JUDGMENT 1. Challenge in this Second Appeal is to the judgment and decree dated 21.10.1997 passed in Appeal Suit No. 291 of 1996 by the Principal District Court, Kamarajar (Virudhunagar) District at Srivilliputhur, wherein the judgment and decree dated 13.8.1996 passed in Original Suit No. 42 of 1996 by the Principal District Munsif Court, Srivilliputhur are reversed. 2. The respondents herein as plaintiffs have instituted Original Suit No. 42 of 1996 on the file of the trial Court for the reliefs of declaration and perpetual injunction, wherein the present appellant has been shown as sole defendant. 3. The nubble of the plaint can be stated like thus: The suit property is situate in Ward No. 4, Rajapalayam Town and Rajapalayam Village. The suit property is the ancestral property of the plaintiffs’ father by name Thangamani @ Ramamoorthy Nadar. For better appreciation, with regard to juxtaposition of the suit property a plaint plan has been annexed with. The suit property has been shown as ‘a, b, c, d’ in the plaint plan. The portion which has been described as ‘e, f, g, h’ is a tomb. The plaintiffs are brothers and sisters. The father of the plaintiffs by name Thangamani @ Ramamoorthy Nadar and his father by name Narayanan Nadar have jointly executed the sale deed dated 30.3.1946 in favour of the defendant with regard to the properties situate on eastern, western and southern side for a sum of Rs. 4,937/- and they retained the suit property which has been shown as ‘a, b, c, d’ in the plaint plan. On 2.2.1984, the plaintiffs have issued a notice to the defendant so as to permit them to effect repairs in tomb. The defendant has given a reply notice dated 7.2.1984, wherein it has been stated to the effect that the plaintiffs cannot effect repairs and subsequently on 16.2.1984, the plaintiffs have given a legal notice to the defendant and thereafter the father of the plaintiffs has instituted Original Suit No. 402 of 1986 against the defendant for the reliefs of perpetual injunction, wherein an order of status-quo has been passed in I.A. No. 437 of 1987. In Original Suit No. 402 of 1986, the defendant has filed a written statement on 24.9.1987, wherein it has been specifically stated that the plaintiffs are not having title to the suit property and the defendant has had enjoyed the same for more than a statutory period and thereby prescribed title to the same by adverse possession. The defendant is estopped from claiming title to the suit property. Under the said circumstances, the present suit has been instituted for the reliefs sought for in the plaint. 4. In the written statement filed on the side of the defendant it is averred that the defendant has purchased properties under a registered sale deed dated 30.3.1946. But, there is no plaint schedule property on ground as mentioned in the plaint. The defendant has had enjoyed the suit property for more than a statutory period and thereby prescribed title to the same by adverse possession. It is false to say that the defendant has written several letters to the father of the plaintiffs and thereby requested him to donate the suit property in favour of the defendant. The suit is barred by limitation on the basis of latches and acquiescence on the part of the plaintiffs. The father of the plaintiffs has withdrawn Original Suit No. 402 of 1986 with a liberty to file a fresh suit and necessary permission has been given wherein a period of limitation has been prescribed. But, the present suit has been instituted beyond the period of limitation fixed thereon and therefore, the present suit is not legally maintainable and there is no merit in the suit and the same deserves to be dismissed. 5. On the basis of the divergent pleadings raised on either side, the trial Court has framed necessary issues and after analysing both the oral and documentary evidence, has dismissed the suit. Against the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court, the plaintiffs as appellants have preferred Appeal Suit No. 291 of 1996 on the file of the first appellate Court. 6. The first appellate Court after hearing both sides and upon reappraising the evidence available on record has allowed the Appeal and thereby set aside the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court and ultimately decreed the suit as prayed for. 6. The first appellate Court after hearing both sides and upon reappraising the evidence available on record has allowed the Appeal and thereby set aside the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court and ultimately decreed the suit as prayed for. Against the judgment and decree passed by the first appellate Court, the present Second Appeal has been instituted at the instance of the defendant as appellant. 7. At the time of admitting the present Second Appeal, the following substantial questions of law have been settled for consideration: (i) Whether the first appellate Court is erred in law and misconstrued in allowing the appeal and decreeing the suit without framing issues and appropriate consideration and without correctness of law by reversing the judgment of the trial Court? (ii) Whether the suit property is a public street which is used continuously by the members of the public at all claims and whether a decree can be granted in favour of the respondent/plaintiff in respect of the public street ignoring the law or interest of the public? (iii) Whether the plaintiff at this stage has title to the public street or portion of the public municipal property? 