B.S.Verma, J.— Since the controversy involved in all these Second Appeals is similar. Separate civil suits were filed by the same plaintiff against the defendants in respect of separate property including out-houses situated within the premises of Balrampur House Nainital, therefore, for the sake of convenience they are being decided by this common judgment. 2. All these second appeals are directed against separate judgment and decree dated 25-7-1994 passed by the IV Additional District Judge, Nainital, in separate civil appeal, whereby the appeal preferred by the plaintiff-respondent was allowed, the judgment and decree of the trial court dated 31-3-1989 in each suit was set aside and the suit of the plaintiff-respondent for mandatory injunction was decreed. The defendant in each suit was directed to deliver possession of the property in suit to the plaintiff within a period of two months. 3. Brief facts giving rise to the present second appeals are that the plaintiff-respondent herein filed separate suit against each of the defendants for a decree of mandatory injunction that the plaintiff-company is the owner and landlord of the building known as Balrampur House including its outhouses. 4. According to the plaintiff-respondent, defendant-appellant Haridev Lal Sharma of Second Appeal No. 524 of 2001 is a licensee of Out House No. H.-15 (for short property in suit) at the rate of Rs. 30/- per month as licence fee including the electricity and water charges as well as scavenging tax. The defendant is said to have fallen in arrears of licence fee worth Rs. 8940/-. 5. The defendant-appellant Kuber Singh in Second Appeal No. 1069 of 2001 is a licensee of Room No. I-2 and J-1 of Balrampur House (for short property in suit) @ Rs. 35/- per month as licence fee including the electricity and water charges as well as scavenging tax. The defendant is said to have fallen in arrears of licence fee worth Rs. 9940/-. 6. The defendant-appellant Digpal Singh Bisht in Second Appeal No. 1070 of 2001 is a licensee of Outhouse No. A-2 of Balrampur House (for short property in suit) @ Rs. 35/- per month as licence fee including the electricity and water charges as well as scavenging tax. The defendant is said to have fallen in arrears of licence fee worth Rs. 2310/-. 7. 35/- per month as licence fee including the electricity and water charges as well as scavenging tax. The defendant is said to have fallen in arrears of licence fee worth Rs. 2310/-. 7. The defendant-appellant Prahlad Singh Satyapal in Second Appeal No. 1068 of 2001 is a licensee of Outhouse No. F-4 of Balrampur House(for short property in suit) @ Rs. 22/- per month as licence fee including the electricity and water charges as well as scavenging tax. The defendant is said to have fallen in arrears of licence fee worth Rs. 3146/-. 8. The defendant-appellant Dev Singh Bisht in Second Appeal No. 1071 of 2001 is a licensee of Outhouse No. D-4 of Balrampur House (for short property in suit) @ Rs. 22/- per month as licence fee including the electricity and water charges as well as scavenging tax. The defendant is said to have fallen in arrears of licence fee worth Rs. 3146/-. 9. The defendant-appellant Mohan Chandra Chaudhary in Second Appeal No. 1072 of 2001 is a licensee of Outhouse No. G-6 of Balrampur House (for short property in suit) @ Rs. 22/- per month as licence fee including the electricity and water charges as well as scavenging tax. The defendant is said to have fallen in arrears of licence fee worth Rs. 3146/-. 10. The defendant-appellant Pooran Chandra Pandey in Second Appeal No. 1073 of 2001 is a licensee of Room No. G-5 of Balrampur House (for short property in suit) @ Rs. 40/- per month as licence fee including the electricity and water charges as well as scavenging tax. The defendant is said to have fallen in arrears of licence fee worth Rs. 1560/-. 11. The defendant-appellant Prem Singh Negi in Second Appeal No. 1074 of 2001 is a licensee of Outhouse Nos. G-12 and G-13 of Balrampur House (for short property in suit) @ Rs. 100/- per month as licence fee including the electricity and water charges as well as scavenging tax. 12. The defendant-appellant Ram Chandra Kanaujiya in Second Appeal No. 1079 of 2001 is a licensee of Outhouse Nos. F-1 and F-2 of Balrampur House (for short property in suit) @ Rs. 40/- per month as licence fee including the electricity and water charges as well as scavenging tax. The defendant is said to have fallen in arrears of licence fee worth Rs. 2640/-. 13. F-1 and F-2 of Balrampur House (for short property in suit) @ Rs. 40/- per month as licence fee including the electricity and water charges as well as scavenging tax. The defendant is said to have fallen in arrears of licence fee worth Rs. 2640/-. 13. The defendant-appellant Ramesh Chandra Joshi in Second Appeal No. 1080 of 2001 is a licensee of Outhouse No. H-4 of Balrampur House (for short property in suit) @ Rs. 30/- per month as licence fee including the electricity and water charges as well as scavenging tax. The defendant is said to have fallen in arrears of licence fee worth Rs. 1500/-. 