JUDGMENT Mr. Mehinder Singh Sullar, J.: (Oral) - As identical points of law and facts are involved, therefore, I propose to dispose of above indicated four petitions for quashing the similar complaint (Annexure P1) & summoning order (Annexure P2), by virtue of this common judgment, in order to avoid the repetition. However, the facts extracted from (1) CRM No. M-15881 of 2011 titled as “Rakesh Nayar & Anr. Vs. State of Punjab & Anr.” would be mentioned in subsequent part of this judgment for ready reference in this respect. 2. The matrix of the facts, which needs a necessary mention, relevant for the limited purpose of deciding the core controversy, involved in the instant petitions and oozing out, from the record, is that the firm M/s FMI Limited, Ludhiana was manufacturing Tape measures (Inchi-tapes) and petitioners were its Directors at the relevant time. During the course of scrutiny of its record for the financial years from 2004-05 to 2008-09, certain discrepancies were noticed by the Deputy Controller, Legal Metrology, who submitted his report (Annexure R1/T) to the Controller, Legal Metrology (in short “the Controller”), which, in substance, is as under:- “In the record received from central excise & custom deptt. number of tape measures have been clearly shown. Therefore, comparison of record given by both the companies with this deptt. record could be conducted in rightful manner. The record of this deptt. received has been compared with the record of above mentioned companies which more or less tallies. From the above it is clear that verification fee received from M/S F.M.I. Ltd. for the year 2004-05 to 2008-09 and actual verification fee has difference of Rs.4,30,98,825/- & verification fee received from M/S Freeman Measure Pvt. Ltd. for the year 2004-05 to 2008-09 & actual verification fee has difference of Rs.2,05,97,033/-.” 3. After the receipt of indicated report, the Inspector, Legal Metrology, Weights & Measures, Khanna complainant-respondent No.2 (for brevity “the complainant”) prepared the report dated 17.12.2008 (Annexure P3). In pursuance thereof, the Controller authorized the complainant to file a complaint against the petitioners under Sections 56(1) (2), 22 & 45 of the Standards of Weights and Measures (Enforcement) Act, 1985 (hereinafter to be referred as “the Act”). Consequently, the complainant filed the complaint dated 21.3.2011 (Annexure P1) in the Court and the Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate summoned the accused, vide impugned summoning order dated 31.3.2011 (Annexure P2). 4. Consequently, the complainant filed the complaint dated 21.3.2011 (Annexure P1) in the Court and the Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate summoned the accused, vide impugned summoning order dated 31.3.2011 (Annexure P2). 4. The petitioners did not feel satisfied with the initiation of criminal prosecution against them and preferred the present petitions to quash the impugned complaint (Annexure P1), summoning order (Annexure P2) and all other consequent proceedings arising therefrom, inter-alia on various grounds contained therein in general and on the ground of limitation as contemplated under Section 468 Cr.PC in particular, invoking the provisions of Section 482 Cr.PC. 5. The complainant refuted the prayer of petitioners in this regard and filed the reply, wherein, it was admitted that the proceedings were initiated against them on the report (Annexure R1/T) of the Deputy Controller. However, the complaint (Annexure P1) was stated to have been filed in time after obtaining the sanction from the Government. Instead of reproducing the entire contents of the reply and in order to avoid the repetition, suffice it to say that the complainant has reiterated the allegations contained in the impugned complaint (Annexure P1). However, it will not be out of place to mention here that he has stoutly denied all other allegations contained in the main petition and prayed for its dismissal. 6. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, having gone through the record with their valuable help and after bestowal of thoughts over the entire matter, to my mind, the instant petitions deserve to be accepted in this context. 7. Ex facie, the argument of learned State counsel that if the period for obtaining the sanction is excluded, then, the complaint (Annexure P1) is within time, is not only devoid of merit but misplaced as well. 8. As is evident from the record, that in the wake of report (Annexure R1/T), pertaining to the financial years from 2004-05 to 2008-09 & report dated 17.12.2008 (Annexure P3), the complaint (Annexure P1) was instituted in the Court on 21.3.2011 for the violation of Section 22 punishable under Sections 45 & 56(1)(2) of the Act, in which, the accused were summoned to face trial, by way of impugned summoning order (Annexure P2), by the SDJM. Sections 45 and 56 postulate that “whoever commits an offence under these Sections, is liable to be punished with imprisonment for a term, which may extend to six months or with fine, which may extend to one thousand rupees or with both.” 9. Above being the legal position and material on record, now the short and significant question, though important that, arises for determination in these petitions, is as to whether the Court can legally take cognizance against the petitioners in this relevant connection or not? 10. Having regard to the rival contentions of learned counsel for the parties, to me, the answer must obviously be in the negative in this respect. 11. As is clear that Section 468 Cr.PC posits that “no court shall take cognizance of an offence after the expiry of period of limitation and the period of limitation shall be one year, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year.” The learned State counsel did not point out any material muchless cogent and legal provisions essential to obtain sanction, to enable the complainant to exclude the period in reckoning the limitation, as claimed on his behalf. Meaning thereby, the cognizance of the impugned complaint (Annexure P1) against the petitioners is legally barred and summoning order (Annexure P2) cannot possibly be maintained. This matter is no more res integra and is now well settled. 12. An identical question came to be decided by this Court in case Madan Mohan Nayar v. State of Punjab, [2008(4) Law Herald (P&H) 2683] : 2009(1) RCR (Criminal) 52, wherein having interpreted the similar provisions vis-a-vis Section 468 Cr.PC, it was ruled that “no court can take cognizance after the expiry of period of limitation.” Thus, the contrary submissions of learned State counsel “stricto sensu” deserve to be and are hereby repelled under the present set of circumstances, as the ratio of law laid down in the aforesaid judgment “mutatis mutandis” is applicable to the facts of this case and is the complete answer to the problem in hand. 13. Therefore, to my mind, since the court is legally debarred to take cognizance of the complaint (Annexure P1) in the manner described hereinabove, so, if such time barred prosecution is allowed to continue, then it will inculcate and perpetuate injustice to the petitioners. 13. Therefore, to my mind, since the court is legally debarred to take cognizance of the complaint (Annexure P1) in the manner described hereinabove, so, if such time barred prosecution is allowed to continue, then it will inculcate and perpetuate injustice to the petitioners. Hence, the impugned complaint (Annexure P1) and summoning order (Annexure P2) deserve to be set aside in the obtaining circumstances of the case. 14. In the light of aforesaid reasons, the instant petitions are accepted. Consequently, the impugned complaint (Annexure P1), summoning order (Annexure P2) and all other subsequent proceedings arising thereto, are hereby quashed. The petitioners are accordingly discharged from the indicated criminal prosecution. ---------0.B.S.0------------