Judgment This order shall dispose of A.Nos.3144 to 3149 of 2012 and A.No.4875 of 2011 filed under Order XIV Rule 10 of O.S. Rules r/w Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as common question of law and facts have been raised in all these applications. For the sake brevity, the facts are being taken from A.No.3144 of 2012. 2. The degree holder had entered into an agreement with the applicants / judgment debtors for sale of 72.28/50400 of undivided share of the land described in Schedule 'A' and 'B' to the agreement for sale for consideration of Rs.4,39,771/-(Rupees Four Lakhs Thirty Nine Thousand Seven Hundred and Seventy One only) and for construction and allotment of an office on the third floor of the proposed commercial complex measuring 502 sq.ft. 3. The judgment debtors were allotted three buildings inside their campus measuring 70.32 grounds, out of which, one building 'G' Block was constructed as early as 1980. The building was completed and occupied. With regard to the building of Blocks H & I, approval was pending with the Government, which was accorded sanction vide G.O.Ms.No.1729 Housing and urban Development dated 16.11.1987. 4. On 08.01.1988, the Member Secretary, MMDA asked the applicants to pay a sum of Rs.11,42,100/- (Rupees Eleven Lakhs Forty Two Thousand and One Hundred only) as security deposit for Block 'H' and a sum of Rs.15,12,900/-(Rupees Fifteen Lakhs Twelve Thousand and Nine Hundred only) as security deposit for Block 'I'. The judgment debtors complied with the demand. 5. Thereafter, vide order dated 28.04.1989, the Government cancelled the order issued vide G.O.Ms.No.1729, on the ground of violation of the provisions of the Development Control Rules. According to the judgment debtors, it was on account of change of Government in the State of Tamil Nadu. The applicants / judgment debtors questioned the decision by filing representation. 6. It is the case of applicants / judgment debtors, that new Board of Directors took over the company and decided not to continue with the project, in view of show cause notice issued by the Government for cancellation of sanction. The judgment debtors were of the view, that due to cancellation of sanction, the contract had become impossible to be performed, therefore, they had a right to cancel the proposal to construct, by invoking Clause 18 of the Agreement. 7. The judgment debtors accordingly issued notice on 23.05.1992, cancelling the agreement. The judgment debtors were of the view, that due to cancellation of sanction, the contract had become impossible to be performed, therefore, they had a right to cancel the proposal to construct, by invoking Clause 18 of the Agreement. 7. The judgment debtors accordingly issued notice on 23.05.1992, cancelling the agreement. The degree holder, being dissatisfied with the cancellation of agreement filed a petition before the Consumer District Redressal Forum. On the other hand, the judgment debtors filed C.S.No.1370 of 1993. 8. It is not in dispute, that the suit ended in a compromise decree dated 30.09.1993. The terms of the decree read as under: "It is in terms thereof ordered and decreed as follows: (i) That the Plaintiff herein shall complete in all respects the Shopping Cum Office Complex known as Gemini Towers formerly known as 'The City Centre Point' under construction at No.601, Mount Road, Madras 600 006, within a period of 18 months from this date; (ii) That the Plaintiffs hereins hall hand over within a period of 18 months from this date the office space construction to eb built for the defendant under Builders Agreement dated 22.04.1987 with all the amenities stated therein like water, electricity etc and further amenities inclusive of the additional amenities etc., a) Face lift in the front of the building viz., "Gemini Towers", by adopting a new elevation and outer facade. b) Improvement of main entry to the building from Gopathy Narayanasamy Chetty Road, by providing a grant entrance and a circular road around the building of Gemini Towers. c) Entrance Lobby in the Ground Floor to be widened. d) In the lobby, interior decoration to be done. e) Landscaping to be done around the building between the car parks and also in front of the building based on Architect's recommendations. f) in all the common areas inside the complex and the Shop / Office areas , white mosaic flooring to be provided. g) Adequate power supply to be ensured by designing the panels and the transformers to the required load, taking into consideration that every unit will have air conditioning. h) in the toilet, white spartek or equivalent tiles to be used instead of ordinary glazed tiles. g) Adequate power supply to be ensured by designing the panels and the transformers to the required load, taking into consideration that every unit will have air conditioning. h) in the toilet, white spartek or equivalent tiles to be used instead of ordinary glazed tiles. i) If the Madras Telephones sanctions the scheme for installing a local exchange in the building, the plaintiffs have agreed to provide a minimum of one Telephone tot he Defendant / Shop / Office on actual costs