14. According to the plaintiff-respondent, the defendants at the time of granting licence in their favour have agreed that they will not let out the property in suit to any other person and shall not make use of the vacant land shown in the plaint map. When the plaintiff demanded the amount in question from the defendants, the defendant in each case moved application for allotment of the property in suit before the Office Authorised under the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 ( UP Act No. 13 of 1972). Since the defendant had been licencee of the said property with certain conditions, therefore, his possession could not be regularized under the U.P.Act No. 13 of 1972. The plaintiff has claimed that the plaintiff is entitled to recover licence fee for a period of three years. 15. The licence of the defendant in each case was terminated by registered notice sent to the defendants but the notice was not complied with, hence the plaintiff filed civil suits against the defendant in each case for a decree of mandatory injunction. 16. The defendants contested the suit by filing their written statements and denied the ownership of the plaintiff over the property in suit. They also denied that they are licensee in the property in suit as alleged by the plaintiff. The defendants claimed that they are tenant of the property in suit from different period as asserted in the written statement. The defendants however denied that there is no question of their being licensee as the plaintiff was not the owner of the property in suit at the relevant time. The defendants claimed that they are tenant of the property in suit from different period as asserted in the written statement. The defendants however denied that there is no question of their being licensee as the plaintiff was not the owner of the property in suit at the relevant time. They further asserted that earlier Rani Raj Laxmi Devi and her son Dharmendra Pratap were the owners of the property in suit and they used to reside in Balrampur, district Gonda and their property at Nainital was being managed and looked-after by their agent Sri Bhagwat Singh Bhakuni. In the year 1981, the plaintiff company purchased the property in suit, but the said agent used to collect the rent on behalf of the plaintiff company as their agent. The plaintiff after purchase of the property in suit started threatening the defendants to evict them by force, therefore, the defendants moved application before the Officer Authorised, which does not affect the rights of the defendant as tenants. The plaintiff should have resorted to other appropriate remedy available to the plaintiff and the plaintiff has got no right to seek mandatory injunction against the defendants. The suit is barred by the provisions of Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act. 17. The learned trial Court framed following issues in each suit:- 1. Whether the plaintiff is not the owner or landlord of the property in suit? If yes, its effect? 2. Whether the defendant is a licensee or the defendant is a tenant of Bhakuni? 3. Whether the suit is undervalued and the court fee paid is insufficient? 4. To what relief is the plaintiff entitled? 5. Whether the suit is not maintainable and the suit is barred by Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act? 18. Both the parties led oral as well as documentary evidence in support of their respective contentions. The learned trial Court heard them and after perusing the evidence has held on Issue No.1 that the plaintiff company is the owner and landlord of the property in suit. On Issue No.2, the learned trial Court has held that the defendants are tenants in the property in suit and that the plaintiff failed to establish that the defendants are licensee of the plaintiff company. On Issue No.3, the learned Trial Court has held that the suits are not undervalued and the court fee paid is sufficient. On Issue No.2, the learned trial Court has held that the defendants are tenants in the property in suit and that the plaintiff failed to establish that the defendants are licensee of the plaintiff company. On Issue No.3, the learned Trial Court has held that the suits are not undervalued and the court fee paid is sufficient. On Issue No. 5, it has been held that the suits are barred under Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act. On Issue No.4, the learned trial Court has held that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief and ultimately, by judgment and decree dated 31-3-1989, the suits filed by the plaintiff were dismissed with costs. 19. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 31-3-1989 passed in each suit, the plaintiff-respondent herein preferred appeals before the appellate Court. 