ORDER 1. These Criminal Original Petitions have been filed to call for the records in S.T.C. Nos. 102 of 2012, 103 of 2012 and 104 of 2012 respectively on the file of the Judicial Magistrate No.I, Tuticorin and set aside the order dated 8.10.2012 made in Cr. M.P. Nos. 6543 of 2012, 6545 of 2012 and 6547 of 2012 respectively and direct the Magistrate to accept the plea of the petitioner made through his counsel pending disposal of Crl. O.P. Nos. 17470 of 2012, 17471 of 2012 and 17472 of 2012 respectively. 2. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and the learned Government Advocate (Criminal Side) appearing for the respondent. 3. The petitioner herein in all the petitions is one and the same and he is an accused in S.T.C. Nos. 102 of 2012, 103 of 2012 and 104 of 2012 on the file of the learned Judicial Magistrate No.I, Tuticorin. The Inspector of Factories, Tuticorin had filed a private complaint against the petitioner in S.T.C. No. 102 of 2012 for the alleged offences under Sections 62 read with Rule 241(1)(a)(9) of the Building and Other Construction Workers (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service) Act, 1996, in S.T.C. No. 103 of 2012 for the alleged offences under Sections 39(1) Rule 210(1)(a)(b), Section 39(1) Rule 210(5) Rule 210(7)(3) and Section 40 Rule 51(d) Rule 54 and 42(5), 178 and 179 and in S.T.C. No. 104 of 2012 for the alleged offences under Sections 46(1) Rule 239(1) and R 26(3) of the Building and Other Construction Workers (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service) Act, 1996 respectively. 4. The petitioner, who is the resident of Hyderabad, on receipt of summons engaged a counsel and his counsel appeared before the learned Judicial Magistrate No. I, Tuticorin on 14.9.2012 and filed a petition under Section 205 of the Code of Criminal Procedure seeking permission to dispense with the personal attendance of the accused/petitioner and also filed admission petition voluntarily pleading guilty and admitting the facts. The complaints are filed against the petitioner for the offences which are punishable only with a fine as per Section 50 of the Building and Other Construction Workers (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service) Act, 1996. 5. The complaints are filed against the petitioner for the offences which are punishable only with a fine as per Section 50 of the Building and Other Construction Workers (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service) Act, 1996. 5. The learned Judicial Magistrate No. I, Tuticorin considering the health condition of the petitioner allowed the petition filed by the petitioner under Section 205 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and adjourned the case to 8.10.2012. After hearing the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, the learned Magistrate though allowed the application filed under Section 205 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, did not accept the guilty memo filed by the petitioner through his counsel. The learned Magistrate passed an order on 8.10.2012 refusing to entertain the memo filed by the petitioner’s counsel and rejected the admission petition filed by the petitioner’s counsel. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner had preferred these Criminal Original Petitions under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to set aside the order and also seeking for a direction to the learned Magistrate to accept the plea of the petitioner under Section 252 of the Code of Criminal Procedure through his counsel. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the learned Magistrate refused to accept the plea of the petitioner through his counsel stating in his order that substance of the accusation has to be explained directly to the accused, and as such, the presence of the accused was absolutely necessary. The learned counsel for the Petitioner further submitted that offence for which the petitioner is charged is only technical offence and furthermore the offences are only punishable with fine only. There is no bar for the learned Magistrate to accept the plea of the petitioner admitting his guilt through his counsel. 7. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the petitioner also relied on the following decisions: (1) In Mst. Munni Begum v. State 1968 Crl.L.J. 1162 . (2) In Helen Rubber Industries Kottayam and Others v. State of Kerala and Others 1973 Crl.L.J. 262 . (3) In Noorjahan v. T.T. Moideen and Others 2000 Crl.L.J. 4264 . 8. The learned Government Advocate (Criminal Side) submitted that only in petty offences, the accused can plead guilty through his counsel as provided under Section 206 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. (3) In Noorjahan v. T.T. Moideen and Others 2000 Crl.L.J. 4264 . 8. The learned Government Advocate (Criminal Side) submitted that only in petty offences, the accused can plead guilty through his counsel as provided under Section 206 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The learned Government Advocate (Criminal Side) further submitted that the Court even after accepting the plea of guilty by the accused, the accused must be questioned with regard to the sentence i.e., to be imposed upon him. Under such circumstances, the presence of the accused is very much necessary. 