8. The sum and substance of the case of the plaintiffs is that the suit property is situate in Ward No. 4, Rajapalayam Town and Village. The suit property and its adjacent properties are ancestrally belonged to the father of the plaintiffs by name Thangamani @ Ramamoorthy Nadar and the father of the plaintiffs and his father by name Narayanan Nadar have jointly executed a sale deed dated 30.3.1946 in favour of the defendant in respect of the lands which situate on eastern, western and southern side of the suit property. The suit property has been shown as ‘a, b, c, d’ in the plaint plan, wherein a tomb is in existence and the same has been described as ‘e, f, g, h’ in the plaint plan. In the sale deed dated 30.3.1946, the suit property has not been mentioned. The suit property has been shown as ‘a, b, c, d’ in the plaint plan, wherein a tomb is in existence and the same has been described as ‘e, f, g, h’ in the plaint plan. In the sale deed dated 30.3.1946, the suit property has not been mentioned. In fact the same has been excluded and since the defendant has refused to give permission to the father of the plaintiffs so as to effect repairs in the tomb he instituted Original Suit No. 402 of 1986 for the relief of permanent injunction, wherein the defendant has filed a written statement on 24.9.1987 stating that the plaintiff therein is not having title to the suit property and further the defendant has had enjoyed the suit property for more than a statutory period and thereby prescribed title to the same by adverse possession and by way of considering the defence taken on the side of the defendant in Original Suit No. 402 of 1986, the plaintiff therein has withdrawn the same with liberty to file a fresh suit on the same cause of action. Under the said circumstances, the present suit has been instituted for the reliefs of declaration and perpetual injunction. 9. In the written statement it is averred that the plaintiffs and their predecessors in title have had no right, title and interest over the suit property and the defendant has had enjoyed the suit property for more than a statutory period and thereby prescribed title to the same by adverse possession and further in Original Suit No. 402 of 1986, the plaintiff therein has been permitted to withdraw the same with a liberty to file a fresh suit within a period mentioned in the order. But, the present suit has been instituted on 20.3.1991 and therefore, the present suit is barred by limitation and further the present suit is barred by limitation due to lacthes as well as acquiescence on the part of the plaintiffs. 10. As adverted to earlier, the trial Court has dismissed the suit. But the first appellate Court has decreed the same as prayed for. 11. Before contemplating the rival submissions made on either side, it would be condign to look into Sections 3 and 27 , Articles 58 , 65 and 113 of the Limitation Act, 1963. 12. 10. As adverted to earlier, the trial Court has dismissed the suit. But the first appellate Court has decreed the same as prayed for. 11. Before contemplating the rival submissions made on either side, it would be condign to look into Sections 3 and 27 , Articles 58 , 65 and 113 of the Limitation Act, 1963. 12. Section 3 of the said Act reads as follows: “Bar of Limitation.- Subject to the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive), every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence. A mere reading of the said Section would reveal that if any suit or appeal or application has been filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation mentioned in the Limitation Act , is liable to be dismissed even though plea of limitation has not been taken as a defence.” 13. Section 27 of the said Act reads as follows: “Extinguishment of right to property.-At the determination of the period hereby limited to any person for instituting a suit for possession of any property, his right to such property shall be extinguished. It means, as far as a suit for possession is concerned, the same should be filed before expiry of the period mentioned in the Limitation Act and if the same is filed beyond the period of limitation, right of plaintiff over such property shall become extinguished.” 14. Article 58 reads as follows: Description of suit Period of limitation Time from which period begins to run To obtain any other declaration Three years When the right to sue first accrues From a cursory look of the provision of the said Article, it is easily discernable that apart from the declaratory suits mentioned in Articles 56 and 57, any other declaratory suit should be filed within three years from the date when right to sue first accrues. 15. Article 65 reads as follows: Description of suit Period of limitation Time from which period begins to run For possession of immovable property or any interest therein based on title Twelve years When the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff. 15. Article 65 reads as follows: Description of suit Period of limitation Time from which period begins to run For possession of immovable property or any interest therein based on title Twelve years When the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff. From a plain reading of the said Article, it is made clear that a suit filed for recovery of possession based on title should be filed within a period of 12 years when possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff concerned. 16. Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is corresponding to Article 142 of the Limitation Act, 1908, wherein it is stated that the plaintiff who based his case on title has to prove not only title, but also possession within 12 years of the date of suit. The said Article has undergone metamorphic change in view of Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The vital distinction between Articles 142 of the Limitation Act, 1908 and Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is that as per Article 142 of 1908 Act, the plaintiff has to prove not only title, but also possession within 12 years of the date of suit, whereas, as per Article 65 of 1963 Act, a suit for possession based on title has to be filed within 12 years when possession becomes adverse to the concerned plaintiff. 17. Article 113 reads as follows: Description of application Period of limitation Time from which period begins to run Any suit for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in this Schedule. Three years When the right to sue accrues It means, if no prescribed period of limitation is provided elsewhere in the Limitation Act, 1963, as per Article 113 of the said Act, a suit must be instituted within a period of 3 years when the right to sue accrues. 18. From the conjoint reading of the said Sections and Articles of the Limitation Act, 1963, the Court has to find out as to whether the reliefs sought for in the present suit would come within the contour of Article 58 or any other Article of Limitation Act , 1963. 19. Article 58 comes within the purview of Part-III of Limitation Act, 1963 and the same deals with suits relating to declarations. 20. 19. Article 58 comes within the purview of Part-III of Limitation Act, 1963 and the same deals with suits relating to declarations. 20. Especially, Article 56 deals with declaratory suits with regard to forgery of an instrument issued or registered. Article 57 deals with declaration that an alleged adoption is invalid, or never, in fact, has taken place. 21. Article 58 deals with the suit relating to any other declaration, not covered under Articles 56 and 67. 22. The present suit has been instituted for the reliefs of declaration and consequential relief of permanent injunction. Therefore, it is pellucid that the present suit comes within the purview of Article 58 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and it is the bounden duty of the Court to find out as to whether the present suit has been filed within a period of limitation prescribed under the said Article. 23. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant/defendant advanced his argument to the effect that the father of the plaintiffs as plaintiff has instituted Original Suit No. 402 of 1986 on the file of the District Munsif Court, Srivilliputhur for the relief of perpetual injunction against the present defendant wherein the defendant has filed a written statement on 24.9.1987, wherein it has been specifically stated to the effect that the plaintiff therein is not having title to the suit property and subsequently Original Suit No. 402 of 1986 has been withdrawn with a liberty to file a fresh suit for the reliefs of declaration and perpetual injunction on the same cause of action. But, the present suit has been instituted on 20.3.1991 and therefore, the present suit is barred by limitation, since the same has not been filed within a period of three years from the date on which the right to sue first accrues and the trial Court has rightly dismissed the suit. But the first appellate Court has failed to look into the said aspect and therefore, the judgment and decree passed by the first appellate Court are liable to be set aside. 24. But the first appellate Court has failed to look into the said aspect and therefore, the judgment and decree passed by the first appellate Court are liable to be set aside. 24. In order to dissipate the contention put forth on the side of the appellant/defendant, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents/plaintiffs has advanced a queer argument to the effect that the Articles mentioned in Part-III of the Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable and as per Section 27 of the Limitation Act , 1963, the Court can easily come to a conclusion that the present suit is not barred by limitation and the trial Court has erroneously dismissed the suit. But, the first appellate Court has rightly decreed the same and therefore, the contention put forth on the side of the appellant/defendant is incorrect and the same is liable to be eschewed. 25. On the basis of the divergent submissions made on either side, the Court has to look into as to whether the present suit has been filed within a period of limitation as contemplated under Article 58 of the Limitation Act, 1963 or the present suit has been instituted on the basis of Section 27 of the said Act, even without looking into the other material facts put forth on either side. 26. It has already been pointed out that Section 27 of the said Act deals with “Extinguishment of right.” It means a suit for possession of any property should be filed within a period of limitation, otherwise, right of such property shall become extinguished. 27. The present suit has been instituted for the reliefs of declaration and perpetual injunction. The present case has not been filed for the relief of recovery of possession based on title. Since the present case has been instituted for the reliefs of declaration and perpetual injunction, the same should be filed within the period of limitation mentioned in Article 58 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Therefore, the plaintiffs cannot take umbrage either under Section 27 or Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963. 28. As adverted to earlier, the present suit has been instituted for the reliefs of declaration and perpetual injunction. Therefore, the plaintiffs cannot take umbrage either under Section 27 or Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963. 