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2012 DIGILAW 49 (CAL)

Bank Of India v. Parameswaran Padmanabhan

2012-01-17

PRANAB KUMAR CHATTOPADHYAY

body2012
JUDGMENT PRANAB KUMAR CHATTOPADHYAY, J. 1. THE appellant bank has preferred the instant appeal assailing the judgement and order dated 21st September, 2010 passed by a learned Judge of this Court whereby and whereunder the said learned Judge was pleased to dispose of the writ petition by quashing the charge-sheet issued to the respondent/writ petitioner, enquiry report submitted by the Enquiry Officer, the order of punishment issued by the disciplinary authority in respect of the respondent/writ petitioner and also the subsequent order of the appellate authority affirming the decision of the disciplinary authority. 2. THE necessary facts which are relevant for the purpose of deciding the appeal are briefly narrated hereinafter : The respondent/writ petitioner while working in the bank as staff clerk in Satgram Branch was served with a memorandum dated 7th August, 1980 issued by the Regional Manager, Eastern Region of the bank pursuant to a complaint received from one Sri P.K. Mukhopadhyay, an Officer of the Asansol Branch of the said bank. In the aforesaid memorandum it was alleged that the respondent/writ petitioner assaulted said Sri Mukhopadhyay and also hurled filthy languages towards him. The Regional Manager, Eastern Region was the disciplinary authority of the respondent/writ petitioner at the relevant time. After receiving the aforesaid memorandum, respondent/ writ petitioner submitted his reply refuting the charges levelled against him. Thereafter, another memorandum dated 23rd December, 1980 was served upon the respondent/writ petitioner with a direction to submit his explanation within seven days. The respondent/writ petitioner also submitted his reply to the aforesaid memorandum denying the charges levelled against him. Respondent/writ petitioner thereafter filed a writ petition before this Court being Matter No. 840 of 1981 challenging the legality and validity of the aforesaid memorandums dated August 7, 1980 and December 23, 1980. After final disposal of the aforesaid writ petition an appeal was also preferred by the respondent/writ petitioner being Appeal No. 252 of 1982. In the said appeal an order was passed by the Division Bench of this Court on September 7, 1982 granting liberty to the appellant bank to proceed with the departmental proceeding against the respondent/writ petitioner. The bank was however, restrained from passing the final order in relation to the said disciplinary proceeding till the disposal of the appeal. Thereafter, the appellant bank issued a charge-sheet on September 10, 1982 to the respondent/writ petitioner. The bank was however, restrained from passing the final order in relation to the said disciplinary proceeding till the disposal of the appeal. Thereafter, the appellant bank issued a charge-sheet on September 10, 1982 to the respondent/writ petitioner. In the aforesaid charge-sheet the disciplinary authority specifically mentioned the name of the Enquiry Officer for conducting the enquiry proceeding and also directed the respondent/writ petitioner to report to the said Enquiry Officer on 20th September, 1982 at 11 A.M. 3. THE enquiry proceeding was started at the Burdwan Regional Office of the respondent bank on the aforesaid 20th September, 1982 and was abruptly concluded on 11th March, 1983. As a matter of fact, the said enquiry officer on March 7, 1983 fixed the next date of the enquiry on March 11, 1983 for production of first defence witness as per the list submitted by the writ petitioner. The said defence witness namely Sri Amitava Roy was an employee of the Asansol Branch of the appellant bank. The said first defence witness could not be produced on March 11, 1983 since the Manager of the Asansol Branch of the appellant bank did not release the said witness Sri Amitava Roy from the duty in order to enable him to appear before the enquiry officer at the place of enquiry at Calcutta. A prayer was made on behalf of the respondent/writ petitioner for adjournment of the enquiry proceeding. The enquiry officer asked the presenting officer of the appellant bank to ascertain the actual position from the Asansol Branch of the bank over telephone and adjourned the enquiry proceeding for some time on the same date. The enquiry was thereafter resumed at about 1-45 P.M. when the presenting officer of the bank could not appraise the enquiry officer about the actual state of affairs at Asansol since the telephone lines of the Asansol Branch of the bank were out of order. The enquiry officer however, did not adjourn the enquiry proceeding and abruptly closed the enquiry proceeding even without granting opportunity to the other witnesses to adduce evidence. Ultimately the enquiry officer submitted his enquiry report before the Disciplinary Authority on 16th September. 4. The enquiry officer however, did not adjourn the enquiry proceeding and abruptly closed the enquiry proceeding even without granting opportunity to the other witnesses to adduce evidence. Ultimately the enquiry officer submitted his enquiry report before the Disciplinary Authority on 16th September. 