Judgment :- Anand Byrareddy, J 1. These appeals and petitions are disposed of by a common judgement having due regard to the circumstance that the issues raised and the points for consideration are identical. 2. The facts leading up to these appeals are that the High Court of Karnataka (Conditions of Service and Recruitment) Rules, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the 1973 Rules’ for brevity) having been amended by the High Court of Karnataka Service (Conditions of Service & Recruitment) (I Amendment) Rules, 2009 (vide notification dated 24.02.2009); the High Court of Karnataka Service (Conditions of Service & Recruitment) (II Amendment) Rules, 2009 (vide Notification dated 28.5.2009); the High Court of Karnataka Service (Conditions of Service & Recruitment) (III Amendment) Rules, 2009 (vide notification dated 28.5.2009); the High Court of Karnataka Service (Conditions of Service & Recruitment) (IV Amendment) Rules, 2009 (vide notification dated 28.5.2009) and the High Court of Karnataka Service (Conditions of Service & Recruitment) (V Amendment) Rules, 2009 (vide Notification dated 29.7.2009) (Hereinafter commonly referred to as “the 2009 Rules”, for brevity) – to substitute the Rules prescribing qualifications in respect of certain categories of posts, and aggrieved by the same, more particularly, by the provisos and the explanations to the amended Rules, which are extracted hereinafter, a large number of petitions were filed by Group-D employees, Typists, Second Division Assistants, First Division Assistants, Stenographers, Judgment Writers and Senior Judgment Writers, since the amended Rules required that they possess a higher educational qualification, to be considered, for promotion to the next higher post in each of their cases. Incidentally, they were also aggrieved by promotions being conferred on other employees, who apparently met the requisite qualification and were granted promotion. Some of the petitioners also sought for a declaration that the stipulation of a competitive test to be appointed to the post of Judgment Writers and Senior Judgment Writers and the quota reserved in respect of Senior Judgement Writers for promotion to the post of Assistant Registrars being restricted to six posts, as being arbitrary and unconstitutional. 3. In Writ Petitions in WP 35072-111/2009, the petitioners are Section Officers, who aspired to get promoted to the next higher cadre of Assistant Registrars till such time the very impugned Rules came into effect. The basic criteria for promotion was changed from ‘Seniority-cum-efficiency’ to ‘Merit-cum-Efficiency’. 3. In Writ Petitions in WP 35072-111/2009, the petitioners are Section Officers, who aspired to get promoted to the next higher cadre of Assistant Registrars till such time the very impugned Rules came into effect. The basic criteria for promotion was changed from ‘Seniority-cum-efficiency’ to ‘Merit-cum-Efficiency’. The amendment thus takes away further promotional avenues, in spite of long service rendered by them. 4. In WP 37825-841/2009, the petitioners are First Division Assistants who were aggrieved by the promotions granted to Respondent No.3 to Respondent No.68 as Senior Assistants, overlooking the petitioners – since they did not posses a degree qualification as prescribed under the 2009 Rules. 5. In W.P.No.10131/2010, the petitioner is aggrieved by the fact that his candidature has been overlooked in making the selection and appointment of respondents 3 to 15, in the said petition. The petitioner’s primary grievance is that the 2009 Rules have not been followed in granting promotion to the private respondents in the petition and in by-passing the petitioner. 6. The petitions were contested by the appellants herein and some other respondents. It was canvassed before the learned Single Judge on behalf of the First Division Assistants and Second Division Assistants that the requirement of possessing a degree by the petitioners lacks the necessary criterion. The position earlier, in terms of the 1973 Rules, did not require them to possess a degree qualification for being considered for promotion to the post of First Division Assistants. The promotion of the petitioners was hampered on account of the prescription of a degree qualification and that they would stand to lose monetarily, which would have accrued to them in the usual course had they been promoted in accordance with the 1973 Rules. It was contended that the right to be considered for promotion is affected and respondents 1 and 2, namely, the appellants herein having allowed the 1973 Rules to be in force all along, to enforce the 2009 Rules and to hold that the petitioners could not be considered for promotion, is arbitrary and without basis. It was also urged that the proceedings did not indicate the criterion adopted in prescribing the degree qualification and parameters that lead to the requirement of degree qualification being necessary and therefore, the right of the petitioners to be considered for promotion was taken away. It was also urged that the proceedings did not indicate the criterion adopted in prescribing the degree qualification and parameters that lead to the requirement of degree qualification being necessary and therefore, the right of the petitioners to be considered for promotion was taken away. It was further argued that the explanation to the proviso would indicate that the permission by the employees to take up a degree examination was not automatic and the blanket concession that a degree could be obtained within five years and subject to the discretion of the Chief Justice, in either granting or not granting permission to obtain such a degree, would render the very prescription otiose and onerous. Further, the amended Rules being given retrospective effect, the petitioners’ right to promotion has been denied. 7. It was contended on behalf of the Judgment Writers that the requirement of a Law Degree, to be entitled for promotion was not based on any criteria and there was no nexus between the duties performed by the Judgment Writers and the requirement of a Law Degree and since it was impossible for the Judgment Writers to obtain a Law Degree, while continuing to function as Judgment Writers in the High Court, the prescription was wholly arbitrary and unjust. It was also argued that the procedure in bringing about the amendment has not been followed and that the Draft Rules, which were sent to the Governor for approval, were returned by the Governor and thereafter, the amendments were resorted to, which is highly irregular and the Rules are, therefore, rendered invalid. Though it is indicated in the Gazette Notification that the Draft Rules were approved by the Governor, it is candidly admitted by the appellants herein that the Rules were not approved by the Governor and they continue to remain as Draft Rules. It was also sought to be highlighted that the service conditions sought to be altered at this point of time, does not take into account the fact that many Judgment Writers are not graduates and therefore, it would be impossible for them to obtain Law Degree without first securing a basic degree. It was also sought to be highlighted that the service conditions sought to be altered at this point of time, does not take into account the fact that many Judgment Writers are not graduates and therefore, it would be impossible for them to obtain Law Degree without first securing a basic degree. It was also pointed out that there was no direct recruitment in respect of posts of Assistant Court Officer, Court Officer and Section Officer and no Law Degree was insisted upon for the feeder cadres and hence, requiring the Judgment Writers to obtain Law Degrees is wholly unreasonable and discriminatory. It was further canvassed that several respondents had been promoted to vacancies, which arose prior to the coming into force of the new Rules and Hence, in respect of those vacancies that arose prior to the coming into force of the new Rules, it is the 1973 Rules which would apply. By implementing the amended Rules and holding that they apply in respect of such vacancies which arose prior to the coming into force of the 2009 Rules, is whimsical and unreasonable. Therefore, promotions granted to the several respondents were liable to be quashed. It was also contended, with reference to Article 229(2) of the Constitution of India, that the approval of the Governor was required in respect of amendment to a Rule concerning salaries, allowances, leave, pension or conditions of service, which would include promotion and therefore, prescription of a qualification for promotion under the amended Rules certainly required the approval of the Governor and hence, in the absence of the same, would not stand the test of law. It was further highlighted that it was difficult to obtain a Law Degree as a Law Degree by Correspondence Course was not recognized for any purpose and it was not possible for the petitioners to attend a full-time Law Course, which is compulsory at present in the State of Karnataka to obtain a Law Degree. It was further highlighted that it was difficult to obtain a Law Degree as a Law Degree by Correspondence Course was not recognized for any purpose and it was not possible for the petitioners to attend a full-time Law Course, which is compulsory at present in the State of Karnataka to obtain a Law Degree. It was also contended that insofar as Group-D employees are concerned, in terms of the 1973 Rules, 50% of the posts of Second Division Assistants was to be filled up by direct recruitment and 25% was earmarked for Group-D employees who had passed the SSLC examination, but whereas under the amended Rules, while maintaining 50% by direct recruitment, in respect of the remaining 50%, possession of a degree by Group-D employees was insisted upon. Therefore, it was contended that since the minimum qualification for the post of a Group-D employee was Seventh Standard, the petitioners who were Group-D employees had passed only the Seventh Standard and were not in a position to obtain a Bachelor’s Degree within five years and therefore, the amended Rules are unreasonable and unjust. This would result in stagnation in the very same post as Group-D employees, which would have a telling effect on their morale and consequently, on efficiency of their service. 8. It was contended on behalf of the Senior Assistants, who were to be promoted to the post of Section Officers, that the requirement of a Degree being possessed by Senior Assistants was also arbitrary, as in respect of none of the feeder posts, a Degree qualification was prescribed. It was thus contended that the object sought to be achieved has no nexus and there is no indication as to what weighed with the appellants in amending the Rule. It was further pointed out that some of the respondents did not have the necessary qualification and yet they were promoted, whereas if the 1973 Rules were to be applied, the very same respondents were juniors to some of the petitioners. Therefore, the promotions were arbitrary and resulted in denial of a legitimate right of the petitioners. 9. It was further pointed out that some of the respondents did not have the necessary qualification and yet they were promoted, whereas if the 1973 Rules were to be applied, the very same respondents were juniors to some of the petitioners. Therefore, the promotions were arbitrary and resulted in denial of a legitimate right of the petitioners. 9. Per contra, it was contended on behalf of the appellants that insofar as the power of the Chief Justice to frame necessary Rules in respect of recruitment as well as conditions of service of the staff of the High Court is concerned, as was evident from Article 229(2) of the Constitution of India, the Chief Justice was vested with the power to frame Rules in respect of promotion. It is only where conditions of service, if sought to be amended by way of Rules and which would have a financial implication, that the necessity of seeking approval of the Governor would arise. It was, therefore, contended that the five amendments brought to the 1973 Rules were within the powers of the Chief Justice and that he had the power to amend the mode of recruitment as well as to prescribe qualifications. It was further contended that it was intended by the High Court to repeal the 1973 Rules and the Draft Rules which were proposed to replace the 1973 Rules were sent to the Governor, which was however, returned by the Governor and the said Draft Rules had thereafter been discarded and it was the 1973 Rules, which continued to hold the field. It is those Rules, which stand amended by the Chief Justice, who is competent to do so. It was emphasized that the requirement of approval being sought from the Governor would not be necessary in respect of change of conditions pertaining to promotions and the prescription of a higher educational qualification is permissible in order to ensure efficiency of service and the High Court, being a Court of Record, it was imperative to ensure that efficiency was maintained at all levels and that is the main objective in prescribing different educational qualifications in respect of categories of employees. It was also contended that the prescription of criterion for promotion for appointment would fall exclusively under the domain of the employer and the exercise of the power of judicial review can be contemplated only if it is established that the Rules framed are contrary to the Constitutional provisions. 10. On these rival contentions, the following points for consideration were framed by the learned Single Judge:- “1. Whether the power given to the Chief Justice to make Rules under Article 229(2) of the Constitution in respect of the conditions of service of the High Court staff, can be used to validate unconstitutional discrimination in promotional chances of persons belonging to the same category? 2. Is there a rational nexus between prescribing Degree/Law Degree qualifications and the object of higher efficiency to be achieved? 3. Whether the criterion fixed by the proviso to the amended Rules of 2009 is manifestly erroneous, arbitrary, unreasonable, irrational and discriminatory and thus violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, when the right to considered for promotion is held to be a fundamental right? 4. Whether the requirements mentioned in the explanation to the proviso are arbitrary, unreasonable, impracticable and lacks rational nexus and hence violative of Article 14 & 16 of the Constitution? 5. In respect of the vacancies in the promotional posts which arose prior to the amendment in 2009, which Rule is applicable – old Rules of 1973 or amended Rules of 2009? 6. Whether the amended Rules which have retrospective operation has the effect of taking away the existing right under 1973 Rules and thus the amended Rules are arbitrary, discriminatory and violative of the right guaranteed under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and hence unconstitutional? 7. Whether the promotions given pursuant to the amended Rules are in consonance with the well established principles of service jurisprudence? 8. 7. Whether the promotions given pursuant to the amended Rules are in consonance with the well established principles of service jurisprudence? 8. Is the procedure followed in bringing about the amended Rules of 2009 is in accordance with the well established principles and procedures applicable in respect of bringing amendments to the principles rules?” Insofar as Point No.1 is concerned, it was held that the power of the State to make legislation in regard to conditions of service, in respect of the staff of the High Court has been conferred on the Chief Justice and the Rules made under Article 229(2) of the Constitution of India are to be held as subordinate legislation. It was also held that the approval of the Governor was not necessary in respect of an amendment to a Rule concerning promotions and it was necessary only in respect of those matters which were specifically mentioned in the Proviso to Article 229(2) of the Constitution of India. And this was laid down by the apex court in the case of one M. Gurumoorthy versus The Accountant General, Assam and Nagaland, AIR 1971 SC 1850 , and with reference to case-law, it was held that the Chief Justice was the supreme authority to frame Rules in respect of recruitment as well as the conditions of service, but however, such power is subject to the limitation as contained in Article 229(2) itself and that power will have to be exercised keeping in view the limitations as expressed by the apex Court. In other words, the power cannot be used to validate unconstitutional discrimination in promotional chances of persons belonging to the same category. With regard to Point No.2, it was held that there was no specific reason forthcoming as to why a Degree qualification was being insisted in respect of Group-D employees, Second Division Assistants, First Division Assistants, Stenographers, and Judgment Writers, in order to move on to a higher post. Similarly, no specific reason was forthcoming as to why a Law Degree was insisted upon for Senior Judgment Writers. The learned Single Judge has expressed that insofar as the nature of duties assigned to various categories of employees, as could be seen from the material that was placed before him, was concerned, Group-D employees were assigned with the work of keeping the office clean and tidy and to deliver files to other Sections. The learned Single Judge has expressed that insofar as the nature of duties assigned to various categories of employees, as could be seen from the material that was placed before him, was concerned, Group-D employees were assigned with the work of keeping the office clean and tidy and to deliver files to other Sections. Insofar as Second Division Assistants were concerned, they were required to maintain the diary, organize the movement of files and distribution of files. Insofar as Senior Assistants and First Division Assistants were concerned, they were required to attend to the job of a case worker as per the duties assigned to them. Insofar as Stenographers, Judgment Writers and Senior Judgment Writers were concerned, they were entrusted with the work of Stenography, which is entrusted to them by the Judges of the High Court, apart from receiving tappal and files. The duties of the Court Officers and Assistant Court Officers was that of arranging the case files according to the cause-list, to note the stage of the cases, according to the court proceedings and to maintain the books that are in their custody for the conduct of the proceedings. The Sections Officers were required to scrutinise the files submitted by the case-worker as per the procedure prescribed. The Assistant Registrars were required to be Branch Officers incharge of one more sections and after scrutiny of the files submitted by the Section Officers, swearing to the letters on behalf of the High Court. Therefore, it was striking that the nature of work done by the aforesaid officials was basically clerical and was not managerial. It was also taken note of by the learned Single Judge that at some points of time, Second Division Assistants would be required to carry out the duties of First Division Assistants and the First Division Assistants, in turn, were required to carry out the duties of Senior Assistants. Similarly, the Senior Assistants were sometimes required to carry out the functions of Section Officers. So also, the Stenographers also carried out the work of Judgment Writers and the Judgment Writers, in turn, also carried out the duties of Senior Judgment Writers. Some Senior Judgment Writers were assigned with the duties of Assistant Registrars. Similarly, the Senior Assistants were sometimes required to carry out the functions of Section Officers. So also, the Stenographers also carried out the work of Judgment Writers and the Judgment Writers, in turn, also carried out the duties of Senior Judgment Writers. Some Senior Judgment Writers were assigned with the duties of Assistant Registrars. It was this ground reality that was taken note of by the learned Single Judge in holding that, even without the possession of the requisite qualification as was prescribed under the new Rules, the work of the Court could be carried on smoothly under the 1973 unamended Rules and there was no need to disturb a system that had worked fairly well for over three and a half decades. Therefore, the learned Single Judge has concluded that there was no nexus between the objective sought to be achieved and the prescription of a higher qualification. For adopting the above reasoning, the learned Single Judge has drawn sustenance from the Judgments of the apex Court in Food Corporation of India versus Om Prakash Sharma and Others, AIR 1998 SC 2682 and in B.N. Saxena versus New Delhi Municipal Committee, AIR 1990 SC 2021 . He has contended that the facts of those cases and the circumstances in the case on hand were identical. The learned Single Judge has made a special mention of the duties of the Stenographers, Judgment Writers, Senior Judgment Writers to the effect that even without a Degree or a Law Degree qualification, they were capable of discharging their duties efficiently and effectively and possession of a Degree would make no difference insofar as the core work to be discharged by those employees was concerned and especially, since they do not carry out the function of a Research Assistant, and the prescription of a Law Degree would have no nexus to the object sought to be achieved. It was held that it was enough if those employees possessed the basic knowledge of grammar, control over vocabulary and command over language and not necessarily be equipped with any special educational qualification, which would be superfluous, without those other requirements being present. It was held that it was enough if those employees possessed the basic knowledge of grammar, control over vocabulary and command over language and not necessarily be equipped with any special educational qualification, which would be superfluous, without those other requirements being present. As regards Point No.3, as to whether the right to be considered for promotion is a fundamental right of the petitioners and whether the said right was affected, has been answered by the learned Single Judge with reference to the view expressed by the apex Court in cases, namely, Mohammad Shujat Ali versus Union of India, AIR 1974 SC 1 631 ; Manager, Government Branch Press versus D.B. Belliappa, AIR 1979 SC 429 ; Ajit Singh versus State of Punjab, (1999) 7 SCC 209 and a Division Bench Judgment of this court in Channe Gowda versus High Court of Karnataka, ILR 2004 Karnataka 4633, and has concluded that the petitioners’ right to be considered for promotion is a fundamental right and not a mere chance of promotion. The petitioners, many of whom, have worked for more than ten to thirty years and others similarly placed have not been promoted, only because, they did not possess a Degree or a Law Degree and therefore, their right to be considered for promotion to the next higher post has been severely affected. The learned Single Judge has opined that they could not be deprived of their fundamental right to be considered for promotion by virtue of the Proviso and Explanation substituted by way of the 2009 Rules. Points 4 and 6 have been then considered together, namely, whether the criterion fixed by the Proviso to the amended Rules was violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India as being unreasonable, discriminatory and irrational. It is observed by the learned Single Judge that the Explanation to the Proviso in respect of the method of recruitment for the aforesaid category of employees, requires them to obtain permission to secure a Degree or a Law Degree and that it was not automatic. The period prescribed, within which they could obtain such qualification, was five years. The permission granted was at the discretion of the Chief Justice. Therefore, there was no guarantee of every person, who was desirous of obtaining such higher qualification, being granted the permission, automatically. The period prescribed, within which they could obtain such qualification, was five years. The permission granted was at the discretion of the Chief Justice. Therefore, there was no guarantee of every person, who was desirous of obtaining such higher qualification, being granted the permission, automatically. Secondly, a Circular dated 24.8.2010, prescribed guidelines as regards the grant of permission to pursue further studies by employees such as the petitioners, which read as follows:- “1. The officers/officials of this Honourable Court who are of desirous of pursuing Degrees/ LL.B/LL.M/Master’s Degree / MBA by attending colleges with a view to acquiring colleges with a view to acquiring knowledge and higher education should obtain prior permission of Honourable the Chief Justice, subject to the following conditions: i) that their study will not adversely effect their work and in particular the hours of study will permit them to adhere to the normal official hours; ii) that they have passed the departmental examinations prescribed for the post held by them. 2. At one point of time not more than 10% of the officers/officials working in a particular cadre shall be permitted to pursue Degree’s / LL.B / LL.M / Master’s Degree / MBA as stated at Sl.No.1. 3. Permission shall be granted on the basis of seniority of the officers/officials of their respective cadres and the senior shall be entitled to preference”. The learned Single Judge has opined with reference to the above, that not more than 10% of the officials working in a particular cadre would be permitted to pursue a higher Degree course and permission had to be granted on the basis of seniority. If this was read in conjunction with the Explanation to the Proviso, which provided for a maximum period of five years to obtain a higher qualification, and going by the number of employees, even 10% of such employees per cadre would clearly require more than five years to obtain such higher qualification and therefore it was totally unworkable for all the employees desirous of gaining such higher qualification within the stipulated time. Insofar as the employees in Group-D or even the Second Division Assistants and First Division Assistants were concerned, many of them had moved on to the next post by way of promotion in the past. Insofar as the employees in Group-D or even the Second Division Assistants and First Division Assistants were concerned, many of them had moved on to the next post by way of promotion in the past. The minimum qualification required at the time of initial appointment was Seventh Standard and not even the Secondary School Leaving Certificate Examination (hereinafter referred to as ‘the SSLC’ for brevity). Therefore, a Group-D employee, who had passed Seventh Standard was required to obtain a Degree, to be eligible for promotion, he would first have to complete SSLC and then a Pre-University Course, before embarking on a Degree Course. This was again totally unworkable, when only a five year period was granted to the employees desirous of obtaining a higher qualification. It was also noted by the learned Single Judge that the Five year period which was to run from the date of permission granted, should always coincide with the academic year, in which the employee seeks to undertake a higher course of study, for otherwise, the five year period would be lopsided and would result in an imbalance insofar as the several employees were concerned. The learned Single Judge had further relied upon a decision of the apex Court in State of Tamil Nadu versus P. Krishna Murthy, (2006) 4 SCC 517 , wherein the apex Court, while considering the circumstances under which a subordinate legislation could be challenged, has held that violation of fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution of India and violation of any provision of the Constitution of India or manifest arbitrariness and unreasonableness to an extent where the court might well say that the Legislature never intended to give authority to make such Rules and held that the decision would clearly be applicable to the present case on hand. It was also noticed that there were graduates as well as non-graduates working in various categories of posts and no distinction was made in the past when they were promoted to the higher cadre and that no Degree qualification or a Law degree was prescribed in respect of feeder posts and only Group-D employees, Second Division Assistants, First Division Assistants, Senior Assistants, Stenographers, Judgment Writers and Senior Judgement Writers were required to possess a Degree or a Law Degree qualification and the present requirement, as prescribed, would run counter to the decision of the apex court in the case of State of Mysore versus Krishna Murthy, AIR 1973 SC 1146 , wherein it has been held that two classes of members of the same service, belonging to the same cadre for the purpose of creating a difference in promotional opportunities would clearly violate Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. It was further held that the power to make Rules under Article 309 of the Constitution of India cannot be used to validate unconstitutional discrimination in promotional chance of Government Servants, who belonged to the same category. Thus, the learned Single Judge has held that the respective persons in the categories mentioned were appointed under the 1973 Rules and belonged to the same category and they cannot be discriminated by insisting upon possession of a higher Degree qualification, which apparently is impossible to be achieved within the period prescribed, in view of other restrictions that are imposed under the aforementioned Circular and has proceeded to answer Points 4 and 6 in the affirmative. The next point as regards the effect of the amended Rules, the learned Single Judge has found that there was no controversy between the parties insofar as the promotions effected in respect of vacancies that arose prior to the amendment. The next point as regards the effect of the amended Rules, the learned Single Judge has found that there was no controversy between the parties insofar as the promotions effected in respect of vacancies that arose prior to the amendment. This is apparent from the record and placing reliance on the decisions of the apex Court in Y.V. Rangaiah versus J. Sreenivasa Rao, (1983) 3 SCC 284 ; Arjun Singh Rathore versus B.N. Chaturvedi, (2007) 11 SCC 605 and State of Rajasthan versus R. Dayal, (1997) 10 SCC 419 , it is held that the petitioners cannot be deprived of being considered for promotion by virtue of the Proviso now substituted to the 1973 Rules, whereas, on the contrary, the posts which the petitioners would have occupied by way of promotion under the original Rules, have now been conferred on persons who are promoted pursuant to the 2009 Rules. This, according to the learned Single Judge, is giving effect to the Rules with retrospective effect in respect of vacancies, which arose prior to the coming into force of the 2009 Rules. He has cited with approval, the opinion of the author N. S. Bindra in the "Interpretation of Statutes", Eighth Edition, at Page 776, to the effect that every Statute which took away or impaired vested rights acquired under existing laws, or which created a new obligation or imposed a new duty or attached a new disability would be presumed to be intended not to have a retrospective effect. Therefore, the learned Single Judge has held that the amendment has taken away not only the rights of the petitioners under the existing Rules, but has also deprived them of the benefit of stepping up of pay, Time Bound Increments and Senior Scale of Pay, as all of them would have been eligible for promotion, but for the amendment. Insofar as Point No.7 is concerned, in relation to the justification of the orders of promotion, the learned Single Judge has held that persons belonging to Group-D category, though did not possess a Degree qualification, had been promoted and some of them, who were juniors to the petitioners, were also promoted to the next cadre by virtue of the qualification prescribed. In respect of one official, it was noticed that the requirement of a Degree qualification was relaxed as a one time measure and this has prompted the learned Judge to observe that if such relaxation is given to an employee, as a one time measure, it could be considered in respect of other petitioners as well, who, for various reasons, economical or otherwise, were not fortunate enough to have secured a Degree or a Law Degree when they entered the service, several decades ago. Insofar as Point No. 8 is concerned, the learned Judge has examined the procedure followed in bringing about the amendment and notices that in the preamble to the Gazette Notification, by which, the amended Rules were published in the Gazette, it is stated that the Chief Justice had secured the approval of the Governor of Karnataka, insofar as the amended Rules are concerned. But, it was conceded by the learned Counsel appearing for the respondents 1 and 2 therein, before the learned Single Judge, that the Draft Rules, which were sent for approval of the Governor, were returned without any such approval. In that light, the learned Single Judge has observed that if the Draft Rules, on being published in the Gazette, were to be taken as the Rules having come into force in view of the provisions of the General Clauses Act, the effect as per Rule 26 would be repeal of the 1973 Rules. If this is to be the position, then the question of bringing amendment to the 1973 Rules would not arise. Therefore, the learned Single Judge has held that the Draft Rules as well as the amended Rules were not in consonance with the well established canons of law and the precepts and practice that is to be followed in respect of amending an Act and accordingly has allowed all the writ petitions, holding that the Proviso as well as the Explanation to the amended Rules of 2009, requiring higher qualifications are to be quashed and the orders of promotion granted to the named respondents also were quashed. It was further held that the quota restriction for Senior Judgment Writers to the post of Assistant Registrars was not considered for the time being and it was left open. The Chief Justice was directed to redo the entire process of promotion of the posts in accordance with the 1973 Rules. It was further held that the quota restriction for Senior Judgment Writers to the post of Assistant Registrars was not considered for the time being and it was left open. The Chief Justice was directed to redo the entire process of promotion of the posts in accordance with the 1973 Rules. It is that which is under challenge in the present appeals. 