incurred by the Plaintiffs, subject again to the Telephone Department making available necessary lines: (iii) That on completion of the office space for the defendant the Plaintiff herein shall issue a notice in writing by Registered Post with acknowledgment due to the last known address of the defendant, unless the change of address has been communicated to the Plaintiff by the defendant in writing, intimating the defendant that the plaintiffs herein are ready to put the defendant in possession; (iv) That the Defendant herein shall pay the balance of Rs.99,000/-(Rupees Ninety nine thousand only) payable to the plaintiffs under the builders agreement dated 22.04.1987 within 30 days from the date of receipt of such notice as mentioned in clause 2 supra and that the plaintiff herein, shall forthwith put the defendant in possession of the office space as mentioned in clause (2) supra and also execute and register the necessary deed of sale of undivided interest in land as contemplated under the Builders agreement dated 22.04.1987; (v) That in default of payment by the defendant herein of the said balance and take possession of the space within 30 days of receipt of the notice and mentioned in clause (4) supra the builders agreement dated 22.4.1987 shall stand cancelled and the deed of sale in favour of the defendant shall become null and void and that thereafter the plaintiffs shall be entitled to register a deed of cancellation after paying back the actual amounts paid by the defendant under the said agreement dated 22.4.1987 together with interest thereon at the rate of 10% per annum; (vi) That the Defendant herein shall pay escalated cost at the rate of Rs.130.00 (Rupees one hundred and thirty only) per sq.ft. of constructed area (which rate includes cost of additional amenities) within a period of six months from the date of possession and to ensure such payment the builders agreement dated 22.4.1987 as well as the deed of sale executed and Registered in favour of the defendant herein shall be kept in deposit with the plaintiff by the defendant as security for such payment and that if the defendants fails to make the payment within the said period the builders agreement dated 22.4.1987 shall stand cancelled and the deed of sale in favour of the defendant shall become null and void and thereafter the plaintiff shall be entitled to register a deed of cancellation after paying back the actual amount paid by the defendant under the builders agreement dated 22.4.1987 together with interest thereon at the rate of 12% p.a. (vii) That the defendant of handing over of the possession by the plaintiff herein within 18 months period as mentioned in clause (1) Supra the Plaintiff shall be liable to pay interest at the rate of 24% per annum on Rs.2,41,000/-(Rupees Two Lakhs forty One thousand only) paid by the defendant under the builders agreement dated 22.4.1987 from the date of expiry of the 18th month period till date of delivery and that if delivery is delayed beyond 24 months from this date, then the builders agreement shall be deemed cancelled and the plaintiff shall be liable to refund the sum of Rs.2,41,000/- (Rupees Two Lakhs and forty one thousand only) paid by the defendant under the builders agreement dated 22.4.1987 together with interest thereon at the rate of 24% per annum with quarterly rests from the date of payments made by the defendants viz. 1. on Rs.15,000/- from 23.3.1987 2. on Rs.1,00,000/- from 22.4.1987 3. on Rs.14,000/- from 1.6.1987 4. on Rs.14,000/- from 30.6.1987 5. on Rs.14,000/- from 30.7.1987 6. on Rs.14,000/- from 31.8.1987 7. on Rs.14,000/- from 25.9.1987 8. on Rs.14,000/- from 2.11.1987 9. on Rs.14,000/- from 30.11.1987 10. on Rs.14,000/- from 23.12.1987 11. on Rs.14,000/- from 28.1.1988 till date of payment by the Plaintiffs in full and till such payment is made in full there shall be a charge on the land and building known as Gemini Towers in favour of the defendant. on Rs.14,000/- from 25.9.1987 8. on Rs.14,000/- from 2.11.1987 9. on Rs.14,000/- from 30.11.1987 10. on Rs.14,000/- from 23.12.1987 11. on Rs.14,000/- from 28.1.1988 till date of payment by the Plaintiffs in full and till such payment is made in full there shall be a charge on the land and building known as Gemini Towers in favour of the defendant. (viii) That the defendant herein shall not object to the plaintiff constructing upto a maximum of 7 additional floors over and above the existing basement, ground plus 3 floors provided the plaintiffs obtain requisite sanction. (ix) That the plaintiff and the defendant shall withdraw all other proceedings instituted by either of them in respect of the builders agreement dated 22.4.1987; (x) That there be no to costs, if the Plaintiff Company with clauses (1) and (2) of Supra, and that if delivery is delayed beyond 24 months from this date rendering the Plaintiff liable to refund amounts as specified Clause (7) Supra, the Plaintiffs herein shall pay to the Defendant herein, the costs of this suit as and when taxed by the taxing officer of this Court and noted in the margin hereof; SCHEDULE 'A' All those piece and parcel of land measuring