4. A Division Bench of this court by the order dated October 4, 1983 modified the interim order passed earlier in appeal being Appeal No. 252 of 1982 by giving opportunity to the appellant bank to pass final order in respect of the pending disciplinary proceeding although the appellant bank was restrained from giving any effect to the same. A second show-cause notice dated October 31, 1983 was served upon the respondent/petitioner in view of the modification of the interim order dated 4th October, 1983 by the Division Bench. The respondent/writ petitioner thereafter moved a writ petition before this court being Matter No. 1797 of 1986 when a learned Judge of this court passed an interim order restraining the appellant bank herein from giving any effect or further effect to the final order if already passed in the matter pursuant to the aforesaid show-cause notice. 5. THE aforesaid writ petition was finally disposed of by a learned Judge of this court on March 21, 2006 when the said learned Judge was pleased to set aside the second show-cause notice dated October 31, 1983 and also issued a specific direction to the bank to issue a fresh show-cause notice. 6. THE learned Single Judge however, specifically directed that before issuing the fresh second show-cause notice, the Disciplinary Authority shall give an opportunity to the respondent/writ petitioner to submit his representation on the findings of the enquiry officer and if the representation is submitted by the writ petitioner then the Disciplinary Authority shall pass a reasoned order after considering the contentions of the writ petitioner made in the said representation. The operative part of the aforesaid order dated 21st March, 2006 passed by the learned Single Judge while deciding the writ petition being W.P. No. 1797 of 1986 is set out hereunder :- "For these reasons I am of the view that the second show cause notice should be set aside. I accordingly set it aside. The writ petition is allowed to this extent. I accordingly set it aside. The writ petition is allowed to this extent. Before issuing the fresh second show cause notice, the disciplinary authority shall give the petitioner an opportunity of submitting his representation to the findings of the enquiry officer. If the representation is submitted by the petitioner, then (and because of the fact that the 1982 disciplinary proceedings have remained pending for such a long time) the disciplinary authority shall give a reasoned decision after considering the contentions raised by the petitioner in his representation to the findings of the enquiry officer. If the disciplinary authority is of the view that findings of the enquiry officer are to be accepted, then he shall issue the second show cause notice regarding the proposed punishment. He shall give the petitioner a reasonable opportunity to submit his representation to such second show cause notice. After considering the representation, if submitted by the petitioner, the disciplinary authority shall give the final decision in the proceedings. Such decision must reflect his due application of mind to the contentions that may be raised by the petitioner in his representation. After the final order is made by the disciplinary authority (by this I mean the authority who is competent to act as disciplinary authority at the present moment) the parties will be at liberty to choose their respective courses of action." 7. PURSUANT to the aforesaid order, the respondent/writ petitioner herein submitted his representation on the findings of the enquiry officer on May 6, 2006 and on June 7, 2006 the Disciplinary Authority issued a fresh second show-cause notice upon holding the respondent/writ petitioner guilty of the charges and proposed the punishment of compulsory retirement. On July 20, 2006, the respondent/writ petitioner submitted his representation in connection with the fresh second show-cause notice. On August 19, 2006, the Disciplinary Authority issued punishment order of compulsory retirement of the respondent/writ petitioner from the service with superannuation benefits i.e. pension and/or provident fund and gratuity as would be due under the rules. 8. THE respondent/writ petitioner thereafter preferred an appeal before the Appellate Authority challenging the entire disciplinary proceeding including the chargesheet, the findings of the enquiry officer, the second show-cause notice and the order of punishment issued by the Disciplinary Authority. The Appellate Authority however, affirmed the decision of the Disciplinary Authority and rejected the appeal preferred by the respondent/writ petitioner. 9. THE respondent/writ petitioner thereafter preferred an appeal before the Appellate Authority challenging the entire disciplinary proceeding including the chargesheet, the findings of the enquiry officer, the second show-cause notice and the order of punishment issued by the Disciplinary Authority. The Appellate Authority however, affirmed the decision of the Disciplinary Authority and rejected the appeal preferred by the respondent/writ petitioner. 