11. The learned Senior Advocate, Shri. Basavaprabhu S. Patil, appearing for the Counsel for the appellants contends as follows:- In terms of Article 215 of the Constitution of India, the High Court is a Court of Record. Article 229 provides that the Chief Justice of a High Court or such other judge or officer of the High Court as he may direct, shall appoint officers and servants of a High Court. In terms of Clause - (2) of Article 229, subject to the provisions of any law made by the State Legislature, the conditions of service of officers and servants of a High Court shall be such as may be prescribed by Rules made by the Chief Justice. The Rules made in Clause - (2) of Article 229 of the Constitution of India, insofar as they may relate to salaries, allowances, leave or pension, would require the approval of the Governor of the State. In exercise of the power thus conferred by Articles 229(1) and (2) of the Constitution of India, the Chief Justice of the High Court of Karnataka, had made the 1973 Rules. Rule 6 thereof prescribes that there shall be such number of permanent and temporary posts of employees in the categories in Group -A,B,C and D, as is specified in the first three columns of Schedule-II to the Rules. The rates of scales of pay of the said posts are as specified in the fourth column of the said Schedule. The Chief Justice may amend Schedule-II by increasing or decreasing the number of posts. Rule-7 provides for recruitment to a post or class of posts as enumerated in Schedule-III. The Chief Justice has the power to amend the method of recruitment by general or special order. Under Rule 8, the qualification required for appointment to the various categories of posts shall be such as the Chief Justice may by general or special order specify. Rule-7 provides for recruitment to a post or class of posts as enumerated in Schedule-III. The Chief Justice has the power to amend the method of recruitment by general or special order. Under Rule 8, the qualification required for appointment to the various categories of posts shall be such as the Chief Justice may by general or special order specify. In terms of Rule 11, in respect of such matters pertaining to conditions of service of employees of the High Court, for which no provision has been made, Rules and orders for the time being in force, applicable to servants holding the posts in the Government of Karnataka would also regulate the conditions of service of the employees of the High Court service, subject to such modifications or exceptions, if any, as the Chief Justice may specify, except the rules relating to salaries, allowances, leave or pension, which the Chief Justice may do so with the previous approval of the Governor. It is stated that with a view to provide speedy and effective dispensation of justice and to enhance the quality and efficiency of service as well as to provide promotional opportunities to employees, Draft Rules entitled the High Court of Karnataka Service (Conditions of Service and Recruitment) Rules, 2009 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Draft Rules' for brevity) were framed, proposing to repeal the 1973 Rules and to substitute the same with the Draft Rules as approved by the Chief Justice on 25.3.2009. The Draft Rules contemplated creation of new posts, prescription of a higher educational qualification for appointment and promotion to various existing posts and this was in line with the prevailing rules applicable in respect of other High Courts in the country. Since the Draft Rules contemplate the creation of new posts and increase in the number of existing posts, in view of the financial implications, the same were also sent to the Governor for approval and were published in the Karnataka Gazette dated 13.5.2009. Pursuant to which, objections were received from various quarters and the said objections were placed before a committee constituted for recommending amendments to the Draft Rules. The Committee, at its meeting on 18.8.2009 suggested certain modifications. This was accepted by the Chief Justice and the modified Rules were also sent to the Government for approval. After further exchange of correspondence, the Government did not accept the proposal to create additional posts. The Committee, at its meeting on 18.8.2009 suggested certain modifications. This was accepted by the Chief Justice and the modified Rules were also sent to the Government for approval. After further exchange of correspondence, the Government did not accept the proposal to create additional posts. Therefore, the Draft Rules did not receive the approval of the Governor. It is however stated that by an order dated 24.2.2009 published in the Karnataka Gazette on 26.2.2009, an amendment was issued to the 1973 Rules entitled the High Court of Karnataka Service (Conditions of Service and Recruitment) (I Amendment) Rules 2009, seeking to amend the method of recruitment contained in Schedule-III applicable to the posts of Senior Judgment Writers, Judgment Writers, Stenographers and Second Division Assistants. The Senior Advocate would draw attention to the particulars of the amendment which is reproduced here below in a tabular form:- Sl. Method of recruitment Method of Recruitment as Cadre No. under Principal Rules Amended 1) 60% of the total strength of Senior Judgment Writers shall be recruited by promotion by selection from the cadre of Judgment Writers working in the High Court office on the basis of a test conducted for the purpose, giving the weightage for seniority and service records as prescribed; provided that they shall satisfy the following conditions here under: a) They shall possess Law Degree from the recognised university orequivalent examination. Explanation:1. The present members who are working as Senior Judgment Writers and who do not possess the required qualification, shall qualify themselves, without affecting the regular work, with prior permission of Honourable the Chief Justice, 13A within a period of five years, failing which they shall not be entitled for further promotion. The permission is not automatic, but subject to the interest of the institution. Such permission shall not take away the Rights of the senior employees and does not confer the undue privileges on the junior employees. The qualification obtained without following the above norms would not be taken into consideration, till they come within the zone of consideration. Note:- 1) For securing By promotion by selection from the cadre of Judgment Writers working Senior Judgment in the High Court office on the basis of a test Writer conducted for the purpose, giving the weight for seniority and service records as prescribed. minimum qualification prescribed for this cadre within stipulated time, the permission may be liberally granted. Note:- 1) For securing By promotion by selection from the cadre of Judgment Writers working Senior Judgment in the High Court office on the basis of a test Writer conducted for the purpose, giving the weight for seniority and service records as prescribed. minimum qualification prescribed for this cadre within stipulated time, the permission may be liberally granted. 2) The period of time prescribed for securing minimum qualification (i.e., five years) starts from the date of permission. 3) If no eligible candidate is available for promotion, such vacant post may be filled up by direct recruitment. 4) The candidate shall possess a Certificate Course in Word Processing or equivalent. 2) Remaining 40% of the posts shall be recruited by Direct Recruitment by Selection (after calling application and holding a competitive test and interview) and the Judgment Writers as well as Stenographers working in the establishment of the High Court of Karnataka /Subordinate Courts are also eligible for the Direct Recruitment, provided they shall obtain necessary permission from the Competent Authority. Minimum Qualifications (for Direct Recruitment) 1. Must possess Degree in Law from the recognized University or equivalent examination and, 2. i) Senior Grade examination in English Shorthand in First Class; or the Proficiency Grade Examination in English Shorthand; and ii) Senior Grade examination in Type writing in English conducted by the Department of Public Instruction of Karnataka Secondary Education Board or equivalent examination. 3. Certificate in Computer Word Processing or equivalent. Note: 1) Preference will be given to those candidates who possess the qualification of Senior Grade examination in Typewriting and Shorthand in Kannada Language also. 2) The procedure for conducting test which was followed previously for the promotion to the cadres of Senior Judgment Writers shall also be followed for the Direct Recruitment to the said posts. 1) 60% of the total strength shall be recruited by promotion by selection from among: a)Stenographers working in the High Court Establishment who have put in not less than one year of service as such; or b) Judgment Writers or Selection Grade Stenographers working in Sub-ordinate Courts on the basis of a test conducted for the purpose, giving due weight for inter-seniority and service records as prescribed. Provided that they shall possess Degree from a recognised university orequivalent examination. NOTE: Preference will be given for Law Graduates. Explanation:1. Provided that they shall possess Degree from a recognised university orequivalent examination. NOTE: Preference will be given for Law Graduates. Explanation:1. The present members who are working as Judgment Writers, who do not possess the required qualification shall qualify themselves without affecting the regular work with prior permission of Honourable the Chief Justice, within a Judgment Writer By promotion by selection from among:a) Stenographers working in the High Court Establishment who have put in not less than one year of service as such; or b) Judgment Writers or Selection Grade Stenographers working in Sub-ordinate Courts on the basis of a test conducted for the purpose, giving due weight for inter-period of five years, failing which they shall not be entitled for further promotion. The permission is not automatic, but subject to the interest of the Institution. Such permission shall not take away the Rights of the senior employees and does not confer the undue privileges on the junior employees. The qualification obtained without following the above norms would not be taken into consideration, till they come within the zone of consideration. Note: 1) For securing minimum qualification prescribed for this cadre within stipulated time, the permission may be liberally granted. 2) The period of time prescribed for securing minimum qualification (i.e., five years) starts from the date of permission. 3) If no eligible candidate is available for promotion, such vacant post may be filled up by direct recruitment. 4) The candidate shall possess a Certificate seniority and service Course in Word Processing records as prescribed. or equivalent. 2) Remaining 40% of posts shall be recruited by Direct Recruitment by Selection (after calling application and holding a competitive test and interview) Minimum Qualifications (For Direct Recruitment) 1) Must possess Degree from a recognized University or equivalent examination. NOTE: Preference will be given to the Law Graduates. 2) i) Senior Grade examination in English Shorthand in First Class; or the Proficiency Grade Examination in English Shorthand; and ii) Senior Grade examination in Typewriting in English conducted by the Department of Public Instruction of Karnataka Secondary Education Board or equivalent examination. 3) Certificate in Computer Word Processing orequivalent Note: 1) Preference will be given to those candidates who possess the qualification of Senior Grade examination in Typewriting and Shorthand in Kannada Language also. 3) Certificate in Computer Word Processing orequivalent Note: 1) Preference will be given to those candidates who possess the qualification of Senior Grade examination in Typewriting and Shorthand in Kannada Language also. 2) The procedure for conducting test which was followed previously for the promotion to the cadres of Senior Judgment Writers shall also be followed for the Direct Recruitment to the said posts. 3) For Direct Recruitment in service candidates may also compete. 1) By promotion by selection from amongst Typists who have passed Senior Grade examination in both Typewriting and Shorthand conducted by the Department of Public Instruction of the Karnataka Secondary Education Board or equivalent examination working on the establishment of the High Court or from amongst the Stenographers working in the Subordinate Courts, or by both, on the basis of a Test conducted for the purpose, due weight being given to seniority and service records, as prescribed: provided that Steno- (a) By promotion by selection from amongst Typists who have passed Senior Grade in both Typewriting and Shorthand conducted by the Department of Public Instruction of the Karnataka Secondary Education Board or equivalent examination working on the establishment of the High Court or from amongst the Stenographers working in the Subordinate Courts, or by both, on the basis of a Test conducted for the purpose, due weight being given to seniority and service records, as prescribed; or(b) By direct recruitment by selection (after calling for applications and holding a competitive test and interview). Minimum Qualifications: (for they shall possess Degree from a recognized university or equivalent examination. Explanation:1. The present members who are working as Stenographers and who do not possess the required qualification, shall qualify themselves without affecting the regular work with prior permission of Honourable the Chief Justice, within a period of five years, failing which they shall not be entitled for further promotion. The permission is not automatic, but subject to the interest of the Institution. Such permission shall not take way the Rights of the senior employees and does not confer the undue privileges on the junior employees. The qualification obtained without following the above norms would not be taken into consideration, till they come within the zone of consideration. Note: 1) For securing minimum qualification prescribed for this cadre within stipulated time, the permission may be liberally granted. 2) The period of time grap her direct recruitment) 1. The qualification obtained without following the above norms would not be taken into consideration, till they come within the zone of consideration. Note: 1) For securing minimum qualification prescribed for this cadre within stipulated time, the permission may be liberally granted. 2) The period of time grap her direct recruitment) 1. Must have passed the SSLC examination conducted by the Karnataka Secondary Education Board or equivalent examination. Note: Preference will be given to those who are graduates. Must have passed. 1. The Senior Grade Examination in English Shorthand in first class; or The Proficiency Grade Examination in English Shorthand; and 2. Senior Grade Examination in Typewriting in English conducted by the Department of Public Instruction of the Karnataka Secondary Education Board or equivalent qualification. prescribed for securing minimum qualification (i.e., five years) starts from the date of permission. 3) If no eligible candidate is available for promotion, such vacant post may be filled up by direct recruitment. 4) The candidate shall possess a Certificate Course in Word Processing or equivalent. Or 2) By direct recruitment by selection (after calling for applications and holding a competitive test and interview) Minimum Qualifications (For Direct Recruitment) 1. Must possess a Degree from a recognised University or equivalent examination. 2. The Senior Grade examination in English Shorthand with 60% of aggregate marks; or The Proficiency Grade Examination in English Shorthand; and 3. Senior Grade examination in Typewriting in English conducted by the Department of Public Instruction of the Karnataka Secondary Education Board or equivalent examination. 4. Certificate in Computer Word Processing or equivalent. Note: 1) Preference will be given to those candidates who possess the qualification of Senior Grade examination in Typewriting and Shorthand in Kannada Language. 2) The procedure for conducting test which was followed previously for the promotion to the cadres of Stenographers shall also be followed for the Direct Recruitment to the said posts. (a) 50% by direct recruitment by selection after calling for application and interviewing the applicants. The minimum qualification for direct recruitment shall be a (a)50% by direct degree in Science / Arts / 19. recruitment by Commerce / Business selection after calling Management of a for application and recognized University with interviewing the minimum of 55% marks in applicants. (a) 50% by direct recruitment by selection after calling for application and interviewing the applicants. The minimum qualification for direct recruitment shall be a (a)50% by direct degree in Science / Arts / 19. recruitment by Commerce / Business selection after calling Management of a for application and recognized University with interviewing the minimum of 55% marks in applicants. The the aggregate for minimum qualification candidate belonging to for direct recruitment General category and as hall be a degree of a minimum of 45% marks in recognised University the aggregate to Schedule with minimum of 55% Caste and Schedule marks in the aggregate Tribes.(b) 50% Promotion for candidate belonging to General Category and a minimum of 45% marks in the aggregate to Schedule Caste and Schedule Tribes.(b) 25% Promotion on the basis of seniority-cum-merit from the cadre of Group D officials working in the High Court Establishment and who have passed degree examination of recognised University and who have put in not less than one year of service. (c) 25% by promotion on the basis of Second Divisionseniority-cum-merit from the cadre of Assistant Group D officials working in the High Court Establishment and who have passed the SSLC or Equivalent examination and who have put in not less than 3 years of Service. (d) If any vacancy cannot be filled up by promotion for want of suitable candidate from the cadre of Group D Officials possessing degree qualification, the same shall be filled up by promoting suitable candidate from the cadre of Group D Officials Possessing SSLC or equivalent qualification. on the basis of seniority-cum-merit from the cadre of Group D officials working in the High Court Establishment and who have passed degree examination of recognized University and who have put in not less than two years of service:. Explanation:1. The present members who are working as Second Division Assistants and who do not possess the required qualification, shall qualify themselves, without affecting the regular work, with prior permission of Honourable the Chief Justice, within a period of five years, failing which they shall not be entitled for further promotion. The permission is not automatic, but subject to the interest of the Institution. Such permission shall not take away the Rights of the senior employees and does not confer the undue privileges on the junior employees. The permission is not automatic, but subject to the interest of the Institution. Such permission shall not take away the Rights of the senior employees and does not confer the undue privileges on the junior employees. The qualification obtained without following the above norms would not be taken into consideration, till they come within the zone of consideration. Note:- a) For securing (e) If any vacancy minimum qualification meant for Group D prescribed for this cadre Officials cannot be filed within stipulated time, the up by promotion for permission may be liberally want of suitable granted. candidate the same shall be filled by direct 2) The period of time recruitment. prescribed for securing minimum qualification (i.e., five years) starts from the date of permission. 3) If no eligible candidate is available for promotion, such vacant post may be filled up by direct recruitment. There was yet another Notification dated 28.5.2009 duly published in the Karnataka Gazette entitled the High Court of Karnataka Service (Conditions of Service and Recruitment)(II Amendment) Rules, 2009, whereby Schedule-III of the 1973 Rules were further amended as regards the method of recruitment to the posts of Assistant Registrars / Assistant Registrar -Protocol and a further Notification similarly entitled as the High Court of Karnataka Service (Conditions of Service and Recruitment) (III Amendment) Rules, 2009, which brought about the following changes as indicated in the tabular form: SI. Method of recruitment Method of Recruitment as Cadre No. under Principal Rules Amended By promotion on the basis of seniority-cum- efficiency from the cadres of Section Officers, Court Officers, and Senior Judgment Writers(i) The quote of Senior Judgment Writers has been increased from 5 to 6 Assistant Registrar / 6. Assistant Registrar (Protocol) (ii) The ratio between Court Officers and Section Officers for promotions to the remaining 18 posts shall be maintained at 2:1 respectively for a period of three years, the ratio shall stand reverted to 1:1 between Court Officers and Section Officers. (iii) Cadre review shall be done at the end of three years. (Out of the total number of posts of Assistant Registrar, 1/5th posts shall be reserved for being filled up from the cadres of Senior Judgment Writers. (iii) Cadre review shall be done at the end of three years. (Out of the total number of posts of Assistant Registrar, 1/5th posts shall be reserved for being filled up from the cadres of Senior Judgment Writers. However, initially the existing and future vacancies shall be filled up in the ratio 2:2:1 from the cadres of Section Officers, Court Officers and Senior Judgment Writers, respectively, till the quote reserved for senior judgment writers is realised and thereafter whenever a post held by an incumbent coming from the cadre of senior judgment writers fall vacant, such vacancy shall be filled up only from the cadre of Senior Judgment Writers. The other vacancies shall be filled up from the cadres By promotion by selection basis of Merit-cum-efficiency from the cadre of Section Officers, Court Officers and Senior Judgment Writers who possess Degree in Law from the University established under Law in the ratio of 2:1:1.If no eligible candidate is available among the section officers/ court officers/ senior judgment Writers, by deputation among the Judicial Officers in the cadre of Civil Judge (Senior Dvn.). Explanation: 1. The present members who do not possess Law Degree, shall qualify themselves without affecting the regular work with prior permission of Honourable Chief Justice, within a period of five years, failing which they shall not be entitled for further promotion. The permission is not automatic but subject to the interest of the Institution. Such permission shall not take away the Rights of the senior employees and does not confer the undue privileges on the junior employees. The qualification obtained without following the above norms would not be taken into consideration, till they come within the zone of consideration. Note:-1) For securing minimum qualification prescribed for this cadre within stipulated time, the permission may be liberally granted. of Section Officers and 2) The period of time prescribed Court Officers by for securing minimum rotation. qualification (i.e., five years) starts from the date of NOTE: The seniority of permission. Senior Judgment Writers posted as Section Officers of Judicial Wing Typing Pool, Paper Book Section and copying Branches I and II, if any, shall be counted for purpose of seniority in the cadre of Senior Judgment Writers. qualification (i.e., five years) starts from the date of NOTE: The seniority of permission. Senior Judgment Writers posted as Section Officers of Judicial Wing Typing Pool, Paper Book Section and copying Branches I and II, if any, shall be counted for purpose of seniority in the cadre of Senior Judgment Writers. There were also Fourth and Fifth Notifications dated 28.5.2009, 29.7.2009 and 30.7.2009 pertaining to the posts of Assistant Court Officers, Section Officers, Senior Assistants and First Division Assistants and Audit Clerks, which are also reproduced hereunder:- Method of recruitment Method of Recruitment as Sl. No. Cadre Name under Amended Principal Rules (a) By promotion on the basis of seniority-cum- efficiency from the cadre of Senior Assistants, Senior Statistical Assistant, and Audit Superintendents borne on the establishment of the High Court on the basis of length of service in that particular cadre. Provided that the post of Section Officers of Judicial Wing Typing Pool, Paper Book Section 9. Officer Section and Copying Branches I and II may be filled up by posting senior-most of the Senior Judgment Writers, (method of recruitment for Section Officers except (i) Section Officer, Judicial Wing Typing Pool (ii)Section Officer, Paper Book Section (iii)Section Officer, Copying Branch-I, (iv)Section Officer, Copying Branch-II). (b)By transfer of a Senior Judgment Writer working in the High Court, (method of recruitment of Section Officers of Judicial Wing Typing Pool, Paper Book Section, Copying Branch Iand Copying Branch- II). (c) Initially the posts of Senior Protocol Officers which are upgraded as Section Officers (Protocol) shall be filled up by shifting the lien of Sriyuths D.R.Balakrishna and K.S. Ragavendra Rao, By promotion on the basis of seniority-cum efficiency from the cadre of Senior Assistants borne on the establishment of the High Court on the basis of length of service in that particular cadre. Provided that they shall possess a Degree from any University established by Law in India or equivalent. Explanation: 1. The present members who do not possess Degree shall qualify themselves, without affecting the regular work, with prior permission of Honourable the Chief Justice, within a period of five years, failing which they shall not be entitled for further promotion. The permission is not automatic, but subject to the interest of the Institution. Such permission shall not take away the Rights of the senior employees and does not confer the undue privileges on the junior employees. The permission is not automatic, but subject to the interest of the Institution. Such permission shall not take away the Rights of the senior employees and does not confer the undue privileges on the junior employees. The Section Officers to these upgraded posts of section officers (Protocol). Note:- (a) The posts of Section Officers (Protocol) shall be upgraded to that of an Assistant Registrar when an Officer in the Cadre of Section Officer of all Sections who has put in equal or lesser number of years of service in that than the Section Officers (Protocol) gets promotion as Assistant Registrar, the incumbents shall continue in the upgraded posts of Section Officers (Protocol) as long as they hold the said posts of Section Officers (Protocol) shall stand downgraded to the original cadre. (b) Initially the upgradation shall be for a period of 2 years and the approval shall be obtained for further continuance of the upgraded posts of Section Officers (Protocol), if the incumbents continue in the upgraded posts for more than 2 years. By transfer of Section qualification obtained without following the above norms would not be taken into consideration, till they come within the zone of consideration. Note:- 1) For securing minimum qualification prescribed for this cadre within stipulated time, the permission may be liberally granted. 2) The period of time prescribed for securing minimum qualification (i.e. five years) starts from the date of permission. Officers of all sections having aptitude in protocol work, (methodof recruitment to the post of Section Officer(Protocol). By promotion on the basis ofseniority-cum-efficiency from the cadre of First Division Assistants, Audit Clerks, Assistant Librarians working inthe High Court. Provided theyshall possess a Degree from any university established byLaw in India or equivalent.Explanation:1. The present members who are working as Senior Assistants and who do 14. Senior Assistant By promotion on thebasis of seniority-cum-efficiency from the cadre of First Division Assistants, Accountants, Audit Clerks, Assistant not possess the required qualification, shall qualify themselves, without affecting the regular work, with prior permission of Honourable the Chief Justice, within a period of five years, failing which they shall not be entitled for further promotion. Librarians and Junior Statistical Assistant working in the HighCourt. The permission is not automatic, but subject to the interest of the Institution. Librarians and Junior Statistical Assistant working in the HighCourt. The permission is not automatic, but subject to the interest of the Institution. Such permission shall not take away the Rights of the senior employees and does not confer the undue privileges on the junior employees. The qualification obtained without following the above norms would not be taken into consideration, till they come within the zone of consideration. Note:- 1) For securing minimum qualification prescribed for this cadre within stipulated time, the permission may be liberally First Division Assistants 15. and Audit Clerks By promotion from the cadres of SDAs and Typists in the ratio of 6:4 (6 SDAs and 4 Typists) as far as possible; Provided that, an official of one of the above two cadres shall not be given promotion to the cadre of First Division Assistants / Audit Clerks, earlier to the promotion of the officials of the other cadre who had become members of that cadre granted. 2) The period of time prescribed for securing minimum qualification (i.e., five years) starts from the date of permission. By promotion from the cadres of SDAs and Typists in the ratio of 6:4 (6 SDAs and 4 Typists) as far as possible; Provided that, an official of one of the above two cadres shall not be given promotion to the cadre of First Division Assistants/ Audit Clerks, earlier to the promotion of the officials of the other cadre who had become members of that cadre prior to the date on which the former official became a member of his / her cadre. Provided they shall possess a Degree from any university established by Law in India and Certificate Course in Computer Application. Explanation: 1. The present members who are working as First Division Assistants and who do not possess the required qualification, shall qualify themselves, without affecting the regular work, with prior permission of Honourable the Chief Justice within a period of five years, failing which they shall not be entitled for further promotion. The permission is not automatic, but subject to the interest of the Institution. Such permission shall not take away the Rights of the prior to the date on senior employees and does not which former official confer the undue privileges on the became a member of junior employees. The his/ her cadre. The permission is not automatic, but subject to the interest of the Institution. Such permission shall not take away the Rights of the prior to the date on senior employees and does not which former official confer the undue privileges on the became a member of junior employees. The his/ her cadre. qualification obtained without following the above norms would not be taken into consideration, till they come within the zone of consideration. Note:- 1) For securing minimum qualification prescribed for this cadre within stipulated time, the permission may be liberally granted. 2) The period of time prescribed for securing minimum qualification (i.e., five years) starts from the date of permission. Note: For the posts of Audit Clerks preference will be given to the officials who possess Bachelor's Degree in Commerce. The learned Senior Advocate would contend that the aforesaid amendments were aimed at securing better efficiency and better functioning of the court. This was made having regard to the nature of work performed by the respective officers. The stipulation of a Law Degree, for instance, for the post of Assistant Registrar or a University degree for different posts is on par with identical stipulations in Service Rules applicable to other High Courts, such as the High Court of Kerala, the High Court of Andhra Pradesh and the High Court of Madras and the stipulation of a University Degree for promotion to the cadre of Second Division Assistants, is in line with the qualification that were prescribed for direct recruitment to the said cadre. Though the Draft Rules, aforesaid, also contemplated these stipulations and remained with the Government without being approved, this did not impede the Chief Justice to amend the Principal Rules since the amendments did not relate to creation of new posts and increase in the number of existing posts, which alone, would have required the approval of the Governor. The learned Senior Advocate would contend that the opinion expressed by the learned Single Judge on the first point for consideration namely, whether the power given to the Chief Justice under Article 229(2) of the Constitution of India could be exercised to validate unconstitutional discrimination, proceeds on a presumption that there existed an unconstitutional discrimination. The learned Senior Advocate would contend that the opinion expressed by the learned Single Judge on the first point for consideration namely, whether the power given to the Chief Justice under Article 229(2) of the Constitution of India could be exercised to validate unconstitutional discrimination, proceeds on a presumption that there existed an unconstitutional discrimination. The learned Single Judge had ignored the contention of the appellants that the stipulation of a higher educational qualification for promotion was to bring in more efficiency in the working of the establishment of the High Court and this definitely had a nexus with the said objective and did not result in any discrimination. He would hence contend that the very point no.1 framed for consideration is erroneous and did not arise at all. The learned Single Judge had called for the records, which indeed reflected the background and the circumstances warranting the above amendments and the said records have been completely ignored and negated in the learned Single Judge concluding that there was no reason assigned as to why there was insistence of a higher educational qualification. The obvious reason being that, it aimed at securing a more efficient and better functioning of the court, which was not taken into consideration. It was also overlooked that the State Government having declined a critical need for increase of the existing number of posts, it had a telling effect on the efficiency and speedy discharge of work and hence, the prescription of a higher educational qualification was made with due regard to the nature of work performed by the respective officers and which had been adopted uniformly by several other High Courts as already stated. The learned Senior Advocate would further contend that the learned Single Judge has not confined himself to examining the decision making process, which alone is the scope of judicial review, but, has proceeded to consider the merits of the decision and has substituted his own opinion, as to the nature of work performed by various categories of employees, in concluding that the nature of work executed by them was purely clerical and not managerial. The further subjective opinion that has been expressed was that since the work of the High Court has been carried on from 1973 without the respective employees possessing a higher degree qualifications that are now prescribed by way of amendment, the higher educational qualifications prescribed have no nexus with the object sought to be achieved. This assertion of the learned Single Judge ignores the primary circumstance that the amendments were in the nature of subordinate legislation under a rule making power and therefore, in the absence of any statutory requirement, the learned Single Judge proceeding to hold that no specific reasons were assigned by the competent authority as to what higher educational qualification is insisted upon is clearly erroneous. If the said reasoning is allowed to stand, it would follow that any amendment, stipulating prescription of a higher education is foreclosed. The reasoning of the learned Single Judge is not based on any material that was available before the court, except the pleadings of the petitioners, in concluding that a higher educational qualification was not necessary for the several categories of employees. The learned Single Judge had also ignored that there was no right created by a mere chance of promotion. The reasoning that some of the employees may not be able to attain the prescribed qualification and the reference to the method of recruitment which contemplates permission by the Chief Justice for acquiring higher educational qualification not being automatic and that there was no guarantee of such permission being granted etc., overlooks the fact that there is only a reduction in the chance of acquiring such qualification and does not impinge upon any vested right of the employees. Amendments I to V could not have been invalidated in view of the Circular dated 24.8.2010, which prescribes guidelines regarding grant of permission by the Chief Justice to the employees to pursue further studies, when neither the circular nor the specific exercise of power thereunder, having been impugned. The learned Single Judge has proceeded on an exaggerated hypothesis as to the mechanism of employees seeking permission and the Chief Justice granting permission to pursue higher studies, as being impracticable. The learned Single Judge has proceeded on an exaggerated hypothesis as to the mechanism of employees seeking permission and the Chief Justice granting permission to pursue higher studies, as being impracticable. The learned Single Judge has proceeded to hold that the Draft Rules did not come into force at all though the learned Single Judge was informed and it was taken on record that the Draft Rules did not come into force at all and the learned Single Judge further held that if the Draft Rules, on being published in the Gazette are taken as having come into force, the effect would be the repeal of the 1973 Rules. Therefore, the question of amendments to the 1973 Rules would not arise. This, on the face of it, is not tenable. The further opinion that the procedure followed for Draft Rules as well as the amended 2009 Rules is not in consonance with the well-established cannons of law, is stated without indicating the specific requirement of law that was not complied with. It is contended that the learned Single Judge having proceeded to quash the proviso as well as the explanation to the amended Rules, requiring higher qualifications, the consequent direction to re-do the promotions to all the posts in accordance with the 1973 Rules without reference to the amended Rules of 2009, is wholly improper and the further direction to redo the entire process of promotions within a fixed time frame is without reference to the prerogative of the employer to decide whether to confer such promotions or not. Further, the observation that the ratio provided for direct recruitment as per the amended Rules for the post of Judgment Writers and Senior Judgment Writers could not be addressed, since all the direct recruitees are not parties and then for the learned Single Judge to proceed to hold that as the court has directed the entire process to be repeated in accordance with the 1973 Rules, no further clarification was necessary, is also inconsistent as the amendment relating to 40% ratio provided for the direct recruitment not having been disturbed, it is incongruous to negate the said amendment. The learned Senior Advocate while referring to a large number of decisions would submit that though the learned Single Judge has referred to the said decisions, the ratio laid down therein has not been adverted to and no reasons are forthcoming as to how the same would not apply to the present case on hand. 12. In the light of the above findings of the learned Single Judge and the contentions now put-forth, the points that arise for consideration by this bench would be as follows:- 1) Whether the above amended Rules, framed in exercise of power under Article 229(2) of the Constitution of India, are arbitrary and violative of the Constitution of India? 2) Whether the prescription of higher educational qualifications under the amended Rules, permanently disables the several classes of employees for being considered for promotion, and is hence violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India? 3) Whether the reasoning of the learned Single Judge that owing to the nature of duties to be discharged by the employees, the prescription of higher educational qualifications, not being reasonable as there was no nexus with the object sought to be achieved, is bad in law? 4) Whether the impugned order runs counter to the law with reference to the several authorities cited by the learned Counsel for the appellants? In considering Point no.1 above, it has been contended that the learned Single Judge could not examine the wisdom behind the object sought to be achieved by the amended Rules. The reasonableness of such subordinate legislation would not depend upon the court's own view, under legislative policy. It has also been contended that a mere chance of promotion does not create a vested right in the employees. Therefore, the very petitions were not maintainable. It has also been contended that the prescription of a educational qualification for promotion to a higher post is a valid and reasonable criterion and the learned Single Judge's subjective opinion that the nature of work involved did not call for such higher educational qualification is a blatant substitution of his opinion for that of the competent authority. Further, the reasoning of the learned Single Judge that, the mechanism provided under the amended Rules to enable the employees to acquire the requisite educational qualification to be eligible for promotion, results in the same being unfairly trashed, as being unworkable. 