20. Before the first appellate Court, the plaintiff-appellant had assailed the judgment and decree of the trial Court mainly on the findings recorded on Issue Nos. 2 and 5 and it was contended before the appellate Court that the learned trial Court had erred in holding that the defendants are tenants in the property in suit and that the suit is barred by the provisions of Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act. 21. The first appellate Court after reappraisal of the evidence led by the parties has examined the issue whether there is a relationship of landlord and tenants between the parties or there is a relationship of licensor and licensee between them. The learned first appellate Court after analysing the defence case as set up in the written statements filed by the defendants has come to the conclusion that the defendants have no where stated that Mr. Bhagwat Singh Bhakuni was ever authorised by the landlords to realize rent from the occupants of the property in suit or that said Bhagwat Singh Bhakuni had let out the property in suit on rent to them. The defence case on the point of letting out of the suit property on rent to the defendant is quite silent. On the other hand, the learned first appellate Court on the basis of the averments made by the plaintiff in paragraph nos. The defence case on the point of letting out of the suit property on rent to the defendant is quite silent. On the other hand, the learned first appellate Court on the basis of the averments made by the plaintiff in paragraph nos. 3 and 4 and the reply of the defendants given in their written statements has come to the conclusion that the defendants have simply denied the allegation that the property in suit was let out to the defendants with certain conditions including that the plaintiff had a right to determine the licence of the defendants at any time or may extend the period of licence at its own will. In paragraph no. 4 of the plaint, the plaintiff has specifically stated that the defendants at the time of delivering possession were asked to keep the property in suit clean and not to given possession of the same to any outsider and shall not make use of the vacant land as grove and that they shall not raise any construction thereon or alter the property in suit. The defendants have simply denied the allegations made in para 4 of the plaint but they have not stated that no such conditions were imposed by the plaintiff. It has also been held by the first appellate Court that the electric and water supply was being made to the defendants from the main Balrampur House, which was in occupation of the landlord and the defendants had not their own connection. The defendants in their written statements have not categorically denied that electric and water supply was made by the plaintiff-landlord from the main building. It was also observed that the defendants have admitted that electric connection was disconnected from time to time. It was further observed at page 11 of the impugned judgment that it is admitted to the defendants that the association of the occupants moved an application for allotment of the property in suit to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, therefore, it was held that if the defendants had been tenants therein, there was no question of making an application to the R.C.&E.O. for allotment of the property in suit. Learned first appellate Court also observed that it is admitted to the defendants that Bhagwat Singh Bhakuni was realizing rent from them but he never issued any rent receipts even of demand. Learned first appellate Court also observed that it is admitted to the defendants that Bhagwat Singh Bhakuni was realizing rent from them but he never issued any rent receipts even of demand. Even a notice was given to said Sri Bhakuni in the year 1980 but even after receipt of notice, no rent receipt was issued to the defendants. Learned appellate Court has held that no action was taken by the tenant-defendants against the landlord under the provisions of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 so as to compel the landlord to issue rent receipts. No steps were taken by the defendants to deposit the rent under Section 30 of the said Act when said Bhagwat Singh Bhakuni refused to accept the rent. It was also held that the suit is not barred under Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act and the plaintiff has rightly sought relief by filing suits for mandatory injunction. The learned first appellate Court after dealing with the documentary evidence led by the defendants did not find favour with them and ultimately allowed the appeals and decreed the suits of the plaintiff as against the defendants by separate judgment and decree dated 25-7-1994 passed in each case. 22. Aggrieved by the judgment and decrees passed by the first appellate Court, the defendant-appellants have preferred Second Appeals before this Court. 23. It may be mentioned that all the ten appeals were connected together by order dated 7-11-1994 passed by the Allahabad High Court. In S.A. No. 845 of 1994 (new Second Appeal No. 524 of 2001) the substantial questions of law have been framed. The appeal has been admitted on the following substantial questions of law framed in the memo of appeal:- 1. Whether the appellant is entitled for statutory protection as Guaranteed under the Rent Control Act and the eviction is possible only under the permissible heads i.e. under Sections 20 and 21 of U.P. Act 13 of 1972? 