9. THE respondent/writ petitioner thereafter filed the present writ petition before the learned Single Judge challenging the entire disciplinary proceedings including the chargesheet, the findings of the enquiry officer the order of punishment issued by the Disciplinary Authority and the subsequent order of the Appellate Authority affirming the decision of the Disciplinary Authority. The aforesaid writ petition was ultimately allowed by the learned Single Judge by the judgment and order under appeal whereby the said learned Single Judge quashed the chargesheet along with the report of the enquiry officer, order of the Disciplinary Authority imposing punishment on the respondent/writ petitioner and the subsequent order passed by the Appellate Authority affirming the decision of the Disciplinary Authority. 10. THE learned Single Judge upon hearing the learned counsel of the respective parties and considering the facts and circumstances of this case held that the Disciplinary Authority issued the chargesheet in closed mind and without giving any opportunity to the respondent/writ petitioner to submit his reply to the said chargesheet. 11. THE learned Single Judge specifically observed that the Disciplinary Authority did not form a prima facie opinion about the charges levelled against the respondent/writ petitioner as mentioned in the chargesheet after giving an opportunity to the said respondent/writ petitioner to submit reply to the chargesheet and considering the same. The learned Single Judge relying on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Punjab Vs. V. K. Khanna, reported in AIR 2001 SC 343 held that the respondent/writ petitioner should have been granted an opportunity to submit reply to the chargesheet by the Disciplinary Authority before forming an opinion to enquire into the charges levelled against the said respondent/writ petitioner by appointing an enquiry officer. 12. THE learned Single Judge also referred to the letters of complaint dated May 28, 1980 and October 5, 1980 and held that the chargesheet suffered from patent discrepancy with regard to the date of the incident since the date of incident was not mentioned in the first letter of complaint. 13. 12. THE learned Single Judge also referred to the letters of complaint dated May 28, 1980 and October 5, 1980 and held that the chargesheet suffered from patent discrepancy with regard to the date of the incident since the date of incident was not mentioned in the first letter of complaint. 13. THE learned counsel representing the appellant bank however, submitted that the principles laid down in the case of V. K. Khanna (supra) were not followed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the subsequent decision reported in (2010) 11 SCC 71 (South Bengal State Transport Corporation Vs. Ashok Kr. Ghosh and Ors.). The learned counsel of the appellant submitted that the learned Single Judge failed to appreciate the aforesaid subsequent decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in an appropriate manner. 14. MR. R. N. Mazumdar learned counsel representing the appellant bank referred to Clause 19.12 of the first Bipartite Settlement dated 19th October, 1966 made between the management of Bank represented by Indian Banks' Association and All India Bank Employees Federation. The relevant extracts from the aforesaid Clause 19.12 of the first Bipartite Settlement are set out hereunder :- "(a) An employee against whom disciplinary action is proposed or likely to be taken shall be given a charge sheet clearly setting forth the circumstances appearing against him and a date shall be fixed for enquiry, sufficient time being given to him to enable him to prepare and give his explanation so also to produce any evidence that he may be wish to tender in his defence. He shall be permitted to appear before the Officer conducting the enquiry, to cross examine any witness on whose evidence the charge rests and to examine witness and produce other evidence in his defence. He shall also be permitted to be defended (Emphasis supplied)" 15. MR. Mazumdar submitted that in view of the aforesaid provisions in the first Bipartite Settlement, principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of V. K. Khanna (supra) cannot be made applicable in the facts of the present case and the principle decided subsequently by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of South Bengal State Transport Corporation (supra) will be applicable in the facts of the present case. 16. 