13. Further, the reasoning of the learned Single Judge that, the mechanism provided under the amended Rules to enable the employees to acquire the requisite educational qualification to be eligible for promotion, results in the same being unfairly trashed, as being unworkable. 13. Reliance is placed on the following authorities:- (a) Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education versus Paritosh and others, (1984) 4 SCC 27 It is laid down in the said decision as follows:- "….. whether a rule or regulation or other type of statutory instrument - is in excess of the power of subordinate legislation conferred on the delegate has to be determined with reference only to the specific provisions contained in the relevant statute conferring the power to make the rule, regulation, etc. and also the object and purpose of the Act as can be gathered from the various provisions of the enactment. It would be wholly wrong for the Court to substitute its own opinion for that of the Legislature or its delegate as to what principle or policy would best serve the objects and purposes of the Act and to sit in judgment over the wisdom and effectiveness or otherwise of the policy laid down by the regulation-making body and declare a regulation to be ultra vires merely on the ground that, in the view of the Court, the impugned provisions will not help to serve the object and purpose of the Act. xxxxxxxx 21.) The legal position is now well-established that even a bye-law cannot be struck down by the Court on the ground of unreasonableness merely because the Court thinks that it goes further than "is necessary" or that it does not incorporate certain provisions which, in the opinion of the Court, would have been fair and wholesome. The Court cannot say that a bye-law is unreasonable merely because the Judges do not approve of it. Unless it can be said that a bye-law is manifestly unjust, capricious, inequitable, or partial in its operation, it cannot be invalidated by the Court on the ground of unreasonableness. The responsible representative body entrusted with the power to make bye-laws must ordinarily be presumed to know what is necessary, reasonable, just and fair". (b) Union of India and another versus Azadi Bachao Andolan and another, AIR 2004 SC 1107 This decision also lays down the law to the same effect as in Paritosh supra. The responsible representative body entrusted with the power to make bye-laws must ordinarily be presumed to know what is necessary, reasonable, just and fair". (b) Union of India and another versus Azadi Bachao Andolan and another, AIR 2004 SC 1107 This decision also lays down the law to the same effect as in Paritosh supra. (c) Mohammad Shujat Ali and others versus Union of India and others, AIR 1974 SC 1 631 It is laid down that chances of promotion are not conditions of service and reduction in a mere chance of promotion does not constitute a variation in the condition of service. (d) State of Jammu and Kashmir versus Shiv Ram Sharma and others, AIR 1999 SC 2012 It is laid down that it is permissible for the employer to prescribe appropriate qualifications in the matter of appointment or promotion to different posts. The case put-forth on behalf of the respondents was that when they joined the service, the requirement of passing the Matriculation was not needed and while they were in service, such prescription was made was to their detriment. But, it is clear that there is no indefensible right in the respondents to claim promotion to a higher grade, to which qualification could be prescribed and there is no guarantee that those Rules framed by the employer in that behalf would always be favourable to them. Further, it is held that the principle of avoiding stagnation in a particular post would not be with reference to a particular individual employee, but with reference to the conditions of service, as such and that as long as the Rules provide for conditions of service making avenue for promotion to higher grades, there is no illegality. (e) Chandra Gupta, IFS versus The Secretary, Government of India, Ministry of Environment and Forests and others, AIR 1995 SC 44 On a review of the entire case-law, as regards the principle whether a mere chance of promotion would be a condition of service, the apex Court has laid down that it cannot be considered as a condition of service. (e) Chandra Gupta, IFS versus The Secretary, Government of India, Ministry of Environment and Forests and others, AIR 1995 SC 44 On a review of the entire case-law, as regards the principle whether a mere chance of promotion would be a condition of service, the apex Court has laid down that it cannot be considered as a condition of service. (f) The State of Jammu and Kashmir versus Triloki Nath Khosa and others, AIR 1974 SC 1 The learned Senior Advocate would draw attention to the following observations and the law laid down by a Constitutional Bench of the apex Court in the said decision to the following effect:- A Rule which classifies existing employees for promotional purposes undoubtedly operates on those who entered service before the framing of the rule which may have an effect on their promotional prospects, but it operates in future, in the sense that it governs the future right of promotion of those who are already in service. It will not affect a promotion already made or reduce a pay-scale already granted. The rule may provide for a classification by prescribing a qualitative standard and the measure of that standard being educational attainment and it is founded on such a consideration, which may suffer from a discriminatory vice is besides the point. But the rule cannot be assumed to be retrospective and then be struck down, for the reason that it may violate the guarantee of equal opportunity by extending its arm over the past. If rules governing conditions of service cannot ever operate to the prejudice of those who are already in service, the age of superannuation should remain immutable and schemes of compulsory retirement would be unworkable. It was held that it is well-settled that rights and obligations are required to be determined under statutory or constitutional authority, the exercise of which may not require reciprocal consent. The competent authority can alter the terms and conditions of its employees unilaterally. The plea of discrimination would require a petitioner to plead and prove through cogent and convincing evidence that every factor, which is relevant or material, had not been taken into account in formulating the classification. Though formal education may not always produce excellence, a classification founded on variant educational classifications would not be unjust on the face of it. The plea of discrimination would require a petitioner to plead and prove through cogent and convincing evidence that every factor, which is relevant or material, had not been taken into account in formulating the classification. Though formal education may not always produce excellence, a classification founded on variant educational classifications would not be unjust on the face of it. The discrimination is the essence of classification and does violence to the constitutional guarantee of equality only if it rests on an unreasonable basis. This is echoed in State of Bihar and others versus Bihar State +2 Lecturers Association and others, AIR 2007 SC 1948 , wherein it is held that Article 14 does not forbid classification. What it prohibits is discrimination and not classification. If otherwise, such classification is legally valid and reasonable. Attention is also drawn to T.R. Kothandaraman and others versus Tamil Nadu Water supply and Drainage Board and others, (1994) 6 SCC 282 , with particular reference to Paragraph -16 which reads as follows:- "16.) From what has been stated above, the following legal propositions emerge regarding educational qualification being a basis of classification relating to promotion in public service: 1) Higher educational qualification is a permissible basis of classification, acceptability of which will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. 2) Higher educational qualification can be the basis not only for barring promotion, but also for restricting the scope of promotion. 3) Restriction placed cannot however go to the extent of seriously jeopardising the chances of promotion. To decide this, the extent of restriction shall have also to be looked into to ascertain whether it is reasonable. Reasons for this are being indicated later". Attention is drawn to P. U. Joshi and others versus Accountant General Ahmedabad and others, (2003) 2 SCC 632 wherein it has been laid down that the State, by appropriate rules, is entitled to amalgamate departments, bifurcate departments, constitute different categories of posts or cadres, by undertaking further classification, abolishing the existing cadres etc. There is no right in any employee of the State to claim that the rules governing conditions of his service should be for ever the same as the one when he entered service for all purposes, except for ensuring or safeguarding rights or benefits already earned, acquired, or accrued at a particular point of time. There is no right in any employee of the State to claim that the rules governing conditions of his service should be for ever the same as the one when he entered service for all purposes, except for ensuring or safeguarding rights or benefits already earned, acquired, or accrued at a particular point of time. A Government Servant has no right to challenge the authority of the State to amend, alter and bring into force new Rules relating to the existing service. To the same effect, is the decision in Union of India versus Pushpa Rani and others, 2008 AIR SCW 6564 wherein the settled legal position has been reiterated to the effect that matters relating to creation and abolition of posts, formation and structuring or restructuring of cadres prescribing the source or mode of recruitment and qualifications, criteria of selection, evaluation of service records etc., fall within the exclusive domain of the employer. What steps should be taken for improving the efficiency of the administration is also the preserve of the employer. The power of judicial review can be exercised in such matters only if it is shown that the action of the employer is contrary to any constitutional or statutory provision or is patently arbitrary or is vitiated due to mala fides. The court cannot sit in appeal over the judgment of the employer and ordain that a particular post be filled by direct recruitment or promotion or by transfer. It has no role in determining the methodology of recruitment or laying down the criteria of selection. It cannot also make a comparative evaluation of the merit of the candidates. The court cannot suggest the manner in which the employer should structure or restructure the cadres for the purpose of improving efficiency of administration. In a more recent judgment in Transport and Dock Workers Union and others versus Mumbai port Trust and another, (2011) 2 SCC 575 , an attempt has been made by the apex Court to formulate the new test of social conduciveness as regards the doctrine of classification on the premise that "Article 14 of the Constitution of India is a slippery slope and a fine balancing act must be done by the court to avoid slipping down the slope" and has expounded as follows:- "22. Thus the classification would not violate the equality provision contained in Article 14 of the Constitution if it has a rational or reasonable basis. However, the question remains: what is "rational" or "reasonable"? These are vague words. What may be regarded as rational or reasonable by one Judge may not be so regarded by another. This could lead to chaos in the law. 23. Should this vagueness or uncertainty be allowed to remain so that Judges may have total freedom or discretion? We think not. The law should be, as far as possible, clear and certain so that people know where they stand and conduct their affairs accordingly. Also, if total freedom is given to Judges to decide according to their own individual notions and fancies the law will run riot. Hence, in our opinion an attempt should be made to clarify the meaning of the words "reasonable" or "rational". 24. Numerous decisions of this Court on Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution have no doubt held certain classifications to be reasonable while other classifications have been held to be unreasonable. But what is reasonable and what is unreasonable does not appear to have been discussed in depth by any decision of this Court, and no tests have been laid down in this connection. All that has been said is that it is not prudent or pragmatic to insist on a mathematically accurate classification covering diverse situations and all possible contingencies in view of the inherent complexities involved in society, vide State of Karnataka versus Mangalore University Non-Teaching Employees' Assn.10 SCC para 10, Ombalika Das versus Hulisa Shaw SCC para 11, etc. 25. In our opinion while it is true that a mathematically accurate classification cannot be done in this connection, there should be some broad guidelines. There may be several tests to decide whether a classification or differentiation is reasonable or not. One test which we are laying down and which will be useful in deciding this case, is: is it conducive to the functioning of modern society? If it is then it is certainly reasonable and rational. 26. In the present case, as we have noted, the purpose of the classification was to make the activities of the Port competitive and efficient. With the introduction of privatisation and setting up private ports, the respondent had to face competition. If it is then it is certainly reasonable and rational. 26. In the present case, as we have noted, the purpose of the classification was to make the activities of the Port competitive and efficient. With the introduction of privatisation and setting up private ports, the respondent had to face competition. Also, it wanted to rationalise its activities by having uniform working hours for its indoor and outdoor establishment employees, while at the same time avoiding labour disputes with employees appointed before 1.11.1996. In the modern world businesses have to face competition with other businesses. To do so they may have to have longer working hours and introduce efficiency, while avoiding labour disputes. Looked at from this point of view the classification in question is clearly reasonable as it satisfies the test laid down above. 27. We do not mean to say that the above is the only test to decide what is reasonable, but in our opinion it is certainly one of the tests to be adopted if we want our country to progress. We have to take a practical view of the matter instead of relying on abstract, a priori notions of equality". 14. On the other hand, of the several authorities cited by the learned counsel for the respondents, the following may have a bearing in application of the law to the present case on hand. In State of Mysore versus Krishna Murthy and others, AIR 1973 SC 1146 , which was a case pertaining to two persons, who had joined the Accounts Service in the Comptroller's office of the former Mysore State as First and Second Division Clerks. Consequent upon the abolition of the Comptroller's office, the petitioners began working as Accounts Clerks under the Chief Engineer, Public Works Department. In the year 1955, a Divisional Accounts' Cadre was created by the Mysore Government under the administrative control of the Chief Engineer. Both the petitioners passed the prescribed examinations and were absorbed in the Divisional Accounts' cadre. It appears that in April 1959, the Public Works Department Re-organisation Committee had recommended the transfer of the Public Works Department Accounts' Branch in toto, to the newly set up Controller of State Accounts. In accordance with this recommendation, the petitioners came under the administrative control of the Controller and the designation of their office was changed to that of "Accounts' Superintendent". In accordance with this recommendation, the petitioners came under the administrative control of the Controller and the designation of their office was changed to that of "Accounts' Superintendent". In May 1959, the two formerly separate units of the Accounts Service, namely, the Public Works Department Accounts Unit under the Chief Engineer of Public Works Department and the Local Fund Audit Unit known also as the "State Accounts" Department came under the common administrative control of the Controller of the State Accounts. On 26th May, 1959, the Mysore State Accounts Services' Cadre and Recruitment Rules were issued and combined cadre strengths were fixed. The result of the rules of 1959 was that an artificial distinction based on mere separate control had been abolished so that both units came under the legally single administrative control of the Accounts' Department in-charge of the Controller of State Accounts. The two employees concerned became absorbed in what was legally a single permanent service regulated by the uniform rules. But in the case of promotion, they were discriminated against simply because, they had worked in the Public Works Department Accounts Unit, which had ceased to exist. The High Court held that the petitioners' grievances were justified. The matter was before the apex court and the apex Court has held as follows :- "8. The High Court rightly relied on State of Mysore versus Padmanabhacharya, AIR 1966 SC 602 to hold that the power of making rules relating to recruitment and conditions of service under the proviso to Article 309 could not be used to validate unconstitutional discrimination in promotional chances of Government servants who belong to the same category. It must be understood that Government servant whose case is considered for promotion but who fails to be selected on an application of just and reasonable criteria, such as that found in the merit-cum-seniority rule found in the Rules of1959, cannot complain of discrimination. But, what the petitioners had complained of and established was that their cases for promotion were not considered at all under these Rules on the false premise that they belong to a class which disables them from obtaining equal consideration for promotion to the offices to which they considered themselves entitled. But, what the petitioners had complained of and established was that their cases for promotion were not considered at all under these Rules on the false premise that they belong to a class which disables them from obtaining equal consideration for promotion to the offices to which they considered themselves entitled. The effect of the order of the Mysore High Court was only that cases of the petitioners, now respondents before us, will be considered, in accordance with Rules of 1959, in preparing the seniority list on merit-cum-seniority basis. All that the order of the High Court enjoins is that the petitioners before it must not be ignored simply on the assumption that the source of their initial recruitment debars the consideration of their merits for promotion. 11.) Other cases mentioned by the Mysore High Court i.e. State of Punjab versus Joginder Singh, AIR 1963 SC 913 and K.M. Bakshi versus Union of India, 1965 Supp (2) SCR 169, also show that inequality of opportunity of promotion, though not unconstitutional per se. must be justified on the strength of rational criteria correlated to the object for which the difference is made. In the case of Government servants, the object of such a difference must be presumed to be a selection of the most competent from amongst those possessing qualifications and backgrounds entitling them to be considered as members of one class. In some cases, quotas may have to be fixed between what are different classes or sources for promotion on grounds of public policy. If, on the facts of a particular case, the classes to be considered are really different inequality of opportunity in promotional chances may be justifiable. On the contrary, if the facts of a particular case disclose no such rational distinction between members of what is found to be really a single class no class distinctions can be made in selecting the best Articles 14 and 16 (1) of the Constitution must be held to be violated when members of one class are not even considered for promotion. The case before us falls, in our opinion, in the latter type of cases where the difference in promotional opportunities of those who were wrongly divided into two classes for this purpose only could not be justified on any rational grounds. Learned Counsel for the State was unable to indicate any such ground to us. The case before us falls, in our opinion, in the latter type of cases where the difference in promotional opportunities of those who were wrongly divided into two classes for this purpose only could not be justified on any rational grounds. Learned Counsel for the State was unable to indicate any such ground to us. We, therefore, think that the Mysore High Court rightly held that the impugned notifications were unconstitutional". (Emphasis supplied) In State of Andhra Pradesh and others versusJ. Srinivasa Rao and others (1983) 3 SCC 285, the apex Court was dealing with the case of persons working as Lower Division Clerks in the Department of Registration and Stamps, Andhra Pradesh. In terms of the relevant rules and instructions governing them, a list of approved candidates should have been prepared as on a particular date for making appointments to the cadre of Sub-Registrars Grade-II by transfer. The grievance of the petitioners was that contrary to the rules and instructions, a list of the approved candidates was not prepared as on that particular date and it was considerably delayed and drawn up only later, when an amendment to the Rules had been incorporated, whereby the original rules providing for consideration of Lower Division Clerks for appointment as Sub-Registrars Grade-II were done away with and promotion or transfer to that category was to be made from amongst Upper Division Clerks employed in the Registration and Stamps Department. The complaint of the petitioners was that by delaying the preparation of list of approved candidates till after the rules were amended their chances for consideration for appointment to the higher post were adversely affected. The claims were resisted on the ground that the competent authority was not obliged to prepare any such list annually though he was obliged to prepare the panels of the Sub-Registrars from time to time and that the delay in the preparation of the panel was not actuated by any motive, but it was consequent upon the implementation of the new rule and that the allocation of posts and personnel among the Zones had to be made by the Government. The apex Court held that if a panel had been prepared every year in September as required under the old rules, transfer or promotion would have been available to the petitioners out of that panel and if that occurred, the petitioners, who ranked higher than the respondents, would not have been deprived of their right of being considered for promotion. The vacancies which occurred prior to the amended Rules would be governed by the old rules and not by the amended rules and therefore, the question of filling the vacancies that occurred prior to the amended rules undoubtedly would be governed by the old rules and not by the new rules. In Abdul Basheer and others versusK. K. Karunakran and others, 1989 Supp (2) SCC 344, the appellants before the apex Court were graduate Excise Inspectors, who were aggrieved by the judgment of the High Court holding that the amendment to Special Rule 2 of the Kerala Excise and Prohibition Subordinate Services Rules as being ultra vires. Writ petitions were filed by non-graduate Excise Inspectors alleging that the amendment to Sub-rule 2 of the aforesaid Rules violated Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution inasmuch as an invidious discrimination had been made between graduates and non-graduates by prescribing a ratio between them in the matter of promotion from the post of Excise Preventive Officer to that of Second Grade Excise Inspectors. The appellants had contended before the High Court that preference shown to graduates under the amended Special Rule 2 the ratio 1:3 represents the recognition of graduation as a standard of merit and it was urged that the officers with more merit in the post of Excise Inspectors would promote administrative efficiency. It was also contended that the amendment to the Special Rules is the result of an historical background which justifies preferential promotion. It was pointed out that as graduates or non-graduates had all along been treated differently in the matter of promotion to the post of Excise Inspector, the classification brought about by amending Special Rule 2 could not be regarded as unreasonable. The apex Court thereafter set up historical background out of which the controversy arose tracing it back to the year 1935 in the erstwhile State of Travancore. After referring to the judgments in Mohammad Shujat Ali, supra; Triloki Nath Khosa, supra; S.L. Sachdev versusUnion of India, (1980) 4 SCC 562 and Col. The apex Court thereafter set up historical background out of which the controversy arose tracing it back to the year 1935 in the erstwhile State of Travancore. After referring to the judgments in Mohammad Shujat Ali, supra; Triloki Nath Khosa, supra; S.L. Sachdev versusUnion of India, (1980) 4 SCC 562 and Col. A. S. Iyer versus V. Balasubramanyam, (1980) 1 SCC 634 , the apex court held that the history of the evolution of the Kerala Excise and Prohibition Subordinate Service had shown no uniformity either in approach or in object. The history had varied with the circumstances prevailing before and after the re-organisation of the State in the year 1956. Originally, when more emphasis was laid on the induction of graduates, the ratio of graduate to non-graduate officers was maintained at 3:1. But, from the year 1974, the ratio was changed inversely to 1:3. More non-graduates were now inducted into the service. The trend showed that it ran in favour of absorbing more non-graduates. The conditions pertaining to the service and respecting which the constitution of service varied from time to time showed fluctuations. A consistent or coherent policy in favour of graduates was absent and it was not a case where the cadre of officers was kept in two divisions. It was a single cadre and they were all equal members of it and that the High Court had noted that the nature of the duties of Preventive Officers, whether graduate or non-graduate was identical and both were put to field work. Non-graduate Preventive Officers were regarded as competent as Graduate Preventive Officers. There was no evidence of any special responsibility being vested in Graduate Preventive Officers. Once they were promoted as Excise Inspectors, there was no distinction between graduate and non-graduate Excise Inspectors. And the apex Court affirmed the judgments of the learned Single Judge as well as the Division bench of the High Court. There was no evidence of any special responsibility being vested in Graduate Preventive Officers. Once they were promoted as Excise Inspectors, there was no distinction between graduate and non-graduate Excise Inspectors. And the apex Court affirmed the judgments of the learned Single Judge as well as the Division bench of the High Court. In Kothandaraman versus Tamil Nadu Water Supply and Drainage Board and others, (1994)6 SCC 282 , the apex Court was concerned with Article 14 and one of its facets as embodied in Article 16 which concerns equality of opportunity in matters of public employment and the Court proceeded to consider the several Constitution Bench decisions and has reiterated the ratio of the several judgment as under: In Triloki Nath Khosa, supra, the sum and substance of what was stated in the leading judgment was that the guarantee of equality is precious and the theory of classification may not be allowed to be extended so as to subvert or submerge the same. And while being called upon to decide whether the classification in question is constitutionally permissible, excellence in service has also to be borne in mind so too the fact that excellence and equality are not friendly bed fellows and a pragmatic approach was therefore required to harmonise the requirements of public services with the aspirations of public servants. The apex court further proceeds to refer to a quotation of Justice Krishna Iyer, who had stated that the social meaning of Articles 14 and 16 is neither dull uniformity nor specious 'talentism'. Further, the soul of Article 16 is the promotion of the common man's capabilities, opening up full opportunities to develop without succumbing to the sophistic argument of the elite that talent is the privilege of the few and they must rule. But, then, personal policy does require an eye on efficiency and so, though "chill penury" should not repress "their noble rage", technical proficiency cannot be sacrificed at the altar of wooden equality. All these call for a striking of a balance between the long hunger for equal chance of the lowlier and the disturbing concern of the community for higher standards of performance. Even so, mini-classifications based on micro-distinctions are false to our egalitarian faith and overdoing of classification would be undoing of equality. The court has to function always as a sentinel on the qui vive. Even so, mini-classifications based on micro-distinctions are false to our egalitarian faith and overdoing of classification would be undoing of equality. The court has to function always as a sentinel on the qui vive. Though there was difference in the underlying thoughts as above, the Bench was unanimous on the question that educational qualifications can form the basis of a valid classification. In coming to this conclusion, the Khosa Bench, noted earlier decisions rendered in State of Mysore versusP. Narasing Rao, AIR 1968 SC 349 , and Union ofIndia versusDr.(Mrs.)S. B. Kohli, (1973) 3 SCC 592 . The apex court also took note of the judgment in Mohammad Shujat Ali, supra where it was pointed out that though educational qualifications can form the basis of classification, it could not be laid down as an invariable rule that whenever any classification is made on such basis, the same must be held to be valid, irrespective of the nature and purpose of the classification or the quality and extent of the difference in the educational qualifications. A particular observation that life has relations not capable always of division into inflexible compartments was made. It was also observed that in a case it may be perfectly legitimate for the administration to say that having regard to the nature of the functions and duties attached to the post, for the purpose of achieving efficiency in public service in which degree-holders shall be eligible for promotion and not Diploma or Certificate-holders. It was then observed that though this distinction may be permissible, for deciding the question of eligibility for promotion, it would be difficult consistently with the claim for equal opportunity to lay down a quota of promotion for each and give a preferential treatment to graduates over non-graduates in the matter of fixation of the quota. Shujat Ali Bench ultimately took the stand that to permit discrimination based on educational attainments, not obligated by nature of the duties of the higher posts is to stifle the social thrust of equality clause. Even so, the Bench did not strike down the quota rule challenged before it because of the historical background. It was then observed that the aforesaid decisions have been understood and applied differently by different courts including the apex court. Even so, the Bench did not strike down the quota rule challenged before it because of the historical background. It was then observed that the aforesaid decisions have been understood and applied differently by different courts including the apex court. The apex Court has also referred to the decisions which had been rendered thereafter and which took note of either Khosa or Shujat Ali, in Punjab State Electricity Board versusRavinder Kumar Sharma, (1986) 4 SCC 617 ; Shamkant Narayan Deshpande versusMaharashtra Industrial Development Corporation, 1993 Suppl. (2) SCC 194, and in N. Abdul Basheer versusK. K. Karunakaran, 1989 Supp.2 SCC 344. Thereafter the apex Court has referred to Roop Chand Adlakha versusDelhi Development Authority, 1989 Supp.(1) SCC 116, which took note of both Khosa and Shujat Ali and some others as well. It observed that if diploma-holders, on the justification of job-requirements and in the interest of maintaining a certain quality of technical expertise in the cadre could validly be excluded from the eligibility for promotion to the higher cadre, it does not necessarily follow as an inevitable corollary that the choice of the recruitment policy is limited to two, namely, either to consider them eligible or not eligible. The Bench then stated that the State is not precluded from conferring eligibility on diploma-holders conditioning it by other requirements like varying period of length of experience, which in the case of Roop Chand, supra was ten years for the diploma-holders and eight years for the degree-holders and it was concluded that Article 16 would not prevent the State from formulating a policy, which prescribes as an essential part of the conditions for the very eligibility that the candidate must have a particular qualification plus a stipulated quantum of service experience. It is on that footing that the rule in question laying down different period of service experience for diploma-holders and degree-holders was not found violative of Articles 14 and 16. Thereafter, attention was drawn to V. Markendeya versus State of Andhra Pradesh, (1989) 3 SCC 191 , in which differentiation of non-graduate Supervisors and graduate Supervisors for the purposed of pay-scales was held not to have violated Articles 14 and 16 and it was noted that in coming to that decision, the historical background was kept in mind. Yet another decision in Government of Andhra Pradesh versusP. Yet another decision in Government of Andhra Pradesh versusP. Dilip Kumar, (1993) 2 SCC 310 , wherein it was held that the classification on the basis of higher educational qualifications to achieve higher administrative efficiency is permissible under our Constitutional scheme and it was held that no fault could be found giving of preference to post-graduates as a class in promotion. Thereafter, attention is drawn to P. Murugesan versus State of Tamil Nadu, (1993) 2 SCC 340 , wherein it was held that placing of restriction on diploma-holders by limiting their chances of promotion to one out of four promotions after the graduate engineers and diploma-holder engineers constituting one class and performed same duties and discharged same responsibilities, would not be justified, was a 'too simplistic way of looking at the issue'. It was observed that if the diploma-holders could be barred altogether from promotion, it was difficult to appreciate how and why the rule making was precluded from restricting the promotion. It was pointed out that the rule making authority may be of the view, having regard to the efficiency of the administration and other relevant circumstances that while it is not necessary to bar the diploma-holders from promotion altogether, their chances of promotion should be restricted. It was then stated that on principle, there was no basis for the contention that only two options are open to the rule-making authority to either bar the diploma-holders or allow then unrestricted promotion on a par with the graduates. It was observed that the Murugesan Bench thereafter noted the hallmark of Shujat Ali, case supra, which required that the historical background of the service to be kept in mind and while noticing the decisions in Shamkant, Ravinder Kumar and Abdul Basheer, supra, the bench upheld the validity of ratio of 3:1 between graduates and diploma-holders in promotion. So also, the longer qualifying period of service by the diploma-holders. The apex Court also noted the decision in Nageshwar Prasad versusUnion of India, which was unreported as on that date in C.A.3985/1984 wherein the bench after taking note of the decisions in Roop Chand, Dilip Kumar, Murugesan and Shujat Ali, supra did not find fault with the prescription of 50% quota for the diploma-holders. The apex Court also noted the decision in Nageshwar Prasad versusUnion of India, which was unreported as on that date in C.A.3985/1984 wherein the bench after taking note of the decisions in Roop Chand, Dilip Kumar, Murugesan and Shujat Ali, supra did not find fault with the prescription of 50% quota for the diploma-holders. The apex Court then held that the aforesaid bird's eye view of the important decisions of the apex Court on the question of prescribing quota in promotion to a higher post based on the educational qualification makes it clear that such a qualification can in certain cases be a valid basis of classification and the classification need not be relatable only to the eligibility criteria but to restrictions in promotions as well. Further, even if in a case the classification would not be acceptable to the court on principle, it would before pronouncing its judgment bear in mind the historical background. It is apparent that while judging the validity of the classification the Court shall have to be conscious about the need for maintaining efficiency in service and also whether the required qualification is necessary for the discharge of duties in the higher post. The apex Court then proceeded to hold that the aforesaid propositions though undisputed, two proposals were projected or in its words, to introduce "two more spokes in the wheel". They are a call of social justice and importance of education. While drawing attention to the importance of justice, reference is made to Unni Krishnan J.P. versus State of Andhra Pradesh, (1993)1 SC 645 and has quoted with approval an observation that "a preparation for living and for life, here and hereafter" and that education is "at once a social and political necessity" and that "[v]ictories are gained, peace is preserved, progress is achieved, civilization is built up and history is made not on the battlefields ... but in educational institutions which are seed-beds of culture, where children in whose hands quiver the destinies of the future, are trained. Therefore, the Apex Court has concluded that any view taken should not play down the importance of education and then it goes on to observe that at the same time, it would have to be remembered that the diploma-holders are drawn mainly from poorer families and they are incapable of making the degree grade. Therefore, the Apex Court has concluded that any view taken should not play down the importance of education and then it goes on to observe that at the same time, it would have to be remembered that the diploma-holders are drawn mainly from poorer families and they are incapable of making the degree grade. The "chill penury" should not, therefore, be allowed to "repress their noble rage". Social justice would not permit to do so. It may be that social justice is not a fundamental right, but there is little doubt that social justice being a requirement of directive principles of our Constitution. The same would have to be the desideratum in any case and has laid down the following legal propositions regarding the educational qualification, being a basis of classification relating to promotion in public service: 1) Higher educational qualification is a permissible basis of classification, acceptability of which will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. 