about 1 Ground and 9536 sq.ft out of 16 Grounds 0311 Sq.ft or thereabouts in R.S.No.3/1 Part of Block No.1 Mylapore, bearing Door No.596 and 601 Anna Salai, Madras-600 006 within the Sub-Registration District of Thousand Lights, bounded on the North by R.S.No.3/1 and 3/8, East by R.S.No.3/11, South by R.S.No.3/10, and West by R.S.No.3/1 Part. SCHEDULE 'B' All those piece and parcel of land measuring about 13 Grounds 1804 sq.ft or thereabouts situate in R.S.No.3/1 Part, Block No.1 Mylapore, bearing Door No.598 Anna Salai, Madras-600 006 within the Sub-Registration District of Thousand Lights, bounded on the North-East by R.S.No.3/1 Part, North-East by Road leading from Nungambakkam High Road, and Southeast by R.S.No.3/10 and Southwest by property R.S.No.3/4 Part. SCHEDULE 'C' An undivided 142.01/50400 share in all that piece and parcel of land described in 'A' & 'B'. SCHEDULE 'D' Shop/Office No."L" in South wing in the I Floor of the Shopping Cum-Office Complex known as THE CITY CENTRE POINT measuring about 572 sq.ft. of built up area (including proportionate share of common area in the particular floor). SCHEDULE 'C' An undivided 142.01/50400 share in all that piece and parcel of land described in 'A' & 'B'. SCHEDULE 'D' Shop/Office No."L" in South wing in the I Floor of the Shopping Cum-Office Complex known as THE CITY CENTRE POINT measuring about 572 sq.ft. of built up area (including proportionate share of common area in the particular floor). SCHEDULE 'E' MEMORANDUM OF COMPROMISE FILED UNDER ORDER XXIII RULE 3 OF THE C.P.C. The Plaintiffs and the Defendant have compromised their differences and have arrived at the following terms of settlement and pray that this Honourable Court may be pleased to pass a decree as follows: 1. The Plaintiffs undertake to complete in all respects the Shopping Cum Office Complex to be known as 'Gemini Towers' formerly to be known as "The City Centre Point" under Construction at No.601, Mount Road, Madras-600 006 within a period of 18 months from the date of the decree. 2. The Plaintiffs undertake to hand over the Office space constructed to be built for the Defendant under builders agreement dated 22.4.1987 with all amenities stated thereinlike water, electricity etc. and further amenities inclusive of the following amenities viz., a) Face lift in the front of the building viz., "Gemini Towers", by adopting a new elevation and outer facade. b) Improvement of main entry to the building from Gopathy Narayanasamy Chetty Road by providing a grand entrance and a circular road around the building of Gemini Towers. c) Entrance lobby in the Ground Floor to be widened. d) In the lobby, interior decoration to be done. e) Lanscaping to be done around the building between the car parks and also in front of the builders based on Architect's recommendations. f) In all the common areas inside the complex and the shop / office areas, white mosaic flooring to be provided. g) Adequate power supply to be ensured by designing the panels and the transformer to the required load, taking into consideration that every unit will have air conditioning. h) In the toilet, white spartek or equivalent tiles to be used instead of ordinary glazed tiles. g) Adequate power supply to be ensured by designing the panels and the transformer to the required load, taking into consideration that every unit will have air conditioning. h) In the toilet, white spartek or equivalent tiles to be used instead of ordinary glazed tiles. f) If the Madras Telephones sanctions the scheme for installing a local exchange in the building the plaintiffs have agreed to provide a minimum of one Telephone to the defendant Shop / Office on actual costs incurred by the Plaintiffs, subject again to the Telephone Department making available necessary lines within a period of 18 months from the date of the decree. 3. On completion of the office space for the defendant, the plaintiffs shall issue a notice in writing by Registered Post with acknowledgment due to the last known address of the Defendant, unless the change of address has been communicated to the Plaintiffs by the Defendant in writing, intimating the Defendant that the Plaintiffs are ready to put the Defendant in possession. Within 30 days from the date of receipt of such notice the Defendant shall pay the balance of Rs.99,000/-payable to the Plaintiffs under the Builders Agreement dated 22.4.1987 and the Plaintiffs shall forthwith put the Defendant in possession of the office space as contemplated under clause 2 of the decree and that Plaintiffs shall also execute and register the necessary deed of sale of undivided interest in land as contemplated under the Railways Agreement dated 22.4.1987. I the Defendant does not tender the balance and take possession within 30 days of receipt of the notice there the builders agreement dated 22.4.1987 shall stand cancelled and the Deed of Sale in favour of the Defendant shall become null and void. Thereafter, the Plaintiffs shall be entitled to register a Deed of Cancellation after paying back the actual amounts paid by the Defendant under the Builders agreement dated 22.4.1987 together with interest thereon at the rate of 10% per annum. 