16. IN the case of South Bengal State Transport Corporation (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has considered its earlier decision in the case of V. K. Khanna (supra) and distinguished the same upon considering the Regulation 38 of the Regulations of the South Bengal State Transport Corporation. The relevant extracts from the aforesaid decision are set out hereunder :- "11. Regulation 38 of the Regulations, inter alia, provides the procedure for imposing penalties. As the High Court had held that the appointment of an enquiry officer without considering the reply submitted by the delinquent employee speaks of bias and the punishment inflicted is in violation of Regulation 38 2 of the Regulations, we deem it expedient to reproduce not only Regulation 38 2 but also Regulation 38 (3) which are relevant for the purpose : "38. Procedure for imposing penalties I (2) The disciplinary authority shall draw up or cause to be drawn up- (i) the substance of the imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour into definite and distinct articles of charge, (ii) a statement of imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour in support of each article of charge which shall contain (a) statement of relevant facts including any admission or confession made by the employee, (b) a list of documents by which, and a list of witnesses by whom, the articles of charge are proposed to be sustained. (3) The disciplinary authority shall deliver or cause to be delivered to the employee a copy of the articles of charge and the statement of imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour prepared under clause (ii) of sub-regulation (2) and shall require the employee to submit to the inquiring authority within such time as may be specified a written statement of his defence and to state whether he desires to be heard in person. 12. From a plain reading of Regulation 38 (2) it is evident that the disciplinary authority is required to draw or cause to be drawn up, the substance of imputation of misconduct into definite and distinct articles of charges and the statement of imputation of misconduct, to contain the statement of relevant facts including any admission or confession made by the employee. It also requires drawing up a list of documents by which and a list of witnesses by whom the articles of charges are proposed to be sustained. It also requires drawing up a list of documents by which and a list of witnesses by whom the articles of charges are proposed to be sustained. Regulation 38 (3) of the Regulations obliges the disciplinary authority to deliver or cause to be delivered to the employee the articles of charges and the statement of imputation of misconduct requiring the employee to submit to the enquiry officer a written statement of defence within a specified period. Neither Regulation 38 (2) nor Regulation 38 (3) provides that before the appointment of the enquiry officer the reply of the delinquent employee is to be considered. 13. In our opinion, it may be open for a disciplinary authority to initiate the departmental proceedings on consideration of the reply of an employee but as an absolute proposition of law it cannot be said that before initiating the departmental enquiry or appointing an enquiry officer, reply of the delinquent employee is required to be obtained and considered unless it is the requirement of the rules. There may be cases where the charges are of such a nature that the disciplinary authority may not require any reply from the delinquent employee but straightway initiate departmental enquiry and appoint an enquiry officer. 14. In the present case the bus was checked by the flying squad of the appellant Corporation itself and in view of what has been found by it, the disciplinary authority while framing the charge had appointed the enquiry officer. We are of the opinion that mere appointment of any enquiry officer while framing the charge-sheet, even before considering the reply of the delinquent employee, does not reflect any bias. 15. Now referring to the authority of this Court in V. K. Khanna, relied on by the High Court, same is clearly distinguishable. In the said case the charge-sheet dated 24.04.1997 was issued to the delinquent employee who happened to be the Chief Secretary of the State and he was asked to submit his reply within 21 days but even before his reply, the Chief Minister coupled with other factors led this Court to conclude that the action was actuated by bias. In the present case the facts are completely different." (Emphasis supplied) 17. In the present case the facts are completely different." (Emphasis supplied) 17. IN view of Clause 19.12 of the first Bipartite Settlement, principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of V. K. Khanna cannot be made applicable in the facts of the present case and is clearly distinguishable in view of the clear provision of Clause 19.12 of the first Bipartite Settlement. The learned Single Judge therefore, was not right to hold that the principles laid down in the case of V. K. Khanna (supra) will be made applicable in the facts of the present case. Following the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of South Bengal State Transport Corporation(supra), we are of the opinion that mere mentioning the name of the enquiry officer in the charge sheet does not reflect any bias of the authority. 