2) High educational qualification can be the basis not only for barring promotion, but also for restricting the scope of promotion. 3) Restriction placed cannot however go to the extent of seriously jeopardising the chances of promotion. To decide this, the extent of restriction shall have also to be looked into to ascertain whether it is reasonable. Reasons for this are being indicated later. The Apex Court then has proceeded to address the facts of case, which is reproduced hereunder for ready reference:- "19. The writ petitioners / appellants of this service have two grievances. The first is that the proviso to Regulation 19(2) (b) of Tamil Nadu Water Supply and Drainage Board Service Regulations, 1972 is violative of Article 16 of the Constitution. Secondly, what has been provided in Rule 2(b) of the Special Rules for the Tamil Nadu Agriculture Engineering Service brought into force with effect from 1.2.1981 is similarly infirm. We proposed to examine these two grievances separately. 20. The purport of the first challenge is that the proviso permits diploma-holders Assistant Engineers to become eligible for promotion to the post of Executive Engineer only if they were to have "exceptional merit" in work; otherwise a diploma-holder is not eligible for such promotion. This challenge has to fail because of what was held in Khosa case, according to which diploma-holders being less educationally qualified than degree-holders can be made non-eligible for promotion to higher post. This challenge has to fail because of what was held in Khosa case, according to which diploma-holders being less educationally qualified than degree-holders can be made non-eligible for promotion to higher post. The proviso really takes out the rigour by permitting the diploma-holders to be considered for promotion in case they were to show exceptional merit in their work. The proviso being thus favourable to the diploma-holders has really to be welcomed by them, instead of inviting their wrath. 21. The validity of aforesaid Rule 2(b) which has prescribed the ratio of 3:2 for direct recruits and promotees - the former being degree-holders and latter diploma holders -is challenged as violative of the guarantee of quality embodied in Article 16. The counsel for the respondents has, inter alia, drawn our attention to the fact that this differentiation is ancient as mentioned in the counter affidavit filed by the State, a part of which has been quoted at Pages 13 to 16 of SLP (C) No.10645 of 1989. A perusal of the same shows that the degree-holder Assistant Engineers were designated as Assistant Engineer (Agriculture Engineering) and given gazetted status, whereas diploma-holders were denied the same. This apart, the degree-holders were given higher scale of pay. The affidavit further shows that the post of Executive Engineer (Agricultural Engineering) calls for higher skill, administration, planning and evolving of proposals and drafting. In these aspects most of the diploma holders were found lacking. It has been mentioned in this affidavit that the degree-holders had studied for six years at college level after leaving school stage, whereas diploma holders have only three years' study at the level of Institute of Technology after school stage. Because of this, higher technical caliber in degree-holders is presumed. Insofar as the common seniority list is concerned, the submission in the counter-affidavit is that the same "did not allow (sic) to give preference in promoting graduates to the level of Assistant Executive Engineer (Agricultural Engineering) in the department". The further averment is that in other departments where separate lists were being maintained, ratio adopted was 3:1, whereas in the department at hand ratio of 3:2 was recommended taking into account large number of diploma-holders. 22. The aforesaid shows that higher educational qualification has relevance insofar as the holding of higher promotional post is concerned, in view of the nature of the functions and duties attached to that post. 22. The aforesaid shows that higher educational qualification has relevance insofar as the holding of higher promotional post is concerned, in view of the nature of the functions and duties attached to that post. The classification has, therefore, nexus with the object to be achieved. This apart, history also supports the differentiation sought to be made by the rule in question. We, therefore, uphold the classification as valid. 23. The next question to be examined is about the extent of the preference given to the degree-holders. At this stage, we may first give our reasons as to why this aspect is amenable to examination. The rulemaking authority having made a diploma-holder eligible for promotion, it follows that a diploma-holder does not suffer from such an infirmity as to make him totally unfit for holding the higher post. If that is so, question is whether the ratio could be made so inequitable as to mock at the guarantee of equality? The right which has been conferred by one hand cannot be taken away by another: nor can the right be converted to a husk. It must continue to be a meaningful right. Too much emphasis on higher education may even cause dent to cause of social Justice, as it would be the poorer section of the society which would be deprived of its legitimate expectations. The preference given to the degree-holders would, at the same time, give fillip to the desire to receive higher education, as such persons would always be favourably placed as compared to the lesser educated ones. A harmony would thus be struck, by maintaining reasonableness in the ratio, between the call of social Justice and the need for higher education, without in any way jeopardising the principal object of classification. But then, no particular ratio can be spelt out which would satisfy these requirements: the reasonableness of the ratio shall depend on facts of each case.(Emphasis supplied) 24. In the present cases the ratio is 3:2 and we regard the same as reasonable in view of what has been stated above relating to adoption of this ratio. Having felt satisfied about the permissibility of the classification also, the cases challenging the constitutionality of the quota for promotion as fixed in this service have to be dismissed. TAMIL NADU ELECTRICITIY BOARD SERVICE CASES 25. Having felt satisfied about the permissibility of the classification also, the cases challenging the constitutionality of the quota for promotion as fixed in this service have to be dismissed. TAMIL NADU ELECTRICITIY BOARD SERVICE CASES 25. The writ petitioners and appellants, among whom is the Engineering Diploma-holders' Association, have challenged the decision of the Tamil Nadu Electricity Board which amended the Boards Service Regulations fixing ratio of 3:1 for promotion to the post of Assistant Engineers (Electrical) between the Junior Engineer (Electrical) and Supervisors (Electrical Grade-I) - the former being degree-holders and latter diploma-holders. 26. The aforesaid shows that the classification is based on higher educational qualification and the same has to receive our approval because for certain types of work the Supervisors are not sufficiently qualified, whereas Junior Engineers are. The nature of the work performed by the two classes of post holders and the higher educational qualification of the degree-holders did permit the Electricity Board to classify the two groups differently for the purpose of their promotion. As to the ratio of 3:1, we have applied our mind and we have come to the conclusion that we may not interfere with the same because of the fact that any different view would create almost a chaotic situation in the working of the Board as the Board's decision, which is of 1974 has held the field for about two decades and any disturbance at this stage would not to be conducive to the functioning of the Board inasmuch as the number of persons to be affected would be in thousands, as it has been stated in paragraph 22 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the Board in CA No.559 of 1991 that the number of qualified diploma-holders and degree-holders in all branches would be in region of 1000; Junior Engineers Grade-I about 2000 and Assistant Engineers also 2000. 27. The aforesaid being the position, we do not find any constitutional infirmity in the classification and would not interfere with the ratio as prescribed because of the aforesaid special facts". Therefore, in view of the above judgment, which has taken note of all the important decisions on the aspect of the matter, it is to be held that the educational qualification is a valid basis of classification. Therefore, in view of the above judgment, which has taken note of all the important decisions on the aspect of the matter, it is to be held that the educational qualification is a valid basis of classification. But, at the same time, it is to be kept in view that the need for maintaining efficiency in service would not be jeopardised if non-graduates and persons without a Law degree and who have put in long years of service were also to be considered for promotion without the insistence of their acquiring such educational qualification, if otherwise, they are found to be efficient and suitable for promotion having regard to the length of service and a good track record. Therefore, the amended Rules ought to have provided adequate scope by introducing a quota for such candidates, which may progressively be tapered off in time and it could then be ultimately ensured that only persons with higher educational qualifications filled the rank and file. Hence, the first point for consideration would have to be answered in the affirmative, in that, the rule making authority has permanently shut out those employees, without the requisite educational qualifications as prescribed, for promotion. This is notwithstanding the mechanism provided enabling such employees to acquire the necessary educational qualification. However, it is not within the realm of this court to take upon itself the exercise of prescribing the appropriate quota in respect ofemployees without the requisite educational qualification vis-a-vis the quota prescribed for direct recruitment. But, the Proviso as well as the Explanation to the amended Rules of 2009 requiring higher qualifications shall not be applicable to employees already in service and shall be read down to that effect. Further, it is relevant to note that providing for a mechanism are as per the guidelines formulated under the Circular dated 24.8.2010. But, the Proviso as well as the Explanation to the amended Rules of 2009 requiring higher qualifications shall not be applicable to employees already in service and shall be read down to that effect. Further, it is relevant to note that providing for a mechanism are as per the guidelines formulated under the Circular dated 24.8.2010. On the face of it, the same appears to be impracticable, where it provides that the officers who are desirous of pursuing degrees by attending Colleges with a view to acquire knowledge and higher education, should obtain prior permission of the Chief Justice and subject to condition that their study will not adversely affect their work and it would permit them to adhere to the normal office hours, apparently contemplates a situation where they undertake Correspondence Courses or attending part-time courses and that not more than 10% of the officers working in a particular cadre would be so permitted to pursue their courses of study. It is also stated that the degrees to be obtained ought to be recognised for appointment or promotion to a post in the High Court or the Government. It is to be noticed, as observed by the learned Single Judge, that there may be a handful of officers, who may take recourse to this avenue in availing of promotion. Senior officials with decades of experience under their belt and who may not be inclined to take up a course of study late in their lives, would hardly be motivated to continue to work efficiently and when there is no longer any scope for promotion, may even contemplate discontinuing their service. And therefore, it is not a mechanism which provides for an avenue of promotion and is wholly impracticable. The morale of the rank and file of the employees would be completely destroyed if this is the only avenue of availing promotion or being eligible for promotion without any guarantee of such promotion, even after they obtain such higher qualification. Judicial notice is taken of the fact that there are no longer part-time LL.B Degree courses available in the State of Karnataka and any Correspondence course may not be recognised by any University nor would they be eligible for employment under the State Government. Judicial notice is taken of the fact that there are no longer part-time LL.B Degree courses available in the State of Karnataka and any Correspondence course may not be recognised by any University nor would they be eligible for employment under the State Government. The view of the learned Single Judge that not more than 10% of the officials working in a particular cadre would be permitted to pursue a higher Degree course and permission has to be granted on the basis of seniority is pertinent. If this is read in conjunction with the Explanation to the Proviso, which provides for a maximum period of five years to obtain a higher qualification, going by the number of employees, even 10% of such employees per cadre would clearly require more than five years to obtain such higher qualification and therefore it is totally unworkable for all the employees desirous of gaining such higher qualification within the stipulated time. Insofar as the employees in Group-D or even the Second Division Assistants and First Division Assistants are concerned, many of them had moved on to the next post by way of promotion in the past. The minimum qualification required at the time of initial appointment was Seventh Standard and not even SSLC. Therefore, a Group-D employee, who has passed the Seventh Standard is required to obtain a Degree, to be eligible for promotion, he or she would first have to complete SSLC and then a Pre-University Course, before embarking on a Degree Course. This is again totally unworkable, when only a five year period is granted to the employees desirous of obtaining a higher qualification. It is hence to be held that the mechanism provided to enable the employees to acquire the necessary educational qualification is not sustainable. Further, it is to be noted that there was no controversy between the parties insofar as the promotions effected in respect of vacancies that arose prior to the amendment. It is hence to be held that the mechanism provided to enable the employees to acquire the necessary educational qualification is not sustainable. Further, it is to be noted that there was no controversy between the parties insofar as the promotions effected in respect of vacancies that arose prior to the amendment. This is apparent from the record and placing reliance on the decisions of the apex Court in Y. V. Rangaiah versus J. Sreenivasa Rao, (1983) 3 SCC 284 ; Arjun Singh Rathore versus B. N. Chaturvedi, (2007 )11 SCC 605 and State of Rajasthan versus R. Dayal, (1997) 10 SCC 419 , it is held that the petitioners cannot be deprived of being considered for promotion by virtue of the Proviso now substituted to the 1973 Rules, whereas, on the contrary, the posts which the petitioners would have occupied by way of promotion under the original Rules, have now been conferred on persons who are promoted pursuant to the 2009 Rules. The view of the learned Single Judge in this regard is affirmed. It is to be kept in view that the general rule, of the court not being in a position to impose its view of facts and circumstances, on a competent authority, may not be strictly applicable in the present case on hand. The peculiarity being that the court was dealing with a case where it has first hand knowledge of the nature of duties of officers concerned and the difference any higher educational qualification would make on the efficiency of service rendered by the respective employees; to ignore that reality -on a nicety of law would be rather naive. This court is alive to the strict rule that the court cannot normally substitute its view on the basis of mere pleadings, without the necessary material to substantiate the pleadings. But to ignore the reality in the present case on hand would not only deprive the concerned employees of a consideration but would also result in overlooking the valuable experience, expertise and efficiency of the employees, to the peril of the Institution. But to ignore the reality in the present case on hand would not only deprive the concerned employees of a consideration but would also result in overlooking the valuable experience, expertise and efficiency of the employees, to the peril of the Institution. The view of the learned Single Judge that if in the case of any one candidate, the competent authority could exercise his discretion to relax the requirement of a higher educational qualification, without indicating any other special qualification being recognised - such a consideration ought to be extended to all suitable candidates who are not graduates or Law graduates -notwithstanding the 2009 Rules, is to be fully endorsed. In the absence of a challenge to the amendment providing for 40% ratio in respect of direct recruitment to the posts of Judgment Writers and Senior Judgement Writers having been set at naught, by implication, would follow from the reasoning of the learned Single Judge. When the learned Single Judge has directed the rule making authority to redo the entire process, it would necessarily have to address the quota so prescribed and it is for this reason, that the learned Single Judge has while clarifying by a subsequent order, opined that it may not require any such clarification and since we have also opined that the rule making authority would have to accommodate the employees without the requisite educational qualification, the same result would follow. Insofar as the judgment of the learned Single Judge being contrary to the law laid down by the Apex Court in the several decisions referred to hereinabove, the reasonableness of the classification always depend on the facts of each case and to read an embargo as applicable to all fact situations without reference to other situations, such as, the historical background and the denial of equal opportunity, it cannot be said that the learned Single Judge has committed any error as he has thought it fit to follow a line of cases decided by the apex Court in supporting his conclusions, just as it is thought fit, in arriving at this opinion, to follow the reasoning of the Apex Court in Kothandaraman's case, which has taken a bird's eye view of the entire case law on the subject relating to educational qualifications forming the basis of classification. 15. 15. In the light of the aforesaid discussion and answers to the points raised for consideration, the appeals and the petitions are disposed of on the following terms:- a) The Proviso as well as Explanation to the amended Rules of 2009 requiring higher qualifications are constitutionally valid, but shall be read down as not being applicable to the existing employees. b) The orders of promotion in respect of vacancies that arose prior to the coming into force of the 2009 Rules - impugned in WP Nos.4683-4722/2010, WP Nos.11797-11827/2010, WP Nos.22155-22184/2010, WP Nos.35966-36032/2009 and WP 37218-37249/2009, WP 35072-35111/2009 and WP 37825-37841/2009 stand quashed. c) Consequent to the quashing of the orders of promotion, it is also necessary in the interest of the work of the High Court that no hardship is caused from the point of view of ensuring the smooth administration of the work of the High Court and hence, the persons, whose promotions are now quashed shall, however, be permitted to continue in their respective posts as an incharge arrangement, till promotions are made in terms as above. d) As the 2009 Rules are upheld, subject to the condition as aforesaid, the 40% ratio provided for direct recruitment for the posts of Judgment Writers and Senior Judgment Writers – is left undisturbed, unless the competent authority deems it necessary to vary the same. e) Having regard to the complaint of the petitioner in WP 10131/2010 - who is not aggrieved by the 2009 Rules, the same is delinked and directed to be posted before the bench having the roster, to be heard in due course. Per SUBHASH B, ADL. J. I have gone through the opinion of my learned brother Justice Anand Byrareddy, respectfully, I am not in complete agreement with, on some of the issues. Hence, I have rendered separate judgement. Writ Appeal Nos.1934 to 1938 of 2011 and 2245 and 2449 of 2011 are by the Chief Justice of High Court of Karnataka questioning the common order passed by the learned single Judge dated 14.12.2010 in W.P. Nos.4683-4722/2010 and connected cases. Writ Petitions are by the employees of the High Court of Karnataka. Since common question of law is involved in all these cases, they are taken up for disposal by this common judgement. Writ Petitions are by the employees of the High Court of Karnataka. Since common question of law is involved in all these cases, they are taken up for disposal by this common judgement. 2.) Petitioners before the learned single Judge had called in question the constitutional validity of High Court of Karnataka Service (Conditions of Service and Recruitment) Rules, 2009. Learned single Judge by the common order has struck down the said rules holding that they are unconstitutional and unenforceable. It is against the said order, the Chief Justice of the High Court is in appeal. To appreciate the question of law raised in these appeals and connected cases, it is appropriate to refer to the brief facts leading to these cases: 3.) That under Article 229 of the Constitution, the Chief Justice of High Court has been conferred with power to appoint Officers and servants of the High Court and frame rules prescribing conditions of service and method of recruitment subject to the provisions of any law made by the legislature of the State. 4.) In so far as the rules relating to salaries, allowances, leave, pensions payable to or in respect of officers and servants of the High Court are concerned, the same is subject to approval of the Governor of the State. 5.) The Chief Justice, in exercise of power conferred under Article 229 of the Constitution framed rules called the High Court of Karnataka Service (Conditions of Service and Recruitment) Rules, 1973 (for brevity, called ‘the Principal Rules'). Since then, the service conditions of the employees of the High Court were governed by and under the said rules. 6.) In 2009, the Chief Justice, invoking the provisions of Article 229(2) of the Constitution, amended the Principal Rules relating to conditions of service and the method of recruitment of the officers and servants of the High Court vide notifications dated 24.02.2009, 28.05.2009, 09.06.2009, 16.07.2009 and 29.07.2009 inter alia called as High Court Service (Conditions of Service and Recruitment) (Amendment) Rules, 2009 (Amendment - I to V). These rules will be hereinafter referred to as the "amended rules of 2009". 7.) By the said amendments, method of recruitment prescribed in Schedule III to the Principal Rules was amended, mainly prescribing higher educational qualification as a criterion for promotion to the next higher cadre in respect of certain categories of posts. These rules will be hereinafter referred to as the "amended rules of 2009". 7.) By the said amendments, method of recruitment prescribed in Schedule III to the Principal Rules was amended, mainly prescribing higher educational qualification as a criterion for promotion to the next higher cadre in respect of certain categories of posts. Most of the employees felt aggrieved by the said amendment as their promotion to the next higher cadre was subject to possessing requisite higher qualification, which was not initially prescribed at the time of the recruitment. 8.) Being aggrieved by the said amendments, large section of the employees working in various Sections and categories, who did not possess higher educational qualification and who were required to acquire higher educational qualification in stipulated period subject to certain conditions and whose right to be considered for promotion was affected, filed several writ petitions questioning the constitutional validity of the 2009 amended rules. 9.) W.P. Nos.35072-350711/2009 were filed by the Section Officers inter alia on the ground that, their right to be considered for promotion to the next higher cadre of Assistant Registrar has been fatally affected on account of requirement of higher educational qualification of Law Degree, which hitherto was not prescribed under the Principal Rules but for the amendment, they were eligible to be considered for promotion on the basis of seniority-cum-efficiency, contending that the amended rules would deny their right to be considered for promotion, despite having put in long service. 10.) W.P. Nos.37825-37841/2009 were by the First Divisional Assistants on the similar grounds. They allege that their right to be considered for promotion to the post of Senior Assistant would be denied in view of the amended rules, as they did not possess the requisite qualification prescribed under the amended rules. They also questioned promotions of respondents No.3 to 68 in their writ petitions, who were promoted under the amended rules. 11.) Another set of writ petitions were filed questioning promotions given to some of the employees without following the amended rules. Their grievance was that the promotions must be in accordance with the amended 2009 rules only. 12.) 2009 rules require a Degree qualification from recognized University or equivalent qualification for promotion from the post of SDA to FDA., which otherwise was not required under the principal rules. Their grievance was that the promotions must be in accordance with the amended 2009 rules only. 12.) 2009 rules require a Degree qualification from recognized University or equivalent qualification for promotion from the post of SDA to FDA., which otherwise was not required under the principal rules. Since some of the petitioners had not possessed the Degree qualification, they sought for declaration that the 2009 amended rules are unconstitutional. It is contended that the amended rules would not only hamper their chance of promotion but would deny their right to be considered for promotion, as a result it would affect their right to livelihood. 13.) Similarly, the Senior Judgement Writers, Section Officers who were aspiring to be considered for promotion to the next higher cadre alleged that their right to be considered for promotion is denied on account of prescribing Law Degree from recognized University as criterion for promotion. 14.) The principal contention that was raised before the learned single Judge was that, the amended rules create discrimination based on unreasonable classification and takes away the right to be considered for promotion to the next higher post and as such, they are arbitrary and unreasonable, and there is no nexus between the object sought to be achieved and the amended rules. 15.) The explanation to the proviso to the amended rules is arbitrary, unworkable, unreasonable as permission that would be granted by the Chief Justice to acquire higher educational qualification of Degree or Law Degree was subject to the discretion of the Chief Justice and at a time only 10% of employees from each cadre were allowed to acquire higher educational qualification. Having regard to the strength of the officers and servants in different cadres, the method of granting permission to 10% employees in each cadre to complete Degree or Law Degree within five years is not only unworkable, but is impossible as employees from Group SC and VDV cadres, were appointed on the basis of the minimum educational qualification of 7th Standard or SSLC, and it would not be possible for them to acquire the Degree or Law Degree within five years, and it is too late in then service career to acquire the requisite qualification.” 16. That the procedure followed in bringing amended rules is contrary to Article 229, as draft rules were sent to the Governor, however, the same were not approved by the Governor and they remained as draft rules, as such they are unenforceable. 17. That the vacancies arose prior to coming into force of the amended rules. Some of the employees have been promoted to the next higher post which had become vacant. The amended rules have no retrospective effect. That the vacancies, which arose prior to the coming into force of the amended rules have to be filled only under the Principal rules and not under the amended rules. 18. That for more than three decades, service conditions of the employees have been governed by and under the principal rules without the requirement of higher educational qualification. Employees have been promoted based on seniority-cum-efficiency from time to time, and they have been functioning in different cadres at different levels. So far, there has been no grievance of lack of efficiency or lack of quality, as such, without even higher educational qualification as criterion for promotion to higher cadre, the employees have been rendering efficient service. 19. On behalf of the Chief Justice, it was contended that the Chief Justice under Article 229 of the Constitution is vested with power to frame rules relating to the service conditions and method of recruitment of officers and servants of the High Court and only in respect of matters pertaining to salary, allowances, pensions and leave, the rules framed by the Chief Justice was subject to the approval of the Governor of the State. The Chief Justice exercises the legislative function as a delegate. He is competent to frame rules. No approval of the Governor is necessary as the amended rules do not relate to the salary or allowances or pensionary benefit or leave. Rules, which involve financial implication require the approval of the Governor and not otherwise. 20. Even under the Principal rules, the Chief Justice has power to prescribe the method of recruitment. He has power to prescribe higher educational qualification as a criterion for promotion to the next higher cadre. Just because some of the employees do not possess requisite qualification and being not eligible for promotion, they cannot be said to be aggrieved by the amended rules, as there is no vested right of promotion. He has power to prescribe higher educational qualification as a criterion for promotion to the next higher cadre. Just because some of the employees do not possess requisite qualification and being not eligible for promotion, they cannot be said to be aggrieved by the amended rules, as there is no vested right of promotion. Higher educational qualification is prescribed to ensure the efficiency at all levels and more so, in respect of higher posts, where responsibility is higher. Having regard to the changed circumstances and to achieve speedy disposal and to improve quality and efficiency at all levels, higher educational qualification is prescribed. There is no arbitrariness nor it creates any unreasonable classification nor it takes away rights of the employees to be considered for promotion. Amended rules has made a provision for granting reasonable time to the employees for acquiring higher educational qualification and Chief Justice would liberally consider the request for grant of permission to acquire higher educational qualification. Power to amend the rules is within the exclusive domain of the employer. Judicial review of such rules can only be on the grounds of having no nexus to the object sought to be achieved, unreasonableness and arbitrariness and neither of these grounds are available as the amended rules have been framed taking into account all the circumstances and done in the interest of the establishment. 21. Learned single Judge framed the following points for determination: “1. Whether the power given to the Chief Justice to make Rules under Article 229(2) of the Constitution in respect of the conditions of service of the High Court staff, can be used to validate unconstitutional discrimination in promotional chances of persons belonging to the same category? 2. Is there a rational nexus between prescribing Degree/Law Degree qualifications and the object of higher efficiency to be achieved? 3. Whether the criterion fixed by the proviso to the amended Rules of 2009 is manifestly erroneous, arbitrary, unreasonable, irrational and discriminatory and thus violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, when the right to considered for promotion is held to be a fundamental right? 4. Whether the requirements mentioned in the explanation to the proviso are arbitrary, unreasonable, impracticable and lacks rational nexus and hence violative of Article 14 & 16 of the Constitution? 5. 4. Whether the requirements mentioned in the explanation to the proviso are arbitrary, unreasonable, impracticable and lacks rational nexus and hence violative of Article 14 & 16 of the Constitution? 5. In respect of the vacancies in the promotional posts which arose prior to the amendment in 2009, which Rule is applicable - old Rules of 1973 or amended Rules of 2009? 6. Whether the amended Rules which have retrospective operation has the effect of taking away the existing right under 1973 Rules and thus the amended Rules are arbitrary, discriminatory and violative of the right guaranteed under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and hence unconstitutional? 7. Whether the promotions given pursuant to the amended Rules are in consonance with the well established principles of service jurisprudence? 8. Is the procedure followed in bringing about the amended Rules of 2009 is in accordance with the well established principles and procedures applicable in respect of bringing amendments to the principal rules?" and answered the said points as under:- “i) The proviso as well as explanation to the amended Rules of 2009 requiring higher qualifications are quashed as being violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and hence unconstitutional. ii) The orders of promotions as per Annexure-B in W.P. Nos.4683-4722/2010, Annexure-B in W.P. Nos.11797-11827/2010, Annexures-G, H, J & K in W.P. Nos. 22155-22184/2010, Annexures-C, D, E & F in W.P. Nos.35966-36032/2009 and Annexure-C in W.P. Nos.37218-37249/2009 given to the respective respondents, whose promotions are assailed in the respective writ petitions stand quashed. iii) Consequent to the quashing of the orders of promotion, it is also necessary in the interest of the work of the High Court that no hardship is caused from the point of view of ensuring the smooth administration of the work of the High Court and hence, the persons, whose promotions are now quashed shall, however, be permitted to continue in their respective posts as an incharge arrangement, till the promotions are made in accordance with the 1973 Rules, after considering the cases of the petitioners also for promotion. iv) As regards the relief sought by the petitioners in W.P. Nos.22155-22184/2010 with regard to quota restriction for Senior Judgment Writers to the post of Assistant Registrar is concerned, in view of the writ petitions filed by the Section Officers in W.P. Nos.35072-111/2009 being pending involving the same question, the said relief sought is not considered for the time being and it is left open. v) The second respondent is directed to redo the entire process of promotions to all the posts in accordance with old Rules of 1973, and necessary steps in this regard shall be taken within eight weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order". 