4. The Defendant shall pay the escalated cost at the rate of Rs.130.00 per sq.ft of constructed area (which rate includes cost of additional amenities) within a period of six months from the date of possession. To ensure such payment, the builders Agreement dated 22.4.1987 as well as the Deed of Execution and registered in favour of the Defendant shall be deposit with the Plaintiff by the Defendant as security for such payment. To ensure such payment, the builders Agreement dated 22.4.1987 as well as the Deed of Execution and registered in favour of the Defendant shall be deposit with the Plaintiff by the Defendant as security for such payment. If the Defendant failed to make the payment within the said period the Builders Agreement dated 22.4.1987 shall stand cancelled and the Deed of sale in favour of the Defendant shall become null and void. Thereafter, the Plaintiffs shall be entitled to Register a Deed of Cancellation after paying back the actual amounts paid by the Defendant under the Builder's Agreement dated 22.4.1987 together with interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum. 5. In the event that possession is not handed over by the Plaintiffs within the 18th months period stipulated, then the Plaintiffs shall be liable to pay interest at the rate of 24% per annum on Rs.2,41,000/-paid by the Defendant under the Builders Agreement dated 22.4.1987 from the date of expiry of the 18th month period till date of delivery and if the delivery is delayed beyond 24 months from the date of decree then the Builders Agreement shall be deemed cancelled and the Plaintiffs will be liable to refund the sum of Rs.2,41,000/- paid by the Defendant under the Builders Agreement dated 22.4.1987 together with interest thereon at the rate of 24% per annum with quarterly rests from the date of payments made by the Defendant viz., 1. On Rs.15,000/- from 23.3.1987. 2. On Rs.1,00,000 from 22.4.1987 3. On Rs.14,000/- from 1.6.1987 4. On Rs.14,000/- from 30.6.1987 5. On Rs.14,000/- from 30.7.1987 6. On Rs.14,000/- from 31.8.1987 7. On Rs.14,000/- from 25.9.1987 8. On Rs.14,000/- from 2.11.1987 9. On Rs.14,000/- from 30.11.1987 10. On Rs.14,000/- from 23.12.1987 11. On Rs.14,000/- from 38.1.1988 till date of payment by the Plaintiffs in full and till such payment is made in full there shall be a change on the land and building known as Gemini Tower in favour of the Defendant. 6. The Defendant agrees not to object to the Plaintiffs constructing upto a maximum of 7 additional floors over and above the existing basement, ground plus 3 floors provided the Plaintiffs obtained requisite sanction. 7. The Plaintiffs and Defendants hereby agree to withdraw all other proceedings instituted by either of them in respect of the Builders Agreement dated 22.4.1987. 8. 6. The Defendant agrees not to object to the Plaintiffs constructing upto a maximum of 7 additional floors over and above the existing basement, ground plus 3 floors provided the Plaintiffs obtained requisite sanction. 7. The Plaintiffs and Defendants hereby agree to withdraw all other proceedings instituted by either of them in respect of the Builders Agreement dated 22.4.1987. 8. Neither party shall be entitled to costs if the Plaintiffs comply with clauses 1 and 2 of the Decree but the Plaintiffs shall be liable to pay costs of the Defendant if delivery is delayed beyond 24 months from the date of decree rendering the Plaintiff liable to refund amounts as specified in clause 5 of the Decree." 9. After passing of the consent decree on 30.09.1993, the judgment debtors did not take any steps to comply with the terms of the consent decree. It was on 01.08.2011, that two applications were filed for condoning the delay in filing appeal against the order of learned Master dated 27.04.2011 and 24.11.2010. Thereafter, A.No.3826 of 2011 was filed to condone the delay of 6496 days in filing appeal to set aside the compromise decree dated 30.09.1993. These applications were dismissed as withdrawn. 10. The judgment debtors, thereafter moved A.No.3822 of 2011 to stay the auction dated 10.08.2011. This application was also closed. In A.No.3821 of 2011, prayer was made to set aside the order of the learned Master dated 27.04.2011. This application was also dismissed. On 24.11.2011, three applications were filed to grant extension of time to comply with the consent decree to allot office / shop space. The three applications were also dismissed. The grounds taken in those applications were almost identical to the one taken in these applications 11. In July, 2012, these applications have been filed, by invoking Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure to set aside the consent decree. 12. It is the case of the applicants, that the Government of Tamil Nadu had referred the matter to the multi-storeyed Building Panel for recommendation and as per the guidelines then in force, the Panel recommended issue of planning permission to the applicants to put up construction of basement floor, ground plus four floors in 'I' Block and the lower ground floor + 7 floors in the 'H' Block at R.S.No.3/1 pt., 3/10pt of Mylapore Village, Anna Salai, Chennai. 