18. HOWEVER, serious allegations have been levelled against the enquiry officer on behalf of the respondent/writ petitioner for not conducting the enquiry proceeding upon observing the principles of natural justice and procedural justice. It has been alleged on behalf of the respondent/writ petitioner that the enquiry officer had closed the enquiry proceeding on the day, it was fixed for recording the evidence of the first defence witness Sri Amitava Roy. 19. THE respondent/writ petitioner was asked to produce his first named defence witness i.e. Sri Amitava Roy for adducing evidence as defence witness. Unfortunately, the first defence witness Amitava Roy was not released by the Branch Manager of the respondent bank. The defence representative of the respondent/writ petitioner by a letter dated 11th March, 1983 informed the enquiry officer that the said first defence witness Amitava Roy could not remain present in the enquiry since the said witness was not released by the Branch Manager of the appellant bank. The enquiry officer asked the presenting officer to ascertain the fact over telephone from the Branch Manager of the Asansol Branch where the said defence witness was employed under the appellant bank at the relevant time. The enquiry officer adjourned the enquiry proceeding for one hour. The presenting officer, however, could not contact the Branch Manager of the Asansol Branch of the appellant bank over telephone and therefore could not furnish the required information to the enquiry officer. The enquiry officer thereafter closed the enquiry proceeding without allowing the other listed defence witnesses to adduce any evidence. 20. The presenting officer, however, could not contact the Branch Manager of the Asansol Branch of the appellant bank over telephone and therefore could not furnish the required information to the enquiry officer. The enquiry officer thereafter closed the enquiry proceeding without allowing the other listed defence witnesses to adduce any evidence. 20. AS a matter of fact, the respondent/writ petitioner submitted a list of witnesses and the enquiry officer did not grant any opportunity to the respondent/writ petitioner to produce other defence witnesses before the enquiry officer. It is not in dispute that the enquiry officer directed the respondent/writ petitioner to produce only the first named defence Witness Amitava Roy on 11th March, 1983. Therefore, it was incumbent upon the enquiry officer to fix another date for the production of other listed defence witnesses. The Branch Manager, Asansol Branch of the appellant bank prevented the first named defence witness Amitava Roy from appearing before the enquiry officer in order to adduce evidence by not releasing him from the duty. The enquiry officer instead of taking appropriate steps against the Branch Manager of the Asansol Branch of the appellant bank for preventing the defence witness from coming to Calcutta in order to adduce evidence most surprisingly closed the enquiry proceeding abruptly in an arbitrary manner. The enquiry officer abruptly closed the enquiry without affording reasonable opportunity to the said chargesheeted employee to disprove the allegations levelled against him. 21. THE learned senior counsel representing the respondent/writ petitioner specifically urged before this court that the entire disciplinary proceeding has vitiated due to violation of the principles of natural justice and procedural justice. It has been submitted on behalf of the respondent/writ petitioner that the authorities of the bank rejected the repeated requests of the respondent/writ petitioner for changing the venue of holding the enquiry proceeding from Calcutta to Asansol. Repeated requests were made on behalf of the respondent/writ petitioner for holding the enquiry proceedings in Asansol where all the witnesses were available and the alleged incident also allegedly took place therein. The Disciplinary Authority held that the enquiry officer may fix a venue which is administratively convenient for holding the enquiry. The Appellate Authority also agreed with the aforesaid decision of the Disciplinary Authority in this regard. 22. The Disciplinary Authority held that the enquiry officer may fix a venue which is administratively convenient for holding the enquiry. The Appellate Authority also agreed with the aforesaid decision of the Disciplinary Authority in this regard. 22. WE fail to understand why the enquiry officer found the venue of enquiry in Calcutta as administratively more convenient than Asansol where all the witnesses were available apart from the facts that the alleged incident also took place therein. The Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority did not consider the aforesaid aspect in an appropriate and reasonable manner. On behalf of the appellant bank it has been submitted that there was compulsion on the enquiry officer to conclude the enquiry proceeding without any further delay so that the disciplinary proceeding can be completed within the period mentioned in the order dated 7th September, 1982 passed by a Division Bench of this court in Appeal No. 252 of 1982. 