2. Whether the appellate court has illegally ignored the documents relating to Electoral Roll, Nagarpalika records and certificate from the Head of the Institution where the son of the defendant-appellant was having his education showing the status of the appellant as a tenant? 3. Whether the appellant is entitled for protection under Section 14 of U.P. Act 13 of 1972? 4. Whether the appellate court has illegally ignored the documents relating to Electoral Roll, Nagarpalika records and certificate from the Head of the Institution where the son of the defendant-appellant was having his education showing the status of the appellant as a tenant? 3. Whether the appellant is entitled for protection under Section 14 of U.P. Act 13 of 1972? 4. Whether there is no evidence on the record to show that the respondent has ever created the licence of the rooms in question to the defendant-appellant or there is sufficient evidence on the record to prove that the appellant was a tenant before the purchase of the property by the respondent? 5. Whether in the circumstances of the case, the accommodation was given in lease or licence? 24. I have heard learned counsel for both the parties and perused the entire material placed before this Court in each appeal including the impugned judgment and decree passed by the first appellate Court as well as the judgment of the trial Court. 25. Learned counsel for the appellants has vehemently contended that the defendant-appellants are the tenants in the property in suit and not the licensee of the plaintiff, therefore, the suit for mandatory injunction against the tenants is not maintainable 26. Learned counsel for the appellants further submitted that the defendants-appellants herein are in exclusive possession of the property in suit and since the plaintiff-respondent has no control over the premises in suit and since the appellant-defendants were payment the rent, the finding of the learned first appellate Court to the contrary is bad in law. Learned counsel further contended that the position of the appellants herein is that of a lessee and not a licensee in view of their right to exclusive possession and enjoyment of the property in suit. 27. The short controversy to be resolved in these appeals is whether the defendants-appellants herein are licensee, as alleged by the plaintiff or they are the tenants as alleged by the defendants. The answer to this question would decide the substantial questions of law mentioned above. 28. It is undisputed that there is no written agreement between the parties whether the contract between the parties is a lease or licence. There is only oral evidence led by the parties to substantiate their respective pleadings raised in the plaint or the written statement. The answer to this question would decide the substantial questions of law mentioned above. 28. It is undisputed that there is no written agreement between the parties whether the contract between the parties is a lease or licence. There is only oral evidence led by the parties to substantiate their respective pleadings raised in the plaint or the written statement. It is also not disputed that the building known as Balrampur House along with outhouses, quarters and appurtenant land initially belonged to Rani Rajya Laxmi Devi and her adopted son Sri Dharmendra Pratap Singh, who used to reside at Balrampur, then under district Gonda (U.P.) and the property at Nainital including the property in suit was being managed by one Bhagwat Singh Bhakuni. It is also not disputed that the aforesaid Balrampur House was sold by the previous owners Ran Lakshmi Kumari Devi and Dharmendra Prasaid Singh in favour of the plaintiff company on 14-9-1981 by a registered sale deed. 29. The positive case of the plaintiff is that the defendants are the licensees of the plaintiff company. Paragraph no. 3 and 4 of the plaint is relevant, which read as under:- “(3) That the licence was initially granted to the Defendant with a clear understanding that the Grantor Company could at its pleasure extend or revoke the licence according to the exigencies of the circumstances as and when the Company needed the accommodation for its own use. (4) That the licence fee or premium payable by the defendant licencee included scavenging, water and electricity charges and the said taxes and charges are being borne by the Plaintiff Company. Besides, the electric connection has been given by the Plaintiff Company to the dwellers of the out houses from its meter which is connected with the supply line of the Company’s main building at Balrampur House compound.” 30. In the written statement filed on behalf of the defendants, the reply has been given as under:- “3- That para 3 of the plaint is denied. 4. That para 4 of the plaint is denied. However it is submitted that the aforesaid monthly rent of the premises in dispute includes the taxes and the electricity and the water charges.” 