ORDER 1. This Criminal Revision Petition has been filed against the order dated 21.4.2011 made in C.M.P. No. 5833 of 2010 in S.T.C. No. 3127 of 2011 on the file of the learned Judicial Magistrate No. I, Pollachi condoning the delay of 94 days in filing the complaint. 2. The learned counsel for the petitioner states that aggrieved against the order dated 21.4.2011 made in C.M.P. No. 5833 of 2010 in S.T.C. No. 3127 of 2011, the petitioner, who is the de facto complainant, has come forward with this revision and contended that there is a mistake in mentioning the number of days delay i.e., instead of 94 days, the respondent has stated that there is only 64 days delay and it was not properly considered by the Court below. Further, he would only state that the respondent alleged to have suffered illness, but he has not produced any medical certificate in support of such claim and therefore, he has challenged the order condoning the delay. 3. The learned counsel for the respondent mainly would contend that as a complainant, his basic right should not be curtailed merely on the ground of delay. In fact, in the application, he has stated the reasons for condoning the delay to the effect that he is a business man, he was traveling to various places and due to that, he could not contact his advocate to give necessary instructions for filing the complaint and the mistake in number of days delay (i.e.,) 64 days or 94 days is only a typographical error. The Court below also accepted the justifiable reasons assigned by the respondent for condoning the delay and it cannot be said to be unjustifiable. In support of his contention, he would rely upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy AIR 1998 SC 3222 : (1998) 7 SCC 123 : (1999) 1 MLJ 114 and also the decision of this Court in S.K.A.P. Balakrishnan v. Jimmy, V.J. George Nedungadan & Sons (2010) 2 LW (Crl.) 1200. Relying on the aforesaid decisions, the learned counsel for the respondent would state that the length of delay is not a criteria and the reason should be the basis for allowing the application. Relying on the aforesaid decisions, the learned counsel for the respondent would state that the length of delay is not a criteria and the reason should be the basis for allowing the application. Considering the justifiable reasons assigned by the respondent, the Court below has rightly allowed the application for condonation of delay and it need not be interfered with by this Court. 4. Heard both parties. By consent, the main Revision itself is taken up for final disposal. 5. The short point for consideration in this Revision case is whether the Court below is right in condoning the delay in filing the complaint by the respondent or not? 6. Admittedly, the complainant has filed the complaint with a delay. Though in the application, it is stated that the delay is 64 days, as per the calculation made, the delay is 94 days. The respondent only would contend that it is a typographical error. The reason assigned by the respondent for the delay is that he is a business man, he was on a business trip for placing orders and collecting the amount, he was traveling all over and hence, he could not contact his advocate to give necessary instructions for filing the revision. Therefore, according to the respondent, the delay in filing the complaint has been properly explained. 7. The Lower Court has considered the reasons assigned by the respondent for the delay and held that the basic right of the complainant to file a case by invoking Section 142 of the Negotiable Instrument Act, could not be curtailed by dismissing the application at the initial stage itself. In support of this connection, the respondent counsel relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy (supra) wherein the Supreme Court has categorically stated as follows: “9. It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the Court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncontainable due to want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases delay of very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncontainable due to want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases delay of very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. Once the Court accepts the explanation as sufficient it is the result of positive exercise of discretion and normally the superior Court should not disturb such finding, much less in regional jurisdiction, unless the exercise of discretion was on wholly untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is a different matter when the first Court refuses to condone the delay. In such cases, the superior Court would be free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such superior Court to come to its own finding even untrammeled by the conclusion of the Lower Court. 10. The reason for such a different stance is thus: The primary function of a Court is to adjudicate the dispute between the parties and to advance substantial justice. Time limit fixed for approaching the Court in different situations is not because on the expiry of such time a bad cause would transform into a good cause.” 8. It is evident from the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court referred to above that the rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of parties and they are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. In the present case, the Court below considered the reasons assigned for the delay and condoned it by exercising its powers to condone such delay, which is fair, reasonable and needs no interference by this Court. 9. The learned counsel for the respondent also relied upon the judgment of this Court in S.K.A.P. Balakrishnan v. Jimmy, V.J. George Nedungadan & Sons (supra) where also, the delay of 86 days was condoned and in fact, this Court reversed the findings of the Court below while allowing the application for condonation of delay taking into consideration that Section 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act contemplates an opportunity for the complainant to initiate appropriate proceedings notwithstanding the reasonable delay in filing the complaint 10. In the present case, the petitioner, who is complaining of the delay on the part of the respondent/complainant before the Court below in filing the complaint, has in fact filed the present revision with a delay of 214 days which was also condoned by this Court. Under those circumstances, I do not find any merits to interfere with the reasoned order of the Court below. Hence, this civil revision petition is dismissed. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are also dismissed. Petition dismissed.