13. 13. The Government of Tamil Nadu directed the CMDA to issue planning permit as per panel recommendation subject to certain conditions. It is submitted that there was again change of Government during 1996, after passing of G.O.Ms.No.949 and accordingly, the planning permit was not issued even after repeated reminders. Notice was also issued to the applicants for demolishing the unauthorized building. 14. The judgment debtors challenged the decision by filing W.P.No.24139 of 2002, wherein interim injunction was granted and thereafter, the writ petition was allowed by passing the following order: "It is clear that while the Government had granted exemption and the exemption is still in force, the impugned order of demolition is illegal and is liable to be interfered with. So long as the Government order dated 16.11.1995 is in force, the respondent cannot take action against the petitioner for demolition on the basis of the impugned notice. Hence, in our considered view, the petitioner is entitled to succeed in the writ petition and accordingly the writ petition is allowed and the impugned demolition notice is quashed. In the light of the above observation, it is needless to mention that the Member Secretary, CMDA shall consider the application of the petitioner for planning permission filed on 9.9.1996 and shall pass order as per the Government Order dated 16.11.1995 within a period of two months from the date of production of the copy of the order by the petitioner. A copy of the order dated 27.10.2006 is filed herewith." 15. The judgment debtors approached CMDA in view of the order passed by this Court, reproduced above, but CMDA reasserted their stand of not issuing planning permit, on the ground that G.O.Ms.No.949 dated 16.11.1995 had been rendered infructuous. The applicants / judgment debtors filed a clarification petition, but no clarification was issued by this Court. However liberty was granted to the judgment debtors to file appeal against the order of CMDA. The appeal filed against the decision is pending before the Government of Tamil Nadu. 16. It is thus submitted that non performance of the terms of decree between the applicants and respondents was due to the reason, that the consent decree had become impossible of performance, which was not for the act within the control of the applicants. The appeal filed against the decision is pending before the Government of Tamil Nadu. 16. It is thus submitted that non performance of the terms of decree between the applicants and respondents was due to the reason, that the consent decree had become impossible of performance, which was not for the act within the control of the applicants. It is further submitted that Doctrine of Impossibility of Performance (lex non cogit ad impossibilia) stipulates, that however mandatory the provisions may be, but when it is impossible of compliance, then it is a good excuse of non compliance. 17. Reliance in this regard was placed on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in 1985 (Supp) SCC 416 State of Rajasthan vs. Shamsher Singh. It is submitted, that Doctrine of Frustration is really an aspect or part of the law of discharge of contract by reason of supervening impossibility or illegality of the act agreed to be done, therefore, comes within the purview of Section 56 as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Satyabrata Ghose vs. Mugneeram Bangur, AIR 1954 SC 44 . It is also submitted, that Section 56 of the Indian Contract Act, is a positive rule, which does not leave the matter of frustration to the Court for determination. 18. It is next submitted that the compromise entered into between the applicants and respondents is invalid on the ground of frustration and impossibility of performance under Section 56 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, which discharges the contract, therefore, the compromise decree is invalid and null and void, thus is not binding on the applicants. 19. It is further submitted, that the compromise decree is not a decision by the Court, but it merely sets the seal of the Court on the agreement of the parties. Therefore, when the compromise decree becomes impossible of performance, it is to be termed as null and void. 20. Allegations have also been made against the Officers of the Indian Bank for non cooperation in construction of ten storeyed commercial cum residential complex. It is submitted that one of the Officers of the Indian Bank is an accused in the CBI enquiry. 21. It is also the case of the judgment debtors, that the compromise decree was outcome of collusion of P.R.K.Rao of Indian Bank, who instigated the Managing Director of 2nd applicant company to sign the illegal compromise deed. It is submitted that one of the Officers of the Indian Bank is an accused in the CBI enquiry. 