is to carve out an exception to the main enactment and it excludes something which otherwise would have been within the rule.
The scope of the proviso, therefore, is to carve out an exception to the main enactment and it excludes something which otherwise would have been within the rule. It has to operate in the same field and if the language of the main enactment is clear, the proviso cannot be torn apart from the main enactment nor can it be used to nullify by implication what the enactment clearly says nor set at naught the real object of the main enactment, unless the words of the proviso are such that it is its necessary effect.” Keeping in mind the definition of the word “proviso” and the interpretation of the said word by the Apex Court as noted, in my view, there is no dispute that section 18(3) is the enacting part. It is to be noted the enacting part deals with the procedure for removal of the Chairman by the majority of councillors who should be “present and voting”. It is evident from the clear language of the proviso to the said section, that it is with regard to the restriction with regard to time frame regarding removal of the Chairman as it stipulates that no resolution regarding the Chairman shall be moved before the expiry of six months from the date of assumption of office by a Chairman and if such resolution fails, no such resolution for such purpose shall be moved before the expiry of a period of six months from the date on which the former resolution was passed. Thus, section 18(3) - the enacting part – clearly deals with the procedure of removal of Chairman and the proviso is regarding restriction regarding moving a fresh resolution once such resolution for removal is moved. The judgment in Jennings (supra) relied on by the petitioner is not applicable to the facts of the case as therein it was held “In the present case, however, not only is the first part of the section deficient in express definition, but also the second part is complementary and necessary in order to ascertain the full intention of the legislature” & therefore, it was held “The proper course is to apply the broad general rule of construction, which is that a section or enactment must be construed as a whole, each portion throwing light, if need be, on the rest”.
However, in the case in hand, the language of section 18(3) is clear and unambiguous and cannot be said to be deficient in expression, and the proviso – the second part – cannot be said to be complementary as it operates independently. In view of this interpretation, reference to the provisions of the West Bengal Municipal Corporation, 2006 is inapplicable. Therefore, as the section and proviso are in different spheres altogether and as the proviso can have no repercussion on the interpretation of the main enactment, it cannot override section 18(3). With regard to the fourth issue the answer is to be in the affirmative as it is evident from the language of proviso to section 18(3) that it creates a bar in moving a resolution in removing a Chairman before the expiry of six months from the date of assumption of office by a Chairman and no resolution can be moved before the expiry of a period of six months if such resolution fails. Therefore, the writ petition is dismissed. No order as to costs. (SOUMITRA PAL, J.) Later After the judgment is delivered, learned advocate for the petitioner, prays for stay of its operation. Prayer is considered and is rejected. Urgent photostat certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, be given to the appearing parties on priority basis.