JUDGMENT Mr. Tejinder Singh Dhindsa, J.: - The Municipal Committee, Pataudi is in second appeal before this Court against the judgments and decrees of the Courts below whereby the suit filed by the plaintiff-respondents for permanent injunction stands decreed. 2. The plaintiffs filed a suit pleading that they were residing in their house situated in rect. No.87 killa No.24 within the municipal limits of Pataudi for the last more than 25 years and the same was marked by letters ‘EFGH’ in the site plan attached to the killa No.21/1 of rect.No.88 had been reserved for public purpose and had always been used by the inhabitants of village Pataudi including the plaintiff as a thoroughfare and for the ingress and egress to their house for the last more than 30 years. It was pleaded that there was no passage for the house of the plaintiff leading upto the main passage. There had been no interference from any quarter regarding the usage of passage and thereafter, the plaintiff had acquired the right of easement by way of prescription as well as by way of necessity. The passage in question was 3 karams wide and upon the defendant-Municipal Committee, Pataudi threatening to block the same, the suit for permanent injunction had been instituted. 3. Defendant-Municipal Committee filed a written statement taking the preliminary objection of the suit being barred in terms of Section 52 of the Haryana Municipal Act, 1973 (hereinafter referred as ‘’the 1973 Act’’). It was pleaded that the Committee was the owner of the disputed passage shown in letters ‘ABCD’ and the plaintiff had no right to use the same. It was further stated that even if there was no other passage for the use of the plaintiffs as regards ingress and egress from their house, then the matter should have been raised before the consolidation authorities. 4. Upon the pleadings of the parties, the trial Court struck the following issues: ‘’1. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for relief of permanent injunction on the grounds as alleged? OPP 2. Whether suit of the plaintiff is not maintainable in its present form? OPD 3. Relief.’’ 5. 4. Upon the pleadings of the parties, the trial Court struck the following issues: ‘’1. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for relief of permanent injunction on the grounds as alleged? OPP 2. Whether suit of the plaintiff is not maintainable in its present form? OPD 3. Relief.’’ 5. The trial Court having heard respective counsel and having scanned the evidence adduced on record, decreed the suit filed by the plaintiffs and restrained the defendant-Municipal Committee from causing any hindrance in the ingress and egress of the plaintiffs to their house marked ‘EFGH’ through the passage ‘ABCD’ which, in turn, led to the main thoroughfare. A civil appeal preferred by the defendant-appellant-Municipal passed by the District Judge, Gurgaon. 6. I have heard respective counsel for the parties and have perused the case file minutely. 7. Mr. J.S. Cooner, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, vehemently contended the plaintiff-respondents having purchased the plot upon which their house was constructed in rect.No.87 killa No.24 after the consolidation proceedings and being fully aware that there was no regular passage leading up to their house they could not have laid any claim of passage through the land vested under the ownership of the appellant-Municipal Committee. Learned counsel would further contend that the suit filed by the plaintiff-respondents was itself not maintainable as the mandatory notice in terms of requirement under Section 52 of the 1973 Act had not been discharged. 8. On the other hand, Mr. Amit Jain, learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff-respondents would submit that the judgments and decrees of both the Courts below are well reasoned and based on due appreciation of evidence and as such, do not warrant any interference. 9. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the submission advanced by the respective counsel and find that the present second appeal must fail on the reasons recorded hereinafter. 10. The concurrent findings of fact have been recorded by the Courts below to the effect that the passage as depicted by letters ‘ABCD’ has been used by the plaintiff-respondents for the last more than 30 years for the ingress and egress to their house and it has also been recorded that except for the disputed passage, there is no other passage leading to their house. While recording such findings, plaintiff-Ved Parkash had himself appeared in the witness box as PW4 and had also examined the other inhabitants of village, namely, Jagdish Chander and Mahipal Singh as PW2 and PW3 respectively, who had testified to the same effect. The ask shijra, Exhibit DW2, had been duly placed on record by the Municipal Committee and the Courts below have seen that it was clear therefrom that apart from the passage in question, there was no other passage from the land comprising in killa No.24, rect. No.87 i.e. the land owned by the plaintiff-respondents upon which they have constructed their house leading out to the main passage. I find no infirmity in the findings recorded by the Courts below holding the plaintiff-respondents entitled to the right of easement as regards the passage in question by way of prescription as also by way of necessity. 11. There is no merit in the submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant that a prior notice was necessary to institute a suit for injunction in the light of Section 52 of the 1973 Act. Section 52 of the 1973 Act reads as under: ‘’52. Suits against committee and its employee.— No suit shall be instituted against a committee, or against any employee of a committee, in respect of any act purporting to be done in its or his official capacity, until the expiration of one month next after notice in writing has been, in the case of a committee, delivered or left at its office, and in the case of an employee, delivered to him or left at his office or place of abode, stating the cause of action and the name and place of abode of the intending plaintiff; and the plaint must contain a statement that such notice has been so delivered or left: Provided that nothing in this section shall apply to any suit instituted under Section 38 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963.’’ 12. A bare reading of the Section itself would make it apparent that there is no requirement for serving of an advance notice for filing of a suit for permanent injunction. 13. The present second appeal does not raise any question of law, much less a substantial question of law. 14. The present second appeal is, accordingly, dismissed. 15. Appeal dismissed. ---------0.B.S.0------------