21. It is also the case of the judgment debtors, that the compromise decree was outcome of collusion of P.R.K.Rao of Indian Bank, who instigated the Managing Director of 2nd applicant company to sign the illegal compromise deed. It is submitted that M/s.Vanbey Holdings Pvt. Ltd., who had paid nominal amount, is now claiming over Rs.10 crores on the basis of illegal compromise decree passed by this Court. It is also submitted that the decree is nullity, being hit by fraud and breach of trust, and also on the ground of lack of inherent jurisdiction of the Court. 22. It is further submitted that the decree holder, who was allotted 142.01 of undivided share of land, has now filed the Execution Petition for sale of entire property. It is also the case that the Executing Court has ordered attachment and proclamation of sale of suit schedule property, which was fixed for 10.08.2011 against which appeal was filed before this Court, which was dismissed by the Hon'ble Single Judge. 23. The reading of pleadings in the affidavit shows, that the objections under Section 47 of CPC have been filed to challenge the compromise decree, on the ground of Doctrine of Impossibility of Performance and Doctrine of Frustration. The other ground is that the decree is outcome of fraud and collusion of P.R.K.Rao, Officer of the Indian Bank and that the judgment debtors were under the impression, that the compromise decree would be given up on the advice of Mr.Varkey, but the Decree Holders are continuing with the execution of the decree. 24. However, at the time of argument, learned Senior Counsel vehemently contended that though deposit was of nominal amount, but the decree now sought to be executed runs into crores of rupees. 25. This contention on the face of it is misconceived, firstly for the reason that this Court cannot go into the legality of the decree, as it is not open to the Executing Court to go behind the decree to check its illegality. Reference in this regard can be made to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Haryana Vidyut, Parsaran Nigam Limited and another vs. Gulshan Lal and others, 2009 (4) RCR (Civil) 880, wherein it has been held as under: "19. Mr. Reference in this regard can be made to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Haryana Vidyut, Parsaran Nigam Limited and another vs. Gulshan Lal and others, 2009 (4) RCR (Civil) 880, wherein it has been held as under: "19. Mr. Jain has relied upon a decision of this Court in Bhawarlal Bhandari v. Universal Heavy Mechanical Lifting Enterprises, 1991 (1) RCR (Civil) 278: [(1991) 1 SCC 558]. Therein the decree was passed by a court lacking inherent jurisdiction and in that situation this court considered as to whether a decree passed by a court wholly without jurisdiction would be a nullity to hold: "10. The aforesaid decision of this Court squarely applies to the facts of the present case. This is not a case in which the award decree on the face of it was shown to be without jurisdiction. Even if the decree was passed beyond the period of limitation, it would be an error of law or at the highest a wrong decision which can be corrected in appellate proceedings and not by the executing court which was bound by such decree. It is not the case of the respondent that the Court which passed the decree was lacking inherent jurisdiction to pass such a decree. This becomes all the more so when the respondent did not think it fit to file objection against the award which was sought to be made rule of the court." It is on that premise the question which has been raised by Mr.Jain that the court could not have passed a decree for back wages for a period of more than three years assumes importance. Whether by reason of the decree the respondents would be getting some amount by way of back wages for a period of more than three years would depend upon the facts of each case. It would also depend upon the date on which the cause of action of suit arose. 20. As indicated hereinbefore, for the purpose of allowing an objection filed on behalf of a judgment debtor under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it was incumbent on him to show that the decree was ex facie nullity. It would also depend upon the date on which the cause of action of suit arose. 20. As indicated hereinbefore, for the purpose of allowing an objection filed on behalf of a judgment debtor under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it was incumbent on him to show that the decree was ex facie nullity. For the said purpose, the court is precluded from making an indepth scrutiny as regards the entitlement of the plaintiff with reference to not only his claim made in the plaint but also the defence set up by the judgment debtor. As the judgment of the Trial Court could not have been reopened, the correctness thereof could not have been put to question. It is also well-known that an Executing Court cannot go behind the decree. If on a fair interpretation of the judgment, Order and decree passed by a court having appropriate jurisdiction in that behalf, the reliefs sought for by the plaintiff appear to have been granted, there is no reason as to why the Executing Court shall deprive him from obtaining the fruits of the decree. In Deepa Bhargava v.Mahesh Bhargava, 2009 (1) RCR (Civil) 507 : 2009 (1) RAJ 202 : {2008 (16) SCALE 305}, this Court held as under: "11.... An executing