31. In the written statement filed on behalf of the defendants, the reply has been given as under:- “3- That para 3 of the plaint is denied. 4. That para 4 of the plaint is denied. However it is submitted that the aforesaid monthly rent of the premises in dispute includes the taxes and the electricity and the water charges.” 31. Thus, in the instant case, the case of the plaintiff respondent before the trial Court was that the defendants are merely licensees, while the defendants have taken up the case that they are tenants in the property in suit. 32. Undisputedly, there is no formal document to establish the relationship between the parties, therefore, for a just decision, it is necessary to examine the difference between the lease and licence. The Apex Court in the case of Mrs. M.N. Clubwala and another Vs. Fida Hussain Saheb and others [AIR 1965 Supreme Court, 610] has considered the provisions of Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The Apex Court in paragraph 12 of the judgment has inter alia held as under:- “…. Whether an agreement creates between the parties the relationship of landlord and tenant or merely that of licensor and licensee the decisive consideration is the intention of the parties. This intention has to be ascertained on a consideration of all the relevant provisions in the agreement. In the absence, however, of a formal document the intention of the parties must be inferred from the circumstances and conduct of the parties.” 33. In a subsequent decision in the case of New Bus-Stand Shop Owners Association Vs. Corporation of Kozhikode and another [(2009) 10 Supreme Court Cases 455], the Apex Court has relied upon a number of earlier decisions of the Apex Court and laid down the tests to determine the use of terms “lease” or “licence”, “lessor” or “licensor”, “rent” or “licence fee”. The Apex Court in paragraph no. 27 has held thus:- “27. In a rather recent judgment of this Court in C.M. Beena v. P.N. Ramachandra Rao the learned Judges relied on the ratio in Associated Hotels of India Ltd. in deciding the difference between lease and licence. The Apex Court in paragraph no. 27 has held thus:- “27. In a rather recent judgment of this Court in C.M. Beena v. P.N. Ramachandra Rao the learned Judges relied on the ratio in Associated Hotels of India Ltd. in deciding the difference between lease and licence. In para 8 of the said judgment, learned Judges held the difference between lease and licence is to be determined by finding the real intention of the parties from a total reading of the document, if any, between the parties and also considering the surrounding circumstances. The learned Judges made it clear that use of terms “lease” or “licence”, “lessor” or “licensor”, “rent” or “licence fee” by themselves are not decisive. The conduct and intention of the parties before and after the creation of relationship is relevant to find out the intention. The learned Judges quoted from the treaties of Evans and Smith on The Laws of Landlord and Tenant and of Hill & Redman on Law of Landlord and Tenant in support of their proposition. 34. I have perused the entire material placed before this Court including the original record of Original Suit in each case and the impugned judgment and decree. 35. Learned counsel for the appellants has vehemently contended that the suit for mandatory injunction as brought by the plaintiff is barred by Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act and that an injunction cannot be granted against tenants. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent has contended that from the intention and conduct of the parties, it is established that there is relationship of licensor and licensee between the parties. Learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that the defendants in their written statements could not dare state as to who had let out the property in suit to them on rent. They could not even state that Bhagwat Singh Bhakuni, who is said to be managing the property in suit, had ever given the property in suit on rent to them, even if the same was not rented out by the landlord. The defendants have not even stated that said Bhagwat Singh Bhakuni was ever authorised by the landlords to realize the rent from the defendants as tenants. Learned counsel further contended that the defendants never insisted for obtaining rent receipts from Mr. The defendants have not even stated that said Bhagwat Singh Bhakuni was ever authorised by the landlords to realize the rent from the defendants as tenants. Learned counsel further contended that the defendants never insisted for obtaining rent receipts from Mr. Bhagwat Singh Bhakuni under the provisions of the U.P.Act No. 13 of 1972 and that had there been any relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and if the acceptance of rent had been refused by the said agent Bhakuni, the defendants could have taken recourse to Section 30 of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 for deposit of rent in the Court prior to the filing of the suits in question by the respondent-plaintiff, but there is no such circumstances in this