23. THE learned counsel of the appellant bank also did not dispute that the enquiry officer closed the enquiry proceedings without allowing all the defence witnesses to adduce the evidence. However, no reason has been furnished on behalf of the appellant bank for preventing the first named defence witness from appearing before the enquiry officer on 11th March, 1983. It was the duty of the Branch Manager, Asansol Branch of the appellant bank to release the first named defence witness Amitava Roy from the duty on 11th March, 1983 in order to enable him to appear before the enquiry officer to adduce his evidence. The compulsion of the enquiry officer to complete the enquiry proceeding within a reasonable period does not mean that the enquiry officer will abruptly close the enquiry proceeding without even allowing all the defence witnesses to adduce evidence. The enquiry officer is under an obligation and duty bound to conduct the enquiry proceeding fairly and upon observing the principles of natural justice and procedural justice which have been flagrantly violated in the instant case as the said enquiry officer closed the enquiry proceedings without even allowing all the listed defence witnesses to appear and adduce evidence in the enquiry proceeding. The Division Bench of this court by the order dated 7th September, 1982 only expressed the desire for completion of the disciplinary proceedings by the end of November, 1982. The Division Bench of this court by the order dated 7th September, 1982 only expressed the desire for completion of the disciplinary proceedings by the end of November, 1982. Therefore, there was no mandatory direction upon the enquiry officer to complete the enquiry proceedings on 11th March, 1983. In any event, the enquiry officer cannot close the enquiry proceeding abruptly without allowing the listed defence witnesses to adduce evidence which has been unfortunately done in the present case. Therefore, the enquiry proceeding has been vitiated in the instant case for violating the principles of natural justice and procedural justice by closing the enquiry proceedings abruptly in an arbitrary manner without allowing all the defence witnesses to adduce evidence. 24. THE Disciplinary Authority should have taken note of the aforesaid illegalities and/or irregularities committed by the enquiry officer. The respondent/writ petitioner raised specific objections before the Disciplinary Authority narrating the illegalities and/or irregularities committed by the enquiry officer while conducting the enquiry proceeding in the instant case. The Disciplinary Authority without appreciating the aforesaid illegalities and/or irregularities committed by the enquiry officer issued the second show-cause notice to the respondent/writ petitioner which was set aside by a learned Judge of this Court while deciding the writ petition being W.P. No. 1797 of 1986 by the order dated March 21, 2006. 25. THE respondent/writ petitioner pursuant to the specific direction passed by the learned Single Judge submitted representation before the Disciplinary Authority and while issuing the fresh second show cause notice, the said Disciplinary Authority again did not consider the illegalities and/or irregularities committed by the enquiry officer while conducting the enquiry proceeding although the same were specifically narrated by the respondent/writ petitioner in his representation to the Disciplinary Authority. The Appellate Authority also while considering the appeal preferred by the respondent/writ petitioner mechanically affirmed the decision of the Disciplinary Authority and rejected the appeal preferred by the respondent/writ petitioner. 26. THE enquiry officer had no occasion to hold the respondent/writ petitioner guilty of the charges mentioned in the chargesheet without conducting the enquiry proceeding properly upon observing the principles of natural justice and procedural justice. In the instant case, the enquiry proceeding was admittedly not completed by allowing all the defence witnesses to adduce evidence. 26. THE enquiry officer had no occasion to hold the respondent/writ petitioner guilty of the charges mentioned in the chargesheet without conducting the enquiry proceeding properly upon observing the principles of natural justice and procedural justice. In the instant case, the enquiry proceeding was admittedly not completed by allowing all the defence witnesses to adduce evidence. The plea taken by the appellant bank regarding compulsion of the Enquiry Officer to complete the enquiry proceeding expeditiously pursuant to an order passed earlier by a Division Bench of this Court is not acceptable to us since the Division Bench of this court by the aforesaid order dated 7th September, 1982 specifically directed that the respondent/writ petitioner should be granted all opportunities to defend himself in accordance with the rule of the disciplinary proceedings and according to law. 27. IN the aforesaid circumstances, we have no hesitation to hold that the disciplinary proceeding was vitiated from the stage of enquiry proceeding since the enquiry officer failed to conduct the enquiry proceeding upon observing the principles of natural justice and procedural justice and also did not complete the enquiry proceeding after allowing all the listed defence witnesses to adduce evidence. 