court, it is well known, cannot go behind the decree. It has no jurisdiction to modify a decree. It must execute the decree as it is. A default clause contained in a compromise decree even otherwise would not be considered to be penal in nature so as to attract the provisions of Section 74 of the Indian Contract Act." 21. It is also not a case where this Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India to mould an order. The decree passed by the learned Trial Court has attained finality. Whether rightly or wrongly, the judgment of the learned Trial Judge has been affirmed by this Court. It is one thing to say that no right having crystalised in favour of a party to the lis, this Court can mould the relief appropriately, but it is another thing to say that despite the decree being found to be an executable one, this Court will refuse to direct execution thereof. 22. It is one thing to say that no right having crystalised in favour of a party to the lis, this Court can mould the relief appropriately, but it is another thing to say that despite the decree being found to be an executable one, this Court will refuse to direct execution thereof. 22. We are not oblivious of the fact that the respondents legally would not have been entitled to the reliefs prayed for by them. However, as a decree has been passed, we do not intend to go behind the same. The Executing Court shall, it goes without saying, execute the decree strictly in terms thereof." 26. The Hon'ble Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Dina Nath vs. Yash Pal, 2009 (4) RCR (Civil) 105, has been pleased to lay down, that it is not open to the judgment debtor to raise the same plea before the learned Executing Court, which was the ground before the Court, as the Executing Court cannot go behind the decree to record a different finding then the one recorded by the Court passing decree. 27. It was next contended by the learned Senior Counsel for the applicants / judgment debtors, that the attachment order has been issued, qua 20 grounds of land, which was sought to be developed without taking note of the fact, that some part of it has been sold to the third parties. Therefore, the application deserves to be allowed. 28. This contention of the learned Senior Counsel deserves to be rejected for two grounds, i) firstly for the reason that the challenge in the application is not to sale of land, on the plea that part of land would be sufficient for the execution of decree, but the plea raised is to declare the consent decree to be null and void; ii) secondly, the judgment debtors / applicants have not filed any objection under Order 21 to execution of decree by the decree holder. It is settled law, that after the warrant of attachment is issued, it is not open to the applicants / judgment debtors to raise objections against attachment in view of law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Barkat Ali and another vs. Badri Narain (D) by LRs., 2008 (2) RCR (Civil) 117, wherein it has been held as under: "7. Order 21 Rule 22 CPC culminates in end of one stage before attachment of the property can take place in furtherance of execution of decree. The proceedings under Order 21 Rule 23 can only be taken if the executing Court either finds that after issuing notice, under Section XXI Rule 21 the judgment-debtor has not raised any objection or if such objection has been raised, the same has been decided by the executing Court. Sub-rule (1) as well as sub-rule (2) under Order 21 Rule 22, operates simultaneously on the same field. Sub-rule (1) operates when no objection is filed. Then the Court proceeds and clears the way for going to the next stage of the proceedings namely attachment of the property and if the Court finds objections on record then it decides the objections in the first instance and thereafter clears the way for taking up the matter for attachment of the property if the objections have been overruled. Whether the order is made under sub-rule (1) or sub-rule (2), it has the effect of determining the preliminary stage before the attachment process is set in motion. In this background, the order of the Court to proceed with attachment on finding that no objection has been raised also operates as an order deciding the preliminary stage of the execution proceedings and operates as if the judgment-debtor has no objection to file. If thereafter, the judgment-debtor wants to raise an objection in the same proceedings in the absence of any modification of order passed under Order 21 Rule 22 sub-rule (1) or (2), he has to take recourse to get rid of the order by way of appeal. There is no dispute and it has not been agitated that the order for proceeding by the judgment under Order 21 Rule 22 amounts to a decree under Section 47 of CPC and it is appealable as a decree i.e. to say it is not an appeal against the interim order but an appeal against the decree which is provided against the final order. It means that at the different stages of the execution orders passed by the executing court have attained finality unless they are set aside by way of appeal before the higher forum. It