case. 36. Learned counsel for the appellants-defendants further argued that since the defendants were in occupation of the property in suit with the consent of the landlord immediately before the commencement of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) (Amendment) Act 1976, the defendants at the least shall be deemed to be a tenant of such building in view of Section 14 of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. Even otherwise, Section 2-A also deals with eviction of licensee under the said Act. 37. Even otherwise, Section 2-A also deals with eviction of licensee under the said Act. 37. This argument of the learned counsel for the defendants is of no avail for the simple reason that the occupation of the defendants cannot be said to be under sub-section (1) of Section 2-A of the U.P.Act No. 13 of 1972, relevant portion of which reads as under:- “2-A. Special provisions for short term licence.- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, a person occupying a building as owner or as tenant or in any other capacity (hereinafter in this section referred to as licensor) may permit any other person (hereinafter in this section referred to as licensee) to occupy for purely temporary residential accommodation for a period not exceeding three months without any order of allotment under Section 16: Provided that intimation of the grant of such licence shall be given jointly by the licensor and the licensee to the District Magistrate within one month from the date of occupation of the building or part by the licensee: Provided further that the District Magistrate may by order, extend the maximum period of such temporary occupation up to 6 months in the aggregate (including the original period of occupation):” 38. In the case at hand, the defendants-appellants herein have denied their occupation as a licensee, rather they have claimed themselves to be tenant in the property in suit. Therefore, this provision of law does not help them. It is made clear that this provision could be applicable only in case of short-term licence for a period not exceeding three months. 39. So far as the contention of the defendants-appellants herein that the plaintiff could not bring a civil suit for eviction against the licensees is concerned, a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Miss Asha Lata E. Robin Vs. Radha Swami Satsangi Sabha, Dayalbagh, Agra [1982 All.L.J., 1237], wherein it has been held in paragraph nos. 20, 23, 24 and 25 as under:- “20. The provisions of Act were to apply in cases where there was a conflict with the provisions of Transfer of Property Act or Code of Civil Procedure. The legislature did not intend that the Act should apply where there was a conflict with the provisions of Easements Act. 20, 23, 24 and 25 as under:- “20. The provisions of Act were to apply in cases where there was a conflict with the provisions of Transfer of Property Act or Code of Civil Procedure. The legislature did not intend that the Act should apply where there was a conflict with the provisions of Easements Act. The law relating to licenses as contemplated by the Easements Act cannot be controlled or effected by the provisions of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972.” “23. According to the appellant sub-s.(5) of S. 2-A of the Act provided a remedy for eviction of licencee. As the Act was a special enactment and the remedy was provided under it the general remedy of suit was not available and the Civil Court would have no jurisdiction. 24. We are unable to agree with the same. The Act does not prohibit filing of the suit against the licensee as it does in case of tenants by S.20. Thus even if sub-s.(5) of S.2-A was applicable, the suit could not be barred. 25. There is yet another aspect of the case. Assuming that the license in favour of the defendant was governed by the Act, there was neither any intimation to the District Magistrate nor any extension granted by him as required by the first two provisos to sub-s.(1) of S. 2-A of the Act. It will also be hit by S. 23, Contract Act. Thus it will be illegal and invalid. The defendant’s possession under such a license would be wrongful, as a mere trespasser. She has no right to continue her occupation. There is no provision barring a suit against a trespasser.” 40. In paragraph no. 27, the Allahabad High Court has held thus:- “27. We accordingly hold that the suit was maintainable in Civil Court and was not barred by the provisions of sub-s.(5) of S. 2-A, U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972.” 41. In this view of the matter, the suits against the defendants were fully maintainable and the learned first appellate Court has rightly held that the suits for mandatory injunctions are not barred by Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act. 42. Besides, it is the positive case of the plaintiff-respondent that the licence fee included the water, electricity and scavenging charges. 