22. Sri Basava Prabhu Patil, learned senior counsel addressed his arguments on behalf of the Chief Justice. On behalf of the employees aggrieved by the amended rules, Sri S.P. Shankar and Sri Jayakumar S. Patil, learned senior counsels and Sri S.G. Bhagwan, Sri V.S. Naik and another and Sri B.V. Krishna, learned counsel for the respondents addressed their arguments. 23. Sri Basava Prabhu Patil, learned senior counsel submitted that the High Court is the highest Court in a respective State. Chief Justice is the administrative head of the High Court. Under Article 229 of the Constitution, the Chief Justice exercises the legislative power as a delegate, he has power to frame rules governing the service conditions and method of recruitment of officers and servants of the High Court. Power to frame rules includes power to amend. Service conditions also includes prescribing higher educational qualification. 24. Supporting the amendments prescribing higher educational qualification, it was submitted that the stipulation of educational qualification of Degree or Law Degree as eligibility criterion for promotion to various posts was with the object of enhancing the quality and efficacy. The High Court, being Court of record, for efficient and smooth functioning, it is necessary that the officers and servants should possess the higher educational qualification to render effective service. To meet the changing challenges, the educational qualification is essential. The higher qualification is prescribed in the interest of the High Court. There is nothing arbitrary or unreasonability. 25. The High Court, being Court of record, for efficient and smooth functioning, it is necessary that the officers and servants should possess the higher educational qualification to render effective service. To meet the changing challenges, the educational qualification is essential. The higher qualification is prescribed in the interest of the High Court. There is nothing arbitrary or unreasonability. 25. For posts of Senior Assistants, Senior Judgement Writers, Section Officers, Court Officers, Degree of law is prescribed as a criterion for promotion to the next higher cadre as the nature of work discharged by them requires legal knowledge to handle the scrutiny, verification, limitation and court fee etc., which per se require proper legal knowledge. Similarly, Court Officers, who deal with the Court files and assist Court in providing law books and journals and providing information, maintaining the case diary to keep track of the disposed of cases, writing the note of the proceedings of the day are the essential features of the functioning of the Court officer. The Court officer without the qualification of Law Degree, may not render an effective service to the Court and may affect the speedy and effective justice delivery system. 26. To achieve the higher standard, quality and efficiency in the justice delivery system, the rules are amended prescribing requisite higher educational qualification corresponding to the nature of work discharged. It was contended that the Chief Justice as a delegatee has exercised the legislative function. Prescribing higher educational qualification cannot be termed as arbitrary or unreasonable. The object behind the amendment being to achieve higher standard and quality, which has direct nexus to the effective and speedy dispensation of justice. The object being not discriminatory, arbitrary or unreasonable and has direct nexus to the object sought to be achieved. Hence, it is neither violative of Articles 14, 16 or 21 of the Constitution nor it is beyond the power of subordinate legislation. 27. It is further contended that, for better and smooth functioning of the High Court with the object of achieving the efficient administration to ensure the quality justice delivery system, in the larger interest of litigant public, rules are amended. Prescribing the higher educational qualification is based on intelligible differentia having direct nexus to the object sought to be achieved. 27. It is further contended that, for better and smooth functioning of the High Court with the object of achieving the efficient administration to ensure the quality justice delivery system, in the larger interest of litigant public, rules are amended. Prescribing the higher educational qualification is based on intelligible differentia having direct nexus to the object sought to be achieved. Proportional educational qualification has been prescribed according to the need, having regard to the nature of work discharged by the respective officers and servants of the High Court. 28. The Constitution itself has delegated the legislative power to Chief Justice. Legislation cannot be questioned on the ground of hardship. No employee has a right to claim that he / she should be governed only by such rules, as existed on the date of his / her entry into service. Depending upon the need and for enhancing the performance, the rules are required to be amended from time to time. For the efficiency of the service, the rules have been amended. However, to protect the interest of the employees, who do not possess such educational qualification, an opportunity is given to them to acquire educational qualification in reasonable time, to become eligible for promotion to the next higher cadre. It is also made clear that such requests would be considered liberally. 29. On the other hand, the learned senior counsel representing the employees were to contend that amending the Rules would retrench the promotions once for all. The right of employees to be considered for promotion is taken away. The discretionary power given to the Chief Justice granting permission does not subserve the purpose. Employees entered into service with hope and promise of further promotions has been denied as a result, the employees would be frustrated due to the reason of stagnation. Further, acquiring higher educational qualification is unworkable and has no reasonable nexus to the object sought to be achieved. Learned counsel further contended that the nature of work and functioning of the employees do not warrant such a higher educational qualification, as the qualification prescribed at the entry level with their experience is sufficient to discharge their function in the promotional post, as it has been working for several years. Since the amended rules are based on unreasonable classification, having no rational nexus are violative of Articles, 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India. Since the amended rules are based on unreasonable classification, having no rational nexus are violative of Articles, 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India. The requirement of higher qualification has no relevance nor essential for promotion as the promotions are based on seniority, work experience with good track record. 30. Having not prescribed such educational qualification at the entry level, such rules cannot be amended for promotion at the time of their appointment, such rules cannot be amended as same would be hit by the principles of estoppel. 31. Before adverting to the rival contentions, it would be better to refer to the reasoning and findings in the order of the learned single Judge supporting the conclusion. 32. As regard to whether, the power given to the Chief Justice to make Rules under Article 229(2) of the Constitution in respect of the conditions of service of the High Court staff, can be used to validate unconstitutional discrimination in promotional chances of persons belonging to the same category, the learned single Judge relying on various judgements, has observed at para 56 of the order as under: "56. It is thus clear from the aforesaid position in law that while the Chief Justice is the supreme authority to frame the Rules in respect of recruitment as well as conditions of service, the power of the Chief Justice is, however, subject to the limitation as contained in Article 229(2) itself and the power will have to be exercised keeping in view the aforesaid limitations as expressed by the Apex Court in the aforementioned cases as well as by the Division Bench of this court in Channegowda's case. In other words, the said power cannot be used to validate unconstitutional discrimination in promotion chances of persons belonging to the same category". 33. As regard to whether there is a rational nexus between prescribing Degree/Law Degree qualifications and the object of higher efficiency to be achieved, the learned single Judge referring to the amended rules observes at para No.59 as under: "59. 33. As regard to whether there is a rational nexus between prescribing Degree/Law Degree qualifications and the object of higher efficiency to be achieved, the learned single Judge referring to the amended rules observes at para No.59 as under: "59. From the submissions made by the learned counsel/senior counsel for the petitioners as well as learned senior counsel for Respondents 1 and 2 and after going through the records that are produced for my perusal by the learned senior counsel for the Respondents 1 and 2, there appears to be no specific reasons being given as to why Degree is insisted in respect of persons, who are in Group-D, SDA, FDA, Stenographers and Judgment Writers, for them to move to the higher post and likewise, no specific reasons are forthcoming as to why the Law Degree is insisted upon the Senior Judgment Writers". These observations are made by the learned single Judge by perusing the records placed before him and the learned single Judge found that there is no specific reason assigned as to why degree or law degree is prescribed as a criterion for promotion to the next higher post. 34. Learned single Judge has observed that the nature of job or the duties assigned to various categories of employees, which were brought to his notice shows that, the duties of the Group-D employees include that of keeping the office neat and tidy and deliver tappals to other sections and SDAs are required to maintain the diary, organize the movements of receipt of files and distribution of files and, Senior Assistants and PDAs, are required to attend case files as per the duties assigned to them. 35. As far as the Stenographers, Judgment Writers and Senior Judgment Writers are concerned, they are entrusted with the work of stenography entrusted to them by the Honourable Judges, apart from receiving the tappals and files. The duties of the Court Officers and Assistant Court Officers are that of arranging the case files according to the cause list, to note the stage of the case according to the court proceedings and keep all the law books that are received for the conduct of proceedings. Section Officers are required to scrutinize the files submitted by the case worker as per the procedure prescribed. Section Officers are required to scrutinize the files submitted by the case worker as per the procedure prescribed. Assistant Registrars are required to be the Branch Officers in charge of one or more sections and after the scrutiny of the files submitted by the Section Officers to the Assistant Registrars. 36. The nature of work discharged by employees such as SDAs., FDAs., Stenographers, Judgement Writers, Senior Judgement Writers, Section Officers, Assistant Court Officers, Court Officers and Assistant Registrars, is purely clerical and not managerial. 37. Learned single Judge on the basis of his personal assessment of the nature of work of the staff, observes that some times, SDAs will do the work of FDAs, PDAs., will do the work of Senior Assistants and Senior Assistants, in turn, will do the work of Section Officers. Likewise, Stenographers will be posted to work in place of Judgement Writers and Judgement Writers will be posted to work in place of Senior Judgement Writers and Senior Judgement Writers also look after the work of the Assistant Registrars. 38. Learned single Judge by considering the nature of work assigned to the various categories of staff and the fact that one category of officials can do the work of another category at times, has further observed that: "It thus appears that even without possessing the required qualification as is now prescribed under the new Rules, work of the High Court has gone on smoothly right from the time of coming into force, the 1973 Rules". It is further observed that, for the last three and half decades, the different categories of staff have gone on discharging their duties with the qualification as prescribed under 1973 Rules and even employees from Group-D category have been able to reach the post of Assistant Registrar in course of time. 39. It is further observed that, for the last three and half decades, the different categories of staff have gone on discharging their duties with the qualification as prescribed under 1973 Rules and even employees from Group-D category have been able to reach the post of Assistant Registrar in course of time. 39. To support his findings, the learned single Judge relied on the decision of the Apex Court in the matter of FOOD CORPORATION OF INDIA Versus OM PRAKASH SHARMA AND OTHERS (AIR 1998 S.C.2682), wherein the Apex Court, after going through the job description of various categories of employees, found that the duties performed by the persons holding AG III posts could be assigned with the same work as required to be performed by AG I and AG II and the Typists and Telephone Operators were also expected to perform duties listed in AG III category and thus the duties performed by the Typists and Telephone Operators as well as persons holding AG in posts were found to be similar. The Apex Court, taking note of the fact that non-Graduates were also performing same duties as of Graduates, held that the amendment incorporating five years of service as eligibility criterion for non-Graduates, as the classification made by the Amendment, is violative of equality clause. The Apex Court referred to various decisions in this connection and ruled that the amendments to the Regulations making a differentiation between Graduates and non-Graduates in the matter of promotions of the posts of AG-1 and AG-II offend the equality clause and are, therefore, unconstitutional. 40. Having regard to the nature of work discharged by the employees of the High Court, the learned single Judge has observed that to do the clerical work or stenography work, Graduation or law degree is unnecessary. 41. Learned single Judge has further observed that as far as Stenographers, Judgement Writers and Senior Judgement Writers are concerned, their basic duty is that of taking dictation given by the Judges, transcribing the dictation and placing the draft or fair copy for signature of the Judge. 41. Learned single Judge has further observed that as far as Stenographers, Judgement Writers and Senior Judgement Writers are concerned, their basic duty is that of taking dictation given by the Judges, transcribing the dictation and placing the draft or fair copy for signature of the Judge. Even without Degree or Law Degree qualification, they are discharging their duties all these years and possession of Degree / Law Degree would not make any difference so far as the core work discharged by the Stenographers, Judgement Writers and Senior Judgement writers is concerned, it is observed that: "It may be proper for a Research Assistant to have a Law Degree because the nature of work of the said Research Assistant requires him to take note of the arguments addressed by the learned counsel in the court and look to the decisions and place reported decisions in the light of the arguments noted by him or her, to enable the Judge concerned to render judgments at the earliest. The Stenographers, Judgment Writers and Senior Judgment Writers are not doing the functions of a Research Assistant and, therefore, asking them to have a Law Degree has no nexus between the object sought to be achieved and possession of Law Degree". It is further observed that Stenography is a skill or talent acquired, improvised and perfected by a layman, aided and assisted by basic knowledge of grammar and control over vocabulary, ability to construct sentences i.e, syntax, command over language, unrelated to the educational qualifications. The art, skill and talent possessed by the Stenographers has no other parallel in any service jurisprudence and, as such, these qualities will make a person a good Stenographer or Judgment Writer or Senior Judgment Writer, rather than the educational qualification. At para No.70, the learned single Judge refers to the experience and observes as under: “70. It may also have to be mentioned that it has been the experience of many Judges, including the author of this judgment, that there are Stenographers, Judgment Writers and Senior Judgment Writers possessing only SSLC qualification, but they are turning out outstanding work of taking dictation flawlessly and transcribing the material into draft or fair copy, to perfection". It may also have to be mentioned that it has been the experience of many Judges, including the author of this judgment, that there are Stenographers, Judgment Writers and Senior Judgment Writers possessing only SSLC qualification, but they are turning out outstanding work of taking dictation flawlessly and transcribing the material into draft or fair copy, to perfection". Therefore, the learned single Judge held that requirement of Degree qualification in respect of Group ‘D’, Second Division Assistants, First Division Assistants, Senior Assistants, Stenographers and Judgment Writers and requirement of Degree of Law in respect of Senior Judgment Writers has no bearing whatsoever in respect of the work to be turned out by the respective categories of employees. To support the said observation, the learned single Judge has relied upon the judgement in the case of T.R Kothandaraman Versus Tamil Nadu Water Supply & Drianage BD, reported in (1994) 6 SCC 282 , and held that prescription of higher qualification under the amended rules and explanation has no nexus with the object sought to be achieved. 42. As regard to whether the criterion fixed by the proviso to the amended Rules of 2009, it is held that it is manifestly erroneous, arbitrary, unreasonable, irrational and discriminatory and thus violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, as the right to be considered for promotion is held to be a fundamental right. Learned single Judge has relied on: the judgement of Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Mohammad Shujat Ali Versus Union of India,reported in AIR 1974 SC 1 631 ; The Manager, Govt. Branch Press Versus D.B. Belliappa,reported in AIR 1979 SC 429 ; another decision of Constitutional Bench of Apex Court in the case of Ajit Singh Versus State of Punjab,reported in (1999) 7 SCC 209 and decision of Division Bench of this court, in the case of Channe Gowda Versus High Court of Karnataka,reported in ILR 2004 Karnataka 4633. Learned single Judge has observed at para No.85 as under:- "85. In the light of the aforesaid law laid down by the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court and a Division Bench of this court, the petitioners' right to be considered for promotion is, therefore, a fundamental right and it is not a mere chance for promotion. Learned single Judge has observed at para No.85 as under:- "85. In the light of the aforesaid law laid down by the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court and a Division Bench of this court, the petitioners' right to be considered for promotion is, therefore, a fundamental right and it is not a mere chance for promotion. The petitioners who have been working between 10 to 30 years, as could be seen in the writ petition averments, and persons who are similarly placed like the petitioners, have not been promoted only because they have no a Degree qualification or Law Degree, and thus the right of the petitioners for being considered for promotion to the next higher post, has been severely affected. The petitioners cannot be deprived of their fundamental right to be considered for promotion by way of proviso and explanation substituted by way of 2009 amendment Rules to 1973 Rules". Learned single Judge has held that right to be considered for promotion is a fundamental right and it is not a mere chance of promotion and thus, amended rules are violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. 43. As regard to whether the requirements mentioned in the explanation to the proviso to the amended rules are arbitrary, unreasonable, impracticable and lacks rational nexus and hence violative of Articles 14 & 16 of the Constitution and whether the amended Rules which have retrospective operation has the effect of taking away the existing right under 1973 Rules and thus the amended Rules are arbitrary, discriminatory and violative of the right guaranteed under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and hence unconstitutional is concerned, the learned single Judge by referring to the discretionary power conferred on the Chief Justice in granting permission, has observed that, the explanation to the proviso in respect of the method of recruitment provides that even to pursue higher studies, i.e., to obtain degree or a law degree, permission has to be granted and it is not automatic and the period prescribed to obtain qualification is 5 years and thus, grant of permission is not automatic and it is also subject to the discretion of the Chief Justice and, as such, there is no guarantee of every person seeking permission, being given permission automatically because, the very explanation says the permission is not automatic. The Circular at Annexure “M” dated 24.8.2010, stipulates that at a time not more than 10% of the officers/officials working in a particular cadre shall be permitted to pursue Degree's/LL.B/LL.M/Master's Degree/MBA. 44. Group ‘D’ employees, who have been recruited into service with a minimum qualification of 7th Standard, may take more than eight years to acquire Degree or Law Degree. The learned single Judge, relying on the judgement of the Apex Court, in the case of State of T.N. Versus P. Krishna Murthy,reported in (2006) 4 SCC 517 and in the case of N. Abdul Basheer Versus K.K Karunakaran,reported in 1989 Supp. (2) SCC 344, has observed that there is no consistent policy followed in treating graduates and non-graduates and it amounts to creating two classes of employees belonging to the same cadre for the purpose of creating difference in promotional opportunities and is violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. Learned single Judge further held that explanation to proviso is unworkable, unreasonable, imposes restriction on the right to be considered for promotion and it is violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. 45. As regard to which Rule is applicable -old Rules of 1973 or amended Rules of 2009, in respect of the vacancies in the promotional posts which arose prior to the amendment in 2009, the learned single Judge has relied on the decisions of the Apex Court: in the case of Y.V. Rangaiah Versus J. Sreenivasa Rao,reported in ( (1983) 3 SCC 284 ); Arjun Singh Rathore Versus B.N. Chaturvedi,reported in (2007) 11 SCC 605 and in the case of State of Rajasthan Versus R. Dayal, reported in (1997) 10 SCC 419 , and has held that the posts which fell vacant prior to the amendment of the Rules would be governed by the original Rules and not the amended Rules. Learned single Judge has held that the amended Rules have taken away not only the rights of the petitioners under the existing Rules of 1973, but also deprive them of the benefits of stepping up, time bound increments and senior scale of pay, as all of them would have been eligible for promotion but for the amendment and the amendment by way of proviso and explanation is, therefore, arbitrary, discriminatory, irrational and violative of the rights guaranteed under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and hence unconstitutional. 46. As regard to whether the promotions given pursuant to the amended Rules are in consonance with the well established principles of service jurisprudence, the learned single Judge has held that special relaxation is given to one candidate as one time measure without any criterion and the promotions given to the persons, whose orders of promotion are called in question, are contrary to the well established principles of service jurisprudence and cannot be upheld in law as the said promotions are in violation of the fundamental rights of the petitioners. 47. As regard to whether the procedure followed in bringing about the amended Rules of 2009 is in accordance with the well established principles and procedures applicable in respect of bringing amendments to the principal rules, the learned single Judge has held that the procedure followed both in respect of draft rules and amended rules, 2009 is not in consistence with the well established principles of law. 48. Having regard to the reasoning and findings of the learned single Judge and the rival contentions addressed by the learned counsel appearing for the respective parties, I formulate the following points for determination: 1. Whether the amended rules of 2009 violate the provisions of Article 229 of the Constitution of India? 2. Whether the amended rules of 2009 requiring higher educational qualification as eligibility criterion for promotion to the next higher cadre is violative of Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution? 3. Whether the amended rules are applicable to the vacancies that existed prior to coming into force of the amended rules of 2009? 4. Whether the hardship caused to the employees in acquiring higher educational qualification could be a ground to declare the amended rules as arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India? 49. Having regard to the several contentions raised by the respective counsel, it would be appropriate to consider:- 1) Nature and scope of the power of the Chief Justice under Article 229 of the Constitution of India; 2) Scope and extent of power of judicial review of legislative power of the Chief Justice; 3) Constitutionality of the amended rules; 4) Rights of the employees for promotion to the next higher cadre; 50. Re. Re. Power of Chief Justice under Article 229 of the Constitution of India: The Chief Justice is delegated with legislative power under Article 229 of the Constitution of India. He exercises the legislative power as a delegate. Article 229 of the Constitution of India reads as under: "229. Officers and servants and the expenses of High Courts (1) Appointments of officers and servants of a High Court shall be made by the Chief Justice of the Court or such other Judge or officer of the Court as he may direct: Provided that the Governor of the State may by rule require that in such cases as may be specified in the rule no person not already attached to the Court shall be appointed to any office connected with the Court save after consultation with the State Public Service Commission. (2) Subject to the provisions of any law made by the Legislature of the State, the conditions of service of officers and servants of a High Court shall be such as may be prescribed by rules made by the Chief Justice of the Court or by some other Judge or officer of the Court authorised by the Chief Justice to make rules for the purpose: Provided that the rules made under this clause shall, so far as they relate to salaries, allowances, leave or pensions, require the approval of the Governor of the State (3) The administrative expenses of a High Court, including all salaries, allowances and pensions payable to or in respect of the officers and servants of the Court, shall be charged upon the Consolidated Fund of the State, and any fees or other moneys taken by the Court shall form part of that Fund". 51. Article 229 has three folds: (1) the Chief Justice of the Court or such other Judge or officer of the Court as he may direct, shall have the power to appoint officers and servants of the High Court (2) power to frame rules governing the conditions of service of the employees of the High Court subject to the provisions of any law made by the Legislature of the State and (3) to frame rules relating to salaries, allowances, leave, pension, subject to the approval of the Governor of the State. 52. Sri Jayakumar S. Patil, learned senior counsel contended that the amended rules require the approval of the Governor. 53. 52. Sri Jayakumar S. Patil, learned senior counsel contended that the amended rules require the approval of the Governor. 53. To my mind, I do not find any such requirement, except for rules relating to salary, allowance, leave and pension. The Apex Court had an occasion to consider the scope of the power of the Chief Justice under Article 229 of the Constitution. 54. In a judgement reported in AIR 1990 SC 334 in the matter of SUPREME COURT EMPLOYEES WELFARE ASSOCIATION VERSUS UNION OF INDIA AND OTHER Sconsidering the scope of Article 146 conferring power on the Chief Justice of Honourable Supreme Court and Article 229 conferring power on the Chief Justice of the High Court, Apex Court has held that, the rules relating to salary, allowances, pension, leave as payable to the servants require the approval of the Governor. Apex Court at para 40 has referred to the opinion of Dr. Ambedkar in constitutional debate on Articles 146 and 229 of the Constitution, which reads thus: “40. In State of U.P. VersusJ.P Chaurasia, AIR 1980 SC 19 this Court observed as follows (at p.25 of AIR):- "The first question regarding entitlement to the pay scale admissible to Section Officers should not detain us longer. The answer to the question depends upon several factors. It does not just depend upon either the nature of work or volume of work done by Bench Secretaries. Primarily it requires among others, evaluation of duties and responsibilities of the respective posts. More often functions of two posts may appear to be the same or similar, but there may be difference in degrees in the performance. The quantity of work may be the same, but quality may be different that cannot be determined by relying upon averments in affidavits of interested parties. The equation of posts or equation of pay must be left to the Executive Government. It must be determined by expert bodies like Pay Commission. They would be the best judge to evaluate the nature of duties and responsibilities of posts. If there is any such determination by a Commission or Committee, the Court should normally accept it. The Court should not try to tinker with such equivalent unless it is shown that it was made with extraneous consideration." 55. They would be the best judge to evaluate the nature of duties and responsibilities of posts. If there is any such determination by a Commission or Committee, the Court should normally accept it. The Court should not try to tinker with such equivalent unless it is shown that it was made with extraneous consideration." 55. The power of the Chief Justice under Article 229 of the Constitution of India has been elaborately considered by the Apex Court in the judgement reported in AIR 1998 SC 1079 in the matter of HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN VERSUS RAMESH CHAND PALIWAL AND ANOTHER, observing that, Article 229 makes the Chief Justice of High court the supreme authority in the matter of appointment of the High Court officers and servants. This Article also confers rule making power on the Chief Justice for regulating the conditions of service of officers and servants of the High Court subject to the condition that if the Rules relate to salaries, allowances, leave and pension, they may have to have the approval of the Governor of the State. If the legislature has made any law, the rules made by the Chief Justice would operate subject to the law made in the State. At para 40 of the said judgement, it is observed as under:- "Under the constitutional scheme, Chief Justice is the supreme authority and the other Judges, so far as officers and servants of the High Court are concerned, have no role to play on the administrative side. Some Judges, undoubtedly, will become Chief Justice in their own turn one day, but it is imperative under constitutional discipline that they work in tranquility. Judges have been described as "hermits". They have to live and behave like "hermits" who have no desire or aspiration, having shed it through penance. Their mission is to supply light and not heat. Some Judges, undoubtedly, will become Chief Justice in their own turn one day, but it is imperative under constitutional discipline that they work in tranquility. Judges have been described as "hermits". They have to live and behave like "hermits" who have no desire or aspiration, having shed it through penance. Their mission is to supply light and not heat. This is necessary so that their latent desire to run the High Court administration may not sprout before time, at least, in some cases." In a later decision, the Apex Court has cautioned as to the arbitrary exercise of power by the Chief Justice in the matter of appointment of staff for the subordinate Court, in a decision reported in AIR 1991 SC 295 in the matter of H.C. PUTTASWAMY AND OTHERS VERSUS THE HONOURABLE CHIEF JUSTICE OF KARNATAKA HIGH COURT, BANGALORE AND OTHERS, inter alia holding that the Chief Justice has no power to appoint the staff of the subordinate Court. At para 11, Supreme Court observed thus: "The judiciary is the custodian of constitutional principles which are essential to the maintenance of rule of law. Itis the vehicle for the protection of a set of values which are integral part of our social and political philosophy. Judges are the most visible actors in the administration of justice. Their case decisions are the most publicly visible outcome. But the administration of justice is just not deciding disputed cases. It involves great deal more than that. Any realistic analysis of the administration of justice in the Courts must also take account of the totality of the Judges behaviour and their administrative roles. They may appear to be only minor aspects of the administration of justice, but collectively they are not trivial. They constitute, in our opinion, a substantial part of the mosaic which represents the ordinary man's perception of what the courts are and how the judges go about their work. The Chief Justice is the prime force in the High Court. Article 229 of the Constitution provides that appointment of officers and servants of the High Court shall be made by the Chief Justice or such other Judge or officer of the Court as may be directed by the Chief Justice. The Chief Justice is the prime force in the High Court. Article 229 of the Constitution provides that appointment of officers and servants of the High Court shall be made by the Chief Justice or such other Judge or officer of the Court as may be directed by the Chief Justice. The object of this Article was to secure the independence of the High Court, which cannot be regarded as fully secured unless the authority to appoint supporting staff with complete control over them is vested in the Chief Justice. There can no disagreement on this matter. There is imperative need for total and absolute administrative independence of the High Court. But the Chief Justice or any other Administrative Judge is not an absolute ruler. Nor he is a free-wheeler. He must operate in the clean world of law, not in the neighbourhood of sordid atmosphere. He has a duty to ensure that in carrying out the administrative functions, he is actuated by same principles and values as those of the Court he is serving. He cannot depart from and indeed must remain committed to the constitutional ethoes and traditions of his calling. We need hardly to say that those who are expected to oversee the conduct of others must necessarily maintain a higher standard of ethical and intellectual rectitude. The public expectations do not seem to be less exacting". Apex Court has held that, the power of the Chief Justice in the matter of appointment is confined to the High Court only. 56. Distinction has been drawn in the matter of appointment of officers and servants of the High Court and subordinate Court. In so far as High Court is concerned, to secure independence of the High Court, which cannot be regarded as fully secured unless an authority to appoint supporting staff with-complete control over them is vested in the Chief Justice. 57. Article 229 of the Constitution expressly confers legislative power. Chief Justice exercises the legislative function as delegatee. There is no excessive delegation nor the rules prescribing the service conditions and method of recruitment is beyond the scope of delegated legislation. Rules framed and amendments are well within the power of delegated legislative power of the Chief Justice. 58. 57. Article 229 of the Constitution expressly confers legislative power. Chief Justice exercises the legislative function as delegatee. There is no excessive delegation nor the rules prescribing the service conditions and method of recruitment is beyond the scope of delegated legislation. Rules framed and amendments are well within the power of delegated legislative power of the Chief Justice. 58. Thus, it leaves no doubt that, the Chief Justice has power to make the rules prescribing conditions of service and method of recruitment of the officers and servants of the High Court and the same do not require approval of the Governor as these rules do not relate to the salary, allowance, pension and leave. 59. Re. The Scope and extent of power of judicial review of legislative function of the Chief Justice. Under Article 229 of the Constitution, the Chief Justice exercises delegated legislative function. The power of judicial review of the legislative function is limited. While considering the judicial review of legislative power, Court must consider the rational nexus between the rules framed or amended and the object sought to be promoted. 60. To further appreciate, I also refer to some of ‘the provisions of the Principal Rules’. 61. Rule 7 of the Principal Rules provides for the recruitment to a post or a class of posts shall be made by the Chief Justice in consonance with the procedure prescribed under Schedule III to the rules. The said rule also confers power to the Chief Justice to modify the method of recruitment from time to time by general or special order. 