means that at the different stages of the execution orders passed by the executing court have attained finality unless they are set aside by way of appeal before the higher forum. Otherwise they bind the parties at the subsequent stage of the execution proceedings so that the smooth progress of execution is not jeopardised and the stage which reached the finality by dint of various orders of the Order 21, operates as res judicata for the subsequent stage of the proceedings. Since the order passed at different stage itself operates as a decree and is appealable as such, the same cannot be challenged in appeal against subsequent orders also, because appeal against an order passed under Order 21 Rule 22 does not amount to appeal against order at initial stage, but amounts to a decree finally determining the question. That is why no appeal against orders made under Order 21 has been provided under Order 43. In this background, where a judgment-debtor has an opportunity to raise an objection which he could have raised, but failed to take and allowed the preliminary stage to come to an end for taking up the matter to the next stage for attachment of property and sale of the property under Order 21 Rule 23 which fell within the above principle, the judgment-debtor thereafter cannot raise such objections subsequently and revert back to earlier stage of proceedings unless the order resulting in termination of preliminary stage which amounts to a decree is appealed against and order is set aside or modified." 29. It was also the contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the applicants, that the value of property is more than Rs.84 crores, as assessed by the Executing Court, therefore, it is not permissible to sell whole land for execution of decree, therefore, sale proclamation is bad in law. 30. This contention of the learned Senior Counsel is also misconceived, as it is not the ground taken in the applications, filed under Section 47 of CPC. 30. This contention of the learned Senior Counsel is also misconceived, as it is not the ground taken in the applications, filed under Section 47 of CPC. Furthermore, this very ground taken earlier in A.Nos.3651 and 3652 of 2011, which was rejected by this Court vide order dated 09.08.2011, therefore, this contention cannot be allowed at this stage, in view of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Barkat Ali and another vs. Badri Narain (D) by LRs., (supra), laying down, that principles of res judicata not only apply in respect of separate proceedings, but the general principles also apply at the subsequent stage of the same proceedings, and the same Court is precluded to go into that question again, which has been decided or deemed to have been decided by it at an early stage. 31. Learned Senior Counsel for the applicants / judgment debtors vehemently contended, that the decree is null and void, as it is capable of non performance, because of the act of the Government. This contention again cannot be accepted, as the parties have entered into a compromise and consent decree was passed, which also stipulated payment of money, therefore, it cannot be said that the decree is incapable of being performed. In the compromise decree itself, it was held, that on failure to comply within the time stipulated, then the judgment debtors were to pay the amount along with the agreed rate of interest. This, therefore, becomes money decree, which cannot be said to be incapable of performance. 32. Learned Senior Counsel for the applicants / judgment debtors, in support of his contention, that the decree is null and void, also placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rafique Bibi (Dead) by LRs vs. Sayed Waluddin (Dead) by LRs and others, (2004) 1 SCC 287 . This judgment however does not advance the case of the judgment debtors in any way, rather the judgment goes against the judgment debtors, as the Hon'ble Supreme Court in this case was pleased to explain the difference between null and void decree and illegal decree. 33. It is not the case of the judgment debtors, that the Court passing decree did not have jurisdiction to pass consent decree. 33. It is not the case of the judgment debtors, that the Court passing decree did not have jurisdiction to pass consent decree. Therefore, it is not open to the applicants / judgment debtors now to challenge the decree under execution, by invoking Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 34. The proceedings referred to above shows, that the applicants / judgment debtors, inspite of having entered into a compromise on the basis of which, consent decree was passed, has successfully delayed execution of the decree on one pretext or other for more than 18 years. 35. These applications under Order 47 of the CPC is yet another attempt to delay the proceedings even though there is no merit either in the stand taken in the applications or in the contentions raised by the learned Senior Counsel. These applications can be said to be vexatious, misconceived and not sustainable in law. 36. Consequently, all these applications are ordered to be dismissed. No costs.