28. As adverted to earlier, the present suit has been instituted for the reliefs of declaration and perpetual injunction. The father of the plaintiffs has instituted Original Suit No. 402 of 1986 against the present defendant for the relief of perpetual injunction, wherein the defendant therein (present defendant) has filed a written statement on 24.9.1987 and the specific averments made therein are that the plaintiff therein is not having title to the suit property and the defendant has had enjoyed the suit property for more than a statutory period and thereby prescribed title to the same by adverse possession. It is an admitted that after receipt of written statement filed on 24.9.1987. Original Suit No. 402 of 1986 has been withdrawn with a liberty to file a fresh suit for the reliefs of declaration and perpetual injunction. The present suit has been instituted for the reliefs of declaration and perpetual injunction on 20.3.1991. In the present plaint, it has been clearly stated to the effect that cause of action has arisen on 24.9.1987 when the defendant has denied title of the plaintiff by way of filing written statement in Original suit No. 402 of 1986. Therefore, it is quite clear that the right to sue first accrues on 24.9.1987. 29. It has already been discussed in detail that a suit for any other declaration should be filed within three years from the date when the right to sue first accrues. In the instant case, right to sue first accrues on 24.9.1987 and therefore as per Article 58 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the present suit must be filed on or before 24.9.1990. But the present suit has been instituted on 20.3.1991. Therefore, it is quite clear that the present suit is barred by limitation as per Article 58 of the Limitation Act, 1963 since the same has not been filed within a period of 3 years from the date on which the right to sue first accrues. 30. It has already been pointed out that the learned counsel appearing for the respondents/plaintiffs has made an inert attempt to the effect that the present suit would come within the purview of Section 27 of the Limitation Act, 1963. 30. It has already been pointed out that the learned counsel appearing for the respondents/plaintiffs has made an inert attempt to the effect that the present suit would come within the purview of Section 27 of the Limitation Act, 1963. But, this Court has specifically pointed out that neither Section 27 nor Article 65 of the said Act is applicable in view of the nature of reliefs sought for in the present suit. 31. In order to fortify the aforesaid legal aspect, the Court has to place reliance upon the following decisions: (a) In Natha Singh and Another v. Heet Singh and Others AIR 1980 All 358 it has been specifically held that “with regard to declaration of fixation of boundaries of village, a suit for declaration must be filed within a period of limitation prescribed under Article 58 of the Limitation Act, 1963.” (b) In R. Ravindra Reddy and Others v. H. Ramaiah Reddy and Others, AIR 2010 SC 991 it has been specifically held that “a suit for declaration, partition and permanent injunction must be filed within a period of limitation prescribed under Article 58 of the Limitation Act, 1963.” 32. Therefore, from the conjoint reading of the said decisions, the Court can easily come to a conclusion that a declaratory suit other than the declarations mentioned in Articles 56 and 57 of the Limitation Act, 1963 should be filed within a period of limitation mentioned in Article 58 of the said Act. In view of the foregoing narration of both the factual and legal aspects, it is very clear that the contention put forth on the side of the appellant/defendant with regard to fact that the present suit is barred by limitation is really having subsisting force, whereas the contention put forth on the side of the respondents/plaintiffs is sans merit. 33. The present suit has been instituted for the reliefs of declaration and perpetual injunction. It has already been pointed that the present suit is barred by limitation, since the same has been filed beyond the period of limitation prescribed under Article 58 of the Limitation Act, 1963. 33. The present suit has been instituted for the reliefs of declaration and perpetual injunction. It has already been pointed that the present suit is barred by limitation, since the same has been filed beyond the period of limitation prescribed under Article 58 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Since the present suit is barred by limitation under the said Article, the Court need not look into the merits and demerits of the present case since the present suit is liable to be dismissed on the ground of limitation and further the substantial questions of law settled in the present second appeal need not be decided. 34. The first appellate Court without considering the crucial date mentioned in the plaint on which cause of action first accrues has erroneously decreed the suit as prayed for and therefore the judgment and decree passed by the first appellate Court are liable to be set aside and the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court are liable to be restored. 35. In fine, this Second Appeal is allowed without cost. The judgment and decree passed in Appeal Suit No. 291 of 1996 by the Principal District Court, Kamarajar (Virudhunagar) District at Srivilliputhur are set aside and the judgment and decree passed in Original Suit No. 42 of 1996 by the Principal District Munsif Court, Srivilliputhur are restored. Connected Miscellaneous Petition is closed. Appeal allowed.