9. This Court considered the submissions made on either side and perused the records as well as the decisions cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 10. It is observed by the Honourable Delhi High Court in Mst. Munni Begum v. State (supra) at paragraph No. 17 of the decision observed as follows: “17. In the very nature of things, if the personal attendance of the accused has already been dispensed with, the answer to the charge will have to be made by his pleader. If the plea is one of guilty, the Magistrate shall, under sub-section (5), record the plea and may, in his discretion, convict him thereon. This will attract the application of Section 366(2). But if on the other hand, the pleader on behalf of the accused either refuses to plead or does not plead, or claims to be tried, the Magistrate shall, under sub-section (6), fix a date for the examination of the witnesses and so on and so forth till the evidence on behalf of the prosecution as well as defence is recorded and concluded and the case reaches the stage of final judgment. That will again attract the provisions of Section 366(2).” (Section 366 of the Code of Criminal Procedure old Act corresponding to New Act 353 of the Code of Criminal Procedure) 11. It is observed by the Honourable Kerala High Court in Helen Rubber Industries Kottayam and Others v. State of Kerala and Others (supra) at paragraph Nos. 21 and 25 of the decision observed as follows: “21. All these cases, as I have already stated, are cases under the Companies Act and all are private limited companies. It is observed by the Honourable Kerala High Court in Helen Rubber Industries Kottayam and Others v. State of Kerala and Others (supra) at paragraph Nos. 21 and 25 of the decision observed as follows: “21. All these cases, as I have already stated, are cases under the Companies Act and all are private limited companies. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted before me that if personal attendance was exempted on the first hearing day itself, the cases could have been disposed of on that day. It is in this context that the salutary provisions in Sections 205 and 540-A should be construed in the interests of expeditious disposal of cases. I would have been happy if the learned District Magistrate had permitted the accused to be represented by pleaders and collected the fine and disposed of the cases on the first hearing date itself. I find it difficult to agree with him in the orders passed by him in these cases which according to me are neither warranted by the circumstances of the case nor necessary in the interests of justice. I feel that interest of justice has suffered in these cases by the refusal to grant exemption prayed for. Even in cases where the District Magistrate himself had issued summons to the accused to appear either in person or through pleader, he has not allowed the pleader to represent the accused and in some other cases he has issued warrant. I am constrained to observe that this was a negation of justice. It behoves me therefore to emphasise the liberality built in the Sections enumerated above enabling the Magistrate to extend their benefits to the accused appearing before them and to avoid unnecessary harassment. I therefore hold that in all trivial and technical cases where the accused are ladies, old and sickly persons workers in factories, daily wage earners, other labourers and busy business people or industrialists Courts should invariably exercise discretion liberally to exempt such persons from personal attendance. 25. It is therefore clear with reference to the authorities cited by me above that this Court can in revision exempt the personal attendance of the accused in cases pending before the lower Court or direct the lower Court to grant exemption from personal attendance of the accused before them, where such Courts have refused to do so. 25. It is therefore clear with reference to the authorities cited by me above that this Court can in revision exempt the personal attendance of the accused in cases pending before the lower Court or direct the lower Court to grant exemption from personal attendance of the accused before them, where such Courts have refused to do so. I think in these cases the better procedure to be adopted is to direct the lower Court to exempt the personal appearance of the accused in the cases from which these revision petitions have arisen.” (Section 205 of the Code of Criminal Procedure old Act corresponding to New Act 205 of the Code of Criminal Procedure) (Section 540-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure old Act corresponding to New Act 317 of the Code of Criminal Procedure) 12. It is observed by the Honourable Kerala High Court in Noorjahan v. T.T. Moideen and Others (supra) at paragraph Nos. 7 and 8 of the decision observed as follows: “7. ..... It is now to consider whether a uniform procedure need be followed by the Court in all the above situations and direct the personal attendance of the accused or the counsel can be permitted to make the plea of the accused in all or any of such situations. That too when Sections 205 and 317 permit the Court to dispense with the personal attendance of the accused, and Section 253 specifically permitting the counsel to make a plea of ‘guilty’ in petty cases. A consideration of Section 253 would reveal that the Court can accept the plea and convict and impose a sentence on the accused where the pleader is authorised by the accused in this behalf makes the plea of guilty (emphasis given). The above provision would indicate that whenever the accused wants to make a plea through the counsel, the counsel has to be specifically authorised by the accused in that behalf. If a counsel has to be specifically authorised in that behalf, such authorisation should disclose whether the accused intends to plead ‘guilty’ or ‘not guilty’. The above provision would indicate that whenever the accused wants to make a plea through the counsel, the counsel has to be specifically authorised by the accused in that behalf. If a counsel has to be specifically authorised in that behalf, such authorisation should disclose whether the accused intends to plead ‘guilty’ or ‘not guilty’. The Bombay High Court in Dorabshah Bomanji Dubash v. Emperor, AIR 1926 Bom 218 : ( 1926 (2) Cri LJ 440 ), while considering the question whether the estate manager of the accused can be treated as a pleader authorised by the accused to represent him, held that whenever there is a deviation from the general law, and it is allowed, there should be something on record to show that the person who represents the accused has been duly appointed by him for that purpose. There it was further held that where the Court dispenses with the personal attendance of an accused under Section 205 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the Court should note upon the record that permission under Section 205 had been granted and also that the Court can act upon the plea of the counsel in cases falling under Sections 242 and 243 Cr.P.C (summons cases). 