62. Under Rule 8 of the Principal Rules except as otherwise provided in the said rules, the qualifications required for appointment to the various categories of posts by departmental promotion or otherwise shall be such as the Chief Justice may, prescribe from time to time, by general or special order. 63. From 1973, the service conditions of the officers and the servants of the High Court have been governed under the Principal Rules. However, the Chief Justice, in exercise of his power conferred on him under Article 229 of the Constitution, ordered for issue of notification amending the Principal Rules relating to the method of recruitment. Amongst the others, higher educational qualification was prescribed as an eligible criterion for promotion to the next higher cadre. 64. However, the Chief Justice, in exercise of his power conferred on him under Article 229 of the Constitution, ordered for issue of notification amending the Principal Rules relating to the method of recruitment. Amongst the others, higher educational qualification was prescribed as an eligible criterion for promotion to the next higher cadre. 64. By notification dated 24.02.2009, schedule III was amended in respect of posts relating to: Senior Judgement Writer; Judgement Writer; Stenographer; Second Division Assistant and the Computer operator / Typist. 65. In respect of Senior Judgement Writers, amended rule requires that 60% of the total strength of the Senior Judgement Writers shall be by promotion by selection from the cadre of Judgement Writers working in the High Court office on the basis of a test conducted for the purpose, giving weightage for seniority and service records as prescribed; provided that they shall satisfy the educational qualification of possessing Law Degree from the recognized University or equivalent examination. The remaining 40% of the posts shall be recruited by Direct Recruitment by selection after calling for applications and holding a competitive test and interview. Judgement Writers as well as Stenographers working in the High court of Karnataka / Subordinate Courts were also eligible for the Direct Recruitment provided they obtain necessary permission from the Competent Authority under whom they were serving, subject to competitive test and interview. The minimum educational qualification prescribed was Degree in Law, Senior Grade Examination in English Shorthand in First Class or the Proficiency Grade Examination in English Shorthand and Senior Grade Examination in Typewriting in English etc. 66. Similarly, in respect of the Judgement Writers, 60% of the total strength were to be filled up by promotion. Amongst others, minimum educational qualification of Degree from the recognized University or equivalent examination was prescribed. Remaining 40% shall be filled up by direct recruitment by selection after calling applications from candidates who have passed Senior Grade Examination in English Shorthand in First class or Proficiency Grade Examination in English Shorthand and holding a competitive test and interview, with the further qualification of Degree from a recognized University. 67. In respect of Stenographers, they shall possess a Degree from a recognized University or equivalent examination, apart from other qualifications. 68. 67. In respect of Stenographers, they shall possess a Degree from a recognized University or equivalent examination, apart from other qualifications. 68. In respect of Second Division Assistants, 50% of the posts to be filled up by direct recruitment by selection, with minimum educational qualification of Degree and the remaining 50% of the posts to be filled up by promotion on the basis of seniority-cum-merit from the cadre of Group ‘D’ officials working in the High Court Establishment with minimum educational qualification of degree from recognized University or equivalent. 69. In respect of Computer Operator / Typist (Sl. No.22), 85% of the posts to be filled up by direct recruitment and the remaining 15% by promotion from the Group ‘D’ officials. However, for both, minimum educational qualification of Degree from recognized University or equivalent was prescribed. 70. Before the amended rules of 2009, the method of recruitment to the posts of Senior Judgement Writer and the Judgement Writer was by promotion from the post of Judgement Writer and Stenographer respectively on the basis of a test conducted for the said purpose, by giving due weightage to the seniority and service records as prescribed. In respect of judgement writers, the feeder cadre was the Stenographers, who have put in not less than one year of service or the Judgement Writers or Selection Grade Stenographers working in Sub-ordinate Courts on the basis of a test conducted for the purpose, by giving due weight for inter-seniority and service records. 71. Posts of Stenographers were filled by promotion by selection from amongst Typists, who had passed Senior Grade in both Typewriting and Shorthand exams conducted by the Department of Public Instruction of the Karnataka Secondary Education Board or equivalent examination with minimum qualification of SSLC, or direct recruitment with similar qualification. 72. In respect of posts of Typists, 85% posts were filled up by direct recruitment and 15% by promotion by selection of Group ‘D’ officials. 73. However, the method of recruitment was altered by amending rules by issue of notification dated 24.02.2009. Under the amended rules, for the promotion to the post of Senior Judgement Writer, apart from other requirement was subject to possessing his/her qualification of Law Degree from a recognized University, which hitherto was not prescribed under the principal rules. 73. However, the method of recruitment was altered by amending rules by issue of notification dated 24.02.2009. Under the amended rules, for the promotion to the post of Senior Judgement Writer, apart from other requirement was subject to possessing his/her qualification of Law Degree from a recognized University, which hitherto was not prescribed under the principal rules. Similarly, for the promotion to the post of Judgement Writer and Stenographer, the higher educational qualification of Degree from a recognized University was prescribed as a criterion. For post of Second Division Assistant also, Degree from a recognized University was prescribed as a criterion for promotion from the post of Group ‘D’ employees. Before amendment to the Schedule III to the rules, no higher educational qualification was prescribed as a criterion for the purpose of promotion to the next higher cadre. 74. Similarly, in respect of the post of Assistant Registrar / Assistant Registrar Protocol, which were filled up by promotion by selection at the ratio of 2:1:1 from the cadre of Section Officers, Court Officers and Senior Judgement Writers provided they possess the higher educational qualification of Degree in Law from a recognized University. However, no higher educational qualification was prescribed under the Principal Rules. 75. For the first time, the higher educational qualification was prescribed as eligibility criterion for promotion to the next higher cadre in the High Court by amending the rules relating to the method of recruitment. Since no such eligibility was prescribed earlier, and those who were not possessing the higher educational qualification, their service conditions were got affected and their chances of promotion were diminished, they challenged the constitutional validity of these amended rules of 2009. 76. Promotions are granted to the higher post to avoid stagnation as well as frustration among the employees. The subordinate legislation relating to promotion must be judged keeping in view the object and purport thereof. It must subserve the object rather than subverting the same. If a Rule has the effect of seriously jeopardising the chances of promotion, such rule may amount to imposing unreasonable restriction. However, it depends on facts and circumstances of each case. 77. The subordinate legislation relating to promotion must be judged keeping in view the object and purport thereof. It must subserve the object rather than subverting the same. If a Rule has the effect of seriously jeopardising the chances of promotion, such rule may amount to imposing unreasonable restriction. However, it depends on facts and circumstances of each case. 77. The Apex Court in the judgement reported in ( (2008) 5 SCC 416 ) in the matter of A. SATYANARAYANA AND OTHERS VERSUS S. PURUSHOTHAM AND OTHERS while considering the fixing of ratio for promotion to the next higher cadre from two different cadre, has held that the judicial review of the subordinate legislation is permissible if the rule suffers from arbitrariness, irrationality, unreasonableness or has no nexus with the object, which is sought to be achieved. Though, legislation is presumed to be reasonable, but the legislation must be capable of being taken to a logical conclusion. Para 33 of the said judgement reads as under:- "We have no doubt in our mind that before a rule is declared ultra vires, the same must be held to be wholly arbitrary or irrational. In any event a plea of discrimination based on adequate pleadings therefor would be essential. What, however, must be noticed by us is that the impugned rule does not take into consideration the events which may take place in future, as for example, increase in the strength in the cadre. If the number of posts for promotion is limited to 10, even in a case like the present one where the number of posts has gone up, only 10 posts can be filled up from the cadre of the PSs although the same would contravene the ratio of 14:1. If the Government intends to change the ratio, it may do so. It may also provide for separate rules providing for maintenance of two different cadres at all levels. But what is impermissible is laying down a condition subsequent to adoption of a policy decision which defeats the object and purport thereof". 78. While exercising the power of judicial review, the Court is entrusted with the task of examination as to, whether the decision taken by the authority is proportionate and is well balanced and harmonious. But what is impermissible is laying down a condition subsequent to adoption of a policy decision which defeats the object and purport thereof". 78. While exercising the power of judicial review, the Court is entrusted with the task of examination as to, whether the decision taken by the authority is proportionate and is well balanced and harmonious. To this extent, the Court may indulge merit review and if the Court finds that the decision is proportionate, it seldom interfere with the decision taken and if it finds that the decision is disproportionate i.e., if the Court finds that it is not well balanced or harmonious and does not stand to reason, it tends to interfere. 79. The Apex Court in a decision reported in (2010 SCC (6) 614) in the matter of CHAIRMAN, ALL INDIA RAILWAY RECRUITMENT BOARD AND ANOTHER VERSUS K. SHYAM KUMAR AND OTHERS at paras 36 and 37 has observed thus: "36. Wednesbury applies to a decision which is so reprehensible in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral or ethical standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the issue to be decided could have arrived at it. Proportionality as a legal test is capable of being more precise and fastidious than a reasonableness test as well as requiring a more intrusive review of a decision made by a public authority which requires the courts to "assess the balance or equation" struck by the decision maker. Proportionality test in some jurisdictions is also described as the "least injurious means" or "minimal impairment" test so as to safeguard the fundamental rights of citizens and to ensure a fair balance between individual rights and public interest. Suffice it to say that there has been an overlapping of all these tests in its content and structure, it is difficult to compartmentalize or lay down a straitjacket formula and to say that Wednesbury has met with its death knell is too tall a statement. Let us, however, recognize the fact that the current trend seems to favour proportionality test but Wednesbury has not met with its judicial burial and a State burial, with full honours is surely not to happen in the near future. 37.) Proportionality, requires the Court to judge whether action taken was really needed as well as whether it was within the range of courses of action which could reasonably be followed. 37.) Proportionality, requires the Court to judge whether action taken was really needed as well as whether it was within the range of courses of action which could reasonably be followed. Proportionality is more concerned with the aims and intention of the decision-maker and whether the decision-maker has achieved more or less the correct balance or equilibrium. The Courtentrusted with the task of judicial review has to examine whether decision taken by the authority is proportionate, i.e. well balanced and harmonious, to this extent the court may indulge in a merit review and if the court finds that the decision is proportionate, it seldom interferes with the decision taken and if it finds that the decision is disproportionate i.e. if the court feels that it is not well balanced or harmonious and does not stand to reason it may tend to interfere." 80. To understand as to whether the decision maker has achieved more or less the correct balance or equilibrium, and to examine the proportionality, it is necessary to consider the facts and circumstances of these cases. It is submitted on behalf of Chief Justice that the requirement of higher educational qualification is reasonable and has rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved and does not create discrimination. 81. To appreciate this contention, it is proper to refer to the rules relating to the method of recruitment prior and after amendment. "The existing method of recruitment and amendments to be substituted in place of the earlier method of recruitment, in respect of the petitioners herein, with reference to Notification No.HCE 221/2009 dated 29.7.2009 published in the Gazette, are as under: THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA SERVICE (CONDITIONS OF SERVICE AND RECRUITMENT) (V AMENDMENT) RULES, 2009. Method of Recruitment to the posts of First Division Assistants from Second Division Assistants and Typists: Amendment to be substituted in the To the Cadre of Sl. No. Cadre Name Existing method of Recruitment place of existing method of recruitment By promotion from the cadres of SDAs and Typists in the ratio of 6:4 (6 SDAs and 4 Typists) as far as possible; Provided that, an official of one of the above two cadres shall not be given promotion to the cadre of First Division Assistants / Audit Clerks, earlier to the 1. First Division Assistants By promotion from the cadres of SDAs and Typists in the ratio of 6:4 (6 SDAs and 4 Typists) as far as possible;Provided that, an official of one the above two cadres shall not be given promotion to the cadre of First Division Assistants/ Audit Clerks, earlier to the promotion of the officials of the other cadre who had become members of that cadre prior to the date on which the former official became a member of his/her cadre. promotion of the officials of the other cadre who had become members of that cadre prior to the date on which the former official became a member of his/her cadre.Provided they shall possess a Degree from any University established by Law in India and Certificate Course in Computer Application. Explanation: 1. The present members who are working as First Division Assistants and who do not possess the required qualification, shall qualify themselves without affecting the regular work, with prior permission of Honourable the Chief Justice, within a period of five years, failing which they shall not be entitled for further promotion. The permission is not automatic, but subject to the interest of the Institution. Such permission shall not take away the rights of the senior employees and does not confer the undue privileges on the junior employees. The qualification obtained without following the above norms would not be taken into consideration, till they come within the zone of consideration. Note: 1) For securing minimum qualification prescribed for this cadre within stipulated time, the permission may be liberally granted. 2) The period of time prescribed for securing minimum qualification (i.e. five years) starts from the date of permission. Note; For the posts of Audit Clerks preference will be given to the officials who possess Bachelors' Degree in Commerce. Method of Recruitment to the posts of Senior Assistants from First Division Assistants: Existing method of Amendment to be substituted in the Sl.No.Cadre Recruitment place of existing method of recruitment By promotion on the basis of seniority-cum-efficiency from the cadre of First Division Assistants, Accountants, Audit Clerks, Assistant Librarians working in the High Court.Provided they shall possess a Degree from any university established by Law in India or equivalent. Explanation: 1. Explanation: 1. The present members who are working asBy promotion on the Senior Assistants and who do not basis of seniority-possess the required qualification, cum-efficiency from shall qualify themselves without the cadre of First affecting the regular work, with To the cadre of Division Assistants, prior permission of Honourable the 1. Senior Assistants Accountants, Audit Clerks, Assistant Librarians and Junior Statistical Assistant Chief Justice, within a period of five years, failing which they shall not be entitled for further promotion. working in the High Court. The permission is not automatic, but subject to the interest of the Institution. Such permission shall not take away the rights of the senior employees and does not confer the undue privileges on the junior employees. The qualification obtained without following the above norms would not be taken into consideration, till they come within the zone of consideration. Note: 1) For securing minimum qualification prescribed for this cadre within stipulated time, the permission may be liberally granted. 2) The period of time prescribed for securing minimum qualification (i.e. five years) starts from the date of permission. Method of Recruitment to the posts of Stenographers from Typists, Judgment Writers from Stenographers and Senior Judgment Writers from Judgment Writers: Sl. No. Cadre Existing method of Recruitment (a) By promotion by selection from amongst Typists who have passed Senior Grade in both Typewriting and Shorthand conducted by the Department of Public Instruction of the Karnataka Secondary Education Board or equivalent examination working on the establishment of the High Court or Amendment to be substituted in the place of existing method of recruitment By promotion by selection from amongst Typists who have passed Senior Grade examination in both Typewriting and Shorthand conducted by the Department of Public Instruction of the Karnataka Secondary Education Board or equivalent examination working on the establishment of the High Court or from amongstthe Stenographers working in the Subordinate Courts, or by both, on the basis of a Test conducted for the purpose, due weight being given to seniority and service records, as prescribed; provided that they shall possess Degree from a recognised university or equivalent examination. Explanation: 1. The present members who are working as Stenographers and who do not possess the required qualification, shall qualify themselves without affecting the regular work, with prior permission of Honourable the Chief To the cadre 1. Explanation: 1. The present members who are working as Stenographers and who do not possess the required qualification, shall qualify themselves without affecting the regular work, with prior permission of Honourable the Chief To the cadre 1. of Stenographers from amongst the Stenographers working in the Subordinate Courts, or by both, on the basis of a Test conducted for the purpose, due weight being given to seniority and service records, as prescribed: or(b) By direct recruitment by selection (after calling for applications and holding a competitive test and interview). Minimum Qualifications: (for direct recruitment) 1. Must have passed the SSLC examination conducted by the Karnataka Secondary Education Board of equivalent Examination Justice, within a period of five years, failing which they shall not be entitled for further promotion. The permission is not automatic, but subject to the interest of the Institution. Such permission shall not take away the rights of the senior employees and does not confer the undue privileges on the junior employees. The qualification obtained without following the above norms would not be taken into consideration, till they come within the zone of consideration. Note: 1) For securing minimum qualification prescribed for this cadre within stipulated time, the permission may be liberally granted. 2) The period of time prescribed for securing minimum qualification (i.e. five years) starts from the date of permission. 3) If no eligible candidate is available for promotion, such vacant post may be filled up by direct recruitment. 4) The candidate shall possess a Certificate in Word Processing or equivalent. or 2. By direct recruitment by selection (after calling for applications and holding a competitive test and interview). Minimum Note: Preference will be given to those who are graduates. Must have passed: 2. 1. The senior grade examination in English Shorthand in first class; or The Proficiency Grade Examination in English Shorthand; and 2. Senior Grade Examination in Typewriting in English conducted by the Department of Public Instruction of the Karnataka Secondary Education Board or equivalent qualification. Qualifications: (for direct recruitment) 1. 1. Must possess a degree from a recognized university or equivalent examination. 2. The Senior Grade Examination in English Shorthand with 60% of aggregate marks; or The Proficiency Grade Examination in English Shorthand; and 2. 3. Senior Grade Examination in Typewriting in English conducted, by the Department of Public Instruction of the Karnataka Secondary Education Board or equivalent qualification. 3. 4. Must possess a degree from a recognized university or equivalent examination. 2. The Senior Grade Examination in English Shorthand with 60% of aggregate marks; or The Proficiency Grade Examination in English Shorthand; and 2. 3. Senior Grade Examination in Typewriting in English conducted, by the Department of Public Instruction of the Karnataka Secondary Education Board or equivalent qualification. 3. 4. Certificate in Computer Word Processing or equivalent. Note: 1) Preference will be given to those candidates who possess the qualification of Senior Grade examination in Typewriting and Shorthand in Kannada language. 2) The procedure for conducting test which was followed previously for the promotion to the cadres of Stenographers shall also be followed for the Direct Recruitment to the said posts. 1) 60% of the total strength of Senior Judgment Writers shall be recruited by promotion by selection from the cadre of 2. By promotion by selection from among:(a) Stenographers working in the High Judgment Writers working in the High Court office on the basis of a test conducted for the purpose, giving the weightage for seniority and service records as prescribed; provided that they shall satisfy the following conditions hereunder:a) They shall possess Law Degree from the recognized University or equivalent examination. Explanation: 1. The present members who are working as Senior judgment Writers and who do not possess the required qualification, shall qualify themselves without affecting the regular work, with prior permission of Honourable the Chief Justice, within a period of five years, failing which they shall not be entitled for further promotion. The permission is not automatic, but subject to the interest of the Institution. Such permission shall not take away the rights of the senior employees and does not confer the undue privileges on the junior employees. The qualification obtained without following the above norms would not be taken into consideration, till they come within the zone of consideration. Note: 1) For securing minimum qualification prescribed for this cadre within stipulated time, the permission may be liberally granted. 2) The period of time prescribed for securing minimum qualification (i.e. five years) starts from the date of Court Establishment who have put in not less than one year of service as such; or (b) Judgment Writers or Selection Grade Stenographers working in Sub ordinate Courts on the basis of a test conducted for the purpose, giving due weight for inter-seniority and service records as prescribed. To the cadre of Judgment Writers permission. 3) If no eligible candidate is available for promotion, such vacant post may be filled up by direct recruitment. 4) The candidate shall possess a Certificate Course in Word Processing or equivalent. 2) Remaining 40% of the posts shall be recruited by Direct Recruitment by Selection (after calling application and holding a competitive test and interview) and the Judgment Writers as well as Stenographers working in the establishment of the High Court of Karnataka / Sub-ordinate Courts are also eligible for the Direct Recruitment, provided they shall obtain necessary permission from the Competent Authority. Minimum Qualifications (for Direct Recruitment) 1. Must possess Degree in Law from the recognised University or equivalent examination and, 2. i) Senior Grade examination in English Shorthand in First Class; or the Proficiency Grade Examination in English Shorthand; and ii) Senior Grade examination in Typewriting in English conducted by the Department of Public Instruction of Karnataka Secondary Education Board or equivalent examination. 3. Certificate in Computer Word Processing or equivalent Note: 1) Preference will be given to those candidates who possess the qualification of Senior Grade examination in Typewriting and Shorthand in Kannada Language also. 2) The procedure for conducting test which was followed previously for the promotion to the cadres of Senior Judgment Writers shall also be followed for the Direct Recruitment to the said posts. Method of recruitment to the posts of Second Division Assistants from Group ‘D’ officials. Sl. No. Cadre Existing method of Recruitment Amendment to be substituted in the place of existing method of recruitment (a) 50% by direct recruitment by selection after calling for application and interviewing the applicants. The minimum qualification for direct recruitment (a) 50% by direct recruitment by shall be a degree of selection after calling for a recognized application and interviewing the University with applicants. The minimum minimum of 55% qualification for direct recruitment marks in the shall be a degree in Science / Arts / aggregate for Commerce candidate belonging to General Category / Business Management of a To the cadre of 1. The minimum minimum of 55% qualification for direct recruitment marks in the shall be a degree in Science / Arts / aggregate for Commerce candidate belonging to General Category / Business Management of a To the cadre of 1. Second Division Assistants and minimum of 45% marks in the aggregate to Schedule Caste and Schedule Tribes.(b) 25% promotion on the basis of seniority-cum-merit from the cadre of Group D officials working in the High Court Establishment and who have passed degree examination of recognized University and who have put in not less than one year of service. (c) 25% by promotion on the basis of seniority-cum-merit from the cadre of Group D officials working in the High Court Establishment and who have passed the SSLC or equivalent examination and who have put in not less than 3 years of service. (d) If any vacancy cannot be filled up by promotion for want of suitable candidate from the cadre of Group D officials possessing recognised University with minimum of 55% marks in the aggregate for candidate belonging to General category and a minimum of 45% marks in the aggregate to Schedule Caste and Schedule Tribes.(b) 50% promotion on the basis of seniority-cum-merit from the cadre of Group D officials working in the High Court Establishment and who have passed degree examination of recognised University and who have put in not less than two years of service. Explanation: 1. The present members who are working as Second Division Assistants and who do not possess the required qualification, shall qualify themselves without affecting the regular work, with prior permission of Honourable the Chief Justice, within a period of five years, failing which they shall not be entitled for further promotion. The permission is not automatic, but subject to the interest of the Institution. Such permission shall not take away the rights of the senior employees and does not confer the undue privileges on the junior employees. The qualification obtained without following the above norms would not be taken into consideration, till they come within the zone of consideration. Note: 1) For securing minimum qualification prescribed for this cadre within stipulated time, the degree qualification, permission may be liberally the same shall be filled up by promoting suitable candidate from the cadre of Group D officials possessing SSLC or equivalent qualification. Note: 1) For securing minimum qualification prescribed for this cadre within stipulated time, the degree qualification, permission may be liberally the same shall be filled up by promoting suitable candidate from the cadre of Group D officials possessing SSLC or equivalent qualification. (e) If any vacancy meant for Group D officials cannot be filled up by promotion for want granted. 2) The period of time prescribed for securing minimum qualification (i.e. five years) starts from the date of permission. 3) If no eligible candidate is available for promotion, such vacant post may be filled up by direct recruitment. of suitable candidate the same shall be filled by direct recruitment. Method of Recruitment to the posts of Section Officers from Senior Assistants: Existing method of Amendment to be substituted in the Sl. No. Cadre Recruitment place of existing method of recruitment (a) By promotion on the basis of seniority-cum-efficiency from the cadre of Senior Assistants, Senior Statistical Assistant, and Audit Superintendents borne on the establishment of the High Court on the basis of length of service in that particular cadre. Provided that the post of Section Officers of Judicial Wing Typing Pool, 1. Paper Book Section and Copying Branches I and II may be filled up by posting senior most of the Senior Judgment Writers, (method of recruitment for Section Officers except (I) Section Officer, Judicial Wing Typing Pool (ii) Section Officer, Paper Book Section (iii) Section Officer, Copying Branch-I, (iv) Section Officer, Copying Branch-II) (b) By transfer of a Senior Judgment Writer working in the High Court, (method of recruitment of Section Officers of Judicial Wing Typing Pool, Paper Book Section, Copying Branch I and Copying Branch II). (c) Initially the posts of Senior Protocol Officers which are upgraded as Section Officers (Protocol) shall be filled up by By promotion on the basis of seniority-cum-efficiency from the cadre of Senior Assistants borne on the establishment of the High Court on the basis of length of service in that; particular cadre.Provided that they shall possess a Degree from any university established by Law in India or equivalent. Explanation: 1. Explanation: 1. The present members who are working as Section Officers and who do not possess the required qualification, shall qualify themselves without affecting the regular work, with prior permission of Honourable the Chief Justice, within a period of five years, failing To the cadre of Section Officers shifting the lien of Shriyuths D. R. Balakrishna and K.S. Raghavendra Rao, Section Officers to these upgraded posts of Section Officers (Protocol). Note:- (a) The posts of Section Officers (Protocol) shall be upgraded to that of an Assistant Registrar when an Officer in the Cadre of Section Officer of all Sections who has put in equal or lesser number of years of service in that cadre than the Section Officers (Protocol) gets promotion as Assistant Registrar, the incumbents shall continue in the upgraded posts of Section Officers (Protocol) as long as they hold the said posts of Section Officers (Protocol) shall stand downgraded to the original cadre. which they shall not be entitled for further promotion. The permission is not automatic, but subject to the interest of the Institution. Such permission shall not take away the rights of the senior employees and does not confer the undue privileges on the junior employees. The qualification obtained without following the above norms would not be taken into consideration, till they come within the zone of consideration. Note: 1) For securing minimum qualification prescribed for this cadre within stipulated time, the permission may be liberally granted. 2) The period of time prescribed for securing minimum qualification (i.e. five years) starts from the date of permission. (b) Initially the upgradation shall be for a period of 2 years and the approval shall be obtained for further continuance of the upgraded posts of Section Officers (Protocol), if the incumbents continue in the upgraded posts for more than 2 years. By transfer of Section Officers of all sections having aptitude in protocol work, (method of recruitment to the post of Section officer (Protocol). 82. For the post of First Division Assistant, the principal rules prescribe 6:4 ratio from the cadre of Second Division Assistant and Typist. All the posts of First Division Assistant are filled up only by promotion. However, no additional educational qualification was prescribed under the principal rules for promotion. Under the amended rules, Degree from the University established by law and Certificate of Computer Applications is must. 83. All the posts of First Division Assistant are filled up only by promotion. However, no additional educational qualification was prescribed under the principal rules for promotion. Under the amended rules, Degree from the University established by law and Certificate of Computer Applications is must. 83. Similarly, to the post of Stenographers and Judgement Writers, higher qualification of Degree has been prescribed as eligibility criterion for promotion to the next higher cadre. In respect of the posts of Senior Judgement Writers, Section Officers, Court Officers, Assistant Registrars, Degree of Law has been prescribed as eligibility criterion for promotion to the said posts. 84. It was contended that, once the educational qualification is prescribed at the entry level, the rules existed then, will alone regulate the service conditions of such employees, if the higher educational qualification was not prescribed as eligibility criterion for promotion, then the authority is estopped from prescribing the higher educational qualification as a criterion for promotion by means of the principles of promissory estoppel. 85. As regards the contention that the amended rules are hit by principles of promissory estoppel, to my mind, I am clear that there cannot be any estoppel against the law much less against the exercise of legislative function. Hence, I find no merit in this contention. 86. Employee has no right to claim that, the rules existed at the time of entry into service should remain the same for ever. To support the same, I rely on decision of the Apex court reported in ((2003) 2 SCC page 632) in the matter of P.U. JOSHI AND OTHERS VERSUS ACCOUNTANT GENERAL, AHMEDABAD AND OTHERS in a case where Supervisors in Accountant General (Accounts and Entitlement) who had not passed Section Officers Grade Examination, though getting pay scale similar to the Section officer, it was held that they cannot be treated on a par with Sections Officers merely because a common seniority list was prepared. Even though a common seniority list was prepared, such Supervisors were required to pass SOG examination for promotion to the post of Section Officer and it is as such, Section Officers were considered senior to the unqualified Supervisors and for promotion to the higher post Assistant Accounts Officers only Section Officers are considered eligible. Same was questioned by the Supervisors. The Apex Court, having regard to the prescribing of qualification as a criterion for promotion, has observed thus:- "10. Same was questioned by the Supervisors. The Apex Court, having regard to the prescribing of qualification as a criterion for promotion, has observed thus:- "10. We have carefully considered the submissions made on behalf of both parties. Questions relating to the constitution, pattern, nomenclature of posts, cadres, categories, their creation/abolition, prescription of qualifications and other conditions of service including avenues of promotions and criteria to be fulfilled for such promotions pertain to the field of Policy is within the exclusive discretion and jurisdiction of the State, subject, of course, to the limitations or restrictions envisaged in the Constitution of India and it is not for the Statutory Tribunals, at any rate, to direct the Government to have a particular method of recruitment or eligibility criteria or avenues of promotion or impose itself by substituting its views for that of the State. Similarly, it is well open and within the competency of the State to change the rules relating to a service and alter or amend and vary by addition/subtraction the qualifications, eligibility criteria and other conditions of service including avenues of promotion, from time to time, as the administrative exigencies may need or necessitate. Likewise, the State by appropriate rules is entitled to amalgamate departments or bifurcate departments into more and constitute different categories of posts or cadres by undertaking further classification, bifurcation or amalgamation as well as reconstitute and restructure the pattern and cadres/categories of service, as may be required from time to time by abolishing the existing cadres/posts and creating new cadres/posts. There is no right in any employee of the State to claim that rules governing conditions of his service should be forever the same as the one when he entered service for all purposes and except for ensuring or safeguarding rights or benefits already earned, acquired or accrued at a particular point of time, a Government servant has no right to challenge the authority of the State to amend, alter and bring into force new rules relating to even an existing service". (Underlining supplied by me) 87. It is settled law that, when the Courts dealing with the subordinate legislation, it has no choice but to consider the validity of the statute only under the constitutional scheme. Whether it likes it or not, it has to go by the purport of the legislative intention. (Underlining supplied by me) 87. It is settled law that, when the Courts dealing with the subordinate legislation, it has no choice but to consider the validity of the statute only under the constitutional scheme. Whether it likes it or not, it has to go by the purport of the legislative intention. Court should interpret the provision to sustain its validity by giving such meaning to the provisions which advances the object sought to be achieved. 