42. Besides, it is the positive case of the plaintiff-respondent that the licence fee included the water, electricity and scavenging charges. On the other hand, it is admitted to the defendants that the rent included the water, electricity and scavenging charges. In their written statements, the defendants have not denied that initially the electric supply was given to the defendants from the main building in occupation of the plaintiff-respondent. Even if for the sake of arguments it is presumed that the defendants-appellants herein are tenants and the alleged rent included electricity and water charges etc. then there was no need for the defendant-appellants herein to get their own electric connection from the electricity department. The proper course open to the defendants was to move an application to the prescribed authority to get the landlord’s obligation regarding amenities enforced as provided under Section 27 of the U.P. Act 13 of 1972. The original record does not disclose that any such application was ever made by the defendants to the Prescribed Authority under Section 27 of the said Act. This is a very strong circumstance against the defendant-appellants and the contention of the plaintiff-respondent that the defendants were inducted as licensee to the property in suit stands fortified by the conduct of the defendants. 43. In addition to above, the learned appellate Court at page 11 in paragraph no.2 has observed that according to the defendants-appellants herein, rent upto August 1983 was paid to Bhagwat Singh Bhakuni but thereafter, the landlord refused to accept the rent. The defendants never deposited any rent under Section 30 of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 prior to the filing of the present suits by the respondent-plaintiff. The findings on this point recorded by the first appellate Court is a finding of fact on the appraisal of evidence on record. This is yet another circumstance against the case of the defendants that they are not the tenants but licensees in the property in suit. 44. Learned counsel for the appellant-defendants has further contended that the defendants are entered as tenants in the municipal records of Nainital and a list of tenants was got prepared by the Executive Officer, Municipal Board. This is yet another circumstance against the case of the defendants that they are not the tenants but licensees in the property in suit. 44. Learned counsel for the appellant-defendants has further contended that the defendants are entered as tenants in the municipal records of Nainital and a list of tenants was got prepared by the Executive Officer, Municipal Board. In reply, learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent has submitted that even if it may be taken that the defendants have been shown as tenants in the property in suit in the municipal record, such a list was not prepared within the knowledge of the plaintiff and that the Executive Officer of the Municipal Board has got no power to issue a list of tenants to the defendants under Section 60 of the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916, which deals with the functions of a Municipality that must be discharged by the Executive Officer. Learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent submitted that the learned appellate Court has rightly held that on the basis of the entries made in the municipal record, the defendants cannot be held to be tenants, when the conduct of the defendants and the surrounding circumstances lead to an unequivocal inference that they are licensee in the property in suit. 45. As mentioned earlier that in the case at hand, there is no formal document between the parties to show that the defendants are licensee or tenant in the property in suit, therefore, the conduct of the parties and the surrounding circumstances are very material to find out the truth in the matter, as has been held by the Apex Court in [(2009) 10 Supreme Court Cases 455] (supra). Moreover, the learned first appellate Court has elaborately discussed the provisions of Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act as well as provisions of Section 52 of the Indian Easements Act at page nos. 4 and 5 of the impugned judgment to show the difference between the terms ‘lease’ and ‘licence’ and after thrashing the evidence led by both the parties, it has been held that the status of the defendants in the property in suit is that of licensee and not tenant. I am also of the considered view that the conduct of the parties and the surrounding circumstances are sufficient to hold that the defendants are licensee in the property in suit. I am also of the considered view that the conduct of the parties and the surrounding circumstances are sufficient to hold that the defendants are licensee in the property in suit. The defendants are not protected under Section 14 of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 for the simple reason that the defendants were not occupying the property in suit with the consent of the plaintiff-landlord as tenant and that the defendants are not licensee within the meaning of Section 2-A of the said Act. I also find that the documents, which have been filed by the defendants-appellants herein in the trial Court and have been marked with exhibit numbers do not help the defendants and all those documents do not lead to any inference that the defendants are tenants in the property in suit. All those documents have been rightly discarded by the learned appellate Court, as they only show long standing occupation of the defendants over the property in suit. Those documents do not substantiate the case set up by the defendants in their written statements. The question is answered accordingly. 