8. S.R. Jhunjhunwalla v. B.N. Poddar, 1988 Cri LJ 51 the Calcutta High Court held: Section 205 is a general provision from the scope of which Section 251 has not been excepted. Therefore, when in a summons case the accused has been exempted from personal attendance and permitted to appear by his pleader under Section 205, the pleader can take the plea of guilty or not guilty in the examination under Section 251. The presence of the accused is not an absolute necessity while being examined under Section 251 and pleading guilty or not guilty. No doubt, the Magistrate has a discretion under Section 205(2) to require the personal appearance of the accused but that discretion must be exercised judicially. When the Magistrate has exempted the accused from appearing before him during the trial, he must indicate reasons why such exemption was being withheld. No doubt, the Magistrate has a discretion under Section 205(2) to require the personal appearance of the accused but that discretion must be exercised judicially. When the Magistrate has exempted the accused from appearing before him during the trial, he must indicate reasons why such exemption was being withheld. Where the discretion of the Magistrate requiring the personal attendance of the accused for being examined under Section 251 was founded on a wrong view of law that the presence of the accused was an absolute necessity while being examined under Section 251, the order of the Magistrate requiring the presence of the accused is bad. Under Section 313(1)(b) proviso also the Court can dispense with the examination of any person whose personal attendance has been dispensed with by it. This also indicates that in taking the plea of guilty or not guilty under Section 251 an accused can be examined in his absence through his pleader who is representing him under Section 205. The same view was taken by the Delhi High Court in S. Nihal Singh v. Arjan Das, 1985 Cri LJ 467. There it was further held: “It cannot be said that if Section 251 is read in conjunction with Section 252 the plea of the substance of accusation has only to be recorded on the personal appearance of the accused. Section 252 simply lays down that if the accused pleads guilty, the Magistrate shall record the plea as nearly as possible in the words used by the accused and may, in his discretion, convict him thereon. Evidently this Section has no bearing on the question whether the personal appearance of the accused is imperative when substance of accusation is to be read under Section 251. It would in other words, mean that the word “accused” in Sections 251 and 252 is not limited to the person of the accused but may include a pleader where he is permitted by the Court to appear through him”. I am in full agreement with the above view taken by the Calcutta and Delhi High Courts. The above decisions would make it clear that in summons cases when the personal attendance of the accused is exempted under Section 205 Cr.P.C the plea of the counsel can be taken for and on behalf of the accused even if the plea is one of guilty.” 13. The above decisions would make it clear that in summons cases when the personal attendance of the accused is exempted under Section 205 Cr.P.C the plea of the counsel can be taken for and on behalf of the accused even if the plea is one of guilty.” 13. From all the above decisions, now it is made clear that though in the Section 251 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the words that ‘the accused appears’ are mentioned, it is permissible for the Court to dispense with the personal appearance of the accused under Section 205 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and to record the plea of the accused under Section 252 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, through the counsel for the accused. There is no illegality, if the learned Magistrate records the plea of guilty of the accused through his counsel in cases where offences are punishable only with fine and not with sentence of imprisonment. At the same time, it does not mean, it is mandate, or the Court is bound to accept the plea of the accused for guilty or not guilty through his counsel. It is purely within the discretion of the Court. 14. As observed by the Kerala High Court in Helen Rubber Industries Kottayam and Others v. State of Kerala and Others (supra), it is open to the learned Magistrate in summons and summary trial cases in trival and technical cases where the accused are ladies, old and sickly persons workers in factories, daily wage earners, other labourers and busy business people of industrialists Courts to exercise discretion liberally to exempt such persons from personal appearance and may record that plea through his counsel. 15. In this particular case, the Petitioner is aged about 69 years and he is suffering from heart disease and he is also residence of Hyderabad. 16. Considering all these facts, the order passed by the learned Magistrate in Cr. M.P. Nos. 6543 of 2012, 6545 of 2012 and 6547 of 2012 respectively are set aside and the learned Magistrate is directed to exempt the personal attendance of the Petitioner in these cases and to permit him to make his plea through his counsel. 17. With the above observations, these criminal original petitions are allowed. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Petitions are closed. Petition allowed.