88. The Apex Court in a judgement reported in AIR 1987 SC page 117 in the matter of CHANDAVARKAR SITA RATNA RAO VERSUS ASHALATA S. GURAM, has observed thus: "64. In finding out the meaning of the expressions used, the Courts must find out what is legal, not what is right. It may not be inappropriate to refer to the observations of Burger, C.J. in TVA v. Hill, U.S. Supreme Court Reports, (1978) 57 Lawyers' Ed.2d 117,119 at 146 as follows: "Our individual appraisal of the wisdom or unwisdom of a particular course consciously selected by the Congress is to be put aside in the process of interpreting a statute. Once the meaning of an enactment is discerned and its constitutionality determined, the judicial process comes to an end. We do not sit as a committee of review, nor are we vested with the power of veto. The lines ascribed to Sir Thomas More by Robert Bolt are not without relevance here". Wisdom does not lie with the Court to substitute its personal view to the intention of the legislation. 89. In another case, the Apex Court, while considering the extent of power under delegated legislation, in a case reported in ((1984) 4 SCC page 27) in the matter of MAHARASHTRA STATE BOARD OF SECONDARY AND HIGHER SECONDARY EDUCATION AND ANOTHER VERSUS PARITOSH BHUPESHKUMAR SHETH AND OTHERS, has observed as under: "The question whether a particular piece of delegated legislation - whether a rule or regulation or other type of statutory instrument -is in excess of the power of subordinate legislation conferred on the delegate has to be determined with reference only to the specific provisions contained in the relevant statute conferring the power to make the rule, regulation, etc. and also the object and purpose of the Act as can be gathered from the various provisions of the enactment. and also the object and purpose of the Act as can be gathered from the various provisions of the enactment. It would be wholly wrong for the court to substitute its own opinion for that of the Legislature or its delegate as to what principle or policy would best serve the objects and purposes of the Act and to sit in judgment over the wisdom and effectiveness or otherwise of the policy laid down by the regulation-making body and declare a regulation to be ultra vires merely on the ground that, in the view of the Court, the impugned provisions will not help to serve the object and purpose of the Act. So long as the body entrusted with the task of framing the rules or regulations acts within the scope of the authority conferred on it, in the sense that the rules or regulations made by it have a rational nexus with the object and purpose of the Statute, the court should not concern itself with the wisdom or efficaciousness of such rules or regulations. It is exclusively within the province of the Legislature and its delegate to determine, as a matter of policy, how the provisions of the Statute can best be implemented and what measures, substantive as well as procedural would have to be incorporated in the rules or regulations for the efficacious achievement of the objects and purposes of the Act. It is not for the Court to examine the merits or demerits of such a policy because its scrutiny has to be limited to the question as to whether the impugned regulations fall within the scope of the regulation-making power conferred on the delegate by the Statute. Though this legal position is well established by a long series of decisions of this Court, we have considered it necessary to reiterate it in view of the manifestly erroneous approach made by the High Court to the consideration of the question as to whether the impugned clause (3) of Regulation 104 is ultra vires". (underlining supplied by me) 90. Having regard to the principles enunciated by the Apex Court in its decision in P.U. Joshi’ s case and Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education's case, I may refer to the reasoning given by the learned single Judge declaring the amended rules 2009 as ultra vires and unconstitutional. (underlining supplied by me) 90. Having regard to the principles enunciated by the Apex Court in its decision in P.U. Joshi’ s case and Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education's case, I may refer to the reasoning given by the learned single Judge declaring the amended rules 2009 as ultra vires and unconstitutional. The learned Judge at paras 69 to 72 of his order has observed thus: "69. As far as Stenographers, Judgment Writers and Senior Judgment Writers are concerned, their basic duty is that of taking dictation given by the Judge, transcribing and placing the draft or fair copy for the signature of the Judge. In other words, Stenographers and Judgment Writers and Senior Judgment Writers, even without Degree/Law Degree qualification are discharging their duties all these years and possession of said degrees would make no difference, so far as the core work to be discharged by the Stenographers and Judgment Writers and Senior Judgment Writers is concerned. It may be proper for a Research Assistant to have a Law Degree because the nature of work of the said Research Assistant requires him to take note of the arguments addressed by the learned counsel in the court and look to the decisions and place reported decisions in the light of the arguments noted by him or her, to enable the Judge concerned to render judgments at the earliest. The Stenographers, Judgment Writers and Senior Judgment Writers are not doing the functions of a Research Assistant and, therefore, asking them to have a Law Degree has no nexus between the object sought to be achieved and possession of Law Degree. In this connection, it may not be out of place to refer to the nature of work of Stenographers, Judgment Writers and Senior Judgment Writers which have been referred at paragraph 1.4 in W.P. Nos.22155-185/2010 and it is rightly stated in the said paragraph that stenography is a skill or talent acquired, improvised and perfected by a layman, aided and assisted by basic knowledge of grammar and control over vocabulary, ability to construct sentences i.e, syntax, command over language, unrelated to the educational qualifications. The art, skill and talent possessed by the Stenographers has no other parallel in any service jurisprudence and, as such, these qualities will make a person a good Stenographer or Judgment Writer or Senior Judgment Writer, rather than the educational qualification. 70. The art, skill and talent possessed by the Stenographers has no other parallel in any service jurisprudence and, as such, these qualities will make a person a good Stenographer or Judgment Writer or Senior Judgment Writer, rather than the educational qualification. 70. It may also have to be mentioned that it has been the experience of many Judges, including the author of this judgment, that there are Stenographers, Judgment Writers and Senior Judgment Writers possessing only SSLC qualification, but they are turning out outstanding work of taking dictation flawlessly and transcribing the material into draft or fair copy, to perfection. As such, the averments made in paragraph 1.4 of the aforementioned Writ Petitions carry substance and moreover they have not been controverted by Respondents 1 and 2 in their objections. Therefore, requirement of Degree qualification being obtained by Group 'D', SDA, FDA, Senior Assistant, Stenographers and Judgment Writers and Degree of Law being insisted on the Senior Judgment Writers has no bearing whatsoever in respects of the work to be turned out by the respective categories of employees. 71. The Apex Court, in the case of T.R. Kothandaraman VersusTamil Nadu Water Supply & Drianage BD, reported in (1994) 6 SCC 282 , has held that while classification based on higher educational qualification is permissible but total restriction cannot be imposed so as to block the chances of promotion. The Court also held that while determining validity of the classification, historical background, efficiency in service, need for higher education and social justice, have to be kept in mind and approach should be in consonance with Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India. The Apex Court at paragraph-16 of the aforesaid decision laid down the following legal propositions with regard to the educational qualification being a basis of classification relating to promotion in pubic service: "(1) Higher educational qualification is a permissible basis of classification, acceptability of which will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case; (2) Higher educational qualification can be the basis not only for barring promotion, but also for restricting the scope of promotion; (3) Restriction placed cannot however go to the extent of seriously jeopardizing the chances of promotion. To decide this, the extent of restriction shall have also to be looked into to ascertain whether it is reasonable. Reasons for this are being indicated later." 72. To decide this, the extent of restriction shall have also to be looked into to ascertain whether it is reasonable. Reasons for this are being indicated later." 72. Apart from this, even in the records placed for my perusal, no specific reasons are assigned as to why the Degree is insisted upon Group ‘D’, SDA, FDA, Stenographers and Judgment Writers and LL.B. Degree is insisted upon Senior Judgment Writers. Accordingly, the point for consideration is answered holding that prescription of higher qualifications under the amended rules and explanation has no nexus with the object sought to be achieved". 91. From the above observations and the reason assigned by the learned single Judge, it appears that, the learned single Judge has taken into consideration his personal experience, to form an opinion as to whether prescribing the higher educational qualification as a criterion for promotion is necessary or not. Apex Court in the matter of ‘Ramesh Chand Paliwar’ has held that the Chief Justice is the supreme authority so far as administration of the High Court is concerned and the other Judges have no role to play on the administrative side. 92. It may be pertinent to mention that the Chief Justice exercises delegated or subordinate legislative function. It is well within his power to prescribe such conditions as he deems fit and rational. It is the wisdom of the policy maker to decide as to what should be the policy to meet the administrative exigencies. It must be left to the wisdom of the subordinate legislative authority. Court cannot sit in appeal over the policy decisions, except considering as to whether the impugned subordinate legislation is unconstitutional as it violates the fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution. The judicial review of the legislative function is limited. 93. In a judgement reported in ( (2000) 9 SCC 412 ) in the matter of TECHNICAL EMPLOYEES' ASSOCIATION OF RAILWAYS AND ANOTHER VERSUS MINISTRY OF RAILWAYS AND OTHERS, the Apex Court has observed as under:- "3. The petitioner's contention is that Khalasi who are already in service, did not possess the aforesaid qualification and if such a circular is allowed to operate, there will be stagnation and, therefore, the impugned circular be quashed being hit by Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. The petitioner's contention is that Khalasi who are already in service, did not possess the aforesaid qualification and if such a circular is allowed to operate, there will be stagnation and, therefore, the impugned circular be quashed being hit by Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. Prescribing higher qualification for the purpose of promotion whether permissible under law no longer remains res integra. As early as in the case of Union of India Versus S.B. Kohli (Dr.) in a matter relating to the Central Health Service Rules, this Court has held that it would be open for the employer to prescribe qualifications both for direct recruitment as well as for promotion. To the same effect, the judgement of this Court in Mohd. Shujat Ali Versus Union of India and the decision of this Court in T.N. Water Supply case. For maintaining efficiency of service, the higher qualification is required for discharge of the duties in the higher positions and therefore, prescribing such qualifications cannot be held to be arbitrary or irrational. In the case in hand, the Board has issued circular in consonance with the recommendation of the Pay Commission. In that view of the matter, we see no infirmity with the impugned circular so as to be interfered with by this Court. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed". (underlining supplied by me) In the said case also, the contention of the petitioners was that Khalasi, who are already in service did not possess the required qualification prescribed under the circular and if such circular is allowed to operate, there will be stagnation and therefore, the circular is liable to be quashed as hit by Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. The Apex Court relying on the judgements reported in (1973) 3 SCC 592 in the matter of Union of India Versus S.B. Kohli, (1975) 3 SCC 76 in the matter of Mohd. Shujat Ali Versus Union of India (1994) 6 SCC 282 in the matter of T.R. Kothandaraman Versus T.N. Water Supply and Drainage Board, has observed that for maintaining the efficiency of service, higher qualification is required for discharge of the duties in the higher positions and therefore, prescribing such qualifications cannot be held to be arbitrary or irrational. 94. Shujat Ali Versus Union of India (1994) 6 SCC 282 in the matter of T.R. Kothandaraman Versus T.N. Water Supply and Drainage Board, has observed that for maintaining the efficiency of service, higher qualification is required for discharge of the duties in the higher positions and therefore, prescribing such qualifications cannot be held to be arbitrary or irrational. 94. In T.R. Kondandaraman’s case ( (1994) 6 SCC 282 ), the Apex Court has approved the classification of employees based on educational qualification, however, has observed that it depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. Learned single Judge has at para 71 of his order has relied on the decision in T.R. Kodandaraman’s case, but the said decision was considered in Technical Employees case reported in (2009) 9 SCC 412 (supra) and it has been held that, prescribing of higher educational qualification as a criterion for promotion for maintaining the efficiency of service for discharge of duties in the higher positions is well within the domain of the employer. 95. High Court is the final Court in the State. It deals with several thousands of cases, the officer discharging duties must be efficient, higher the position greater the responsibility, efficiency is the motto of speedy and quality discharge of responsibility and duties. Standard and quality cannot be compromised because somehow it is being managed. This will adversely affect the justice delivery system. In era of fast changing world, the things have to move fast for timely justice. If lack of higher educational qualification affects the effective administration, then the policy prescribing higher qualification for efficiency of service cannot be called as arbitrary and unreasonable. 96. No doubt, the Apex Court, in a decision reported in AIR 1990 SC page 2021 in the matter of B.N. SAXENA VERSUS NEW DELHI MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE AND OTHERS, comparing experience and qualification of diploma and relying on the decision reported in AIR 1989 SC page 19 in the matter of U.P. Versus J.P. Chaurasia, has observed as under: "It would be unreasonable to hold that in addition to this considerable experience, one must also have the diploma qualification prescribed under the first part. It could not have been the intention of the rule making authority that, persons who were designated as Senior Draftsmen without any Diploma qualification should acquire such diploma qualification for further promotion. It could not have been the intention of the rule making authority that, persons who were designated as Senior Draftsmen without any Diploma qualification should acquire such diploma qualification for further promotion. Such a view would not be consistent and coherent with the revised rule and its object. We have no doubt that the second limb of the revised rule is independent of the first. The High Court seems to have erred in this aspect of the matter". In the facts and circumstances of the said case, post of Head Draftsman of Municipal Corporation, qualification of Diploma was prescribed since the candidate in the said case was a senior Drafts man, his experience gained itself was treated as a qualification. However, the observations are based on the interpretation of the rules therein, observing that the intentment of the rule is to treat the experience as qualification. 97. In catena of decisions, Apex Court has considered as to whether the higher educational qualification could be prescribed as the basis for promotion to the next higher cadre. It is consistent view that, the authority in exercise of delegated legislative power can prescribe the higher educational qualification as criterion for promotion to the next higher cadre. Prescribing the higher educational qualification by itself does not become unreasonable or arbitrary exercise of power or amounts to unreasonable restriction. However, higher educational qualification should have rational nexus and should not violate the constitutional limitation. 98. In a case reported in AIR 1998 SC 2682 in the matter of FOOD CORPORATION OF INDIA VERSUS OM PRAKASH SHARMA AND OTHERS, the Apex Court considering the decision in STATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR VERSUS TRILOKI NATH KHOSA ( (1974) 1 SCC 19 ), has approved prescribing the eligibility on the basis of educational qualification by observing that the higher educational qualification is required for achieving administrative efficiency and it cannot be said to rest on any fortuitous circumstance. This Constitutional Bench decision was followed in subsequent decisions reported in AIR 1987 SC 367 in the matter of Punjab State Electricity Board, Patiala Versus Ravinder Kumar Sharma and in 1989 Supp(1) SCC 116 in the matter of Roop Chand Adlakha Versus Delhi Development Authority. 99. This Constitutional Bench decision was followed in subsequent decisions reported in AIR 1987 SC 367 in the matter of Punjab State Electricity Board, Patiala Versus Ravinder Kumar Sharma and in 1989 Supp(1) SCC 116 in the matter of Roop Chand Adlakha Versus Delhi Development Authority. 99. The Constitutional Bench decision is also followed in Food Corporation of Indians case, wherein Apex Court approved the policy prescribing the higher educational qualification as has relevance in so far as the holding of higher promotional post, having regard to the nature of duties and responsibility attached to the post. The classification on the basis of educational qualification, therefore, has nexus to the object sought to be achieved. 100. The Apex Court, in a decision reported in (2008) 5 SCC 416 in the matter of A. SATYANARAYANA AND OTHERS VERSUS S. PURUSHOTHAM AND OTHERS (referred supra), while considering the power of judicial review of validity of quota rule, has observed as under: - "23. We, however, are of the opinion that the validity or otherwise of a quota rule cannot be determined on surmises and conjectures. Whereas the power of the State to fix the quota keeping in view the fact situation obtaining in a given case must be conceded, the same, however, cannot be violative of the constitutional scheme of equality as contemplated under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. There cannot be any doubt whatsoever that a policy decision and, in particular, legislative policy should not ordinarily be interfered with and the Superior Courts, while exercising their power of judicial review, shall not consider as to whether such policy decision has been taken mala fide or not. But where a policy decision as reflected in a statutory rule pertains to the field of subordinate legislation, indisputably, the same would be amenable to judicial review, inter alia, on the ground of being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. (See Vasu Dev Singh Versus Union of India [(2006) 12 SCC 753] and State of Kerala Versus Unni [ (2007) 2 SCC 365 ]. 28. The Superior Courts, while exercising their power of judicial review, must determine the issue having regard to the effect of the subordinate legislation in question. There must exist a rational nexus between the impugned legislation and the object of promotion. 28. The Superior Courts, while exercising their power of judicial review, must determine the issue having regard to the effect of the subordinate legislation in question. There must exist a rational nexus between the impugned legislation and the object of promotion. Promotions are granted to a higher post to avoid stagnation as also frustration amongst the employees. This Court, in a large number of decisions, has emphasized the necessity of providing for promotional avenues. [See Food Corporation of India and Ors. Versus Parashotam Das Bansal and Ors. ( (2008) 5 SCC 100 ). The State, keeping in view that object, having found itself unable to provide such promotional avenue, provided for the scheme of Accelerated Career Progress (ACP). The validity and effect of the impugned legislation must be judged keeping in view the object and purport thereof. This Court would apply such principle of interpretation of statute which would enable it to subserve the object in place of subverting the same. xxx 30. Although mere chance of promotion is not a fundamental right, but right to be considered therefor is. In that view of the matter, any policy whereby all promotional avenues to be promoted in respect of a category of employees for all times to come cannot be nullified and the same would be hit by Article 16 of the Constitution of India". (underlining supplied by me) 101. In a recent decision of the Apex Court reported in (2011) 2 SCC 575 in the matter of TRANSPORT AND DOCK WORKERS UNION AND OTHERS VERSUS MUMBAI PORT TRUST AND ANOTHER, the Apex Court, while considering the scope of Articles 14 and 19 in understanding the reasonable classification, has observed as under: "22.Thus the classification would not violate the equality provision contained in Article 14 of the Constitution if it has a rational or reasonable basis. However, the question remains: what is 'rational' or 'reasonable'? These are vague words. What may be regarded as rational or reasonable by one Judge may not be so regarded by another. This could lead to chaos in the law. 23. Should this vagueness or uncertainty be allowed to remain so that Judges may have total freedom or discretion? We think not. The law should be, as far as possible, clear and certain so that people know where they stand and conduct their affairs accordingly. This could lead to chaos in the law. 23. Should this vagueness or uncertainty be allowed to remain so that Judges may have total freedom or discretion? We think not. The law should be, as far as possible, clear and certain so that people know where they stand and conduct their affairs accordingly. Also, if total freedom is given to Judges to decide according to their own individual notions and fancies the law will run riot. Hence in our opinion an attempt should be made to clarify the meaning of the words "reasonable" or "rational". 24. Numerous decisions of this Court on Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution have no doubt held certain classifications to be reasonable while other classifications have been held to be unreasonable. But what is reasonable and what is unreasonable does not appear to have been discussed in depth by any decision of this Court, and no tests have been laid down in this connection. All that has been said is that it is not prudent or pragmatic to insist on a mathematically accurate classification covering diverse situations and all possible contingencies in view of the inherent complexities involved in society, vide State of Karnataka Versus Mangalore University Non-Teaching Employees Association (2002) 3 SCC 302 (para 10), Ombalika Das Versus Hulisa Shaw (2002) 4 SCC 539 (para 11) etc. 25. In our opinion while it is true that a mathematically accurate classification cannot be done in this connection, there should be some broad guidelines. There may be several tests to decide whether a classification or differentiation is reasonable or not. One test which we are laying down and which will be useful in deciding this case, is : is it conducive to the functioning of modern society? If it is then it is certainly reasonable and rational. 26. In the present case, as we have noted, the purpose of the classification was to make the activities of the Port competitive and efficient. With the introduction of privatization and setting up private Ports, the respondent had to face competition. Also, it wanted to rationalize its activities by having uniform working hours for its indoor and outdoor establishment employees, while at the same time avoiding labour disputes with employees appointed before 01.11.1996. In the modem world businesses have to face competition with other businesses. With the introduction of privatization and setting up private Ports, the respondent had to face competition. Also, it wanted to rationalize its activities by having uniform working hours for its indoor and outdoor establishment employees, while at the same time avoiding labour disputes with employees appointed before 01.11.1996. In the modem world businesses have to face competition with other businesses. To do so they may have to have longer working hours and introduce efficiency, while avoiding labour disputes. Looked at from this point of view the classification in question is clearly reasonable as it satisfies the test laid down above. 27. We do not mean to say that the above is the only test to decide what is reasonable, but in our opinion it is certainly one of the tests to be adopted if we want our country to progress. We have to take a practical view of the matter instead of relying on abstract, a priori notions of equality". (underlining supplied by me) 102. Before a rule is declared as ultra vires, the rule must be held to be wholly arbitrary or irrational. If a plea of discrimination is raised, it must be based on adequate pleadings. 103. To find out as to whether there is a rational nexus in prescribing the higher educational qualification as criterion for promotion to the next higher cadre, I deem it proper to consider the method of promotions under the principal rules. The chart below roughly shows the method of promotion from one cadre to another higher cadre. “IMAGE” 104. The above chart indicates that the lowest feeder cadre such as Typist, Second Division Assistant, Stenographer and Group ‘D’ employees, would be eligible for promotion with minimum educational qualification of SSLC. They might reach the post of Assistant Registrar also. 105. By amended rules 2009, the Law Degree is prescribed as criterion for promotion to the Post of Assistant Registrar from the post of Court Officer, Section Officer, Senior Judgement Writer. 106. Court Officer, Section Officer and Senior Judgement Writer are the feeder cadre to the post of Assistant Registrar. 107. Assistant Registrar would be in charge of few Sections. He has a supervisory power. He would be dealing with the various subject matter such as scrutiny, verification as to the objections relating to Court fees, limitation and jurisdiction etc. before the case file is assigned to the respective Courts. 107. Assistant Registrar would be in charge of few Sections. He has a supervisory power. He would be dealing with the various subject matter such as scrutiny, verification as to the objections relating to Court fees, limitation and jurisdiction etc. before the case file is assigned to the respective Courts. Office note on the order sheet will guide the learned Judge as to whether the case file is in order. Court will be dependent on the office note on the order sheet. 108. To ascertain, whether the case is filed within limitation, proper Court fee is paid and the Court has jurisdiction. Person in charge of scrutiny will make a office note. The Section officer and the Assistant Registrar will verify the same. Inefficiency or lack of legal knowledge may result in wrong noting. 109. Similarly, the Section officer is further responsible for his section. 110. Court Officer would be the custodian of the files. His job is not just arranging the files, but also effectively assisting the Court in timely arranging the law books, journals connected or cited in the case, entry into the office note and keeping the records, providing information of similarly decided cases etc. Effective assistance requires sound legal knowledge. If the Court officer lacks the legal knowledge, unable to trace the relevant provision and law book, it would vitally affect the court proceedings. Effective court proceedings depends on the efficient court management by the Court officer. 111. So also the Senior Judgement Writer, who would be working as Private Secretaries to the Judges who are required to prepare draft of the judgement which involve legal words, interpretation, decision, one small mistake may change the nature of the decision. They have to not only follow the dictation but must also understand the meaning of the words in the context. They must effectively follow the dictation. Their responsibility is to transcribe correct and accurate text of the dictation. Hence, following of legal terms and context is must. Private Secretaries have to be confidential, alert, effective and capable of understanding the legal terms and phrases and interpretation. A good Senior Judgement Writer or Judgement Writer are boon to the Court and the Judge and would be an asset to the Institution. 112. From the available material and with the bird's eye view of the functions of these officers, the Law degree would undoubtedly enhance the quality and efficacy. A good Senior Judgement Writer or Judgement Writer are boon to the Court and the Judge and would be an asset to the Institution. 112. From the available material and with the bird's eye view of the functions of these officers, the Law degree would undoubtedly enhance the quality and efficacy. It cannot be said that, for achieving the higher standard and efficacy prescribing the Law Degree as a qualification for promotion to these important posts is unreasonable or arbitrary. In changing world, to suit the modern world, for the effective justice dispensation, if the policy makers have thought it fit to prescribe the higher educational qualification, as a criterion, it cannot be said to be unreasonable or arbitrary. 113. The Apex Court in Technical Employees' case reported in (2000) 9 SCC 412 (supra) has held that, for maintaining the efficiency of service, the higher qualification is required for discharge of duties in higher position and therefore, prescribing such qualification cannot be held to be arbitrary or unreasonable. In the said case, diploma was prescribed as the required qualification for promotion to the next higher cadre. 114. Though wisdom does not lie with the Court to assess the decision of the policy maker, but for considering the rational nexus to the object of prescribing the higher educational qualification, broadly, I referred to the functions and duties of some of the officers. Prescribing the higher educational qualification has the rational nexus for achieving the higher efficiency and standard. 115. The amended rules 2009 do not create discrimination, as no different yardstick is applied in the method of promotion amongst the employees in the same cadre. It only prescribes the educational qualification for promotion. No two classes are created in the same cadre, all will be eligible from the same cadre provided they possess the educational qualification. 116. Learned single Judge has held that the amended rules create classification, but I do not find any classification. Prescribing educational qualification is different from creating classification amongst the employees of the same cadre for fixing quota based on graduates and non-graduates. In this case, no one will be eligible if he/she does not possess the requisite qualification. Hence, there is no discrimination. 117. I may also mention that similar higher educational qualification is prescribed in different High Courts. 118. In this case, no one will be eligible if he/she does not possess the requisite qualification. Hence, there is no discrimination. 117. I may also mention that similar higher educational qualification is prescribed in different High Courts. 118. The High Court of Judicature of Andhra Pradesh and High Court of Kerala have also prescribed higher educational qualification as one of the requisite qualification for promotion. Having regard to the development, the Chief Justice has amended the rules relating to the method of recruitment to fall in line with the modern society. 119. No doubt, the experience of an employee is also an important factor required to be considered in the matter of promotion. However, experience by itself is not, all and is. That alone cannot be a criterion for promotion. Even in case of experience or seniority, the seniority alone will not enable the employee for promotion, if he lacks the merit, or has no good track record, in such event, promotion is only mere chance and not a right. He is not sure of promotion. 120. I may also take note of the development in technology, computerisation of the Court, converting the traditional system to e-court, it cannot be said that with whatever qualification acquired by the employees at the entry level would be sufficient and things can go on. The Information Technology has developed so vast, the judiciary cannot remain static as mute spectator to the fast developing world. It must move on, and provide timely and quality justice. To achieve the same, one must have necessary infrastructure including talent and effective staff support. 121. From cadre of Group ‘D’ one may reach the post of Assistant Registrar. The educational qualification prescribed for Group ‘D’ employee is S.S.L.C. One has to visualise, as to whether he would effectively hold and discharge the functions of Assistant Registrar. 122. Some how, the system is working and the Institution can live with the same forever cannot be an answer. Certainly, for example, good Stenographer with sound English language is a boon and asset to the justice delivery system. The higher educational qualification certainly enhances the efficiency and quality. Only on the ground that the higher qualification is likely to affect some, can the interest of the High Court be compromised?. The promotion is based on higher educational qualification, seniority and good service record. 123. The higher educational qualification certainly enhances the efficiency and quality. Only on the ground that the higher qualification is likely to affect some, can the interest of the High Court be compromised?. The promotion is based on higher educational qualification, seniority and good service record. 123. It is open to the State and the employer to prescribe higher educational qualification. It is exclusively within the province of the legislature and its delegate to determine the policy for better administration. It is for the policy maker as to how the rules could be best implemented and what manner and measures both procedural as well as the substantive could be incorporated in rules for efficacious achievement of the object and purpose. The Court cannot substitute its view, wisdom lies with the policy maker and not with the Court. 124. Having regard to the facts and circumstances and the principles enunciated by the Apex Court in catena of decisions, I have no doubt that the legislature or its delegate is well within its domain to prescribe the higher educational qualification in the matter of recruitment by promotion or direct. 125. I also hold that prescribing the higher educational qualification as a criterion for promotion to the next higher cadre is neither unreasonable nor is arbitrary nor violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. 126. Re: Whether the amended rules 2009 has a retrospective effect? All rules, regulations made would be presumed to be prospective unless the rules or regulations expressly provide for retrospective application. 127. It is neither the case of the appellant nor the amended rules prescribe for retrospective application. 128. Amended rules are prospective in nature. The rules are made applicable from the date on which they are notified. Hence, if the post had already become vacant and was available for promotion at the time of issue of notifications, certainly the said post was available for promotion under the existed rules (principal rules). Hence, such posts have to be filled up only under the existed rules (principal rules). 