46. It has been lastly contended on behalf of the appellants that before the Allahabad High Court, the learned counsel for the respondents (Sri N.B.Singh) had submitted that the appeal may not be admitted as he is likely to obtain instructions and even file affidavit of the respondents that the appeal be allowed and the judgment and decree be set aside. Learned counsel for the appellant has made a reference to the order dated 7-11-1994 passed by the Allahabad High Court to that effect. In reply, learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent has submitted that the order dated 7-11-1994 is self-speaking and that no such statement was given subsequently before the Allahabad Court and no such affidavit had been filed in these appeals, therefore, the observation made by the Allahabad High Court does not help the appellants. 47. I have perused the order dated 7-11-1994 passed by the Allahabad High Court. After the appeal was admitted, the Allahabad High Court passed the following order:- “After the orders are dictated Sri N.B.Singh, counsel for the respondents, appeared and submitted that the appeal may not be admitted as he is likely to obtain instructions and even file affidavit of the respondents that the appeal be allowed and the judgment and decree of the court below be set aside. This he can do at any stage during pendency of the appeal even after two weeks or three weeks when he considers appropriate and in case such affidavit or application is filed by the respondent the appeal may be disposed of on the basis of the statement made therein.” 48. Be that as it may, in my view the above observation made in the order dated 7-11-1994 by itself does not help the appellants because no such affidavit was subsequently filed in this appeal and no statement was made by the learned counsel for the respondents at Bar. 49. Even otherwise, I am of the view that the question whether the defendants-appellants are tenant on the basis of long standing possession or whether the defendants were put in possession as licensee is not a substantial question of law. I am fortified in my view by the Apex Court verdict in the case of Parvati and others Vs. S.R.S. Parvatrao Desai and another [(2005) 11 Supreme Court Cases, 549]. In that case the suit filed by the plaintiff-respondents for possession was dismissed by the trial Court holding that the defendants i.e. the appellants before the Apex Court had perfected their title by way of adverse possession. In appeal, the judgment and decree passed by the trial court was set aside. It was held that the appellants were put in possession of the suit property as licensees and that the appellants had not become the owners of the suit property by way of adverse possession. The High Court, in appeal, had affirmed the finding recorded by the first appellate Court. The Apex Court in paragraph no. 4 has held thus:- “4. We agree with the view taken by the High Court that a substantial question of law did not arise in the facts and circumstances of the case, and the second appeal has therefore been rightly dismissed.” 50. For the reasons and discussion above, I hold that the appellants are not entitled for any protection under the provisions of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. I also hold that the learned first appellate Court has elaborately dealt with the evidence led by both the parties. I have already come to the conclusion that the documents filed by the defendant-appellants were of no avail to them and have been rightly discarded by the first appellate Court. I also hold that the learned first appellate Court has elaborately dealt with the evidence led by both the parties. I have already come to the conclusion that the documents filed by the defendant-appellants were of no avail to them and have been rightly discarded by the first appellate Court. I also hold that the learned first appellate Court has rightly held that the property in suit was given on licence as alleged by the plaintiff-respondent. All the substantial questions of law as mentioned in the memo of appeals are answered accordingly against the appellants herein-defendants. The second appeals being devoid of merits are liable to be dismissed outright. 51. All the appeals are dismissed. The impugned judgment and decrees dated 25-7-1994 are upheld. However, the defendant-appellants herein are granted six months’ time to vacate the property in suit and to deliver its vacant and peaceful possession to the plaintiff-respondent. Interim order dated 15-9-1994 is vacated. _