28. FOR the aforementioned reasons, the order of punishment issued by the Disciplinary Authority without appreciating the representation submitted by the respondent/writ petitioner in reply to the second show cause notice cannot be upheld by any court of law. The conduct of the Appellate Authority also cannot be approved since the said Appellate Authority did not discharge his duties and responsibilities in an appropriate manner. No employee can be punished in a disciplinary proceeding on the basis of an incomplete enquiry which has been done in the present case. 29. THE learned Single Judge, therefore, rightly quashed the report of the enquiry officer dated 16th September, 1983, order of punishment dated August 19, 2006 issued by the Disciplinary Authority and the order passed by the Appellate Authority on November, 28, 2006. We find no infirmity and/or irregularity with the aforesaid findings of the learned Single Judge. 30. THE learned counsel representing the appellant bank at this stage submitted before us that the enquiry proceeding if held to be bad for violation of the principles of natural justice then the matter should be remanded for fresh enquiry from the stage the same was vitiated. 30. THE learned counsel representing the appellant bank at this stage submitted before us that the enquiry proceeding if held to be bad for violation of the principles of natural justice then the matter should be remanded for fresh enquiry from the stage the same was vitiated. The learned counsel of the respondent strongly opposed the aforesaid prayer made on behalf of the appellant bank. 31. MR. Partha Sarathi Sengupta, learned senior counsel of the respondent/writ petitioner submitted that there was no scope for de novo enquiry after a long lapse of time. Mr. Sengupta submitted that the alleged incident mentioned in the chargesheet allegedly occurred in 1980. According to Mr. Sengupta to prove or disprove the charges mentioned in the chargesheet oral evidence will be very much required. Mr. Sengupta further submitted that most of the witnesses have either expired or retired from service and their whereabouts are also not available at this stage. Mr. Sengupta strongly urged before this court that it would be travesty of justice if the respondent/writ petitioner is proceeded de novo at this stage. Mr. Sengupta further submitted that the Hon'ble Supreme Court as well as this court on earlier occasions under similar circumstances declined to pass any order for fresh enquiry after long lapse of time. In the present case, undisputedly long 32 years have already passed. In the case of Union of India and Ors. Vs. M. B. Patnaik and Ors. (Civil Appeal Nos. 2119-2121 of 1979) And Union of India and Ors. Vs. P. N. L. Das (Civil Appeal No. 389 of 1981), reported in (1981) 2 SCC 159 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed :- "7.........................However, we agree with Misra and Mohanty, JJ. Of the Orissa High Court that it would be inequitable for a fresh enquiry being made into the charge framed against the respondents in C. As. Nos. 2119-2121 of 1979 or to go into the merits of the case against P.N.L. Das the respondent in C.A. No. 389 of 1981, having regard to the long lapse of time, the offences having been stated to have been committed in about 1955...................................." 32. FOR the aforementioned reasons, we are unable to allow the prayer of the appellant bank to remand the matter before the enquiry officer for holding a fresh enquiry after a long lapse of 32 years. 33. FOR the aforementioned reasons, we are unable to allow the prayer of the appellant bank to remand the matter before the enquiry officer for holding a fresh enquiry after a long lapse of 32 years. 33. FOR the reasons discussed hereinabove, we do not find any merit in this appeal and dismiss the same. 34. THE respondent/writ petitioner has filed a cross-objection which has also been taken up for hearing along with the instant appeal. The aforesaid cross- objection has been filed since the learned Single Judge even after quashing the order of punishment issued by the Disciplinary Authority did not specify the time limit for payment of the arrear salary, pension and other admissible consequential dues. 35. IN our opinion, the learned Single Judge should have issued a specific direction for payment of admissible dues of the respondent/writ petitioner within a specified time. Therefore, while affirming the decision of the learned Single Judge we also direct the appellant bank to make payment of the arrear salary, pensionary benefit, leave encashment benefit and all other admissible dues of the respondent/writ petitioner at an early date but positively within a period of 8 weeks from the date of communication of this order upon appreciating the fact that the respondent/writ petitioner has been suffering for a considerable period of more than three decades. 36. WITH the aforesaid directions we allow the instant cross-objection filed on behalf of the respondent/writ petitioner. In the facts of the present case, there will be however no order as to costs. Let urgent Xerox certified copy of this judgment and order, if applied for, be given to the learned Advocates of the parties on usual undertaking.