129. Hence, if the post had already become vacant and was available for promotion at the time of issue of notifications, certainly the said post was available for promotion under the existed rules (principal rules). Hence, such posts have to be filled up only under the existed rules (principal rules). 129. The question as to whether such post could be filled up under the amended Rules or existing Rules was considered by the Apex Court in a decision reported in 1983 (3) SCC page 285 in the matter of State of Andhra Pradesh and others Versus J. Sreenivasa Rao and others, has observed as under:- “The vacancies which occurred prior to the amended rules would be governed by the old rules and not by the amended rules. It is admitted by counsel for both the parties that henceforth promotion to the post of Sub-Registrar Grade II will be according to the new rules on the zonal basis and not on the state-wide basis and therefore, there was no question of challenging the new rules. But the question is of filling the vacancies that occurred prior to the amended rules. We have not the slightest doubt that the posts which fell vacant prior to the amended rules would be governed by the old rules and not by the new rules”. The Apex Court has observed that the vacancies accrued or fell vacant before the amendment have to be filled up under the rules then existed. Similar view is taken in another judgement reported in (1997) 10 SCC 419 in the matter of State of Rajasthan Versus R. Dayal and Others, wherein the Apex Court has observed as under: "It is contended by Shri Das that one of the persons, namely, H.L. Meena was appointed against a carried-forward post as per the existing Rules and, therefore, his appointment cannot be challenged. We find it difficult to give acceptance to the contention. Even a carried-forward vacancy is required to be considered in accordance with the law existing unless suitable relaxation is made by the Government. As on that date, when the appointment came to be made, the selection was required to be made on the basis of the Rules as existing on the date the vacancy arose. Even a carried-forward vacancy is required to be considered in accordance with the law existing unless suitable relaxation is made by the Government. As on that date, when the appointment came to be made, the selection was required to be made on the basis of the Rules as existing on the date the vacancy arose. Since, admittedly, that has not been done, the appointment of Shri Bhatnagar and H.L. Meena must be treated to be only temporary appointments pending consideration of the claims of all the eligible persons belonging to General and Reserved quota separately as per Rules". 130. Further, the Apex Court, in a decision reported in (2007) 11 SCC page 605 in the matter of Arjun Singh Rathore an Others Versus B.N. Chaturvedi and others, following the decision in State of R. Dayal’s case and also J. Sreenivasa Rao s case has observed at para 5 as under: "5. Mr. Calla, the learned senior counsel for the appellants has argued that the matter was fully covered by the judgment of this Court in State of Rajasthan Versus R. Dayal (1983) 3 SCC 284 , wherein it had been held that the vacancies to be filled by promotion were to be filled under the rules which were in operation on the date when the vacancies had occurred. Relying on and referring to an earlier judgment in Y.V. Rangaiah Versus J. Sreenivasa Rao (1983 SCC (L & S) 382) it was opined as under: (SCC p.422, para 8) "8. This Court has specifically laid (sic) that the vacancies which occurred prior to the amendment of the Rules would be governed by the original Rules and not by the amended Rules. Accordingly, this Court had held that the posts which fell vacant prior to the amendment of the Rules would be governed by the original Rules and not the amended Rules. As a necessary corollary, the vacancies that arose subsequent to the amendment of the Rules are required to be filled in accordance with the law existing as on the date when the vacancies arose". 6. The above legal position has not been seriously disputed by the learned counsel for respondents 6 and 7. As a necessary corollary, the vacancies that arose subsequent to the amendment of the Rules are required to be filled in accordance with the law existing as on the date when the vacancies arose". 6. The above legal position has not been seriously disputed by the learned counsel for respondents 6 and 7. We are therefore of the opinion that the vacancies which had occurred prior to the enforcement of the Rules of 1998 had to be filled in under the Rules of 1988 and as per the procedure laid down therein. We are therefore of the opinion that the judgement of the learned single Judge needs to be restored. We order accordingly". However, Y.V. Rangaiah’s case ( AIR 1983 SC 852 ) fell for consideration before the Honourable Supreme Court in a judgement reported in 2011 AIR SCW 2138 in the matter of DEEPAK AGARWAL AND ANOTHER Versus STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND OTHERS, wherein the Apex Court considering the decision reported in AIR 1983 SC 852 in the matter of Y.V. RANGAIAH AND OTHERS Versus J. SREENIVASA RAO AND OTHERS, has held that even if there are vacancies as on the date of coming into force of the amended rules, the vacancies by themselves do not confer any right on the employees nor any right be accrued to them. The right to be considered for promotion would be accrued only on the date of consideration for promotion not earlier, unless there is a clear statutory duty, which mandates the determination of vacancies every year. When the Government takes a conscious decision and amends the Rules, the promotions have to be made in accordance with the rules prevalent at the time when the consideration takes place. Paragraphs 21, 22 and 24 of the said judgement read as under: "21. We are of the considered opinion that the judgment in Y.V. Rangaiah's case (supra) would not be applicable in the facts and circumstances of this case. The aforesaid judgment was rendered on the interpretation of Rule 4(a)(1)(i) of the Andhra Pradesh Registration and Subordinate Service Rules, 1976. The aforesaid Rule provided for preparation of a panel for the eligible candidates every year in the month of September. This was a statutory duty cast upon the State. The exercise was required to be conducted each year. Thereafter, only promotion orders were to be issued. The aforesaid Rule provided for preparation of a panel for the eligible candidates every year in the month of September. This was a statutory duty cast upon the State. The exercise was required to be conducted each year. Thereafter, only promotion orders were to be issued. However, no panel had been prepared for the year 1976. Subsequently, the rule was amended, which rendered the petitioners therein ineligible to be considered for promotion. In these circumstances, it was observed by this Court that the amendment would not be applicable to the vacancies which had arisen prior to the amendment. The vacancies which occurred prior to the amendment rules would be governed by the old rules and not the amended rules. In the present case, there is no statutory duty cast upon the respondents to either prepare a year-wise panel of the eligible candidates or the selected candidates for promotion. In fact, the proviso to Rule 2 enables the State to keep any post unfilled. Therefore, clearly there is no statutory duty which the State could be mandated to perform under the applicable rules. The requirement to identify the vacancies in a year or to take a decision how many posts are to be filled under Rule 7 cannot be equated with not issuing promotion orders to candidates duly selected for promotion. In our opinion, the appellants had not acquired any right to be considered for promotion. Therefore, it is difficult to accept the submissions of Dr. Rajeev Dhawan that the vacancies, which had arisen before 17th May, 1999 had to be filled under the unamended rules. 22. It is by now a settled proposition of law that a candidate has the right to be considered in the light of the existing rules, which implies the ‘rule in force’ on the date the consideration took place. There is no rule of universal or absolute application that vacancies are to be filled invariably by the law existing on the date when the vacancy arises. The requirement of filling up old vacancies under the old rules is interlinked with the candidate having acquired a right to be considered for promotion. The right to be considered for promotion accrues on the date of consideration of the eligible candidates. The requirement of filling up old vacancies under the old rules is interlinked with the candidate having acquired a right to be considered for promotion. The right to be considered for promotion accrues on the date of consideration of the eligible candidates. Unless, of course, the applicable rule, as in Y.V. Rangaiah's case, ( AIR 1983 SC 852 ) (supra) lays down any particular time frame, within which the selection process is to be completed. In the present case, consideration for promotion took place after the amendment came into operation. Thus, it cannot be accepted that any accrued or vested right of the appellants have been taken away by the amendment. The judgments cited by learned counsel for the appellants namely B.L. Gupta Versus MCD, (1998 AIR SCW 3969) (supra), P. Ganeshwar Rao Versus State of Andhra Pradesh, ( AIR 1988 SC 2068 ) (supra) and N.T. Devin Katti & Ors. Versus Karnataka Public Service Commission & Ors, ( AIR 1990 SC 1233 ) (supra) are reiterations of a principle laid down in Y.V. Rangaiah's case ( AIR 1983 SC 852 ) (supra). XXX 24. In our opinion, the matter is squarely covered by the ratio of the judgment of this Court in the case of Dr. K. Ramulu ( AIR 1997 SC 1803 : 1997 AIR SCW 1152) (supra). In the aforesaid case, this Court considered all the judgments cited by the learned senior counsel for the appellant and held that Y.V. Rangaiah's case, ( AIR 1983 SC 852 ) (supra) would not be applicable in the facts and circumstances of that case. It was observed that for reasons germane to the decision, the Government is entitled to take a decision not to fill up the existing vacancies as on the relevant date. It was also held that when the Government takes a conscious decision and amends the Rules, the promotions have to be made in accordance with the rules prevalent at the time when the consideration takes place". (underlining supplied by me) The objection statement on behalf of the Chief Justice or the contentions do not say that the vacancies were not determined or existed as on the date of the amended rules. It is also not the case of the Chief Justice that the said vacancies were not required to be filled up under the 1973 Rules. (underlining supplied by me) The objection statement on behalf of the Chief Justice or the contentions do not say that the vacancies were not determined or existed as on the date of the amended rules. It is also not the case of the Chief Justice that the said vacancies were not required to be filled up under the 1973 Rules. If there were vacancies and eligible candidates were required to be considered for promotion before the amended rules, then such vacancies have to be tilled only under the 1973 Rules. Though the Supreme Court has held that the consideration for promotion should be based on the rules that existed as on the date of consideration, treating that the vacancies have been determined as on the date of the amended rules and those vacancies, having been determined, such vacancies create right in the employees for promotion to the next higher cadre. Hence, in so far as the vacancies that existed as on the date of the amended rules have to be filled up only under the 1973 rules. 131. Having regard to the nature of rules, and its application, and in the light of the decisions of the Apex Court, I hold that all the posts which became vacant as on the date of notifying the amended rules shall have to be filled only under the principal rules and not under the amended rules. 132. Re. Hardship caused to the officers and servants in acquiring the higher educational qualification in terms of explanation to the proviso to the amended rules renders the amendment as unconstitutional I find it proper to refer to some of the observations of the learned single Judge. 133. The learned single Judge at paras 89 and 97 observed that, it is impossible to acquire Degree or Law Degree and is unworkable and unreasonable. Paras 89 and 97 of the order of the learned single Judge read as under:- "89. What is clear from the aforesaid conditions prescribed in the circular is that, at one point of time, not more than 10% of the officials working in a particular cadre shall be permitted to pursue Degree/LL.B/LL.M/Master's Degree/MBA and permission also shall be on the basis of seniority. What is clear from the aforesaid conditions prescribed in the circular is that, at one point of time, not more than 10% of the officials working in a particular cadre shall be permitted to pursue Degree/LL.B/LL.M/Master's Degree/MBA and permission also shall be on the basis of seniority. If this condition is read in conjunction with the explanation to the proviso which puts a maximum of 5 years period to obtain degree, as rightly submitted by the learned senior counsel Shri S.P. Shankar, many of the employees will not be able to obtain degree qualification at all, as 10% of the employees per cadre would require more than 5 years to obtain degree or law degree, as the case may be. xxx 97. In the case on hand also, as the respective persons in the categories mentioned above were appointed under the same recruitment Rules, 1973 and belong to the same category and they cannot be discriminated by insisting upon possession of Degree/Law Degree qualifications, which is impossible to be achieved by them within the period prescribed in the explanation to proviso and in the light of restriction imposed by the circular at Annexure 'M'. Therefore, notwithstanding the submission made by learned senior counsel Shri Basava Prabhu Patil that, some of the employees are pursuing degree/law degree courses, that itself will not give room to take the view that the proviso and explanation to the amended Rules are free from the vices of they being arbitrary, unreasonable, discriminatory, irrational and thus unconstitutional". 134. Apex Courtin a recent judgement reported in AIR 2009 SC 2497 in the matter of High Court of Delhi and another Versus A.K. Mahajan and others has considered the right of an employee of benefit of consideration and has observed thus: “There can be no benefit of consideration. To be considered is a right of employee but merely being considered, in itself, is not a benefit as it may or may not result in the selection or promotion of an employee and hence, it is in the nature of a chance. A mere chance of promotion being affected by amendment is in our opinion inconsequential. This Court has time and again held that since promotion is not a right of the employee, a mere chance of promotion if affected cannot and does not invalidate the action on the part of the employer”. 135. A mere chance of promotion being affected by amendment is in our opinion inconsequential. This Court has time and again held that since promotion is not a right of the employee, a mere chance of promotion if affected cannot and does not invalidate the action on the part of the employer”. 135. I have held that, prescribing of higher educational qualification is neither arbitrary, unreasonable nor it is discriminatory in nature. There is rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved. 136. Having held that the amended rules 2009 do not violate the constitutional scheme, hence amended rules cannot be treated as arbitrary and unreasonable on the ground of hardship. 137. No legislation can be struck down as arbitrary and unconstitutional merely because it causes hardship if implemented. If the object is rational, the hardship cannot be a ground to declare the rules as unconstitutional. 138. Rule prescribing higher educational qualification as criterion for promotion is different from providing an opportunity to the employees, who have not acquired higher educational qualification. The rules prescribing higher educational qualification cannot be nullified as the benefit or the opportunity given to the employees to acquire higher educational qualification causes hardship. However, having regard to the provision made giving benefit to the employees to acquire higher educational qualification, to become eligible for promotion to the next higher cadre, I thought it fit to make observation leaving it to the option of the decision making authority to take into consideration such circumstances. When the decision making authority itself has provided such opportunity and it should be meaningful and effective. 139. However, having held that the constitutional validity of the amended rules being prospective in nature, such rules are applicable to all vacancies that arose after the amended rules came into force. The explanation to the proviso under the amended rules only gives benefit to the officers and servants of the High Court to acquire the requisite qualification to enable them to become eligible to be considered for promotion. Since the main proviso is held to be valid, merely because some of the employees find it difficult to acquire requisite qualification, the main proviso cannot be termed as arbitrary and unreasonable. 140. Interpretation of a statute requires giving effect to the main provision. Since the main proviso is held to be valid, merely because some of the employees find it difficult to acquire requisite qualification, the main proviso cannot be termed as arbitrary and unreasonable. 140. Interpretation of a statute requires giving effect to the main provision. The benefit / opportunity to acquire requisite qualification is provided as an exception to the main rule under the explanation to the proviso. The normal function of a proviso is to except something out of the enactment or to qualify something enacted therein which but for the proviso would be within the purview of the enactment. The proper function of a proviso is to except and deal with a case, which would otherwise fall within the general language of the main enactment. It is a qualification of the preceding enactment. A proviso is added to an enactment to qualify or create an exception to what is in the enactment and ordinarily, a proviso is not interpreted as stating a general rule. If the language of the enacting part of the statute does not contain the provisions which are said to occur in it, the Court cannot derive these provisions by implication from a proviso. 141. Apex Court in a judgement reported in (2004) 1 SCC 574 in the matter of Haryana State Cooperative Land Development Bank Ltd., Versus Haryana State Cooperative Land Development Banks Employees Union and another on interpretation of a proviso, has observed thus: "9. The normal function of a proviso is to except something out of the enactment or to qualify something enacted therein which but for the proviso would be within the purview of the enactment. As was stated in Mullins Versus Treasurer of Survey [1880 (5) QBD 170, (referred to in Shah Bhojraj Kuverji Oil Mills and Ginning Factory Versus Subhash Chandra Yograj Sinha ( AIR 1961 SC 1596 ) and Calcutta Tramways Co. Ltd. Versus Corporation of Calcutta ( AIR 1965 SC 1728 ); when one finds a proviso to a section the natural presumption is that, but for the proviso, the enacting part of the section would have included the subject matter of the proviso. The proper function of a proviso is to except and to deal with a case which would otherwise fall within the general language of the main enactment and its effect is confined to that case. The proper function of a proviso is to except and to deal with a case which would otherwise fall within the general language of the main enactment and its effect is confined to that case. It is a qualification of the preceding enactment which is expressed in terms too general to be quite accurate. As a general rule, a proviso is added to an enactment to qualify or create an exception to what is in the enactment and ordinarily, a proviso is not interpreted as stating a general rule. "If the language of the enacting part of the statute does not contain the provisions which are said to occur in it you cannot derive these provisions by implication from a proviso". Said Lord Watson in West Derby Union Versus Metropolitan Life Assurance Co. (1897 AC 647)(HL). Normally, a proviso does not travel beyond the provision to which it is a proviso. It carves out an exception to the main provision to which it has been enacted as a proviso and to no other. (See A.N. Sehgal and Ors. Versus Raje Ram Sheoram and Ors. ( AIR 1991 SC 1406 ), Tribhovandas Haribhai Tamboli Versus Gujarat Revenue Tribunal and Ors. ( AIR 1991 SC 1538 ) and Kerala State Housing Board and Ors. Versus Ramapriya Hotels (P)Ltd. and Ors. ( 1994 (5) SCC 672 )". (underlining supplied by me) 142. A proviso to a section cannot be interpreted to import into the enacting part something which is not there, but where the enacting part is susceptible to several possible meanings it may be controlled by the proviso. There is no ambiguity in the main provisions of the rules and only meaning that can be derived is that higher educational qualification is required for promotion to the next higher cadre. 143. No doubt, there arises certain difficulties in acquiring the requisite qualification to become eligible for promotion. However, merely because explanation to proviso leads to some anomalous results, the Court has no option but to give effect to it and leave it to the legislature to amend or alter the law. 144. Apex Courtin a judgement reported in AIR 1959 SC 422 in the matter of N.T. Veluswami Thevar Versus G. Raja Nainar and others, has observed thus: "13. There is another difficulty in the way of accepting this argument of the respondent. 144. Apex Courtin a judgement reported in AIR 1959 SC 422 in the matter of N.T. Veluswami Thevar Versus G. Raja Nainar and others, has observed thus: "13. There is another difficulty in the way of accepting this argument of the respondent. A candidate may be subject to more than one disqualification, and his nomination paper may be questioned on all those grounds. Supposing that the returning officer upholds one objection and rejects the nomination paper on the basis of that objection without going into other objections, notwithstanding that under s.36(2) he has to decide all the objections, is it open to the respondents in the election petition to adduce evidence on those objections? According to the respondent, it is not, so that if the decision of the returning officer on the objection on which he rejected the nomination paper is held to be bad, the Tribunal has no option but to set aside the election under s. 100(1)(c), even though the candidate was, in fact, disqualified and his nomination paper was rightly rejected. Mr. Sinha for the respondent concedes that the result would be anomalous, but he says that the Law of Election is full of anomalies, and this is one of them, and that is no reason for not interpreting the law on its own-terms. It is no doubt true that if on its true construction, a statute leads to anomalous results, the Courts have no option but to give effect to it and leave it to the legislature to amend and alter the law. But when on a construction of a statute, two views are possible, one which results in an anomaly and the other not, it is our duty to adopt the latter and not the former, seeking consolation in the thought that the law bristles with anomalies. Anomalies will disappear, and the law will be found to be simple and logical, if it is understood that when a question is raised in an election petition as to the propriety of the rejection of a nomination paper, the point to be decided is about the propriety of the nomination and not the decision of the returning officer on the materials placed before him, and that decision must depend on whether the candidate is duly qualified and is not subject to any disqualifications as provided in s. 36(2)" (underlining supplied by me) 145. It is also not the case that, the main provision or proviso gives two different meanings. The contention that explanation is not workable and it would cause hardship, however this cannot be accepted as the explanation cannot control the main provision to render it arbitrary. 146. The Court should try to interpret the statute to sustain its validity and give such meaning to the provision, which advances the objects sought to be achieved by the enactment. Court should not approach the enactment with a view to pick hole or to search defects of drafting, which makes its working impossible. Effort should be made in construing the different provisions so that each provision will have its play and in the event of any conflict, a harmonious construction should be made. 147. Having found the constitutional validity of the main rule, there is no provision to interpret the explanation in such a manner as to take away the very purpose for which rules have been framed. 148. Further, the external aid or Internal aid or reading in between is necessary only when it is not possible to give meaning to the main provision or it cannot be enforced, implement, but for an external aid or internal aid, when the provision is unambiguous and clear, no reason to import external or internal aid. The amended rules are clear and unambiguous. The plain meaning is that, from the date of coming into force of the amended rules, the promotions would be subject to the requisite qualification as prescribed under the amended rules. 149. Hence, amended rules are applicable to all the officers and servants covered under the amended rules for promotion in respect of vacancies that arose from the date of coming into force of the amended rules. 150. However, it is always open to the policy maker to take into consideration the difficulties and grievances of the employees, if any to modify the rules suitably. 151. The Apex Court, while considering the doctrine of reasonable classification in 1989 Supp (1) SCC 116 in the matter of Roop Chand Adlakha and Others Versus Delhi Development Authority and Others, has observed as under: - "18. A large number of authorities were cited on either side. We may first examine the cases relied upon by the High Court in support of its conclusion. A large number of authorities were cited on either side. We may first examine the cases relied upon by the High Court in support of its conclusion. The inherent distinction between a person with a Degree and one who is merely a Diploma-Holder is much too obvious. But the question that falls for consideration, in the context such as the present one, is whether the differences have a reasonable relation to the nature of the office to which the promotion is contemplated. The idea of equality in the matter of promotion can be predicated only when the candidates for promotion are drawn from the same source. If the differences in the qualification have a reasonable relation to the nature of duties and responsibilities, that go with and are attendant upon the promotional post, the more advantageous treatment of those who possess higher technical qualifications can be legitimised on the doctrine of classification. There may, conceivably, be cases where the differences in the educational qualifications may not be sufficient to give any preferential treatment to one class of candidates as against another. Whether the classification is reasonable or not must, therefore, necessarily depend upon facts of each case and the circumstances obtaining at the relevant time. When the state makes a classification between two sources, unless the vice of the classification is writ large on the face of it, the person assailing the classification must show that it is unreasonable and violative of Article 14. A wooden equality as between all classes of employees irrespective of all distinctions or qualifications, or job-requirements is neither constitutionally compelled nor practically meaningful. This Court in GM. South Central Railway Versus A.V.R. Siddhanti, (1974) 4 SCC 335 observed (SCC p.343, SCC(L & S) p.298, para 20) "....A wooden equality as between all classes of employees regardless of qualifications, kind of jobs, nature of responsibility and performance of the employees is not intended, nor is it practicable if the administration is to run. Indeed, the maintenance of such a 'classless and undiscerning ‘equality’ where, in reality, glaring inequalities and intelligible differentia exist, will deprive the guarantee of its practical content. Broad classification based on reason, executive pragmatism and experience having a direct relation with the achievement of efficiency in administration, is permissible.... Indeed, the maintenance of such a 'classless and undiscerning ‘equality’ where, in reality, glaring inequalities and intelligible differentia exist, will deprive the guarantee of its practical content. Broad classification based on reason, executive pragmatism and experience having a direct relation with the achievement of efficiency in administration, is permissible.... In T. Devadasan Versus The Union of India,[1964]4 SCR 680 at 689 & 690, this Court observed: "....What is meant by equality in this Article is, equality amongst equals. It does not provide for an absolute equality of treatment to all persons in utter disregard in every conceivable circumstance of the differences such as age, sex, education and so on and so forth as may be found amongst people in general. Indeed, while the aim of this Article is to ensure that invidious distinction or arbitrary discrimination shall not be made by the State between a citizen and a citizen who answer the same description and the differences which may obtain between them are of no relevance for the purpose of applying a particular law reasonable classification is permissible. It does not mean anything more. 19. But then the process of classification is in itself productive of inequality and in that sense antithetical of equality. The process would be constitutionally valid if it recognises a pre-existing inequality and acts in aid of amelioration of the effects of such preexistent inequality. But the process cannot in itself generate or aggravate the inequality. The process cannot merely blow up or magnify insubstantial or microscopic differences on merely meretricious or plausible differences. The overemphasis on the doctrine of classification or any anxious and sustained attempts to discover some basis for classification may gradually and imperceptibly deprive the article of its precious content and end in replacing doctrine of equality by the doctrine of classification. The presumption of good faith in and of constitutionality of a classification cannot be pushed to the point of predicating some possible or hypothetical but undisclosed and unknown reason for a classification rendering the precious guarantee of equality "a mere rope of sand". 152. The Apex Court in a decision reported in 1993(1) SCC 645 in the matter of Unni Krishnan J. P. and others Versus State of Andhra Pradesh and Others has observed that education is "a preparation for a living and for life, here and hereafter". Education is "at once a social and political necessity". 152. The Apex Court in a decision reported in 1993(1) SCC 645 in the matter of Unni Krishnan J. P. and others Versus State of Andhra Pradesh and Others has observed that education is "a preparation for a living and for life, here and hereafter". Education is "at once a social and political necessity". Educational institutions are the seed-beds of culture, where children in whose hands quiver the destinies of the future are trained. 153. Apex Court, considering the educational qualification has observed that "it would have to be borne in mind that diploma holders are drawn mainly from the poor families and they are incapable of making up to the Degree grade. Chill penury should not be written, therefore, be allowed to repress their noble rage". It may be that social justice is not fundamental right, but there is a little doubt that social justice being a requirement of directive principle of Constitution, same would have to be desideratum in any case. Legal principles regarding the educational qualification being basis of classification relating to promotion in public service: 1. Higher educational qualification is permissible basis of classification, acceptability of which will depend on the facts and circumstances of the case. 2. Higher educational qualification can be the basis not only for barring promotion but also for restricting the scope of promotion. 3. The restriction placed cannot go to the extent of seriously jeopardising the chances of promotion. To decide this, the extent of the restriction shall have also to be looked into, to ascertain whether it is reasonable. 154. The Apex Court has held that, prescribing higher educational qualification as the basis for classification for promotion and restricting promotion and the said restriction should not go to the extent of seriously jeopardising the chances of promotion. However, such is not the case here. 155. It appears from the explanation to the proviso of the amended rules that option given to the employees to pursue higher education under the amended rules and the guidelines formulated under the Circular dated 24.08.2010 require prior permission of the Chief Justice to pursue higher education subject to the condition that their study will not adversely affect office work and would permit them to adhere to office hours. Also, at a time only 10% of the employees working in a particular cadre would be permitted to pursue their course. 156. Also, at a time only 10% of the employees working in a particular cadre would be permitted to pursue their course. 156. It is required to be noticed that some of the officers who have put in long service with the experience of several years service and for whom, it may not be possible to undertake the courses because of age and other constraints, the requirement of higher educational qualification for promotion to the next higher cadre may morally degrade, discourage and demotivate them from continuing to work efficiently. 157. Five years period is prescribed to obtain higher qualification. At a time, only 10% of employees from a cadre would be permitted to pursue higher education. If 10% of the employees as against the strength of the employees are permitted, having regard to the number of employees not having higher educational qualification, there is possibility of many of them may not even getting a chance to acquire higher educational qualification. 158. If the intention of the rule making authority was to give opportunity to employees, who do not possess higher educational qualification, it is open to the rule making authority to consider the same to alter or amend the provisions. 159. I am clear in my mind that the Court has no role to substitute its opinion or suggest as to what would be the correct policy. However, if the provision is made for the benefit of the employees to acquire higher educational qualification, to give effect to the same, authority may consider the same to subserve the purpose for which it is made. 160. For the reasons stated above, I allow the writ appeals filed by the Chief Justice of the High Court of Karnataka in part and accordingly, I dispose of the connected writ petitions except W.P. No.10131/2010 and in modification of the common order of the learned single Judge, I hold that:- 1. The Chief Justice as a delegate under Article 229 of the Constitution has power to amend the rules prescribing higher educational qualification as a criterion for promotion to the next higher cadre. 2. Amended Rules of 2009 do not require approval from the Governor of the State. 3. Amended Rules of 2009 prescribing higher education qualification as criterion for promotion to the next higher cadre are not violative of Articles 14, 16 or 21 of the Constitution. 4. 2. Amended Rules of 2009 do not require approval from the Governor of the State. 3. Amended Rules of 2009 prescribing higher education qualification as criterion for promotion to the next higher cadre are not violative of Articles 14, 16 or 21 of the Constitution. 4. Amended rules of 2009 are prospective in nature. They will not be applicable to the vacancies that existed prior to corning into force of the amended rules of 2009. All the vacancies, which arose prior to coming into force of the amended rules, 2009 have to be filled up under the principal rules. 5. All promotions in respect of vacancies that arose subsequent to coming into force of the amended rules of 2009 have to be filled up under the amended rules. 6. Interpretation of explanation to the proviso to the amended rules of 2009 causing hardship to the employees in acquiring higher educational qualification cannot be a ground to declare the amended rules of 2009 as arbitrary, unreasonable and thus, violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. 7. It is always open to the policy maker to consider the grievances and hardship of the employees. 8. The order of promotion in respect of vacancies that arose prior to coming into force of amended rules of 2009, if any, made under the amended rules shall stand quashed. Similarly, promotions, if any, made under the Principal rules in respect of the vacancies, which arose after the coming into force of the amended rules of 2009 also stand quashed. 9. Writ Petition No.10131/2010 is delinked to be posted before the Bench having roster to be heard in due course. 10. Consequent to quashing orders of promotions, to prevent any hardship that is likely to be caused and in ensuring smooth administration of the work of the High Court, persons, whose promotions have been quashed shall, however be permitted to continue in their respective posts as incharge arrangement till the promotions are made to the said posts in terms of this order.